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IINTRODUCTION
The connection between Marx, Hegel and methodology is a well 
established one. I t  was however in many ways 'resurrected ' in 
the wake of Engels' characterisation o f the re la tio n sh ip , where 
there was made to  appear a f in a l i t y  in the demise o f c la ss ica l 
German philosophy and the standing o f Hegel 'on his f e e t ' .  The 
Pheonix which Engels claimed had arisen was variously described 
as "the m a te ria lis t world-outlook", "the m a te ria lis t standpoint" 
and "the m a te ria lis t conception o f h is to ry " . However expressed, 
th is  represented a censorious a ttitu d e  to  a l l  manner o f 'specu la tions ' 
in the realm o f methodology and acclaimed a body o f 'la w s ', or 
m e tasc ien tific  propositions such tha t a l l  sciences, natura l and 
so c ia l, deal u ltim a te ly  w ith the same ob ject, v iz , 'm atter in 
motion':. Engels' strongly 'm a te r ia lis t ' methodology was inherited  
p r in c ip a lly  by both the Second and Third In te rna tiona ls , blending 
w ith neo-Kantianism in the former and Feuerbachian dualism in the 
la t te r ,  w ith i ts  tenet o f two global trends, materialism  and 
idealism , and where these were d iam e trica lly  opposed. I f  
methodological tenets, as they undoubtedly do, underlie forms o f 
p o l i t ic a l and social p ractice , then th is  determ in ist and p o s it iv is t  
in te rp re ta tio n  o f Marx's en tire  method with i t s  emphasis upon 
unalterable stages of h is to r ic a l development, driven by a seemingly 
autonomous 'base', and of the s u ita b i l i ty  o f the methodological 
model o f the natural sciences fo r  understanding these stages, 
produces a kind of p o lit ic a l quietism. The active  subject has
I I
been le f t  out o f account sinee there is  no longer considered to  
be any need fo r  the active in te rven tion  in the h is to r ic a l process. 
There is  no requirement to  consciously shape h is to ry , and re a li ty  
i t s e l f ,  h is to r ic a l re a li ty ,  is  always simply ‘ presupposed1 as 
given, never 'pos ited ' by a creative  subject. Kant's so- 
ca lled  'm ateria lism ' is lauded to  the present day in ce rta in
quarters where i t  is  said to  e x is t in the ir re d u c ib i l i ty  he
extended to  the 'o b je c tive ' in - i t s e l f ,  and in his dictum th a t 
existence cannot be a predicate. But socia l existence and 
socia l 'o b je c t iv ity ' are’ p recise ly predicated upon forms o f socia l 
p rac tice , are brought about by socia l labour as the active  sub ject. 
Therefore w hat.th is  'm a te r ia lis t ' methodology misses out is  the
creation o f 'o b je c t iv ity ' and therefore the p o s s ib il ity  o f po s iting
/
th is  'o b je c t iv ity ' in accordance w ith a consciously premeditated 
plan. The creation of the object by the subject, the bring ing
of the object about, is  Hegel's centra l message, which however is
buried w ith him and not properly 'transcended' in Engels' v i l i f ic a t io n  
o f a l l  forms o f " id e a lis t  c ro tchets".
The 're su rre c tio n ' re ferred to  above may be said to  o rig in a te  in 
the 1920's in the works o f Lukacs and Korsch, who themselves thereby 
founded a kind o f 't r a d it io n ' in what has become known as "Western 
Marxism". This, in the words o f Russell Jacoby:
" . . . . s h i f te d  the emphasis o f Marxism from p o lit ic a l 
economy and the state to  cu ltu re , philosophy and a r t " .
I l l
Although generally accepted, th is  typology, w ith i ts  emphasis 
upon ‘ occidentalism 1 and i t s  eschewing of p o l it ic a l economy, leaves 
out o f account such as Isaak I l l i c h  Rubin (1886-193?) who was 
Russian and w ith a decided methodological preference fo r  Marx's 
p o lit ic a l economy. Further, the reason fo r  the uncerta inty 
attaching to  the precise date o f Rubin's death has to  do w ith 
the fa c t tha t he 'disappeared' from the land o f the liv in g  in 
tie.' early 1930' s , having been accused by the soviet au th o ritie s  o f 
"Menshevising Idealism" and "Hegelianism". In terms o f his 
Hegelian emphasis alone, Rubin stands in somewhat the same re la tio n  
to  the Third In te rna tiona l as Lukacs and Korsch stood to  the Second.
I t  is Rubin's attempt to  combine Hegel's d ia le c tic a l method w ith 
Marx's p o l it ic a l economy th a t is  the example th a t is  followed here.
I t  is  therefore considered th a t i t  makes l i t t l e  sense to  separate 
p o lit ic a l economy from philosophy as Jacoby does, but ra the r to  
advocate and at least attempt, th e ir  synthesis.
The application to  the subject matter o f p o lit ic a l,  economy o f what 
Marx called Hegel's 'manner o f working' w i l l  be i l lu s tra te d  in 
what fo llow s p r in c ip a lly  by contrasting i t  to  the treatment o f 
the subject matter o f p o lit ic a l economy in the absence o f Hegel's 
'manner o f w orking '. That Engels, and the 'h is to r ic a l transfo rm ation ' 
thesis tha t he o rig ina ted , should be the p rin c ip a l representative 
of th is  la t te r  procedure raises important questions w ith respect 
to  succeeding methodological practices w ith in  the Marxist canon 
i t s e l f .  Therefore Engels and his 'th e s is ' are treated f i r s t  in 
Chapter 1, where his response to  the c r i t ic s  of the th ird  volume of
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Capital is  treated as decisive fo r  fu r th e r developments.
Chapter 2 traces one o f the contemporary consequences o f 
fo llow ing  Engels1 example o f tre a tin g  the substance of value 
as simply labour, labour as such, w ith no fu rth e r q u a lif ic a t io n .
I t  w i l l  be shown th a t th is  view does nothing at a l l  to  d ispel 
an 'embodied labouT1 theory o f value, on the contrary, i t s  whole 
emphasis suggests the substance o f value is  a 'p h y s io lo g ic a lly 1 
presupposed substance, and not one th a t is  posited by a sp e c ific  
socia l form o f labour or a sp e c ific  form of socia l labour. A 
d e fin ite  or spe c ific  form o f labour cannot be developed out of 
'labou r' as such* because i t  is  not contained w ith in  i t ,  i t  is  
an 'abs trac t u n ive rsa l'., whose very conceptual id e n tity  is  based 
upon the negation o f de fin iteness.
The question o f contrasting methodologies is  therefore present 
throughout what fo llows and may be said to  culminate in Chapter 
3 when one o f the f r u i t s  o f a non-Hegelian methodology - the 
'transform ation problem' - is  treated as being symptomatic o f 
ju s t th is  fa i lu re  to  properly come to  terms w ith the methodological 
re la tion sh ip  between Marx and Hegel.
1CHAPTER ONE 
ENGELS AND ABSTRACT LABOUR:
THE METHODOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO THE 'HISTORICAL' PROBLEM.
"....M a rx  had to  f in d  out what value was  He
analysed labour's value-producing property and was 
the f i r s t  to  ascertain what labour i t  was th a t 
produced value, and why and how i t  did so. He 
found th a t value was nothing but congealed labour 
o f th is  k ind ". ‘ Engels, 1977; p .16)
Engels says everything and nothing. Apart from c re d itin g  Marx 
w ith i ts  discovery, ne ither here nor anywhere else does he say 
what abstract labour ac tua lly  is .  This fa c t ,  by i t s e l f ,  may 
serve as a reminder o f the d i f f ic u l t y  tha t ex is ts  in attempting 
to  convey the meaning of abstract labour through d e f in it io n  alone.
For example, Marx defines abstract labour as the ‘ substance’ o f 
value, but the term substance can be given a more or less ‘ n a tu ra l is t ic ’ 
or a more or less ‘metaphysical’ reading according to the p a rt ic u la r  
author's understanding of Marx's labour theory o f value. In 
th is  connection the very vacuity of Engels' statement is  s ig n if ic a n t 
since i t  allows and remains compatible w ith the inse rtion  o f e ith e r 
of the above meanings.
I t  is  d iffe re n t however when we come to  the actual treatment 
of the categories. Here the concept o f abstract labour th a t is  
held by a p a rtic u la r w r ite r is  revealed whether or not abstract 
labour has been defined beforehand and whether or not the concept 
has been expressly addressed. This is  a consequence o f the 
fundamental methodological s ign ificance o f the concept as the basis 
of Marx's theory o f value.
2I t  must be o f consequence fo r  th is  theory o f value and fo r  the 
understanding o f what have become its  various 't ra d it io n s ' to  
know what Engels' understanding o f th is  fundamental category 
ac tu a lly  was, and the manner in which he communicated i t .  In 
th is  regard Engels himself may be said to  have founded a 't r a d it io n ' 
since his views and th e ir  influence are apparent among many 
European pro- and an ti-M a rx is ts , as w ell as in the systematization 
of Soviet 'd ia le c t ic s '.
Since however, i t  is  upon the comprehension o f the category 
'abstract labour' th a t a l l  understanding o f the facts  depends, 
then the th e o re tica l rigou r o f any tra d it io n  must be assessed 
in re la tio n  to  i t s  grasp o f the precise nature o f the substance 
of value.
Engels' most comprehensive statement on the nature o f value and 
i ts  substance is  contained in the Supplement he provided to  
Capital Vol. 3, and published in  1895. This appears one year 
before the pub lica tion  o f Bohm-Bawerk's c r it iq u e  o f Marx's 
e n tire  methodological 'system '. Hence Engels had no opportun ity 
to  rep ly d ire c t ly  to  th is  c r it ic is m , having died ju s t sh o rtly  
before i t s  appearance. What form th is  rep ly  may have taken can 
best be estimated from what ex is ts  in the 1895 Supplement since 
th is  is  i t s e l f  the response to  c r it ic is m  o f Marx's transform ation 
procedure employed in Capital Vol. 3 and leve lled  by Werner Sombart 
and Conrad Schmidt.
3Both Sombart and Schmidt addressed themselves to  the conceptual 
status o f the category .'va lue1 and the manner of i ts  d e riva tio n . 
Their conclusions, and Engels' response to  them, inaugurates 
what has become known as the 'h is to r ic a l transformation problem'.
Although both Sombart and Schmidt were sympathetic to  Marx, th is  
did not stop them from being the f i r s t  to  ra ise the issue o f the 
apparent 'co n tra d ic tio n ' between the value - accounting procedure 
employed in Capital Vol. 1, and the exchange of commodities at 
'p rices o f p roduction ', which deviated from labour-values, and 
employed in Capital Vol. 3. The fa c t tha t in the 're a l ' world 
commodities did not exchange according to  th e ir  labour-values led 
both Sombart and Schmidt to  conclude tha t value was somehow 
'un rea l' -  a.purely 'lo g ic a l ' category. In th is  manner what was 
seen as the discrepancy between volumes 1 and 3 of Capital came to  
be considered as the re fle c tio n  o f the g u lf tha t separated theory 
and re a li ty  or between Marx's method and the ac tua lly  ex is tin g  
subject to  which th a t method was applied.
Bohm-Bawerk him self quotes Sombart to  the e ffe c t:
" . . . t h a t  the Marxian law o f value is fa lse  i f  i t  claims 
to  be in harmony w ith experience... i t  never comes to  
evidence anywhere.... I f  we want to  sum up the 
cha rac te ris tics  o f Marx's value, we would say tha t 
his value is  a fa c t not o f experience but of thought". 
(Bohm-Bawerk, 1949; p .102)
4Schmidt too claims the law of value to  be:
a pure, although th e o re tic a lly  necessary, 
f ic t io n " .  (Marx, 1984; p .895)
Bohm-Bawerk takes much of th is  on board saying:
"Now Marx, instead of proving h is thesis from 
experience.. . . .pre fers another lin e  o f evidence - 
the method o f a purely log ica l p roo f".
(o p .c it .  p. 68)
However, being less enamoured o f Marx than e ith e r Sombart or 
Schmidt, Bohm-Bawerk la te r  q u a lif ie s  the 'p u r i t y 1 o f the log ic  
which he lrad ascribed to  Marx, saying:
" . . . . i t  is  a pretentious incursion in to  the domain 
o f the a c tu a l", ( ib id , p .112)
In the face o f th is  type o f c r it ic is m  Engels chooses to  attempt 
to  v ind ica te  the theory o f value by i l lu s t ra t in g  its  'harmony w ith 
experience'. I f  the attacks o f the c r i t ic s  are directed 
against the lack o f purely em pirical evidence fo r  Marx's theory 
o f value, then Engels-sees i t  as his task to  provide i t .  However, 
th is  evidence is  not gleaned from the experience of 'modern bourgeouis 
s o c ie ty ', but from the period o f 'simple commodity p roduction '.
He seeks to  i l lu s t ra te  the workings o f the law o f value in  i t s  
p u rity  and before i t  is  'm odified ' by cap ita lism  and the ensuing 
'p rices o f p roduction '.
5What the 'lo g ic a l ' charge against Marx amounts to  is  th a t the 
methodology employed in Capital Vol. 1 does not tra n s fe r to  
Capital Vol. 3. Engels sees i t  as his task to  remedy th is .
His understanding o f th is  methodology thus becomes c ru c ia l, the 
more so since i t  w i l l  be accepted by many la te r  c r i t ic s  as the 
'standard' or 't r a d it io n a l ' Marxist response, tha t is ,  as a 
demonstration o f what value and its  substance are and how these 
concepts should be handled.
As indicated above, i t  is  the pub lica tion  o f Capital Vol. 3 in 
the mid-1890's and Engels' response to  the c r it ic is m  th is  insp ired 
which founded, along w ith so much else, the 'h is to r ic a l transform ation 
problem '.
However, i t  seems th a t what comprises th is  question is  only a 
'problem' fo r  those whom, lik e  Engels, seek to  estab lish the 
existence o f a period in h is to ry  when the exchange of commodities 
was regulated by labour-value, i .e .  in accordance w ith the amount 
o f abstract human labour they embodied. As Morishima and 
Catephores express i t :
"Crucia l in a l l  formulations of the 'h is to r ic a l 
transformation problem' is  the assumption of the 
existence o f an epoch o f simple commodity p ro du c tion ... 
in which values approximated to the exchange ra tio s  o f 
commodities. Since under cap ita lism  such ra tio s  no 
longer conform to  the labour content o f goods, there 
must have been a period o f h is to r ic a l transform ation 
from the value to  the price  regime, when p re -c a p ita lis t 
economic formations were succeeded by cap ita lism ".
(1975, p .31)
6I t  is considered to  be less o f a problem fo r  those, l ik e  the 
c r i t ic s  o f the 1890*5, simply deny the empirical evidence fo r  
the existence o f a 1value-epoch' aware in a way th a t Engels was 
not th a t Marx addressed his analysis o f value to  the e x is tin g  
re a li ty  o f cap ita lism  and not to  a hypothetical 'simple commodity 
economy'. As Bohm-Bawerk expressed i t :
" . . . .  i f  Marx thought th a t he could f in d  a re c o n c ilia tio n  
in the view th a t one proposition applied to  p r im itiv e  
conditions and the other to  developed modern socie ty, 
we must po int out to  him th a t in the f i r s t  chapter in 
his work he did not deduce his theory tha t value was 
wholly labour from a 'Robinsonade' but from the 
conditions o f a society where 'a c a p ita lis t  mode o f 
production p re va ils ". (o p .c it .  p .99)
Engels' response to  this- would no doubt have been to  po in t out 
tha t Marx's law o f value was o lder than the c a p ita lis t  mode of 
production, th a t i t  're f le c te d ' the h is to r ic a l course o f the 
evo lution o f value up to  the advent o f c a p ita lis t  soc ie ty .
That the value which pre-exists cap ita lism , and whose existence 
Engels w i l l  evidence is  the necessary h is to r ic a l precondition 
fo r  the formation o f the 'p rices o f production' and whose very 
existence depends upon the 'm o d ifica tio n ' o f th is  p r io r  e x is tin g  
'v a lu e '. Thus value would have to  be considered as forming an
h is to r ic a l continuum which pers is ts through change. Indeed th is
is already the substance o f Engels' rep ly to  the present c r i t ic s
as when he says o f them th a t:
7"Sombart as well as Schmidt does not make
s u ff ic ie n t allowance fo r  the fa c t tha t we are 
dealing here not w ith a purely log ica l process but 
w ith a h is to r ic a l process and its  explanatory 
re fle c tio n  in thought, the log ica l pursuance o f i t s  
inner connections". (Marx, 1984; p .895)
I t  is  worth noting here tha t tw en ty-five  years e a r lie r ,  in his 
review o f Marx’ s * C on tribu tion1 (1859), Engels gives a s im ila r 
emphasis in his account o f the derivation of the concept o f value::.
"The log ica l method o f approach was therefore the only 
su itab le  one. This however, is  indeed nothing but 
the h is to r ic a l m ethod ..... The po int where th is  
h is to ry  begins must also be the s ta rtin g  point o f 
the tra in  o f thought, and i t s  fu rth e r progress w i l l
be simply the re fle c tio n , in abstract and th e o re tic a lly
consistent form, o f the h is to r ic a l course. Though the 
re fle c tio n  is corrected, i t  is  corrected in accordance 
w ith  the laws provided by the actual h is to r ic a l 
course". (Marx, 1981b; p. 225-6)
A quarter o f a cen tury. la te r  "the s ta rtin g  po int fo r  the tra in
of thought" w i l l  have become "the begining of exchange which
transforms products in to  commodities". In th is  regard too ,
Engels' view shows a remarkable degree of co n tinu ity  over the 
years w ith regard to  the deriva tion  o f the law o f value and the 
po in t o f departure fo r  the methodological inq u iry . He concludes 
the passage from the 1859 review as fo llow s:
"With th is  method we begin w ith the f i r s t  and 
simple re la tio n  which is  h is to r ic a lly  ac tua lly  
a v a ila b le . . . .  w ith the f i r s t  re la tio n  to  be
8fo u n d .... an actual event which re a lly  took place 
one time or other",, ( ib id )
What Engels has ju s t sketched over th is  quarter-century period 
is  the th e o re tica l de lineation o f 'the  m a te ria lis t conception o f 
h is to ry 1., which phrase f i r s t  sees the l ig h t  o f day in the 1859
te x t from which we have ju s t quoted. The elaboration o f th is
methodological s ta rtin g  po int in the 1895 Supplement, coupled 
w ith Engels' conviction th a t he is  o u tlin in g  the perimeters o f
"the Marxian law o f value", openly suggests, and often has been
taken to  mean, th a t Marx's s ta rtin g  po in t and th a t being ou tlined 
by Engels are one and the same. Engels defines the po in t o f 
departure and the scope of the 'h is to r ic a l ' method when he 
ind icates the duration of the law of value:
the Marxian law o f value holds g e n e ra lly ... .
fo r  the whole period o f simple commodity
production, up to  the time when the la t te r  suffers 
a m odification through the appearance o f the 
c a p ita lis t  mode of production-.... the Marxian ~;
law o f value has general economic v a l id i ty  fo r  
a period las tin g  from the beginning o f exchange 
which transforms products in to  com m odities.... down 
to  the 15th c e n tu ry .... But the exchange of
commodities dates from a time before a l l  w ritte n
h is to ry ,; . . .  Thus the law o f value has prevailed 
during a period of from f iv e  to  seven thousand 
years". (Marx, 1984; p .889-900)
This is  the manner in which Engels attempts to  provide em pirical 
evidence fo r  the existence of value and thus re -un ite  theory and 
re a li ty ,  deemed not to  correspond by Marx's c r i t ic s .  Evidence fo r
9the existence of a period of 'simple commodity production' thus 
becomes, simultaneously, evidence fo r  the re a li ty  of value and 
before i t  is 'm odified ' by the advent o f cap ita lism . In terms 
of the so-called 'c o n tra d ic tio n ' between Volumes 1 and 3 of 
Capital Engels resolves th is  by imputing th a t the period o f 
simple commodity production coincides w ith the analysis conducted 
in Capital Vol. 1, and tha t the 'm o d ifica tio n ' o f th is  h is to r ic a l 
period by cap ita lism  forms the basis fo r  Capital Vol. 3. This 
id e n tif ic a t io n  o f the evolution o f value and the actual h is to r ic a l 
course - and o f th is  la t te r  w ith the volumes of C ap ita l, - is  
best i l lu s tra te d  by Engels use o f the term 'r e f le c t io n ',  considered 
in terms o f 'correspondence';, and in his proposition th a t the 
s ta rtin g  po in t fo r  the analysis o f value is  "the f i r s t  and simple 
re la tio n  which is  h is to r ic a lly  ac tua lly  ava ilab le ".
Engels' choice o f s ta rtin g  po in t fo r  the study o f value and i ts  
changes is  in sharp contrast to  Marx's, which is  contained in 
the 1857 Introduction.. Here Marx says:
"In  the succession o f the economic categories, as 
in any other h is to r ic a l socia l science, i t  must not 
be forgotten th a t th e ir  subject - here, modern bourgeouis 
society - is  always what is  given, in the head as 
well as in r e a li ty ,  and th a t these categories there fore  
express the forms of being, the cha rac te ris tics  o f 
existence, and often only ind iv idua l sides of th is  
sp e c ific  socie ty, th is  sub ject". (1981a; p .106)
10
And again:
in the th e o re tica l method too, the subject, 
socie ty, must always be kept in mind as the 
presupposition". ( ib id . )
A consideration o f these methodological s tr ic tu re s , and in the 
l ig h t  o f what Marx says elsewhere, leads to  the position  where 
the 'simple commodity economy' is  considered as a th e o re tica l 
abstraction of the fundamental va lu e -re la tion  between the 
producers in th is  spe c ific  soc ie ty ; When Marx says th a t the 
method reaches "low down" in the spheres o f abstraction and then
ascends to  the more "real and concrete", th is  does not describe
the h is to r ic a l process; as Marx says:
" . . . .  the method of r is in g  from the abstract to
the concrete is  only the way in which thought
appropriates the concrete, reproduces i t  as the
concrete in the mind. But th is  is  by no means
the process by which the concrete i t s e l f  comes -<»•
in to  being". (1981a; p. 101)
Engels wants to  show th a t the method o f r is in g  from the abstract 
to  the concrete p a ra lle ls  the h is to r ic a l course. Thus the 's im ple '
or ‘ abstract' becomes fo r  him "the whole period o f simple commodity
production" and the more "concrete" or more "combined" "the 
appearance of the c a p ita lis t  mode o f production". .
11
But un like  Engels, Marx makes the d is t in c tio n  between r e a l i ty ,  
or 'so c ia l being' and the method most su itab le  to  comprehend i t  
in thought. This d is tin c tio n  is  a cruc ia l one since the process 
of r is in g  from the abstract to  the concrete, or from the simple 
to  the combined, does not describe a h is to r ic a l process, but a 
ra tio n a l one. Marx himself defines the core of the method as 
'r a t io n a l ' .  . While the a ttitu d e  o f Engels suggests a kind o f 
the o re tica l pass iv ity  in the face of "the laws provided by the 
actual h is to r ic a l course". His resolve to  estab lish value as 
an em pirical fa c t forces him onto an h is to r ic a l te r ra in , where 
he imagines th is  existence can be v e r if ie d  in i ts  'p u r ity ' and 
thus p r io r  to  i ts  subsequent 'm o d ifica tio n ' by cap ita lism . To 
th is  end he seeks to demonstrate:
" . . . .  the s ign ificance of the law of value fo r  the 
economic stages of soc ie ty 's  development dominated 
by th is  law", (op. c i t .  p. 894)
This 'd is p e rtio n ' o f the law>iOf value among various and diverse 
"economic stages" is  tantamount to  inva lid a tin g  its  id e n tity  
as a category only of the most modern society * so th a t the only 
d e fin it io n  o f the law of value th a t can to le ra te  th is  expansion 
is  i t s  broadest d e fin it io n , i .e .  tha t the value o f a commodity 
is  determined by the amount of human labour necessary fo r  i t s  
production. This can be considered the broadest d e f in it io n , 
not only because i t  takes in Marx's c lass ica l predecessors as 
well as Marx him self, but also, and because o f th is ,  i t  f a i ls  
to  specify above 'human' the spec ific  social id e n tity  o f the
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labour which produces value. I t  is  labour generally, abstract 
human labour. I t  is  only by endowing the concept o f the 
substance of value, abstract labour, w ith an exclusive ly na tu ra l- 
human content th a t one is  able to  shu ttle  the concept o f value 
between various economic stages in the development o f socia l 
production. A ll tha t value can have in common between these 
various stages cannot therefore be any spe c ific  socia l determ ination. 
I t  must therefore be the common character th a t these various 
economic stages share in th a t, whatever the form of socia l 
re la tions  between the producers, th e ir  labours' are in each 
separate case esse n tia lly  a productive expenditure o f 'human 
nerves, muscles, brain e t c . ' .
There can therefore be l i t t l e  doubt th a t the search fo r  an h is to r ic a l 
and em pirical foundation fo r  value must needs lead Engels away 
from the c a p ita lis t  process o f production i t s e l f ,  where 'p rice s  
of production' are in evidence, and to  the h is to r ic a l process 
genera lly. He is thus forced to  forego the 're a l s ta rtin g  
p o in t ',  in his attempt to  counter the charge tha t value has a 
purely 'lo g ic a l ' s ta tus. However, as we have shown, Engels has 
placed himself on old ground here. The c e n tra lity  o f the 
h is to r ic a l process fo r  the the o re tica l method is  described in 
Ludwig Feuerbach, where i t  is  considered as the p o s itive  legacy 
of "the separation from Hegelian philosophy and the re turn  to  
the m a te ria lis t standpoint". Engel continues:
"'This means tha t i t  was resolved to  comprehend the real
world - nature and h is to ry  - ju s t as i t  presents i t s e l f . . . .
I t  was decided m e rc ille s ly  to  s a c r if ic e  every id e a lis t
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.c ro tche t which could not be brought in to  harmony
w ith the facts conceived on th e ir  own...........and
materialism means nothing more than th is " .
(1968, p .168)
What Engels sees as the bene fic ia l e ffe c t of the d isso lu tion  
o f the Hegelian system is  elaborated s t i l l  fu r th e r when he 
says th a t i t  also en ta iled :
" . . . . . t h a t  d ia le c tic s  reduced i t s e l f  to  the science 
o f the general laws of motion, both o f the external 
world and o f human thought - two sets o f laws which 
are ide n tica l in substance.....Thereby the d ia le c t ic  
o f concepts i t s e l f  became the conscious re fle x  of 
the d ia le c tic a l motion o f the real world and thus the 
d ia le c tic  o f Hegel was placed upon i t s  head; or 
ra ther turned o f f  i t s  head, on which i t  was standing 
and placed on i ts  feet"-. ( ib id .  p. 619)
The s itu a tio n  where "the d ia le c t ic  o f concepts" becomes "the 
conscious re fle x  of the d ia le t ic a l motion o f the real w orld ", 
may be considered as a restatement o f Engels' 1859 p o s itio n , 
already re ferred to , and where the h is to r ic a l po int o f departure 
"must also be the s ta rtin g  po in t o f the tra in  o f thought, and 
i t s  fu rth e r progress w i l l  simply be the re f le c t io n , in abstract 
and th e o re tic a lly  consistent form, o f the h is to r ic a l course".
(op. c i t . )  Hence i f  a proper understanding of value and i t s  
substance is  to  be "brought in to  harmony w ith the fac ts  conceived 
on th e ir  own". Engels recommends th a t we resolve "to  comprehend 
the real world - nature and h is to ry  - ju s t as i t  presents i t s e l f " .
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In th is  l ig h t  i t  would be methodologically unthinkable fo r  
Engels to  conceive o f the model o f th e . ' simple commodity economy' 
as designating anything but an actual state o f a f fa irs ,  or an 
economic 's tage ' in the h is to r ic a l process. In Engels' scheme 
of th ings , from where else but h is to ry  could i t  possibly derive?
Yet in sp ite  o f th is ,  and Engels' claim th a t the methodological 
p r io r i t ie s  he is  describing are "e sse n tia lly  connected w ith the 
name o f Marx", Marx himself nowhere id e n tif ie s  the methodological 
s ta rtin g  po int w ith 'the  f i r s t  and simple re la tio n  which is  
h is to r ic a lly  ac tu a lly  a v a ila b le '.
I t  is  the adoption o f th is  la t te r  po in t o f departure, and, in 
p a rt ic u la r , the subsequent entailment th a t the model o f the 'simple 
commodity economy' is  'h is to r ic a l ly ' "a c tu a lly  ava ila b le ", which 
involves the loss o f the spe c ific  socia l determination o f value 
which Marx's analysis uncovers. The attempt to  s h if t  the 
function ing o f the law o f value to  a p re -c a p ita lis t past forces 
the adoption o f a d e fin it io n  o f the substance or essence of 
value th a t is  compatible w ith th a t provided by Marx's c lass ica l 
predecessors. In th is  connection Engels w rites in the Supplement:
"The peasants o f the Middle Ages were themselves
w o rke rs .... what had they expended in making these 
products? Labour and labour alone: they spent 
nothing but th e ir  own labour-power; how then could 
they exchange these products o f th e irs  otherwise than 
in the ra t io  of the labour embodied in them", (op. c i t . )
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And a l i t t le  fu r th e r on he mentions again:
"the whole period of peasant natura l economy.... in 
which the exchanged quan tities  of commodities tend 
to  be measured more and more according to  the 
labour embodied in them", (op. c i t .  p. 898)
"Labour and labour alone" is  the closest Engels ever comes to  
defin ing the substance o f value. I t  is  'labour as such1, 
labour, w ith no fu rth e r q u a lif ic a t io n , human labour in general.
Nor does Engels ra d ic a lly  a lte r  th is  d e fin it io n  o f the substance 
> of value when he leaves the Middle Ages and proceed to  more 
recent times. We can see th a t Engels' d e f in it io n , and as he 
allows i t  to  stand, d if fe rs  not a t a l l  from Adam Smith's when 
the la t te r  w rites :
"Labour alone th e re fo re .. . .  is  the u ltim ate and real standard 
by which the value o f commodities can be estimated".
(1981b, p. 59)
And the d is tin c tio n  between appearance and essence appears at 
f i r s t  in Ricardo in the form o f a question; he asks:
"What is in re a lity  the foundation o f the exchangeable 
value of a l l  things?"
And Ricardo answers:
\
"The value o f a commodity or the quantity  of any other 
commodity fo r  which i t  w i l l  exchange, depends on the
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re la t iv e  quantity  of labour which is  necessary 
fo r  i ts  production". (1951, p .11)
I f  we can proceed to  estab lish prec ise ly  what i t  is  th a t 
d istinguishes Marx from his c lass ica l predecessors in terms of 
the 'substance' o f value, we sha ll be in a be tte r pos ition  to  
determine what i t  is  th a t d istinguishes Marx from Engels. I t  
w i l l  be argued tha t the essentia l ingredient here is given by 
Marx himself in his le t te r  to  Engels o f January 15th 1858, and 
where he informs Engels th a t " in  the manner o f working" he had 
been aided by Hegel's Logic which "by sheer good fortune" he had 
"leafed through".
We must now go on to  consider th is  'method o f working' in order 
to  i l lu s t ra te  the purely lim ited  character o f the conclusion 
th a t 'labour and labour alone1 is  the substance o f value. This 
treatment w i l l  also attempt to  demonstrate the unique character 
of Marx's concept o f ‘ abstract labour' and i ts  methodological 
s ign ificance fo r  the whole discussion.
U
Marx's notion of s c ie n t if ic  method as comprising two d is t in c t  
phases - conceptual analysis and conceptual synthesis - fo llow s 
Hegel's in the sense tha t what is  to  be considered 't ru e ' or 'r e a l ' 
can only be arrived a t, or 'worked-up', by a process of lo g ica l 
reasoning. Marx describes th is  dual movement as when:
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"Along the f i r s t  path the f u l l  conception was evaporated 
to  y ie ld  an abstract determ ination; along the second, 
the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction 
o f the concrete by way of thought". (1981a, p. 101)
In th is  manner re a lity  is  ‘ grasped1 or comprehended, because, 
in the movement ju s t described, 'a chaotic conception o f the 
whole' -  which was the s ta rtin g  po in t fo r  the analysis -  gives 
way to  the whole or re a lity  perceived as "a r ic h  to t a l i t y  o f 
many determinations and re la tio n s , "and which forms the culm ination
of the conceptual synthesis. But Marx is  carefu l to  po in t out
tha t external re a lity  i t s e l f  does not undergo any transform ation 
in th is ,  only tha t our manner o f conceiving o f i t  has a lte red . 
R eality i t s e l f  "re ta ins  i t s  autonomous existence outside the 
head, ju s t as before".
Ten years la te r  Marx describes the tw o-fo ld  movement o f the 
the o re tica l method in s l ig h t ly  d if fe re n t terms:
" . . . . .  the method o f presentation must d i f fe r  in form 
from tha t o f inq u iry . The la t te r  has to  appropriate
the m aterial in d e ta il,  to  analyse i ts  d if fe re n t forms
of development, to  trace out th e ir  inner connection.
Only a fte r th is  work has been done, can the actual 
movement be adequately described. I f  th is  is  done 
successfully, i f  the l i f e  o f the subject-m atter is  id e a lly  
re flec ted  as in a m irro r, then i t  may appear' as i f  we 
had before us a mere a p r io r i construction".
(1983, p. 28)
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We sha ll see la te r  tha t Marx’ s notion o f 'the  method o f presentation ' 
can be given an added dimension to  incorporate fu rth e r developments 
which however, do not a lte r  the s ign ificance o f the way in 
which i t  is  used here. The synthesis then, or the 'method of 
presentation ' is  not an 'a p r io r i '  construction fo r  the very 
reason th a t i t  is  governed in I ts  movement by the preceding 
analysis. This analysis is  i t s e l f  governed by em pirical data 
because i t  is  the analysis o f a d e fin ite  subject -  the o b je c tive ly  
ex is tin g  concrete to t a l i t y .  Thus the synthetic movement is  the 
reverse o f, and m irrors, the an a ly tica l movement o f 'descent' - 
i t  ascends the same path. In short, the d ia le c tic a l synthesis 
is  governed by the subject-m atter, here 'modern bourgeouis 
s o c ie ty '.
Marx's methodological d is tin c tio n s  between "moving a n a ly tic a lly "  
and 're tra c in g  the jou rne y ', and between the methods o f presentation 
and inq u iry , suggest a comparison w ith Hegel's d if fe re n tia t io n  
o f 'a n a ly t ic ' and 's yn th e tic ' cognition and the corresponding 
d is t in c tio n  o f 'Understanding' and 'Reason'. These tw in concepts 
are applied in the realm o f 'Essence', which comprises Book 11 
of his Science o f Logic. Here they operate when we wish to  
consider th ings as not simply 'g iv e n ', immediately, but as 
founded on an underlying basis. Hegel, describes i t  as:
"The point o f view given by Essence is in general the 
standpoint o f 'R e fle c tio n '. This word 're f le c t io n ' 
is  o r ig in a lly  applied when a ray o f l ig h t  in a s tra ig h t
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l in e  impinging on the surface o f a m irro r is  thrown 
back from i t .  In ^ th is  phenomena we have two things - 
f i r s t  an immediate fa c t which is ,  and the deputed, 
derivated or transm itted phase o f the same.
Something of th is  so rt takes place when we re f le c t 
or th in k  on an ob ject; fo r  here we want to  know 
the object not in i t s  immediacy, but as de riva tive  
or mediated". (1982; p .208)
The po in t o f view expressed by 'Essence' then is  th a t where we 
seek to  'ge t behind' what is  immediately presented to  us in the 
external appearance o f the object in order to  discover some 
underlying 'cause' which explains why things appear as they do. 
Yet th is  procedure only describes the f i r s t  movement of the 
method - from external re a li ty  to  the underlying essence. This 
s ing le movement corresponds to  th a t undertaken by the c lass ica l 
economists in th e ir  attempt to  estab lish the existence o f an 
inner substance or essence which would explain the 'va lue ' o f 
commodities. This is  the moevement o f analysis or o f the 
'Understanding', which tra ve ls  backwards or downwards, as i t  
were, in the attempt to  secure an abstract determination fo r  
the way things appear as they do. However, and as we have noted, 
what Marx describes as the " s c ie n t i f ic a l ly  correct method" 
demands a tw o-fo ld  movement from an e x is tin g  concrete subject 
to  i ts  abstract determinations and back again. So i f  we neglect 
the journey back, or the 'a sce n t', our method must be considered 
inadequate because incomplete. As Charles Taylor puts i t :
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"The one-sided view which takes in to  account only 
the movement to  'Essence1 from external re a li ty  is  
an account which takes the observed properties of 
th is  external re a lity  simply as given. Reflection 
is  exte rna l, sub jective, because i t  works on a datum 
which must simply be accepted, which cannot be seen
as in any way determined hence th is  re fle c tio n
not discovering any necessity in what i t  observes, 
must ju s t postulate an underlying re a li ty  which i t
cannot observe   Hence Hegel sees essence not
ju s t  as th a t which one gets to  from the external 
observable, which is  shown to  be non -se lf-subs is ting .
I t  is  also the underlying necessity which makes the 
observed what i t  is " .  (1975, p. 258, my emph.)
Hegel also contrasts the movement o f 'r e f le c t io n 1 from ob ject 
to  essence w ith the subsequent d ia le c tic a l synthesis in the 
fo llow ing  manner:
"D ia le c tic  is d iffe re n t from R eflection. In the f i r s t  
instance Reflection is  th a t movement out beyond the 
iso lated predicates o f a th ing  which gives i t  some 
reference and brings out i t s  r e la t iv i t y ,  while s t i l l  
in other respects leaving i t  in i t s  iso la ted v a l id i ty .  
But by D ia lec tic  is meant th a t indwelling tendency 
outwards by which the one-sidedness and lim ita tio n s  
o f the predicates o f 'Understanding' is  seen in i t s  
true  l ig h t  and shown to  be the negation o f them".
(1892, p. 147)
I t  is  obvious th a t when the analysis is  o r ig in a lly  undertaken 
we must simply presuppose the existence o f the subject o f our
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investiga tion  since i t  cannot yet be seen as 'caused1 or 
posited by something deeper. The whole po in t of the analysis 
is to  discover ju s t th is .  The question then arises as to  whether 
and to  what extent the conclusion reached in the ana ly tica l 
movement can a lte r  th is  state o f a f fa irs ,  i .e .  can change our 
conception o f re a li ty  so th a t i t  is  transformed from being simply 
presupposed to  being posited. In th is  connection the conclusion 
reached by Smith and Ricardo to  some extent fa i ls  because i t  does 
not ra d ic a lly  a lte r  our conception o f re a l i ty .  When th e ir  analysis 
is concluded, the ex is tin g  re la tion s  o f production are not then 
conceived as being .anything other than simply given in the form 
they had when the analysis was begun,. When i t  is  discovered 
tha t the essence o f value is  'la b o u r1, then th is  conclusion is  
compatible w ith , and leaves extant, the e x is tin g  socia l re la tio n s , 
since these are given a natural-human foundation in 'human labour 
in general' or simply 'la b o u r '. 'Labour1 as such, can only 
re fe r to  the na tura l-phys io log ica l homogeneity of a l l  o f the 
d iffe re n t kinds o f labour which together comprise the socia l 
“d iv is io n  o f labour. The'se^existing socia l re la tio n s  are tfius 
considered to  be true  and 'adequate' m anifestations o f th is  
essence and therefore do not require to  undergo any a lte ra tio n  
in the way in which they are presented to  us. Hence what was 
simply presupposed, remains so.
I t  is in the course of Marx's own analysis th a t the conclusion 
reached by the c lass ica l economists is  transcended and negated.
This overcoming o f the p r io r  pos ition  is  o f p ivo ta l s ign ificance
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fo r  Marx's analysis since i t  marks the po in t where analysis 
is  turned in to  synthesis. The re su lt o f the negation o f the 
e a r lie r  pos ition  is th a t the given subject is  no longer seen 
as simply presupposed, but as 'p o s ite d '. What was presupposed 
as 'ch a o tic ' now emerges as being 'pos ited ' by inner-necessity. 
What exactly is the nature o f th is  transcendence and negation 
which allows re a lity  to  emerge as 'comprehended' as opposed to  
being simply 'apprehended' as a p re -ex is ting  given? A clue to  
the answer was given e a r lie r  in the quotation from Taylor where, 
discussing the one-sided view th a t moves only from appearance 
to  essence, he says th a t th is  viewpoint 'does not discover any 
necessity in what i t  observes'. . Hegel re fers  to  the essence as 
"the underlying necessity which makes the observed what i t  is " .  
In th is  manner, in Marx's method, the ex is tin g  socia l re la tio n s  
of production are now seen as being deployed by an inner essence 
or necessity which posits them. As Hegel remarks:
"A na lytic  cogn ition   is  the immediate re la t io n . . .  to
the ob ject; id e n t i t y , the re fo re , is  the determination 
th a t i t  recognises as i ts  own, and ana ly tic  cognition 
is  merely the apprehension o f what j_s. Synthetic 
cognition aims at the comprehension o f what is_, th a t is , 
at grasping the m u lt ip l ic ity  o f determinations in th e ir  
u n ity . . .  Hence i t s  aim is  in general necessity. . .  Now 
synthetic cognition passes over,.,., from abstract id e n tity  
to  re la tio n " . (1968; p. 794)
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Hence when Marx says th a t:
"The concrete is  concrete because i t  is  the 
concentration o f many determ inations, hence un ity  
o f the diverse"* (1981a; p. 101)
then th is  un ity , th is  relatedness, is  provided by necessity. 
Things cohere as re la ted because they are manifestations o f 
re la tion s  th a t must transpire.. What renders the concrete 
'concrete in thought' is  the comprehension o f re a lity  as the 
adequate m anifestation o f inner necessity. In the f u l l  meaning 
of Essence then - which comprises both analysis and synthesis - 
Essence:
"___ must be understood not ju s t as a movement o f re f le c t io n
from the external which is  seen as given, and hence 
presupposed, to  a posited substrate; but also in a 
movement from the underlying necessity, which can 
thus be thought o f as 'p o s it in g ' the external observable". 
(Taylor, op. c i t .  p. 259)
The "chaotic conception o f the whole" has now f in a l ly  given way 
and is superseded by a coherent conception where the whole is  
seen as 'brought about'. In Hegelian terms, i t  is now seen as 
having a Reason fo r  i t s  ex is tin g  in the very manner th a t i t  does. 
In th is  way i t  is  'grasped' in i t s  essence, as opposed to  simply 
re flec ted  upon and accepted. This is  's c ie n t i f ic a l ly  co rre c t' 
and is precise ly what is  'ra t io n a l' in Hegel's method. Marx 
remarks o f the d ia le c t ic :
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"In  i ts  ra tio n a l form i t  is  a scandal and abomination to
bourgeouisdom  pecause i t  includes in i ts  comprehension
and a ffirm a tive  recognition o f the ex is tin g  state o f 
th in g s . . . .  the recognition o f the negation o f th a t stage". 
(1983; p. 26)
And one of the declared 'fr ie n d s ' o f the Hegelian d ia le c t ic  - 
Lenin - remarks when he is  considering "mans ever deeper 
cognition o f the ob jective  connection o f the w orld", th a t:
"Here is  where one should look fo r  the true  meaning, 
s ign ificance and ro le  o f Hegel's Logic. This N.B.
Marx applied Hegel's d ia le c tic s  in i t s  ra tio na l form 
to  p o l it ic a l economy". (C.W. Vol. 38, p. 178)
And when Marx speaks o f the 'a ff irm a tiv e  recogn ition ' o f the 
ex is tin g  state o f th ings he can only mean th a t we know the 
reason why th ings are deployed as they are; we comprehend 
the necessity of th is  deployment.
Before we go on to  discuss Marxes own notion of th is  reason 'why1, 
and therefore his own id e n tif ic a t io n  o f th a t inner necessity, 
we must f i r s t  consider in more d e ta il the conclusion o f Smith 
Ricardo and which Engels does not ra d ic a lly  d is tingu ish  from 
Marx's own.
We have shown e a r lie r  by the use o f quotations th a t 'la b o u r ', 
in general, or human labour considered in the abstract, is  
considered by Smith and Ricardo to  be the 'cause1 of 'v a lu e '.
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Marx does not overcome th is  conclusion simply by re fe rr in g  to  
the ' labour* discovered'by Smith and Ricardo to  be at the root 
of value, as 'abs trac t human lab o u r'. In some versions o f 
Marx's theory o f value the overcoming o f Ricardo by Marx is 
presented as though Ricardo did not have a name fo r  his disclosed 
'essence' apart from simply 'la b o u r '.  Marx's contribution is 
then seen to  consist o f having q u a lif ie d  th is  'labour' fu r th e r 
as 'human labour in the a b s tra c t '. But Ricardo him self tre a ts  
labour as 'a b s tra c tly  human' w ithout being aware of i t .  And 
were he informed o f th is  fa c t , and to ld  to  re fe r to  the substance 
of value in fu tu re  as 'abs trac t human labour' i t  would not transform 
his theory in to  Marx's.. As the la t te r  says o f the C lassical 
school o f p o l it ic a l economy:
" . . .  i t  has not the least idea th a t when the d iffe rence  
between the various kinds o f labour is  treated as 
purely quantita tive., th e ir  q u a lita t iv e  un ity  or 
e q ua lity , and therefore th e ir  reduction to  abstract 
human labour is im p lied". (1983; p. 84)
As was said above, i f  Ricardo were informed o f th is  im p lica tion  
i t  would be p e rfe c tly  compatible w ith the res t o f his theory i f  
he accepted the new designation., since 'abs trac t human labour' 
is  suscepitble to  purely qu a n tita tive  v a r ia tio n .
Both 'lab our' and 'abs trac t human labour' are id e n tica l because 
equally suited to  an 'embodied' labour theory o f value. And 
when Ricardo remarks th a t the 'va lue ' o f a commodity "depends 
upon the d i f f ic u l t y  or f a c i l i t y  o f production" i t  is  c lea r th a t
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th a t by 'va lue ' he understands 'magnitude of value' fo r  which 
preoccupation abstract Jhuman labour in general' is  id e a lly  
su ited . The same is  true of Smith. "Labour a lom " and 
'abs trac t human labour' re fe r to  the same physio logical 'substance' 
inso far as i t  can be measured as an 'in p u t ' at the po int of 
production, and tha t is a l l  tha t is  required to  cons titu te  an 
embodied labour theory o f value. The whole e d ific e  o f Ricardo's 
system rests upon an embodied labour theory of value and is  not 
overcome by changing the names o f i t s  constituents when they 
perform prec ise ly  the same function w ith in  th is  system.
What re a lly  d istinguishes Marx's theory o f value and his concept 
of abstract labour from Ricardo's is  th a t in the la t te r  theory 
no reason is given fo r  the products o f labour having the form 
or 'q u a lity ' o f 'va lue ' in the f i r s t  place. I t  cannot be 
found in the accounts o f  e ith e r Smith or Ricardo as to  why i t  
is o f the essential nature of 'labour' to  manifest i t s e l f  as 
'v a lu e '.  Labour and value are simply id e n tif ie d  as occurring 
at the same tim e, and the ind iv idua l in th e ir  works is ,  always 
and everywhere, in possession o f 'exchangeable value' as the 
manner in which he re la tes himself to  other in d iv id ua ls . The 
concept o f value is given a purely 'n a tu ra l' foundation when i t  
has 'la b o u r ', w ith no fu rth e r q u a lif ic a t io n , as i t s  substance.
From Engel's po in t o f view - and those who subscribe to  i t  -  th is  
natural foundation is  to  be envied, and the attempt is  made to  
secure a s im ila r foundation fo r  Marx's theory and thus co llabora te  
what is  considered his 'm a te r ia lis t ' methodology. In re a l i ty ,
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fo r  Marx value has a "purely socia l r e a l i ty " ,  and he says of 
Smith and Ricardo:
"In  th is  society o f free competition the ind iv idua l 
appears detached from the natura l bonds e tc . which in 
e a r lie r  h is to r ic a l periods made him the accessory o f 
a d e fin ite  and lim ited  human conglomerate. Smith 
and Ricardo.... in whose- imaginations th is  18th century 
ind iv id ua l appears as an ide a l, whose existence they 
p ro jec t in to  the past. Not as a h is to r ic  re s u lt but as 
h is to ry 's  po in t o f departure.. As the Natural Ind iv idua l 
appropriate to  th e ir  own notion of human nature, not 
a ris ing  h is to r ic a lly ,, but as posited by nature".
(1981a; p. 83)
Hence although Marx is  f u l ly  appreciative o f Adam Smith's 
"immense step forward" in reducing a l l  forms of labour to  
labour genera lly, and recognises the p o s itive  aspect o f Ricardo's 
approach o f contrasting a th e o re tica l model which abstraced 
from the complexities of an actual economy in  the attempt to  
reveal the major .influence o f 'lab o u r' w ith in  i t ,  he also 
appreciates th e ir  methodological one-sidedness. I f  we consider 
th is  one-sidedness o f the c lass ica l economists to  be the re s u lt 
o f the fa c t th a t th e ir  analysis does not produce a subsequent 
S yn th e s is ', and where our conception o f re a l i ty  is  a lte red , i t  
can be shown th a t th is  again is  a consequence of the fa c t th a t 
they lacked any notion o f inner necessity in the re la tio n  between 
labour and value.. Marx makes precise ly th is  po in t when he says 
th a t:
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"P o lit ic a l economy has indeed analysed, however 
incompletely, value and i ts  magnitude, and has 
discovered what lie s  beneath these forms. But 
i t  has never once asked the question why labour is 
represented by the value o f i ts  product".
(1983; p. 85)
No reason is  given; i t  is simply accepted th a t i t  is  so.
As Stace remarks in another connection:
"This is  a fa c t which simply is-. We cannot see why 
i t  must be^ I t  dogmatically asserts i t s e l f  in the world 
w ithout g iv ing any reason fo r  i t s e l f .  I t  is  so, and 
th a t is an end o f the m a tte r... I f  instead o f being a 
mere fa c t we could see tha t i t  is  a necessity; i f  we 
could see the reason o f i t ,  and tha t i t  fo llows from 
th a t reason.Iv. we should understand i t .  I t  would 
be explained". (1955; p. 54)
What makes the d ia le c tic a l synthesis possible, so th a t i t  fo llow s 
from the resu lts  o f the analysis., is  p recise ly tha t re a li ty  is  
comprehended as posited by necessity, and th a t i t s  re la tion s  
are necessary re la tio n s . In the synthesis we there fore  know 
why labour takes the form of the value o f the products o f labour. 
C lassical p o l it ic a l economy presents only a one-sided analysis 
and is therefore d e fic ie n t. For, as we have seen, to  be complete,
an explanation must be complete in the sense tha t one can no
longer ask ‘why1. We know tha t in the analysis we are compelled
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to  ju s t accept what ex is ts  as simply 'g iv e n '. But i f  the 
conclusion of the analysis does not disclose th a t th is  re a li ty  
can be presented as the form of expression o f an inner necessity, 
then i t  re ta ins th is  'giveness' and 'o n c e - fo r -a ll ' character.
Marx says in th is  connection th a t:
"Smith and R icardo... t re a t the form of value as a 
th ing  o f no importance. . . . . t h e  reason fo r  th is  is  
not so le ly  because th e ir  a tten tion  is  e n tire ly  absorbed 
in the analysis o f the magnitude of value. I t  lie s  
deeper. The value-form o f the product o f labour is  
not only the most abstract, but is  also the most 
universal form, taken by the product in bourgeouis 
production, and stamps th a t production as a p a rtic u la r 
species o f socia l production, and thereby gives i t  i t s  
special h is to r ic a l character. I f  then we tre a t th is  
mode of production as one e te rn a lly  fixed  by nature 
fo r  every state o f socie ty, we necessarily overlook 
th a t which is the d if fe re n tia  specifica  of the value 
form, and consequently o f the commodity form, and o f i ts  
fu r th e r developments, money-form, cap ita l-fo rm  e tc . . " .
(1983; p. 79)
Engels' too masks what is  spec ific  about the value-form o f the 
product o f labour by pushing i ts  existence back 5-7,000 years. 
Obviously, the recognition of what is s p e c if ic a lly  d if fe re n t 
about the value-form is  precise ly what is s ingu lar about i t ,  i .e .  
th a t the subject o f the an a lys is 'm od e rn  bourgeouis s o c ie ty ', 
is  but a p a rtic u la r expression o f socia l production in general, 
and therefore i t  is  by no means the only manner o f expressing 
the same inner necessity which is a feature o f other forms o f
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s p e c if ic la ly  socia l production.. Marx comments th a t:
" . . .  the c a p ita lis t  process of production is a 
h is to r ic a lly  determined form o f the socia l process 
o f production in general. The la t te r  is  as much 
a production process o f m ateria l l i f e  as a process 
taking place under spe c ific  h is to r ic a l and economic 
production re la t io n s . . .  For the aggregate of these 
re la tio n s , in which the agents o f th is  production 
stand w ith respect to  Nature and to  one another, and 
in which they produce, is  precise ly socie ty, considered 
from the standpoint o f i t s  economic s tru c tu re ".
(1984; p. 818)
This characterisation of the c a p ita lis t  re la tion s  o f production 
as but a p a rtic u la r species o f socia l production, leads us to  
consider Marx’ s own notion o f the inner necessity which deploys 
these re la tio n s .
In his famous le t te r  to  Kugelmann o f 11th July 1868, Marx expresses 
his own view o f th is  necessity, in the fo llow ing  manner:,
even i f  there were no chapter on 'va lue ' in my book, 
the analysis o f the real re la tionsh ips which I give would 
contain the proof and demonstration o f the real value 
re la t io n . . . ' the masses o f products corresponding to  the 
d iffe re n t needs require d if fe re n t and q u a n tita tiv e ly  
determined masses o f the to ta l labour o f socie ty. That
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th is  necessity in the d is tr ib u tio n  o f socia l labour 
in d e fin ite  proportions cannot possibly be done away 
w ith by a p a rtic u la r form of socia l production but 
can only change the form in which i t  appears, is  s e lf -  
evident. No natural laws can be done away w ith .
What can change, in h is to r ic a lly  d if fe re n t circumstances, 
is only the form in which these laws operate".
(1962; Vol. 2, p. 461)
The content of the d ia le c tic a l synthesis is  precise ly the 
demonstration o f the form in which these necessary laws operate 
or manifest themselves in c a p ita lis t  soc ie ty . The subject o f 
the inqu iry  is now treated as a spe c ific  form o f socia l production 
and as a spec ific  example or expression o f the fa c t th a t a l l  
s p e c if ic a lly  socia l production, always and everywhere, requires 
q u a lita tiv e  and qu an tita tive  regu la tion . The transform ation 
of analysis in to  synthesis is  impossible fo r  Smith and Ricardo 
because what they f a i l  to  see is  ju s t tha t the c a p ita lis t  system 
of production is but a p a rtic u la r form o f the socia l process of 
production in general:. And socia l production i t s e l f ,  by i ts  
very nature, demands necessary re la tion s  and functions i f  i t  is  
to  cohere as precise ly a system o f socia l production. The 
life -p rocess o f society demands tha t men enter d e fin ite  re la tio n s  
which are independent o f th e ir  w i l l  because necessary and essentia l 
fo r  the reproduction o f themselves at a l l .  This is  why Marx 
begins the 1857 Introduction w ith "s o c ia lly  determined ind iv id ua l 
production",. Yet Marx la te r  changes and omits th is  s ta r tin g  po in t 
in the Contribution (1859), and in Capital Vol. 1 (1867). Marx
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gives the reason for. th is  as:
" . . .  on fu rth e r consideration i t  seems to  me 
confusing to  an tic ipa te  resu lts  which have s t i l l  
to  be substantia ted". (1981b; p. 19)
S t i l l. ,  's o c ia lly  determined1 ind iv id ua l production is  p rec ise ly  
what is required i f  Marx's notion o f necessity is  to  be a va lid  
one.
What replaces th is  o r ig in a l s ta rtin g  po in t is  the analysis o f 
the 'commodity',, which is  immediately more 'a c tu a l' or more 
concrete than the previous po in t o f departure since the 's o c ia l' 
determination of ind iv idua l labour is  s t i l l  to  be estab lished.•
Yet what the analysis o f the commodity immediately reveals is  
p recise ly so c ia lly  determined ind iv idua l production. The reason 
fo r  th is  is in the nature o f the underlying necessity as the 
need fo r  the q u a lita tiv e  and qu a n tita tive  interconnection o f 
labour as socia l labour. And th is  necessity is  to  manifest 
i t s e l f  in a society where in iv id u a ls  have a ll-round independence 
on one another while, at the same tim e, being autonomous and 
priva te  ind iv idua l producers.. That in the face o f a socie ty 
o f ind iv idua ls  who are separate and fo rm a lly  independent from 
one another, and who are autonomous in the management o f production, 
the necessity fo r  the d iffe re n t and q u an tita tive  p ro p o rtio n a lity  
o f social labour "cannot possible be done away w ith " . Hence
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when the commodity is analysed, i t  is  precise ly th is  d u a lity  
in the nature o f the labour of the in d iv id u a l, as being 
synonymously in d iv id u a l, or p r iva te , and soc ia l, which is  
disclosed in the product of th is  labour being the immediate 
un ity  o f use-value and exchange-value. In th is  spe c ific  
socia l form o f the labour o f the in d iv id u a l, where the 
commodity is the universal form o f the product o f labour:
" ;. . .  the labour o f the ind iv idua l producer acquires 
so c ia lly  a tw o-fo ld  cha rac te r... the socia l character 
th a t his labour has'of being the equal o f a l l  other 
p a rtic u la r kinds o f labour takes the form th a t a l l  
the phys ica lly  d if fe re n t a r t ic le s  th a t are the products 
o f labour, have one common q u a lity , th a t o f having 
value". (1983, p. 78)
Marx speaks here o f the socia l character o f the equa lity  o f 
labour, i .e .  o f the fa c t th a t the labour o f the ind iv idua l is  
‘ equa lly1 a manifestation o f the labour o f socie ty, o f socia l 
labour. The labours o f a l l  o f the ind iv idua ls  are q u a lita t iv e ly  
equal to  th is  extent. Thus equa lity  of labour fo r  Marx has a 
socials as opposed to  a na tu ra l-ph ys io log ica l, foundation. And 
when Marx ta lks  o f th is  eq ua lity  "taking the form o f" the "value" 
o f the products of labour, then value must be considered as 
the expression o f th is  socia l equa lity  o f labour and regarded 
as i ts  form of appearance in c a p ita lis t  soc ie ty . Thus:
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"A commodity is there fore  a mysterious th ing , simply 
because in i t  the  socia l character o f mens' labour 
appears to  them as" an ob jective  character stamped 
upon the product o f th a t la b o u r... a d e fin ite  
socia l re la tio n  between men, th a t assumes, in th e ir  
eyes, the fa n ta s tic  form o f a re la tio n  between 
th in g s ". (1983; p. 77)
For Marx then, the value-form o f the product of labour represents 
a transference o f q u a lit ie s , where the socia l character o f the 
eq ua lity  o f the labours is transfe rred to  the products o f 
labour equally assuming the form o f being ‘ values’ :
" . . .  considered as values, a l l  commodities are 
q u a lita t iv e ly  equal and d i f fe r  only q u a n t ita t iv e ly . . .
Value is  th e ir  socia l re la tio n , th e ir  economic 
q u a lity " .  (1981a; p. 141, my emphasis.)..
The labour th a t value represents then is ‘ s o c ia l1 labour, or 
the necessary and inev itab le  expression of the social character 
o f-the  labour o f the in d iv id u a l„ in  the spec ific  h is to r ic a l 
circumstances o f the c a p ita lis t  re la tions  o f production. Here 
the labour o f the ind iv idua l is  immediately priva te  and has 
s t i l l  to  express i ts  q u a lita tiv e  equa lity  w ith every other kind 
o f labour, to  the extent th a t these too are expenditures of 
socia l labour* This lack o f the immediate presence of ‘ s o c ia l i t y ’ 
in the labour o f the ind ividual;, means tha t mediation is required 
in order to  express the socia l character of his labour. Marx 
contrasts the manner o f th is  mediation with a social system where
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ind iv id ua l production has 'immediately' a socia l or communal 
character, and says th a t, in th is  la t te r  case:
" . . .  i t  would not be exchange which gave labour i t s  
general character, but ra the r i ts  presupposed communal 
character would make the product in to  a communal 
general product from the o u ts e t.. .  The labour o f 
the ind iv idua l is  posited a t the outset as socia l 
labour,. Labour on the basis of exchange values 
presupposes, prec ise ly  th a t ne ither the labour o f 
the ind iv idua l nor his product are d ire c t ly  general; 
the product a tta ins  th is  form only by passing through- an 
ob jective  mediation; by means of a form of money 
d is tin c t from i t s e l f " ,  ( ib id ,  p* 172)
This necessity fo r  mediation presents the labour o f the ind iv id ua l 
in a d is t in c t  guise. When Marx says here th a t i t  is  'exchange' 
which gives labour i t s  general character i t  re ca lls  his comment 
in C ap ita l, th a t:
" . . .  whenever, by an act o f exchange, we equate as 
values our d if fe re n t products, by th a t very a c t, we 
also equate, as human labour, the d iffe re n t kinds 
o f labour expended upon them". (1983; p .78)
And again, th a t:
" . . .  the labour o f the ind iv idua l assets i t s e l f  as a 
part of- the labour o f soc ie ty , only by means o f the 
re la tio n s  which the act o f exchange establishes d ire c t ly  
between the products, and in d ire c t ly ,  through them, between 
the producers", ( ib id . )
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I f  the labour o f the ind iv id ua l producer only allows i ts  socia l 
character to  be manifested "by means o f the re la tions  which the 
act o f exchange establishes d ire c t ly  between the products" then, 
as a consequence, th is  socia l character appears as i t s 1 general 
human character.
Thus when we said e a r lie r  th a t Ricardo's theory of value does 
not become Marx's by means o f simply re -de fin ing  his category 
of 'la b o u r1, so here too: Value is  not the m anifestation o f
the ostensible and o r ig in a l 'human' character o f labour, but 
the expression o f i t s  socia l character, o f the socia l character 
of i t s  equa lity  w ith every other kind o f labour. And in the 
conditions o f the c a p ita lis t  re la tion s  o f production th is  
equa lity  can only be expressed in the products o f labour assuming 
the form o f having 'v a lu e '. Hence i t  is  the process o f exchange 
i t s e l f  which causes th is  socia l character o f th is  equa lity  to  
appear as i ts  natural human q u a lity . Overall then, the fundamental 
condition , th a t which renders or is  the 'reason' fo r  the appearance 
of-^the socia l character of TaboOr as i t s '  abs trac tly  'human'" 
character, is  the fa c t t h a t : .
" . . .  the reciproca l and a ll-s id e d  dependence o f 
ind iv idua ls  who are in d if fe re n t to  one another, 
forms th e ir  socia l connection ..." (Marx, 1983; p. 156)
The appearance o f socia l labour as abstract labour is  there fore  
the sp e c ific  re s u lt o f the universal exchange re la tions  o f 
c a p ita lis t  socie ty. This means th a t i t  does not p re -ex is t th is
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spe c ific  society as a perennial 'cause1 or creator o f value.
This la t te r  is  an h is to r ic a l and n a tu ra lis t ic  viewpoint where 
the equa lity  o f labour - i t s  q u a lita t iv e  id e n tity  -  is  taken 
fo r  granted as a natural q u a lity  or propensity o f labour, and 
which therefore requires no fu r th e r analysis.
The c lass ica l economists simply assume th is  q u a lita tiv e  id e n tity  
as na tu ra l, and proceed to  make centra l to  th e ir  fu r th e r 
investiga tions the 'magnitude' o f value, considered as the 
d ire c t embodiment o f th is  'e s s e n tia l' substance: 'la b o u r '.
Marx, as we know, carries h is analysis fu rth e r than his 
predecessors, to  the po in t where he can conclude th a t:
"From the analysis o f exchange value i t  fo llows tha t 
the conditions o f labour which creates exchange value 
are socia l categories o f labour or categories o f 
socia l labour, socia l however not in the general sense 
but in the p a rtic u la r sense, denoting a spe c ific  type 
of s o c ie ty ... In exchange value the labour time o f 
a p a rtic u la r ind iv idua l is  d ire c t ly  represented as 
labour-time in general, and th is  general character o f 
ind iv idua l labour appears as the socia l character o f 
th is  labour". (1981b; p. 31)
This conclusion, th a t the general, abstract character o f labour, 
is  but the form of expression o f i t s  socia l character, is  what 
takes Marx's analysis o f value beyond th a t o f his c lass ica l 
predecessors'and allows o f the transform ation o f analysis in to  
synthesis. Concerning the conceptual analysis, i t  is  "on ly a fte r
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th is  work has been done" th a t Marx proceeds to  present the 
unfolding of the l i f e  of the subject in a d ia le c tic a l synthesis 
which is  informed by the discovery o f the real nature o f value- 
creating labour. And th is  real nature - expressed as the 'two­
fo ld  character' o f labour - is  the re s u lt o f the necessity fo r  
the labour o f the ind iv idua l to  express i t s  socia l character.
Marx compares the re su lt o f his own analysis w ith th a t o f his 
predecessors when he says th a t he has him self shown:
" . . .  tha t the analysis o f the commodity in terms o f 'labou r' 
has been carried out only im perfectly  and ambiguously 
by a l l  previous economists.
I t  is  not s u ff ic ie n t to  reduce the commodity to  'la b o u r ', 
labour must be broken down in to  i t s  tw o-fo ld  fo rm ... 
the economists constantly lapse in to  contrad ictions and 
ambiguity-, even Ricardo, because they have fa ile d  to  
work out a c lear analysis o f the commodity in terms o f 
the dual form of labour". (1979; p. 995)
The dual form of labour then, has a 'p iv o ta l ' s ign ificance in 
Marx's analysis because i t  negates and transcends the e a r lie r  
position which says tha t 'labou r' in general is  the substance 
or essence o f value. Marx's own a tt itu d e  to  phys io log ica lly  
equal labour, or human labour in general, is  expressed when he 
says:
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"In  each socia l form o f labour the labours o f the 
d if fe re n t ind iv idua ls  are re la ted to  one another as 
human labours too [ i . e .  i t  is  a physio log ica l fa c t ]  
but in th is  case th is  re la tin g  i t s e l f  counts as the 
s p e c if ic a lly  socia l form o f the labours. Now none 
o f these priva te  labours in i t s  natural form possesses 
th is  s p e c if ic a lly  socia l form of abstract human 
labour, ju s t as l i t t l e  as the commodity in i ts  
natural form possesses the socia l form o f value".
(1972; p. 32)
In the previous analysis o f the c lass ica l economists, a 
physio log ica l connection between labours had been substitu ted 
fo r  a socia l one. Here Marx shows th a t the former is  only 
the manner o f expression o f the la t te r ,  th a t in the c a p ita lis t  
society th is  is  the form in which the necessary socia l connection 
expresses i t s e l f .
The d ia le c tic a l synthesis then, comprises the. trac ing  o f the 
development o f th is  spe c ific  socia l connection of p riva te  
labours and_the d iffe re n t and succeeding, forms of i t s  expression. 
With th is  p o la r ity  as his foundation i t  is  c lear th a t Marx does 
not begin his analysis w ith ‘ the commodity1 in general, the 
po int o f departure is not w ith any commodity, but w ith the 
c a p ita l is t ic a l ly  produced commodity. For i t  is  only th is  sp e c ific  
form o f the commodity, as the universal form o f the product o f 
labour, tha t can possibly contain the sp e c ific  con trad ic tion  
where the un iversa lly  socia l and general is  the polar opposite 
o f the p riva te  and in d iv id u a l. The methodological te r ra in  must
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be delim ited in th is  manner i f  Marx's conception o f value- 
creating labour is  to  be kept d is t in c t  from R icardo's.
Engels w rites as though Marx had in fa c t begun his analysis 
w ith the commodity ' in  genera l'. The re su lt is  th a t the 
conclusion of the conceptual analysis, which pivots and forms 
the s ta rtin g  po in t o f ‘ the method of p re sen ta tio n ', is  taken 
to  be the commodity as i t  was present in the period o f 'sim ple 
commodity p roduction ', or o f the commodity as i t  has existed 
'h is to r ic a l ly ' .  This tra n s -h is to r ic a l treatment o f value has 
the re s u lt th a t the d e fin it io n  o f th a t labour which posits value 
loses i t s  d e fin ite  h is to r ic a l moorings and we must d r i f t  towards 
a physio log ica l conception o f abstract labour. Only th is  la t te r  
conception possesses the re q u is ite  h is to r ic a l m o b ility  and 
universal a p p lic ia b i1i t y  tha t is  required fo r  Engels' "h is to r ic a l"  
treatment.
Nothing could be more misleading than to  id e n tify  the methodological 
po in t o f departure w ith 'the  f i r s t  an!d simple re la tio n  which fs-5' 
h is to r ic a lly  ac tua lly  a v a ila b le '. Whatever Engels envisages, 
th is  ' f i r s t  and simple' re la tio n  to  be, i t  is  not th a t un ive rsa lly  
socia l re la tio n  which is the necessary presuppostion in re a l i ty  
fo r  the disclosure o f the true  nature o f value. I f  the attempt 
were made to  take th is  methodological lead serious ly , then one 
could be forgiven fo r  assuming tha t Marx's i n i t i a l  analysis o f 
the commodity at the s ta r t o f Capital has to  do w ith i t  as i t  
presents i t s e l f  'h is to r ic a l ly ' ,  i .e .  during a period o f from 
5 to  7,000 years, ra ther than as i t  presents i t s e l f  as the re s u lt
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of the analysis of the subject o f the inqu iry  - "modern 
bourgeouis soc ie ty ".
In th is  analysis Marx does not dissolve the ex is ting  subject 
in to  the elements o f i t s  own preh is to ry , so tha t the analysis 
o f value - as opposed to  th a t o f the 'p rices of production' - 
properly belongs to  the period o f the 'simple commodity economy'. 
And when Marx assumes at the outset tha t commodities exchange 
at th e ir  values, th is  is  not an 'h is to r ic a l ' deduction, but a 
the o re tica l abstraction o f the fundamental va lue -re la tion  
between the owners o f commodities in the ex is ting  c a p ita lis t  
socie ty.
Therefore the re s u lt o f the analysis, and po int o f departure 
fo r  the conceptual synthesis, are the abstract determinations 
of th is  spe c ific  socie ty, so th a t what is  being dea lt w ith is 
i t s '  commodity, and therefore i t s '  spe c ific  form of con trad ic tion : 
the tw o-fo ld  character o f labour.
When Marx describes th is  tw o-fo ld  character o f labour a t the 
beginning of C ap ita l, then th is  characterisation of the labour 
which produces commodities could be seen to  apply to  p re -c a p ita lis t 
epochs only i f  we assume a physio log ica l conception o f abstract 
labour. . This methodological inference, i t s e l f , tha t Marx's 
analysis begins w ith the commodity ' in  genera l', je tt is o n s  the 
spec ific  socia l determination o f value so tha t Capital 1 appears 
as merely a rehash o f Ricardo's P rin c ip le s .
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Therefore to  argue fo r  the existence o f a p re -c a p ita lis t 'va lue- 
epoch1, or attempt to  give an 'h is to r ic a l1 dimension to  the 
'transform ation problem', is ,  a t the same time, to  saddle Marx 
w ith a conception o f the substance o f value which d if fe rs  not 
at a ll from th a t o f his c lass ica l predecessors. This approach 
can only suggest i t s e l f  when the dual movement o f conceptual 
analysis and conceptual synthesis, u t i l is e d  by Marx as "the 
method o f working"., and adopted from Hegel's Logic, has been 
ignored.
I l l
When the subject of the inves tiga tio n , which was merely presupposed 
as given in the f i r s t  movement, is  seen as 'pos ited ' in the second, 
then something must be uncovered by the analysis which allows 
i t  to  transcend th is  simply given and to  comprehend i t  as 'brought 
about'. The analysis o f value undertaken by the c lass ica l 
economists did not provide a conceptual 'a x is ' fo r  the transform ation 
of analysis in to  synthesis because th is  analysis concluded w ith 
a bare 'id e n t i ty ' o f labour w ith value. Nothing could there fore  
be shown or presented as having developed out of struggle and 
contradiction. Marx provides th is  la t te r  condition because, 
as he says:
" I  was the f i r s t  to  po in t out and examine c r i t ic a l ly  
the tw o-fo ld  nature of the labour embodied in commodities... 
th is  point is the p ivo t upon which a c lea r comprehension... 
tu rn s ". (1983; p .49)
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Thus the immediate id e n tity  o f labour and value is  le f t  behind 
and transcended in the discovery o f the 'tw o -fo ld  character of 
labour' which is  the determining socia l cha ra c te ris tic  o f labour 
which produces value. Hegel remarks in th is  regard:
" I t  has been remarked th a t analysis becomes synthetic 
when i t  comes to  deal w ith determinations tha t are no 
longer posited by the problems themselves. But the 
general tra n s it io n  from ana ly tic  to  synthetic cognition 
lie s  in the necessary tra n s it io n  from the form o f 
immediacy to  mediation, from abstract id e n tity  to  
d iffe rence1 * (1969; p. 793)
In order to  discover precise ly where 'abs trac t id e n t ity ' becomes 
'd iffe re n ce ' and immediacy gives way to  mediation i t  w i l l  be 
useful to  look at Marx's analysis at th a t po in t where i t  
reaches and goes beyond th a t o f Ricardo. In the course o f his 
analysis, Marx reaches agreement w ith Ricardo th a t:
" . . .  a commodity is  exchange-value in so fa r  as a 
d e fin ite  amount o f labour-time has been expended 
in i ts  production and i t  accordingly represents 
m ateria lised labour-tim e" . (1981a; p. 43)
But Marx immediately fo llow s th is ,  and thereby pushes beyond 
his predecessor, when he states:
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"Yet the commodity as i t  comes in to  being is only 
m ateria lised ind iv idua l labour-time o f a spec ific  
kind and not universal labour-tim e. The commodity 
is thus not immediately exchange value but has s t i l l  
to  become exchange v a lu e ... The po int o f departure 
is  not the labour o f ind iv idua ls  considered as socia l 
labour, but on the contrary, labour which proves 
tha t i t  is  socia l labour only by the supersession of 
i ts  o r ig in a l cha rac te r... socia l labour is not a ready­
made prerequ is ite  but an emerging re s u lt" ,  ( ib id . )
In other words, the labour o f the ind iv idua l is  not immediately 
abstract labour but has s t i l l  to  become abstract labour. As 
Marx expresses i t  elsewhere:
"Since the producers do not come in to  socia l contact 
w ith each other u n t i l  they exchange th e ir  products, 
the spec ific  social character of each producer's labour 
does not show i t s e l f  except in the act o f exchange... 
Hence... whenever, by an act o f exchange, we equate 
as values our d iffe re n t products, by th a t very act we 
also equate, as human labour, the d iffe re n t kinds of 
labour expended upon them. We are hot aware of th is  
nevertheless we do i t " .  (1983; p. 77-8)
The point however is not to  make us aware o f ju s t th is  fa c t ,  
and by so doing, end the 'fe t is h ' character o f the products o f 
labour, or the domination o f man by ob jects. The re s u lt o f the 
reve la tion tha t commodities are merely o b je c tif ie d  husks o f 
homogeneous human labour does not, in i t s e l f ,  break the causal 
connection between th is  human labour and value. Marx remarks 
in th is  context:
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"The fa c t ,  th a t in the p a rtic u la r form of production 
w ith  which we are dealing, v iz . ,  the production of 
commodities, the spe c ific  socia l character of p riva te  
labour carried on independently, consists in the 
equa lity  o f every kind o f th a t labour, by v ir tu e  o f i t s  
being human labour, which character, the re fo re , assumes 
in the product the form o f value - th is  fa c t appears 
to  the producers, notwithstanding the discovery above 
re ferred to , to  be ju s t as real and f in a l ,  as the fa c t 
th a t, a fte r  the discovery by science"of the component gases 
o f a ir ,  the atmosphere i t s e l f  remained unaltered".
( ib id ,  p. 79)
A ll th a t the discovery th a t the value-substance is  human labour 
amounts to  then., is  th a t the po in t o f departure is considered to  
be prec ise ly  th a t the labour o f ind iv idua ls  is  considered to  
be, immediately, socia l labour, o r, tha t i t s  generic character 
is i t s  value-creating character. On the other hand, what the 
tra n s it io n  from id e n tity  and immediacy to  d iffe rence and mediation 
s ig n if ie s  is  tha t i t  is  the re s u lt o f a capacity o f value to  
render human labour in general as the immediate form of appearance 
of the socia l character o f labour.
The tra n s it io n  from the form o f immediacy to  mediation also 
s ig n if ie s  th a t the value o f the product o f labour is  conceived 
of as the 'r e s u lt1 of the exchange process, which takes place 
outside o f the process of production, and is  not a p re requ is ite  
fo r  the act o f exchange, determining i t s  proportions.
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As well as re fle c tin g  the change from a 'ready-made p re re q u is ite 1 
to  an 'emerging re s u lt f ,  the tra n s it io n  from id e n tity  and immediacy 
to  d iffe rence and mediation also reg is te rs  the methodological 
tra n s fe r from conceptual analysis to  d ia le c tic a l synthesis.
Hence when we spoke e a r lie r  o f the necessity fo r  the socia l 
character o f the labour of the ind iv idua l to  express i t s e l f ,  
now., given the disclosure o f the tw o-fo ld  character o f labour, 
we must consider tha t necessity as having to  express i t s e l f  in 
the midst o f d iffe rence and as therefore occasioning the subsequent 
need fo r  mediation. What drives the d ia le c tic a l synthesis, or 
forms the core of i ts  content, is  precise ly what the tw o-fo ld  
character o f labour expresses" con trad ic tion . Contradiction 
was the re s u lt th a t was unavailable to  the c lass ica l economists 
because th e ir  conclusion was in terms o f immediate id e n t ity .  ' 
Id e n tity  has a powerful a ttra c tio n  conceptually., appearing inv ioab le . 
But.j as Hegel remarks o f id e n tity :
" . . .  i t  is  one of the fundamental prejudices o f log ic  
, as h ith e rto  understood and!Cof ordinary th ink ing , th a t - * 
con trad ic tion  is not so c h a ra c te r is tic a lly  essentia l 
and immanent a determination as id e n tity ; but in 
fact., i f  i t  were a question of grading the two determinations 
and they had to  be kept separate, then contrad iction  
would have to  be taken as the profounder and more 
essentia l determ ination. For as against con trad ic tion , 
id e n tity  is  merely the determination of the simple 
immediate, but con trad iction  is the root of a l l  movement 
and v i t a l i t y ;  i t  is  only in so fa r  as something has 
a con trad ic tion  w ith in  i t  tha t i t  moves, or has impulse 
or a c t iv i ty " .  (1969; p. 439)
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The d iffe rence between 'labour' pure and simple, and tha t 
labour which possesses a tw o-fo ld  character, resolves i t s e l f  
in to  the d iffe rence between id e n tity  on the one hand, and 
contradiction on the other. Hence at the very inception o f the 
d ia le c t ic a l synthesis, indeed what makes i t  possible at a l l ,  is  
the tw o-fo ld  character o f labour, considered as:
" . . .  the abstract and genera lform  o f a l l  contrad ictions 
inherent in the bourgeouis mode o f labour". (Marx, 1981b; p. 96)
I t  is  the trac ing  of the development o f th is  con trad iction  from 
i ts  abstract and general form to  i t s  concrete and p a rtic u la r 
m anifestations in modern c a p ita lis t  society which marks the 
synonymous process o f synthesis and comprehension o f the sub ject.
This tra n s it io n  from id e n tity  to  d iffe rence must also accomplish 
th a t from immediacy to  mediation., and from what has been said 
already i t  is  c lear th a t:
" . . .  th is  contrad iction between the commodities p a rtic u la r 
natura l q u a n t it ie s  and i t s  general socia l q u a litie s  
contains from the beginning the p o s s ib il ity  tha t these 
two separated forms in which the commodity ex is ts  are not 
convertib le  in to  one ano ther... By e x is tin g  outside 
the commodity as money, the exchangeability of the 
commodity has become something d if fe re n t from and a lien  
to  the commodity,, w ith which i t  f i r s t  has to  be brought 
in to  re la tio n , to  which i t  is  there fore  at the 
beginning unequal; while the equation i t s e l f  becomes 
dependent on external conditions, hence a matter 
of chance". (1981a; p. 148)
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This circumstance allows Marx to  speak o f:
" . . .  th is  un ity  o f production and re a lis a tio n , not 
immediately but only as a process, which is  linked 
to  ce rta in  conditions, and, as i t  appeared, external 
cond itions", ( ib id , p. 407)
The absence o f necessary mediation is evident in both Smith and 
Ricardo in the way tha t they conceive o f labour only in the 
'p o s it iv e 1 sense o f being immediately the generator o f value, 
and therefore where labour is  id e n tif ie d  w ith only one term, as 
i t  were, the 1 a f f i r m a t i o n T h e r e f o r e  th is , perspective cannot 
encompass the 'd e n ia l1, as when, fo r  purely "e x tr in s ic ' reasons, 
and outside of the process o f production i t s e l f ,  the product 
cannot be realised as a value. The maturation and development 
of the con trad ic tion  contained in the commodity and depicted in  
the d ia le c tic a l synthesis enables Marx to  observe:
" . . .  w ith in  bourgeouis soc ie ty , the society th a t rests 
on exchange value, there arise  re la tio n s  of c irc u la tio n  
as well as o f production which are so many mines to  
explode i t .  (A mass o f a n tith e tic a l forms o f the
socia l u n ity , whose a n tith e tic a l character can never be 
abolished through qu ie t metamorphosis. On the other 
hand, i f  we did not f in d  concealed in society as i t  is  
the m aterial conditions of production p rerequ is ite  fo r  a 
classless socie ty, then a l l  attempts to  explode i t  
would be q u ix o tic )" , ( ib id ,  p. 159)
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The standpoint o f 'q u ie t metamorphosis' is  encouraged by the 
id e n tif ic a t io n  o f labour and value, or by the form ulation of 
an 'embodied' labour theory o f value, since i t  e n ta ils  d e fin ite  
consequences concerning the 'a n t ith e t ic a l forms o f the socia l 
un ity '., or lack o f i t ,  as is the case here. We can see at 
once th a t the causal connection o f labour and value, which is  
the core o f a l l  embodied labour theories o f value, destroys the 
con trad ic tion  contained in the tw o-fo ld  character o f labour and 
thereby renders what is  e sse n tia lly  in c o n f l ic t  as though i t  
had escaped i t *  Here the po in t o f departure is  the labour o f 
the ind iv idua l considered as abstract, and the re fo re , in e v ita b ly , 
socia l labour.. The value-creating propensity o f 'la b o u r1 is  
considered as a p re requ is ite , ra ther than as 'an emerging 
re s u lt1.. Marx says o f John Gray, a labour-money th e o r is t, 
and therefore someone fo r  whom the immediate labour o f the 
ind iv idua l is  not to  be distinguished from socia l labour, th a t:
" . . .  he assumed th a t commodities could be d ire c t ly  
compared,with one another as the_products o f socia l labour. 
But on the basis o f commodity production labour becomes 
socia l labour only as the re s u lt o f the universal 
a liena tion  o f ind iv idua l labour. But as Gray 
presupposes th a t the labour time contained in commodities 
is  immediately socia l labour tim e, he presupposes th a t 
i t  is  communal labour time, or labour time of d ire c t ly  
associated ind iv id ua ls . In tha t case i t  would indeed 
be impossible fo r  a sp e c ific  commodity to  confront other 
commodities as the incarnation o f universal labour, but 
ne ither would use-value be turned in to  exchange-value 
and the product in to  a commodity, and thus the very 
basis of bourgeouis society would be abolished".
(1981b; p. 85)
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The very basis o f bourgeouis society is  'abolished' by an 
embodied labour theory o f value because i t  is  here invested 
w ith an inherent s ta b i l i t y  which i t  cannot possess, being ascribed 
cha rac te ris tics  which properly belong to  a planned economy. The 
reason fo r  th is  is  th a t th is  theory necessitates the coincidence 
of ind iv idua l and socia l expenditures o f labour because abstract 
(soc ia l) labour is deemed to  e x is t in the process o f production 
its e lf . .  I t  is  therefore impossible fo r  an embodied labour theory 
o f value to  properly address e ith e r the inherent problems o f 
c a p ita lis t  society i t s e l f ,  and which re la te  to  the p o s s ib il i ty  
o f c rises , or those which re fe r to  i t s  the o re tica l comprehension 
e,.,g. the 'transform ation problem'’, because:
i f  i t  is assumed th a t the contrad ictions e x is tin g  
in bourgeouis society do not e x is t, then these 
contrad ictions obviously cannot come in to  p lay".
(Marx, 1972; p. 55)
And d ire c t ly  re la ted to  th is  is :
"B o is g u illb e rt 's  work, which proves th a t i t  is
possible to  regard labour-time as the measure o f
the value of commodities while confusing the labour
which is m ateria lised in the exchange value o f
commodities and measured in tim e-un its  w ith the
d ire c t physical a c t iv ity  o f in d iv id u a ls ", ( ib id ,  1981b; p .55)
This id e n tif ic a t io n  o f the q u a lita t iv e  and q u an tita tive  determ ination 
o f value w ith physical expenditure is  not expunged from Marx's
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con tribu tion  by Engels' attempt to  a r t ic u la te  and to  defend i t .
For example, B o isg u illb e rt regards 'labour' as being inherently 
productive of value. This being the case and, ra ther in the 
manner o f the 't im e -c h it te rs ', he inveighs against 'money' 
as an a lien  in trude r and a 'usurper' which has been introduced 
in to  the realm of exchange from outside. I t  is  something akin 
to th is  fundamental reservo ir o f 'lab our' th a t Bohm-Bawerk and 
the other c r i t ic s  o f Marx envisage as the foundation upon which 
he constructs his labour theory o f value. Believing th a t when 
Marx spoke of the substance of value he was re fe rr in g  to  a 
'sense datum' then the theory o f value was rejected on the basis 
tha t evidence fo r  the existence o f th is  substance could not be 
demonstrated in the re la tio n  between commodities and the prices 
fo r which they exchanged. Engels does nothing to  correct th is  
n a tu ra lis t ic  in te rp re tio n  of the substance o f value. Indeed 
his response to  the c r i t ic s  o f the 1890's is  precise ly to  attempt
to  prove the existence o f th is  very substance. As well as
doing nothing to  hinder the development of an emodied labour 
theory o f value, Engels' response also sanctions th a t po in t o f 
view which characterises the re la tio n sh ip  between Marx and 
Ricardo as forming a continuum ra ther than as the former 
s ign ify ing  a negation and transcendence o f the la t te r  co n trib u tio n . 
Marx says tha t Ricardo:
" . . .  does not examine the form o f va lue .. He only
examines the magnitude o f value, the quan tities  o f
th is  abstract, general, and in th is  form, soc ia l, 
labour". (1972; p. 172)
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This is  re lated to  the e a r lie r  po int concerning the supposed 
'l ib e r a t in g 1 e ffe c t o f the disclosure th a t, inso far as they are 
values, commodities are merely o b je c tif ie d  husks o f homogeneous 
human labour. With the expression "abstract, general, and in 
th is  form, socia l labour" Marx is  ind ica ting  th a t in c a p ita l is t  
society something happens to  the id e n tity  o f labour when i t  
assumes a socia l form - i t  becomes abstract and general. But 
can labour be 'g e ne ra l', or possess a general socia l v a l id ity  
w ithout, at the same time and as a necessary consequence, having 
to  be rendered as abs trac tly  human? I t  may be tha t to  those 
who hold to  a physio logical conception o f abstract labour i t  is  
ine v itab le  th a t to  be considered socia l labour at a l l  ind iv idua l 
useful labour must re linqu ish  i ts  d e fin ite  concrete character 
and be expressed 'a b s tra c t ly '.  And, th a t, ra ther than have th is  
general 'human' q u a lity  o f labour expressed as value, Marx's 
theory allows us to  dem istify th is  appearance and locate th is  
'substance' o f value where i t  t r u ly  belongs, i .e .  in mans' 
essentia l humanity.
Marx's descrip tion o f abstract labour as socia l labour only 
seems to  have been accepted here, or is  accepted in a manner 
th a t is reminiscent of Feuerbachian humanism. That abstract 
human labour is the form o f expression o f the general socia l 
q u a lity  o f labour which emanates from a sp e c ific  set o f socia l 
re la tio n s , those re la tion s  which are the foundation o f c a p ita l is t  
socie ty, has been overlooked here. I t  is  not necessary th a t the
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labour o f ind iv idua ls  lose i t s  ind iv idua l id e n tity  in order to  
achieve a socia l expression, as Marx says:
" . . .  from the moment th a t men in any way work fo r  
one another, th e ir  labour assumes a socia l form".
(1983; p. 76)
This is  the primary feature o f th a t inner-necessity which deploys 
socia l re la tio n s , but i t  does not e n ta i l ’ th a t labour always 
assumes the same socia l form, so th a t the negation o f i t s  concrete 
useful forms- is ine v itab le . For example, in the p r im itiv e  
communical production, or in the s o c ia lis t  society o f the fu tu re , 
the useful concrete character o f labour _i_s i ts  socia l character; 
here labour is  socia l p rec ise ly  because i t  is  d if fe re n t.  The 
type o f equa lity  o f labour th a t Marx re fers to  as forming the 
substance o f value, and which causes th is  equa lity  to  be in 
terms o f i ts  iden tica l and ab s trac tly  human character, presupposes 
two th ings:
" . . .  (1) That ind iv idua ls  now produce only fo r  socie ty 
and in socie ty; (2) That production is  not d ire c t ly  
soc ia l, is  not the 'o ffs p rin g  o f assocation' which 
d is tr ib u te s  labour in te rn a lly . Ind iv idua ls are subsumed 
under socia l production; socia l production ex is ts  
outside them as th e ir  fa te ; but socia l production is  
not subsumed under the in d iv id u a ls , manageable by them 
as th e ir  common wealth". (1981a; p. 158)
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Those exchange re la tions  which e x is t and take place p r io r  to  the 
c a p ita lis t  system of production, and which are re ferred to  by 
Engels as evidence fo r  the existence o f value, are not engendered 
by ind iv idua ls  who only produce fo r  socie ty, and therefore 
th e ir  analysis cannot d isclose a socia l re la tio n . And since 
value _is a socia l re la tio n  in the form of a th in g , i t s  existence 
and the existence of i t s  substance cannot be derived from the 
investiga tion  o f these p re -c a p ita lis t exchange re la tio n s .
Marx, as opposed to  Engels, does not examine exchange re la tio n s  
as such, but only those which take place in the subject o f his 
in ves tiga tion . The element o f necessity, o f the need fo r  socia l 
cohesion or p ro p o rtio n a lity , being established and maintained 
through and by means o f exchange transactions, is  e n tire ly  missing 
in the p re -c a p ita lis t past. P rio r to  the advent o f cap ita lism  
i t  is  only in the communal production o f a n tiq u ity  th a t socia l 
qua socia l labour is exem plified. And what d istinguishes 
communal production - whether th is  re fers to  ‘ the dawn o f h is to ry ' 
or to  s o c ia lis t society -  is  the absence o f mutually independent 
labours, i .e .  the fundamental" condition fo r  the appearance of 
the socia l character o f labour as i t s  abs tractly  human character.. 
Marx makes th is  contrast, and the form o f m anifestation of 
inner-necessity, when he w rites :
"Where labour is communal, the re la tio n  of men in 
th e ir  socia l production do not manifest themselves 
as 'values o f th in g s '.  Exchange o f products as 
commodities is  a method of exchanging labour, i t  
demonstrates the dependence of the labour o f each
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upon the labour o f others and corresponds to  a
certa in  mode o f socia l labour or socia l production".
(1972; p. 129)
This is  expressed elsewhere as:
" . . .  reciproca l dependence... expressed in the 
constant necessity fo r  exchange and in exchange as 
the a ll-s id e d  m ediation". (1981a; p. 156)
I t  is  th is  necessity fo r  a ll-s id e d  mediation which discloses the 
socia l character o f p riva te  labour. Engels shows th a t he has 
no notion o f th is  socia l essence o f value by, among other th ings, 
fa i l in g  to  notice tha t whereas in c a p ia lis t society a socia l 
re la tio n  of production is  expressed as a re la tio n  between th ings, 
a re la tio n  between things does not, by i t s e l f ,  d isclose a socia l 
re la tio n . Why he fa i ls  to  notice is  because, whereas fo r  Marx
the value o f the product of labour is  a s p e c if ic a lly  socia l
determ ination, fo r  Engels i t  is  a m u lt i-  or trans-soc ia l re la tio n  
determfned by ' labour and labour~alone'. This is  why Engels ~ '■";w 
nowhere distinguishes between the value and exehange-value or 
between essence and appearance but prefers to  contrast the 'f ix e d  
and stab le ' w ith 'change and process', and where the goal is  
deemed to  be the disclosure o f the 'antecedent' ra ther than of 
the 'essence'. Following Ricardo, he is  thus led to  a preoccupation 
w ith the magnitude of value and to  the study of exchange transactions 
themselves. His goal is  to  evidence labour-time as the common 
substance of these transactions, from time out o f mind, and by
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displaying th is  longevity , he seeks to  estab lish the v a l id ity  
o f the 'la b o u r1 theory o f value. The q u a lita tiv e  socia l 
determination o f value isabandoned from the very moment th a t 
Engels seeks evidence fo r  i t s  existence in the p re -c a p ita lis t 
past. And symptomatically, the fa ilu re  to  d is tingu ish  value 
and exchange-value is  the expression o f the fa c t th a t abstract 
labour as a socia l category o f labour, or as a category o f socia l 
labour, is  not d istinguished from abstract labour as a generica lly  
'human' character o f labour.
In his treatment o f these issues Engels is  more concerned to  
ascribe th e ir  function ing to  the 'laws of motion' o f the external 
world generally than to  investiga te  whether they are brought 
about as the manifestion o f an inner essence or necessity.
Perhaps i t  is  simply th a t he considers terms lik e  'essence' and 
'substance' as denoting a kind o f 'demiurge' o f the real world - 
Nature and h is to ry  - and should be 'm erc ilessly s a c r if ic e d ' along 
w ith 'every other id e a lis t  crochet' which 'could not be brought 
in to  harmony w ith the fac ts  conceived on th e ir  own'.
Rosdolsky reports th a t Ferdinand Lassalle:
" . . .  praised Marx as a 'Ricardo become s o c ia lis t and a 
Hegel become economist'. However, Engels, regarded 
the 'German d ia le c tic a l method', which underlay Marx's 
economic system, as 'a re s u lt which was of less 
s ign ificance than the m a te ra ilis t in te rp re ta t io n "1.
(1977; p. x i i i )
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But even th is  seems exaggerated. I f  the 'German d ia le c tic a l 
method' involves the analysis and synthesis of a spe c ific  
subject in order to  comprehend i t  as manifesting necessity, and 
to  th is  extent is to  be considered as 's c ie n t i f ic a l ly  c o rre c t ',  
then i t  is  given no s ign ificance whatever in Engels' attempt 
to  authenticate the law o f value. Of course the subject of 
Marx's analysis does emerge as 'law-governed' - replacing a 
"chaotic conception o f the whole" which existed at the po in t o f 
departure. But th is . is  a spe c ific  law, perta in ing to  a sp e c ific  
society and is only disclosed by the analysis o f i t .  I t  is  
not therefore to  be perceived as a 'general law o f motion*, 
so th a t when we understand the law of the change from quantity  
in to  q u a lity  or the p r in c ip le  o f 'the  negation o f the negation ', 
then the 'sec re t' o f the expression o f value is  autom atically 
revealed. Neither is  th is  law to  be conceived in terms o f the 
form in which i t  is  said to  e x is t fo r  Engels in the Middle Ages 
or in  the supposed period o f 'simple commodity p roduction ', and 
where i ts  existence was manifested in the fa c t th a t "men could 
exchange th e ir  products in the ra t io  o f the labour embodied in 
them". I t  must, on the contrary, be conceived as a spe c ific  
socia l law, as a form o f expression fo r  the fa c t tha t "the 
d is tr ib u tio n  o f socia l labour in d e fin ite  proportions cannot 
possibly be done away w ith , but can only change the form in 
which i t  appears". And the form in which th is  law appears in 
c a p ita lis t  society is as 'the  law of va lu e '. In c a p ita lis t  socie ty 
the necessary equilib rium  or p ro p o rtio n a lity  in the d is tr ib u t io n  
of the social labour-force is  governed by the law o f value.
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As Marx expressed i t :
" I t  requires a fu l ly  developed production of 
commodities before, from accumulated experience 
alone, the s c ie n t if ic  conviction springs up, 
th a t a l l  o f the d if fe re n t kinds of p riva te  
labour which are carried on independently of 
each other, and as yet spontaneously developed 
branches o f the socia l d iv is io n  o f labour, are 
con tinua lly  being reduced to  the qu an tita tive  
proportions in which society requires them. And 
why? Because in the midst o f a l l  the accidental 
and eve r-flu c tua ting  exchange re la tio n s  between 
the products, the labour-time necessary fo r  th e ir  
production fo rc ib ly  asserts i t s e l f  l ik e  an 
ove r-rid ing  law o f Nature". (1983; p. 79)
I t  is the ascertaining o f what is to  be considered necessary 
labour-time at the level o f socie ty, or o f the determination o f 
s o c ia lly  labour-tim e, which regulates ind iv idua l production. 
Whether too much or too l i t t l e  o f soc ie ty 's  to ta l labour-time 
has been expended in the production o f a p a rtic u la r product is 
communicated to  the producers o f th is  product by means o f the 
o s c illa tio n s  in the price fo r  which the commodity w i l l  exchange. 
The commodity is  thus - q u a lita t iv e ly  and q u a n tita tiv e ly  - 
so c ia lly  determined. By being f i r s t  o f a l l  accepted by socie ty 
as a va lid  expression o f socia l labour, the labour o f the 
ind iv idua l receives its  q u a lita tiv e  determ ination, and by being 
accepted by society to  a d e fin ite  extent, or in a sp e c ific  amount, 
i t  receives i ts  q u an tita tive  determ ination.
I t  should be mentioned in passing th a t i t  is  erroneous to  consider 
the concept o f 's o c ia lly  necessary labour-tim e' as re fe rr in g
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exclusive ly to  the re q u is ite  leve l o f productive forces at 
which the ind iv idua l production process must func tion . This 
leads to  a preoccupation w ith technological c r i te r ia  which 
perta in to  the in te rna l s truc tu re  o f the process o f production 
i t s e l f .  Hence i f  i t s  meaning is  held to  apply only in th is  
connection then th is  is  tantamount to  suggesting th a t ind iv idua l 
and socia l expenditures o f labour correspond and, as a concept, 
i t  thereby serves as the q u an tita tive  complement to  the 
q u a lita tiv e  determination o f value by human labour in general.
We sha ll re turn to  the consideration o f th is  in Ch. 3.
The law o f value then is  e n t ire ly  s o c ia lly  determined, serving 
to  regulate the a llo ca tio n  o f soc ie ty 's  productive capacity 
amongst i ts  various functions:
"The socie ta l connection o f these p riva te  labours 
e x is t m a te ria lly  inso far as they are members o f 
an indigenous socia l d iv is io n  of la b o u r... This 
materia l socia l connection o f p riva te  labours p lied  
independently o f  one another is , however, only 
mediated and therefore only rea lises i t s e l f  by 
the exchange of the products o f these priva te  
labours". (Marx, 1976; p. 57)
Here 'mediation' is  to  be viewed in terms o f the means whereby 
i t  is  relayed to  the ind iv idua l producer how he is  to  regulate 
his productive a c t iv ity .  In th is  way the law o f value allows 
society to  cohere and function as a productive organism.
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This mode o f the determination o f value is  a fa r  cry from 
Engels' version o f th is  determination where i t  is considered 
as taking place in terms o f the duration o f the act o f 
production i t s e l f ,  i .e .  by the amounts o f labour the reciproca l 
ind iv idua ls  expend or 'embody*. I t  fo llows from Marx's analysis 
o f the tw o-fo ld  character o f labour, of the con trad iction  
which is  at the foundation of c a p ita lis t  society and is  the 
point o f departure fo r  the d ia le c tic a l synthesis, th a t value 
requires a socia l determination over and against and in opposition 
to  ind iv idua l expenditures o f labour. Engels' treatment o f the 
issue causes the removal of one side of th is  contradiction and 
therefore o f the con trad ic tion  its e lf : .  The tw o-fo ld  character 
of labour and the ensuing necessity fo r  mediation as described 
by Marx,, does not e x is t fo r  Engels. Like Ricardo:
"He never investigates the form of mediation".
( ib id ,  1981a; p. 327)
Engels''writes everywhere as though the method employed by Marx -*stb 
has fo r  i t s  special subject the h is to r ic a l process in general.
In 1867 Marx informed him:
"The best points in my books are: (1) the tw o-fo ld
character o f labour, according to  whether i t  is 
expressed in use-value or exchange-value. (A ll 
understanding o f the fac ts  depends upon th is ) . . .
(2) the treatment o f surplus value independently 
o f i t s  p a rtic u la r forms as p r o f i t ,  in te re s t, ground 
re n t, e tc . . . "  (1965; p. 192.)
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However, ten years la te r ,  in his small biographical sketch 
"Karl Marx", Engels gives the f i r s t  o f Marx's "important 
d iscoveries" not as the key to  the unearthing of the 'law  of 
motion' o f c a p ita l is t  soc ie ty , but as:
" . . .  the revo lu tion  brought about by him in the 
whole conception o f world h is to ry . . .  o f a l l  previous 
h is to ry " . (1970; p. 84)
This is undoubtedly a fa c t ,  but i t  must surely be considered th a t 
the in s ig h t- in to  h is to r ic a l development generally is a consequence 
of the the o re tica l comprehension of c a p ita l is t  society and th a t 
tha anatomy of man provides the key to  the anatomy o f the ape.
No matter how i t  is  perceived, the study of the h is to r ic a l process 
in general, and by i t s e l f ,  does not disclose the tw o-fo ld  character 
of the labour th a t is  embodied in commodities. The omission 
of the tw o-fo ld  character o f labour o r, more simply, Marx's 
concept o f abstract labour, is .aga in  evident in Engels when he 
moves on to  discuss "the second important discovery":
" . . .  the re la tio n  between cap ita l and labour, in 
other words, the demonstration how, under the 
c a p ita lis t  mode o f production, the exp lo ita tion  
o f the worker by the c a p ita lis t  takes place".
( ib id ,  p. 86) '
Engels goes on to  explain the theory of surplus value. In 
th is  explanation Engels gives a succinct example o f the absence 
of the correct concept o f abstract labour in his work, and the 
consequent loss o f con trad ic tion  and the necessity fo r  mediation.
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Engels says:
"Let us assume th a t the means of subsistence of 
a worker fo r  one day require s ix  hours of 
labour fo r  th e ir  production, o r, what is  the same
th in g , th a t the labour contained in them
represents a quantity of labour of s ix  ho u rs ..."
( ib id ,  my emphasis.)
There is  no d is t in c tio n  made here between labour expended in
the production and so c ia lly  v a lid  labour, or between the ind iv id ua l
and the socia l character of labour which is  the tra n s la tio n  of
what is  meant by i t s  tw o-fo ld  character. They are smply run
together as, l i t e r a l ly ,  'the  same th in g ',  and again we have 
id e n tity  in place of d iffe rence and immediacy obviating the need
fo r  mediation. This is why value is  able to  secure a perennial
existence in Engels' hands.
A few months before the appearance of the 1895 Supplement Engels 
wrote to  Sombart:
"When commodity exchange began... value had a 
d ire c t and real existence. . .  and I believe tha t
i t  won't be p a r tic u la r ly  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  you to
trace the intermediate lin k s , at least in general 
o u tlin e , th a t lead from d ire c t ly  real value to  the 
value o f the c a p ita lis t  mode o f production which
is so thoroughly hidden th a t our economists can
calmly deny i t s  existence", ( ib id , p. 506)
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Here, "the intermediate l in k s . . .  th a t lead from d ire c t ly  real 
value" are not recommended to  be traced in terms o f Marx's 
the o re tica l method, i .e .  where "the abstract determinations 
lead towards a reproduction o f the concrete by way of thought", 
but, ra the r, in terms of Engels'- 'h is to r ic a l ' method. This is  
because, fo r  Engels, the ex is ting  concrete i t s e l f  is  not seen 
in terms o f having been decomposed in to  i ts  abstract determ inations, 
and where 'd ire c t ly  real value' is  not considered as a feature 
o f the present, i .e .  the re a lly  ex is tin g  va lue -re la tion , but 
as a feature o f the past. Again, the gathering o f em pirical 
data is  fo r  Marx the work o f the analysis, o f the f i r s t  movement 
of the method and not o f the ascent, the synthesis. The synthetic  
movement in Engels' hands becomes the factua l description of 
the h is to r ic a l coming-to-be o f the ex is ting  society through i ts  
prehistory., a task which is fundamentally d is t in c t from the 
th e o re tica l comprehension o f th is  ex is ting  socie ty. Although 
what we may c a ll Marx's 'h is to r ic a l m ateria lism ' and his theory 
of value have the same s ta rtin g  po in t, in  labour or productive 
a c t iv ity ,  they should not be treated as the same th ing .
Theoretical p o lit ic a l economy investigates a spec ific  and given 
subject and applies a spe c ific  the o re tica l method in i ts  comprehension 
and where the elements which comprise the synthesis are only the 
decomposed elements o f th is  spe c ific  socie ty, and not the 
elements nor determinations o f other soc ie ties . I t  is  not th a t 
Engels fa i ls  to  adequately d is tingu ish  'the  m a te ria lis t conception 
o f h is to ry ' from the'method o f p o lit ic a l economy' , ra ther he 
subsumes the la t te r  in the former, and sees an actual h is to r ic a l 
period o f 'simple commodity production' as an essentia l constituen t
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of th is  la t te r  method. I f  Marx has as his methodological 
conclusion th a t "an eternal Nature imposed necessity" has its  
presence exhib ited in c a p ita lis t  society in the  form and function ing 
o f the law o f value, then i t  is  an e n tire ly  d iffe re n t method 
which removes th is  law of value to  another supposed form o f 
production where i t  is  considered to  be more 're a l' and to  
apply more 'd ir e c t ly 1. The operation of the law o f value in
i ts  'pure ' form, i .e .  in conditions according to  the model o f 
the simple commodity economy, is  a the o re tica l construct which 
has been derived or 'worked up' from observation of the re a lly  
ex is ting  va lu e -re la tion , which is  manifested in the m illio n s  o f 
acts o f exchange which take place every day in the c a p ita lis t  
society its e lf . .  This fundamental social connection, wherein 
the socia l character o f labour gains i ts  expression, is  abstracted 
from c a p ita lis t  society and set in the model o f the simple commodity 
economy.
Yet i t  was from precise ly the observation of these primary 
re la tio n s  o f exchange th a t the c r i t ic s  o f the 1890's concluded 
tha t no evidence existed fo r  the claim tha t labour was the 
substance o f value. Bohm-Bawerk asked o f Marx:
"Does he s ta r t from an actual exchange re la tio n  or
an imaginary one?" (op. c i t .  p. 103)
Purdy qu an tita tive  considerations prompted the asking of th is  
question and the whole substance o f the alleged 'co n tra d ic tio n '
*
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between Volumes 1 and 3 o f Capital is  i t s e l f  founded upon the 
qu a n tita tive  incongruity o f exchange transactions as they are 
seen to  e x is t in theory (Vol. 1) and in re a lity  (Vol. 3).
I t  is  obvious th a t Bohm-Bawerk himself considers the category 
of abstract labour to  re fe r to  th a t human labour in general which 
'embodies' i t s e l f  in value. That is why he can f in d  no evidence 
fo r  i t s  existence, indeed th a t i t s  existence as value-substance 
is contradicted by em pirical fa c t .  As we have seen, ra ther than 
challenge these purely qu a n tita tive  pre-occupations o f the 
c r i t ic s ,  Engels perpetuates i t  by attempting to  e l i c i t  p rec ise ly  
em pirical evidence fo r  the qu an tita tive  congruity th a t the 
c r i t ic s  demand. , In Anti-D uhring, he goes as fa r  as to  say 
th a t, in one place Duhring is  simply repeating:
" . . .  though in vaguer and more confused terms, as the 
much decried Ricardo-Marxian theory said long ago...
Marx, taking Ricardo's investiga tions as his po int 
o f departure, says: The Value of commodities is
determined by the s o c ia lly  necessary general human 
labour embodfed in them, and th is  in turn is
measured by i ts  du ra tion". (1943; p. 214)
Marx nowhere speaks o f the hybrid 's o c ia lly  necessary general 
human,1abour' .  What he does say, in response to  the purely
quan tita tive  preoccupation in Ricardo's theory o f value is :
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"That the quantity of labour embodied in a commodity 
is  the quantity s o c ia lly  necessary fo r  i t s  p roduc tion ... 
is a d e fin it io n  which concerns only the magnitude of 
value. But the labour which constitu tes the 
substance o f value is  not only uniform, simple, 
average labour; i t  is  the labour o f a p riva te  
ind iv id ua l represented in a d e fin ite  product.
However, the product as value must be the 
embodiment o f socia l labour and, as such, be 
d ire c t ly  convertib le  from one use-value in to  
a l l  o thers". (1972; p. 135)
Marx seems to  move here from a consideration o f the qu a n tita tive  
determination o f value to  i ts  q u a lita tiv e  determ ination, as though 
the former were somehow more primary. But i f  we consider the 
synthetic tra n s itio n s  then the comprehension of the q u a n tita tive  
determination o f value fo llows as a necessary consequence o f 
i ts  q u a lita tiv e  determination as socia l labour, i .e .  i t  becomes 
a question o f 'how much' o f th is  labour. In any event, i t  is  
the consideration o f the magnitude of value in terms o f soc ia l 
, ..labour which makes untenable any .'Ricardo-Marxian' th e o ry o f 
value. As fo r  Engels' attempt to  provide h is to r ic a l evidence 
fo r  the 'd ire c t and re a l' existence o f value p r io r  to  the c a p ita l is t  
system o f production, we may say with Marx:
"The nonsense about the necessity of proving the 
concept of value arises from complete ignorance of 
both the subject dealt w ith and the method of science".
(1962; op. c i t . )
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By the very nature o f his response to  Sombart and Schmidt,
Engels is  seen to  accept tha t i f  value cannot be demonstrated 
as ex is tin g  v ia investiga tion  in to  the qu an tita tive  proportions 
of p re -c a p ita lis t exchange re la tio n s , then i t  cannot be deemed 
to  have a 're a l*  existence at a ll., i .e .  i t  is a purely ' lo g ic a l1 
construct. He thus inaugurates a dualism of e ith e r h is to r ic a l 
or log ica l concerning the re a li ty  o f value which w i l l  be inhe rited  
and perpetuated in more recent con tribu tions to  the debate. This 
inse rtion  o f an 'h is to r ic a l1 dimension in to  the transform ation 
procedure evokes a kind of Golden Age of value, and where everything 
is as i t  should be. In th is  connection we can ask w ith Marx:
“What does he conclude from it?  That he re ,-w ith in  
c a p ita lis t  production, the law o f value suddenly 
changes. That is ,  tha t the law o f value, which 
is  abstracted from c a p ita lis t  production, con trad icts 
c a p ita lis t  phenomena. And what does he put in i ts  
place? -'That ea rly  period of soc ie ty ' (th a t is ,  
precise ly when exchange value in general, the product 
as a commodity, is r hardly developed at a l l ,  and 
consequently, when there is  no law of value e ith e r ) " .
(1972; p. 73)
And because of the extent to  which Engels shares w ith Marx's 
c r i t ic s  the view th a t c a p ita lis t  society i t s e l f  provides l i t t l e  
evidence fo r  the existence o f value, i t  being so "thoroughly 
hidden", and th a t therefore i ts  existence must be demonstrated 
elsewhere, then the fo llow ing  is  also apt:
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" . . .  the law o f value is supposed to  be va lid  fo r  
a type o f production which produces no commodities 
(o r only to  a lim ite d  extent) and not to  be va lid  
fo r  a type o f production which is  based on the 
product as a commodity. The law i t s e l f  as well 
as the commodity as the general form o f the 
product, is  abstracted from c a p ita lis t  society and 
yet i t  is  p recise ly in respect o f c a p ita lis t  
production th a t the law is  held to  be in v a lid " .
( ib id ,  p. 74)
Engels accepts th is  very in v a lid ity  in the act of seeking to  
demonstrate the existence of value in the prehistory o f the 
subject ra ther than in the ex is ting  subject i t s e l f .  The 
debate around the 'h is to r ic a l transform ation problem' is 
thereby inaugurated.
11
Whether or not evidence can be e lic ite d  fo r  the existence of 
an h is to r ic a l period which corresponds to  the model o f the 
simple commodity is in many ways a secondary matter. The 
outcome o f. th is  research makes l i t t l e  .difference to  Marx's 
the o re tica l method because the period in question is  not part 
of the subject of th a t method.. I t  is  not necessary th a t there 
should be an h is to r ia l 'value epoch1', ex is tin g  in the p reh is to ry  
o f the subject o f the inquiry., fo r  the va lue-re la tion  and the 
the o re tica l model o f the simple commodity economy to  re ta in  
th e ir  f u l l  v a l id ity  fo r  the comprehension o f th is  sub ject. But 
th is  does not mean th a t the disclosure o f the real nature of 
value is  not based upon em pirical observation of the o b je c tive ly  
ex is ting  re a li ty .  This is p recise ly what the conceptual analysis
69
comprises, i t  is :
" . . .  the po in t of departure in re a li ty  and hence 
also the po in t o f departure fo r  observation and 
conception. Along the f i r s t  path the f u l l  
conception was evaporated to  y ie ld  an abstract 
d e te rm in a tio n ..." , (op. c i t . )
This "abstract determ ination" e n ta ils  the abstraction of ju s t 
one determining ch a ra c te ris tic  from a series o f d iffe re n t 
in d iv idua ls , namely, the primary socia l re la tio n  in which 
they stand to  one another as owners o f commodities. Other 
determining cha rac te ris tics  have been abstracted from, such as 
whether these ind iv idua ls  are workers or c a p ita lis t  and how they 
re la te  to  one another and to  the other members of th e ir  respective 
classes as these sp e c ific  th ings . These la t te r  re la tion s  may 
be considered as more 'concrete1 determinations and w i l l  be 
included in the course o f the d ia le c tic a l synthesis in i t s  
ascent from abstract to  concrete. But we can see th a t the model 
of the' simple commodity economy is  already there , as i t  were, 7 >fiT 
since a l l  tha t th is  model envisages is  a socia l universe comprised 
of commodity owners who mutually exchange th e ir  various commodities. 
Because th is  fundamental re la tio n  is  th e o re tic a lly  abstracted 
i t  must be conceived o f as an in t r in s ic  pa rt o f a greater whole, 
and its  subsequent negation, as when we proceed to  more concrete 
re la tio n s , must be considered a 'determ inate1 negation, so th a t 
the successding categories and re la tions  are bathed in i ts  l ig h t .
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In th is  manner o f succession through determinate negation in the 
d ia le c tic a l synthesis we have:
" . . .  the abstract determinations leading towards 
a reproduction o f the concrete by way of thought".
(op. c i t . )
Therefore, to  f u l ly  comprehend the manner in which the value 
re la tio n  w i l l  appear in i t s  f in a l form in c a p ita lis t  socie ty, 
i .e .  as the 'p rices o f p roduction ', i t  is  necessary to  abstract 
i ts  foundation and examine i t  in i t s  'unmixed' form and w ithout 
the influences o f, what are a t th is  stage o f the synthesis, 
d is tu rb ing accompanying circumstances. I t  is  only in th is  way 
th a t we are able to  comprehend the subsequent m odifica tions.
In the theo re tica l analysis i t  is  compulsory to  abstract and 
id e n tify  the fundamental re la tio n s  on th e ir  own and away from 
th e ir  context. Because in th a t context they are over-layered 
by other determinate re la tion s  which presuppose precise ly the 
nature o f the fundamental re la tio n  and i ts  development up to  a 
certa in  po in t. "For us" these have s t i l l  to  be developed. I t  
is  w ith th is  in mind tha t Marx informs Kugelmann:
" I t  is  precise ly Ricardo's mistake tha t in his f i r s t  
chapter on value he takes as given a l l  possible categories 
which have s t i l l  to  be developed fo r  us, in order 
to  prove th e ir  conformity w ith the law of value".
(op. c i t . )
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Marx w i l l  prove the conform ity o f a l l  o f the other categories 
with the law o f value because these w i l l  be presented as developed 
expressions o f i t  and the va lu e -re la tion  i t s e l f  w i l l  be seen 
as a necessary precondition fo r  th is  development. The model 
of the simple commodity economy may then be considered as making 
possible or grounding the comprehension o f the subject a fte r  i t  
has been dissolved by th e o re tica l analysis. The path o f 
comprehension or the d ia le c tic a l synthesis would then comprise 
th is  the o re tica l model transcending o r negating i ts  abstract 
id e n tity  and emerging in to  a connected un ity  or nexus, and in 
which context i t s  ‘moment o f tru th *  would be preserved as an 
in t r in s ic  part o f the concrete whole.
This movement, where the va lu e -re la tion  or the tw o-fo ld  character 
of labour has a ’ p iv o ta l1 s ign ificance , shows tha t the subject 
of investiga tion  is  ‘ se lf-con ta ined ’ , o r, th a t i t  forms both the 
s ta rtin g -p o in t o f the analysis and the conclusion o f the synthesis. 
A ‘ un ive rsa l’ socia l re la tio n  is  thus presupposed because in the 
subject under investiga tion  the exchange re la tio n  extends to  
a l l , exchange value is  the 'a ll-s id e d  m ediation’ . The subject 
is a system o f production which is  based upon the product o f 
labour being an exchange value. And i t  is  only because o f the 
real existence of th is  universal re la tio n  th a t the analysis is  
able to  disclose th a t what is  being dea lt w ith is  e sse n tia lly  
socia l labour, or a pecu lia r form or character o f socia l labour:
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"But the different kinds of individual 
labour represented in these particular use- 
values, in fact become labour in general, 
and in this way sociallabour, only by actual­
ly being exchanged for one another... The 
point of departure is not the labour of the 
individuals considered as social labour, 
but on the contrary, with labour that proves 
that it is universal social labour only by 
the supersession of its original character 
in the exchage process. Universal social 
labour is consequently not a ready-made pre­
requisite, but an emerging result."
(Marx ,^.1981b + pi45 ; ;myfemp . )
Thus it is the exchange process itself which causes the 
reduction of the social aspect of the labour of individ­
uals to appear as its general human or abstract character. 
Therefore this form of appearance of the social character 
of labour is the result of the mediation effected by the 
exchange process, a result which is to be distinguished 
from the physiological fact of the homogeneity of all ess­
entially ’human’ labour. That is to say the social equal­
isation of labour is to be distinguished from its natural 
or ’generic’ reduction.
It is precisely the failure to distinguish these different 
levels of abstraction which permits Engels to formulate an 
’historical’ version of the transformation, i.e. he needs 
must adopt the general ’physiological’ abstraction and 
forego the historically specific ’social’ one.
Engels ponders the actual process of transformation in his 
letter to Sombart, cited earlier, and says :
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" . . .  This is a very in te res tin g  po in t, about which 
Marx him self does not say much. But his way.of 
viewing things is not a doctrine but a method.
I t  does not provide ready made dogmas, but c r i te r ia  
fo r  fu r th e r research and the method fo r  th is  
research. Here therefore a certa in  amount of 
work has to  be carried out, since Marx did not 
elaborate i t  himself in his f i r s t  d ra ft.  F irs t 
o f a l l  we have the statements on pages 177-179, 
which prove th a t the concept, [ i . e .  o f value] has 
more re a li ty  than you ascribe to  i t " ,  (op. c i t . )
But the movement which inaugurates the research, the analysis, 
has previously taken place before the synthetic tra n s itio n s  tha t 
Engels re fers to  is carried out,. Further research or fu r th e r 
analysis would not then be o f the given subject o f the investiga tion  
since the ana ly tica l ' l i m i t 1 o f th is  subject has already been 
reached, i .e .  the analysis has descended to  the fundamental 
re la tio n  or cond ition . Engels can only be re fe rr in g  to , a lb e it 
un w ittin g ly , " fu rth e r research" which is  outwith or beyond the 
d e fin ite  perimeters o f th is  spe c ific  subject. I t  is  o f fu r th e r 
sign ificance here th a t what Marx "does not say much" about is  
the manner of the h is to r ic a l de riva tion  o f value, and th a t 
Chapters 8, 9 and 10 of Capital Vol. 3 are devoted to  the 
methodological derivation o f value and, in p a rtic u la r, to  i ts
existence as prices of production. The textua l reference made
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by Engels in the above quotation re fers to  Chapter 10 of 
Capital Vol. 3 and contains the contentious and much re ferred 
to 'p r iu s ' quote to  which Engels makes sp e c ific  reference.
We sha ll c ite  th is  passage as i t  is  presented by Engels in the 
Supplement:
"'The exchange o f commodities at th e ir  values, or 
approximately at th e ir  values, thus requires a 
. much lower stage than th e ir  exchange at prices 
o f production, which requires a d e fin ite  level o f 
c a p ita lis t  p roduc tion ... Apart from the domination 
o f prices and price movement by the law o f value, 
i t  is  qu ite  appropriate to  regard the values o f 
commodities as not only th e o re tic a lly  but also 
h is to r ic a lly  prius to  the prices o f p ro d u c tio n ... '
Had Marx had an opportunity to  go over the th ird  
volume once more, he would doubtless have extended 
th is  passage considerably", (op. c i t . ,  p. 896,
Engels' emph.)
As we have been attempting to  show, i t  is  methodologically 
impossible*that Marx means by these 'h is to r ic a l ly  p r iu s ' or 
'A r is to tle a n ' values the same th ing  as he means when discussing 
value as a feature o f the c a p ita lis t  socie ty. For purely 
methodological reasons he cannot mean the same th ing , yet 
Engels takes i t  th a t he does and the h is to r ic a l transform ation 
is  treated, as being co-founded by Marx as well as Engels. But, 
in any event, Marx s p e c if ic a lly  mentions th a t th is  is the case 
outwith or "apart from" the domination o f prices and price  movement
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by the law of value, which 'va lu e 1 and which 'law ' apply only 
in the realm where socia l u n ive rsa lity  or t ru ly  's o c ia l' 
production is operative.. The law o f value is a 're g u la to r ' 
and only applies in re la tio n  to  the to ta l i t y  which i t  regulates 
and enables to  cohere.
P re -c a p ita lis t 'va lues' may have a place in the 'h is to r ic a l ' 
exposition, but they are not a part o f the theo re tica l comprehension 
of the circumscribed subject. When we said tha t the commodity 
tha t beings and ends the methodological inqu iry  was a 'c a p ita l is t ic a l ly  
produced' commodity i t  was meant to  s ig n ify  th a t we are dealing 
w ith a c a p ita l is t ic a l ly  determined va lue -re la tion , i .e .  th a t i t  
is  characterised above a l l  by u n iv e rs a lity . When the subject 
is  presented 'fo r  in q u iry ' i .e .  as i t  ex is ts in the here and now 
and before the analysis has been undertaken, the work o f these 
p re -c a p ita lis t values has already been done. Both subject and 
appropriate method presuppose a given level o f productive fo rces, 
which 'ground' or 'form ' the subject. Therefore Marx's abstractions 
’ ’ Of the components or ind iv idua l elements o f th is  subject do"* 
not tra ve l back in time but are contemporaneous with the subject 
as i t  e x is ts . Therefore the comprehension of the subject does 
not require , in i t i a l l y ,  the comprehension of i ts  p reh is to ry . The 
comprehension of the s ign ificance of p r io r  development, or o f 
what is  decisive in p r io r  development, fo r  the subject, cannot 
take place before the subject i t s e l f  has developed and is
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comprehended. And i t  is  impossible fo r  the abstract determinations 
of the subject to  p re -ex is t the subject i t s e l f  since these 
determinations in themselves:
" . . .  express the forms o f being, the cha rac te ris tics  
of existence, and often only ind iv idua l sides o f th is  
sp e c ific  socie ty, th is  subject and th a t th is  society 
no means begins only at the po int where one can speak 
o f i t  as such" . (Marx, 1981a; p. 106)
For us i t  begins w ith the model o f the simple commodity economy.
And Marx goes on to  say th a t there fore :
" I t  would be unfeasible and wrong to  le t  the economic 
categories fo llo w  one another in the same sequence as 
th a t in which they were h is to r ic a lly  d e c is ive .. Their 
sequence is  determined, ra the r, by th e ir  re la tio n  to 
one another in  modern bourgeouis socie ty, which is 
precise ly the opposite o f th a t which seems to  be 
th e ir  natural order or which corresponds to  th e ir  
h is to r ic a l development. The po int is  not the
h is to r ic a l pos ition  o f the''economic re la tion s  in ' '
the succession o f d iffe re n t forms of s o c ie ty .. . .
Rather th e ir  order w ith in  modern bourgeouis soc ie ty".
( ib id ,  p. 107)
When Marx speaks o f the sequence being the 'opposite1 o f the 
h is to r ic a l emergence o f the categories i t  is  the c learest 
statement yet concerning the d is tin c tio n  between the movement 
o f the the o re tica l method and the movement of the h is to r ic a l 
process. For what else is  Marx describing here in an tithe s is  
to  h is to r ic a l development but the d ia le c tic a l synthesis.
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"Value", or the universal va lue -re la tion  th a t is intended when 
Marx speaks o f th is  category, is  a ch a ra c te ris tic  only o f the 
most modern kind of socie ty, and was not 'h is to r ic a l ly  dec is ive ' 
u n t i l  the development o f the c a p ita lis t  system of production. 
Thus:
"The c a p ita lis t  epoch is  therefore characterised by 
th is ,  th a t labour-power takes in theeyeso f the 
labourer himself the form o f a commodity which is  
his property; his labour consequently becomes 
wage-labour. On the other hand, i t  is  only from 
th is  moment th a t the product o f labour un ive rsa lly  
becomes a commodity", ( ib id ,  1983; p. 167)
Yet is  is  p recise ly th is  mature and h igh ly developed universal 
re la tio n  which forms the po in t o f departure fo r  the d ia le c t ic a l 
synthesis, or of the process o f coming-to-be of contemporary 
re a li ty ,  and which is  "p rec ise ly  the opposite of th e ir  na tura l 
order or which corresponds to  th e ir  h is to r ic a l development".
The methodological 'ascent' is  thus to  be distinguished from the 
h is to r ic a l 'ascent' and therefore the 'va lue ' which e x is ts  in 
the methodological account cannot be the value which is  
h is to r ic a lly  'p r iu s '.  A ll th a t remains is to  say th a t when 
Marx speaks o f these 'p r iu s ' values he is  re fe rr in g  to  them as 
embodiments o f ind iv idua l labour-time and not socia l labour-tim e. 
These former values do not appear as a part o f the method and 
are subsequently re ferred to  as 'embryonic'. But, as was noted
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above, we cannot d is tingu ish  what embryonic features w i l l  be 
s ig n if ic a n t fo r  adulthood u n t i l  we are fa m ilia r  w ith the more 
developed features themselves.
This conclusion must create a problem fo r  forms of ‘ evo lu tiona ry1 
or o rgan ic is t versions o f Marx's method and where the 'process' 
nature o f the method is  said to  p a ra lle l or be a 're f le c t io n ' o f 
the process nature o f Nature and/or h is to ry . For example, how 
would th is  version o f the method explain th a t the va lue -re la tion  
ex is ts  p r io r  to  the prices o f production in the th e o re tica l 
method but does not e x is t p r io r  to  them in the h is to r ic a l process?
That value, as a d is t in c t  stage in  the development of the prices 
of production, and which la t te r  are a feature only o f the most 
modern soc ie ties , presupposes as a category, the formation o f 
these prices of production in the method, but cannot presuppose 
them in fa c t, in h istory? A ll o f th is ,  i .e .  considered th e o re tic a lly , 
the development of the value-concept or o f 'v a lu e ', in the presence o f 
the prices o f production, would be incomprehensible to  Engels, 
p re fe rring  as he does the 'm a te r ia lis t in te rp re ta tio n ' to  the 
d ia le c tic a l method.
Hence the value re la tio n  co-exists w ith o r, be tte r, ex is ts  as 
the prices o f production, when the more concrete re la tion s  o f 
wage-labour and 'many c a p ita ls ' have been superimposed onto th is  
fundamental re la tio n  in the course o f the synthesis. But th is  
fundamental re la tio n  was always there, ex is ting  as an essentia l 
part or as a presupposition o f the more fa m ilia r  re la tio n s , and 
was teased-out or separated by the the o re tica l method. 'Value'
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is  expressed as 'p rices o f production' as the more concrete 
category, and ra ther than attempt to  prove the independent 
existence of value as Engels does, fo r  Marx:
" . . .  science consists in showing how the law of 
value operates", ( ib id ,  1962; op. c i t . )
Therefore the 'separation ' o f value from the prices o f production 
is  a purely a r t i f i c ia l  the o re tica l measure, undertaken to  aid 
the comprehension o f the e x is tin g  concrete re la tio n s . And 
thus value does not e x is t before nor alongside o f the prices 
o f production but ex is ts  as or in  the form o f the prices of 
production. Engels, and many w rite rs  down to  the present day, 
see th is  the o re tica l separation as a re a lly  ex is ting  r separation. 
Obviously the correct conception o f the substance of value is  
what is  at issue here.
Given th is  methodological d iv ide , i t  is  curious th a t we should 
have the ..following from someone who is  popularly recognised to  
emphasise the Hegelian side o f Marx's method:
" . . .  the reader should not imagine th a t economic 
categories are anything other than the re fle c tio n s  
o f real re la tio n s , or th a t the log ica l deriva tion  
o f the categories could proceed independently of 
th e ir  h is to r ic la  d e riva tio n ". (Rosdolsky, op. c i t .  p. 115)
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Rosdolsky proceeds to  quote as methodologically exemplary the 
passage from Engels' reyiew of.M arx's Contribution which we 
quoted e a r lie r ,  and where Engels states, among other th ings, 
th a t the th e o re tica l method is :
" . . .  simply the re fle c tio n , in abstract and th e o re tic a lly  
consistent form, o f the course of h is to ry ,"  and tha t 
" . . .  though the re fle c tio n  is  corrected, i t  is  
corrected in accordance w ith the laws provided by 
the actual course of h is to ry " , (op. c i t .  my emphasis.)
That Rosdolsky considers th is  an accurate descrip tion o f Marx's 
method is  shown when he suggests tha t th is  po in t made by Engels 
is endorsed by Marx himself when he provides:
" . . .  p a ra lle l to  the log ica l deriva tion  o f value 
and money - a h is to r ic a l deriva tion  of these same 
concepts, in which Marx confronts the resu lts  o f 
his abstract analysis w ith actual h is to r ic a l 
development", ( ib id )
What does i t  mean to  say tha t the "re su lts " o f Marx's d ia le c tic a l 
method are corrected " in  accordance w ith ", or are 'confronted b y ', 
"actual h is to r ic a l development"? "Actual h is to r ic a l development" 
is already given in the shape of the presupposed subject and is  
what provides the concrete subject-m atter fo r  the conceptual 
analysis. The subject is  thus 's e lf - re fe r r in g ',  i t  is  i t s  own 
yardstick w ith regard to  what 'c o r re c tly ' or 'in c o rre c t ly ' 
pertains to  i t .
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'C orrection ' is  therefore b u i l t - in ,  and no 'con fron ta tio n ' 
can take place between the resu lts  o f the application of the 
the o re tica l method and 'actua l h is to r ic a l development'. I f  the 
synthetic tra n s itio n s  are the reverse o f the ana ly tic  and 
'm irro r ' these, and the a n a ly tic  tra n s itio n s  themselves based 
upon em pirical observation of the ex is tin g  subject, then the 
synthetic movement is  governed by determ iniations which have had 
th e ir  'actua l h is to r ic a l existence' v e r if ie d . I t  is  only th is  
'actua l h is to r ic a l existence' which allows the d ia le c tic a l synthesis 
in the f i r s t  place, since i t  is  i t s  presupposition. As fo r  
h is to r ic a l process which ex is ts  'ou ts ide ' the subject - i t s  
preh istory - then in th is  case the disclosed nature o f the subject 
i t s e l f  t e l ls  us th a t universal socia l re la tions  are in the 
process of being formed and comprise the preh istory o f the sub ject. 
The analyst knows where h is to ry  is  developing to , because he has 
i ts  resu lts  ready-to-hand, and these resu lts  themselves imply, 
e.g. th a t:
"The d isso lu tion  o f ’ a l l  products and a c t iv it ie s  in to r ' 
exchange values presupposes the d isso lu tion  o f a l l  
fixed  personal (h is to r ic )  re la tio n s  o f dependence 
in production, as w ell as the a ll-s id e d  dependence 
o f the producers on one another". (Marx, 1981a; p. 156)
Before the d e ta ils  o f the p reh is to ry  o f the subject have been 
ac tua lly  addressed, the task o f comprehending the subject i t s e l f  
has to  have been completed and thereby illum inates prec ise ly  what
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in th is  preh isto ry is  worthy o f a tten tion  and considered 
s ig n if ic a n t fo r  the higher development. The inqu iry  has begun 
w ith the o b je c tive ly  ex is tin g  subject and there are no separate 
and autonomous 'matters o f fa c t1 to  which the s c ie n t i f ic a l ly  
correct method must adapt to  co lla te  i ts  re s u lts . Whatever 
'actua l h is to r ic a l development' is  taken to  mean, i t  cannot 
i t s e l f  represent an independent body o f tru th  to  which Marx's 
resu lts  must be compared because the categories and determinations 
which comprise the ex is tin g  subject are contemporaneous and 
coextensive w ith th is  subject i t s e l f ;  given w ith i t .
(What,treatment suggested by Engels, and echoed here by Rosdolsky, 
suggests, is  th a t the th e o re tica l model o f the simple commodity 
economy would have to  be v e r if ie d  w ith regard to  i t s  leg itim acy 
by h is to r ic a l research in to  the actual existence o f such an 
economy. Thus, and th is  is  o f fundamental s ign ificance in the 
present debate, i f  th is  h is to r ic a l evidence is  perceived not to  
have been secured, then the judgement is  tha t Marx's category o f 
value is a purely log ica l construction . There is  there fore  
real and fundamental necessity to  disassociate the 'German d ia le c t ic a l 
method' from the 'm a te ra lis t ' in te rp re ta tio n  o f i t  carried  out 
by Engels in the name of Marx. For example, i t  is  not because, 
as Engels would have i t ,  th a t value is  so 'deeply hidden' th a t 
we must have recourse to  an e a r lie r ,  more transparent, re a l i ty  
in order to  discover 'd ire c t ly  rea l va lu e '. 'Outer' r e a l i ty ,  
the appearance of the subject i t s e l f ,  is  what reveals 'in n e r ' 
re a li ty  or the essence of the subject:
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"R ea lity  then, or a c tu a lity , is  not the essence, 
alone, nor is  i t  the m anifestation alone, but is  
the essence which manifests i t s e l f .  The 
external world, the m anifestation, is  not to  be 
regarded as a v e il which hides and obscures the 
inner being, but on the con trary,' as revealing 
the inner being and bringing i t  f u l ly  to  
knowledge and l ig h t .  Thus to  know the outer 
is  to  know the inner, fo r  the outer is  precisely 
the reve la tion  o f the inner. I t  is  the inner".
(Stace, op. c i t .  p. 212)
Hence the disclosure o f the 'in n e r1 is  not brought about by 
abandoning the subject o f the inqu iry  and seeking i t s  determinations 
elsewhere, in the process o f i t s  h is to r ic a l formation, but by 
the methodological treatment o f the subject i t s e l f  w ith in  i t s  
own perimeters. With regard to  the d is t in c tio n  th a t is  to  be 
maintained between the method o f the o re tica l inqu iry  and the 
actual h is to r ic a l process, Marx remarks:
"Money may e x is t and has existed in h is to r ic a l time 
before c a p ita l, banks, wage-labour, e tc . came 
in to  being. In th is  respect i t  can be said the re fo re , 
th a t the simpler categories express re la tions  
predominating in an immature e n tity  or subordinate 
re la tion s  in a more advanced e n tity ; re la tions  
which already existed h is to r ic a lly  before the e n tity  
had developed the aspects expressed in a more 
concrete category. The procedure o f abstract 
reasoning which advances from the simplest to  more 
complex concepts to  th a t extent conforms to  actual 
h is to r ic a l development". (Marx, 1981b; p. 208)
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I t  is  "to  th a t extent" th a t the method and actual h is to r ic a l 
development coincide, i .e .  to  the extent th a t in each case the 
movement is  from the simple to  the combined. But th is  does 
not mean, and should not be taken to  mean, tha t the method has 
become synonomous w ith or re fle c ts  actual h is to r ic a l development. 
The categories th a t comprise the subject are given a ll-a t-on ce  
and are the sp e c ific  and unique elements o f th is  t o t a l i t y .  They 
are dissolved and restored as perta in ing to  th is  subject i t s e l f  
and, as was noted, "the po in t is  not the h is to r ic  pos ition  o f 
the economic re la t io n s .. .  ra ther th e ir  order w ith in  modern 
bourgeouis so c ie ty ". What th is  means is  th a t i t  is  the order 
which the re la tions  and the corresponding categories have now 
which prescribes th e ir  unfolding in the the o re tica l method, not 
the order they had then in the process o f th e ir  h is to r ic a l 
formation, and:
" . . .  hence belong to  the h is to ry  o f i t s  form ation, but 
in no way to  i ts  contemporary h is to ry , i .e .  not to  
.the,, real system o f the mode o f production ruled by 
i t  ( i .e .  c a p ita l) .  While, e .g. the f l ig h t  o f the 
serfs to  the c it ie s  is  one o f the h is to r ic  conditions 
and presuppositions o f urbanism, i t  is  not a co n d ition , 
not a moment o f the re a li ty  o f developed c it ie s ,  but 
belongs ra ther to  th e ir  past presuppositions, to  the 
presuppositions o f th e ir  becoming which are suspended 
in th e ir  being". ( ib id ,  1981a; p. 459)
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Or again; the re a lly  dominating economist in the la t te r  h a lf 
o f the 18th century was- Adam Smith. James S tuart, who posed 
the problem o f c a p ita lis t  p r o f i t  fa r  more 'h is to r ic a l ly 1 than 
Smith, and who investigated the process by which cap ita l came 
in to  being, was soon fo rgo tten . Marx points to  the essentia l 
d iffe rence between the two in the fo llow ing  manner when he says 
o f S tua rt;
"His service to  the theory o f cap ita l is  tha t he 
shows how the process o f separation takes place 
between the conditions o f production, as the 
property o f a d e fin ite  c lass, and labour-power.
He gives a great deal o f a tten tion  to  the genesis 
o f c a p ita l . . .  He examines the process p a rt ic u la r ly  
in a g ricu ltu re ; and he r ig h t ly  considers th a t 
manufacturing industry proper only through th is  
process o f separation in a g ricu ltu re .
In Adam Smith's w riting s  th is  process of separation 
is  assumed to  be already completed", ( ib id , 1972; p. 43)
Hence...we do not require to  describe the. f l ig h t  o f the serfs to ... 
the c it ie s  in order to  comprehend the nature o f c i t ie s .  On 
the other hand, universal value re la tion s  form the basis o f both 
the re a lly  ex is ting  subject and o f the the o re tica l method. 
Therefore, given th is  foundation, what the method demonstrates 
is  tha t development in r e a li ty ,  as well as in the method i t s e l f ,  
is  a necessary development; th a t the process o f development 
of re a li ty  is  driven by con trad ic tion  and must therefore develop
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as an expression o f th is  con trad ic tion . Here again though, 
‘ s o c ia l1 production is presupposed, or so c ia lly  mediated p riva te  
production is presupposed, the process o f i t s  formation fa l l in g  
outwith the te rra in  o f conceptual analysis. What the analysis 
uncovers is  the nature or substance of th is  universal re la tio n  
and which has p ivo ta l s ign ificance fo r  the d ia le c tic a l synthesis, 
but the analysis does not proceed beyond the h is to r ic a l incidence 
of th is  re la tio n  to  'take in ' the process o f i ts  form ation.
This would simply be another way of losing the unique determ ination 
of value, which has such p ivo ta l s ign ificance , and proceeding 
beyond i t  to  the ' f i r s t  and simple re la tio n  which is  h is to r ic a l ly  
ac tu a lly  ava ilab le ',. Then the subject o f inqu iry  would no 
longer be the c a p ita lis t  process of production, which is  based, 
on exchange, but the process o f exchange i t s e l f ,  in i t s  h is to r ic a l 
en tire ty ,. We have been forced to  conclude th a t 'a c tu a l' h is to r ic a l 
development re fers to  the preh istory or formation o f the subject 
since, in terms of contemporary h is to ry , the subject is  s e lf -  
cortainedand has i ts  own h is to ry  present w ith in  i t .  This being 
the case, i t  is  convenient at th is  po irt to  enquire as to  the 
manner in which th is  preh istory o f the subject is  incorporated 
by Marx in to  his 'method of p resen ta tion '. To th is  end, i t  
is again necessary to  quote tha t passage where Marx makes the 
c ruc ia l d is tin c tio n  between 'in q u iry ' and 'p resen ta tio n ':
"Of course the method o f presentation must d if fe r  
from tha t o f inquiry,. The la t te r  has to  appropriate 
the m ateria l in deta il., to  analyse i t s  d iffe re n t 
forms of development, to  trace out th e ir  inner
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connection. Only a fte r th is  work has been done, 
can the actual movement be adequately described.
I f  th is  is done successfully, i f  the l i f e  of the 
subject-m atter is id e a lly  re flec ted  as in a m irro r, 
then i t  may appear as i f  we had before us a mere 
p r io r i construction", (op. c i t . )
I t  is  the d iv is io n  we have ins isted upon between the province 
o f the the o re tica l method and the 'actual h is to r ic a l development' 
o f the subject which causes th is  appearance o f an 'a p r io r i '  
construction.. I t  is  th is  d iv is io n  which also allows us to  
expand upon our d e fin it io n  o f the 'method o f p resen ta tion ', 
as promised e a r l ie r .  When we f i r s t  considered the d is t in c tio n  
between 'in q u iry ' and 'presentation ' i t  was treated as being 
analogous to  the an a ly tic /syn the tic  d is tin c tio n  which comprises 
the th e o re tica l method. I t  is  now convenient to  give the 
'method of presentation1 an e n tire ly  separate determ ination.
This was not possible e a r lie r  since then we had not f u l ly  
explicated the method and could not therefore d is tingu ish  i t  
from 'actua l h is to rica l-deve lopm ent'. Of course what was said 
e a r lie r  in tre a tin g  the 'method o f presentation' is  s t i l l  e n tire ly  
va lid  fo r  the process o f conceptual synthesis w ith which i t  was 
id e n tif ie d .
We know from the 1857 Inroduction tha t Marx subscribed to  the 
method comprised analysis and synthesis as being 's c ie n t i f ic a l ly  
co rrec t' and therefore as the method to  be u t il is e d  in the process 
o f comprehending the subject,; as a 'r ic h  to ta l i t y  of many 
determinations and re la tions '.. But the new determination we wish
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to  give the 'method o f presentation1 invovles reading Marx as 
saying in the quoted passage th a t the 'method o f in q u iry 1 
comprises both analysis and synthesis and is the re fo re  to  be 
considered as containing the whole o f the method. This a lte ra tio n  
is the more eas ily  made i f  we remember tha t the "inn e r connection" 
would not be disclosed by the 'method of in q u iry ' i f  i t  were 
treated as representing the conceptual analysis alone. On the 
other hand, i f  the 'method o f in q u iry ' is  treated as comprising 
the whole o f the method then 'the  actual movement o f the subject- 
m atter'., which incorporates the coming-to-be or the formation 
o f the subject, is  now ava ilab le  because the the o re tica l method 
(o f inqu iry ) has provided the comprehension o f the subject and 
the resu lts  o f th is  comprehension are at hand and can be 
'presented '. The 'method o f presentation ' would now be taken 
to  mean what Marx ac tu a lly  presents to  his readers once he has 
analysed and synthesised his subject and obtained the resu lts  
o f his inq u iry . I f  we required some kind of in troduction  as 
to  vhat the newly defined 'method o f presentation ' saw as i ts  
function , or what exac tly  I t  Intended to  do, as a movement which 
is  now d is t in c t from analysis and synthesis, then the fo llow ing  
may serve as a beginning:
"This determination o f value, then, presupposes a 
given h is to r ic  stage of the mode o f socia l production 
and is i t s e l f  something given w ith tha t mode, hence 
a h is to r ic  re la tio n . At the same tim e, ind iv idua l 
moments of value-determination develop in e a r lie r  
stages in the h is to r ic  process of socia l production 
and appear as i ts  re s u lt" ,  ( ib id , p. 252)
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The 'method o f presentation ' is  the process whereby these 
'in d iv id u a l moments o f value-determ ination' are now recognised 
fo r  what they are and incorporated w ith the resu lts  o f the 
nature o f the subject its e lf , .  We know th a t i t  is  only 
comprehension o f the subject in the f i r s t  place which elucidates 
these ' ind iv idua l moments o f value-determ ination' fo r  what they 
are. The 'method o f presentation ' is  now the reading o f the 
te x t o f the past or the .p reh is to ry  o f the subject in the l ig h t  
o f i t s  comprehension,. I t  is  l i t e r a l ly  the presentation o f the 
past in  the l ig h t  o f the present,. I t  consists of describing 
the 'actua l h is to r ic a l development1 o f the formation o f the 
subject and to  th is  extent would constitu te  a separate process, 
to  be distinguished from-the method of the o re tica l comprehension 
as such,. As Marx says, "only a fte r  th is  work has been done" 
would the l i f e  of the subject-m atter be presented in i t s  e n tire ty , 
i .e .  'the  method o f presentation ' now provides 'the  whole s to ry ',  
as i t  were. The 're s u lt ' o f h is to ry  being known in advance, or 
the given subject having been comprehended, means exactly th a t 
the destina tion  o f the 'method o f presentation1 is known in 
advance, i .e .  the present, and thus gives an 'a p r io r i '  appearance 
to  the manner o f th is  presentation. But i t  would be wrong to  
assume th a t 'a c tu a l' h is to r ic a l development, in and o f i t s e l f ,  
can reveal i t s  own nature or where i t  is  going, before the re su lts  
o f the analysis and synthesis o f the subject are known. We 
cannot acquire or 'g lean' our method by at f i r s t  going to  the
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h is to r ic a l process 'raw' as i t  were, since what th is  is  a 
process o f is  only in te l l ig ib le  in the wake of the comprehension 
o f h is to ry 's  re s u lt.  And th is  re s u lt i t s e l f  is  to  be considered 
the product o f an active  'working-up' o f concepts which a lte rs  
our knowledge o f the ob ject, a process of production o f knowledge, 
which is  not to  be confused or id e n tif ie d  w ith the passive 
re fle c tio n  o f the laws of Nature and h is to ry . For Marx i t  is  
re fle c tio n  on a given subject, not a contemplative re fle c tio n  o f 
the sub ject. As fa r  as concerns the app lica tion  o f the d if fe re n t 
re su lts  obtained through the employment o f these d if fe re n t 
meanings o f re f le c t io n :
"Bourgeouis society is  the most developed and the 
most complex h is to r ic  organisation o f production.
The categories which express i ts  re la tio n s , the 
comprehension o f i t s  s truc tu re , thereby also 
allows ins igh ts  in to  the structures and the 
re la tio n s  o f production o f a l l  o f the vanished 
socia l formations out o f whose ru ins and elements 
i t  b u i l t  i t s e l f  up", ( ib id ,  p. 105)
This stands in complete and u tte r  contrast to  the 'h is to r ic a l ' 
method as described by Engels where i t  is  "the structures and 
re la tion s  o f production of a l l  the vanished socia l formations" 
which allow ins igh t in to  bourgeouis socie ty.
From what has been said before i t  would be feas ib le  to  envisage 
th a t Engels considers th a t when Marx re fers to  the success o f the
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method being demonstrated in the fa c t tha t i t  'r e f le c ts 1 the 
subject-matter., as in a ^m irro r ', th a t s c ie n t if ic  tru th  is  
ava ilab le  in the outward aspect o f the development of the subject, 
and th a t by simply reproducing or m irro ring  the course of the 
development o f the subject, and o f re g is te rin g  i ts  ' f l u x ' ,  we 
have attained to  a descrip tion o f the d ia le c t ic  o f re a lity  and 
a demonstration of tha t o f thought. A ty p ic a l example o f th is  
approach is  provided by Engels in his preface to  Capital Vol. 3 
where he s ta tes :
" I t  is  se lf-ev iden t th a t where things and th e ir
in te rre la tio n s  are conceived * not as fixed  but as
changing, th e ir  mental images, the ideas, are
likew ise subject to  change and transform ation;
and they are not encapsulated in r ig id  d e fin it io n s ,
but are developed in th e ir  h is to r ic a l or log ica l
process o f formation. This makes c lea r, o f course,
why in the beginning o f his f i r s t  book Marx
proceeds from the simple production o f commodities
as the h is to r ic a l premise, u ltim a te ly  to  a rrive
from th is  basis to  cap ita l -  why he proceeds from
the simple commodity instead o f a lo g ic a lly  and
h is to r ic a lly  secondary form, from an already
c a p ita l is t ic a l ly  modified commodity". (Marx, 1984;, p. 14)
But, as we now know, Marx does not proceed from the "simple 
commodity" and Engels' conclusion is  in complete contrast to  the 
real s ta rtin g  po in t. Imagining fo r  a moment tha t value and i t s  
substance can'be derived by d issection of the 'sim ple ' commodity 
te s t if ie s  to  the complete absence o f the correct conception o f 
abstract labour in "the m a te ria lis t conception of h is to ry " as
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developed and explicated by Engels. Thus, m ethodologically, 
the attempt to  give an 'h is to r ic a l ' dimension to  the transform ation 
problem is  untenable.
Of course i t  may be argued by some tha t Marx to  some extent comes 
to  the rescue of Engels and the c lass ica l economists, and what 
we have considered as th e ir  erroneous conception of abstract 
labour., by himself pointing to  the actual 'p h ys ica l' existence 
o f abstract labour in  'labour, as such' or 's im p le ', unsk illed  
labour, which is mobile over a va rie ty  o f use-values or useful 
functions. In the fo llow ing chapter we sha ll go on to  consider 
th is  claim , before applying the resu lts  arrived at in both o f 
thesechapters to  the methodological so lu tion  to  the 'transform ation 
problem' in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "SIMPLE1 LABOUR
The o f f ic ia l  Soviet biography of Engels says th a t in the 
1895 Supplement to  Capital Vol. 3, he:
" . . .  rejected the bourgeouis economists denial o f the 
ob jective nature of value. With i l lu s tra t io n s  from 
h is to ry  he showed the changes th a t had occurred in the 
exchange of commodities since i ts  o r ig in a l form, 
simple commodity production". (1974; p. 366)
The a ffirm a tion  or the denial o f the ob jective nature o f value 
is the crux of the d iv is ion  w ith in  the debate around the 'h is to r ic a l 
transformation problem1 between the 'h is to r ic a l ly  re a l' or the 
purely 'lo g ic a l' status o f value.
Engels' argument fo r  the ob jective nature o f value becomes 
enshrined in his advocacy of the existence o f a p re -c a p ita lis t 
'value epoch' or a period of simple commodity production where, 
he to ld  Sombart, value had a "d ire c t and real existence".
Obviously th is  must presuppose the existence of the 'd ire c t  
and re a l' substance of value, or th a t which 'grounds' i t ,  and 
id e n tif ie s  th is  substance as unchanging between cap ita lism  and 
i ts  p reh is to ry .
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There is  a more modern view which tre a ts  the substance of 
value - conceived as human labour in general o r, more simply, 
general labour - as only having a re a lity  in the developed 
c a p ita lis t  economy. In one version ; the 'abstractness' of 
labour is not to  be considered as a purely 'lo g ic a l ' abstraction 
from the d iffe re n t kinds o f actual labour which ex is ts  in 
r e a li ty .  I t  says th a t:
" . . .  the abstract labour is taken to  be actual (concrete) 
labour th a t has become independent o f, and hence 
homogeneous across, various use-values, and which comes 
in to  ex is tence ... only w ith the advent o f cap ita lism .
From the standpoint o f p o lit ic a l economy, the re fore , 
abstract labour is labour as such. I t  is  in Marx's 
words, 'the  general p o s s ib il ity  o f wealth as subject 
and a c t iv i t y '" .  (G leicher, 1983; p. 107)
This perspective is not incompatible w ith Engels' view only 
th a t, whereas fo r  Engels value was 'deeply hidden', now, i ts  
sustance has come in to  view. Neither does th is  modern view 
necessarily deny the existence of a period of simple commodity 
production. But in th is  la t te r  period there is  not an observable 
substance of value, and testimony fo r  the existence of abstract 
labour is confined to  observation of the exchange transactions 
themselves. Again, the fa c t tha t the substance of value is  
now to  be considered a palpable ex is ten t does not change the view 
of tha t substance as being a physio logica l e n t ity ,  only th a t, 
whereas previously th is  e n tity  had a m ultitude o f d if fe re n t 
incarnations, as varied as the ind iv idua ls  who pa rtic ipa ted  in 
the exchange process, now i t  has i t s e l f  become incarnated in a
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class o f ind iv idua ls . Abstract labour i t s e l f  has come in to  
existence. This shares w ith Engels the claim fo r  the ' r e a l i t y 1 
of value although would consider the transform ation of values 
in to  prices o f production as a process which takes place w ith in  
c a p ita lis t  society i t s e l f ,  values and prices co -ex is ting , and 
not separated by any h is to r ic a l d iv ide . In sum, i t  perpetuates 
the physiological conception o f abstract labour and sees the 
real existence of value as perta in ing to  a fa c tu a l, physical 
existence of i ts  substance. In contrast to  th is  is  the view 
which, while id e n tify in g  the existence o f 'la b o u r1, as a homogenous 
and so c ia lly  mobile substance tha t is  exclusive to  cap ita lism , 
nevertheless considers tha t th is  only provides the necessary 
m aterial substratum fo r  the form ulation o f the concept o f abstract 
labour. The existence o f th is  simple labour, or labour 'pure 
and sim ple ', w ith no fu rth e r q u a lita tiv e  determ inations, is  seen 
as having 'allowed' Marx, standing on the shoulders o f Adam 
Smith, to  formulate the concept o f abstract labour but is  not 
i t s e l f  to  be considered abstract labour since th is  would 
involve tha t value and i ts  substance were 'r e a l ' ,  whereas, fo r  
the po int o f view we are considering here, value has a purely 
'lo g ic a l ' existence. Although th is  la t te r  tendency has a 
stronger representation w ith in  the 'transfo rm ation ' debate i t s e l f ,  
ex is ting  as a d ire c t response to  Engels' claims, than the former, 
we sha ll tre a t th is  'lo g ic a l' response in the fo llow ing  chapter 
and concern ourselves here w ith tha t con tribu tion  which considers 
the existence of soc ia lly-m ob ile  's im ple ' labour as the existence 
of abstract labour i t s e l f .
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In th is  la t te r  perspective 'la b o u r1, as the substance of value, 
is given a t ru ly  substantia l existence, being seen as capable 
of extension th is  way and th a t, in response to  the demands of 
c a p ita l, and being susceptible o f precise q u a n tita tive  determination 
in the process o f production i t s e l f .  This n a tu ra lis t ic  
conception of substance is  given a graphic descrip tion  by 
Carling (1984) when he says th a t Marx's concept o f abstract 
labour is to  be considered as:
" . . .  a kind o f hydraulic f lu id  regula ting the 
economy - flow ing here res ting  fo r  a while there, 
congealing in to  objects elsewhere; d iv id ing  
in to  streams, created at one point and absorbed 
at another; drawn o f f  and sucked out - the whole 
performance showing an endless va rie ty  o f forms 
or a s ing le common substance. The economy so 
conceived resembles less a f in e ly  tuned mechanism 
than a p lay fu l contraption o f tubes, pumps, sinks 
and pipes", (p. 142)
The existence and f lu id i t y  of th is  "s ing le  common substance" 
is accepted by Marx as a real ex is ten t w ithout however any 
im plica tion th a t th is  is the re a lisa tio n  o f ‘ abstract la bou r'.
For Marx, 's im p le ', unsk illed  labour th a t is  s o c ia lly  mobile 
across various use-values, and is  in d if fe re n t between the tasks 
i t  is set to  perform, ex is ts  in re a li ty ,  whereas abstract 
labour, the substance of value, has no existence at a l l .  Or, 
ra ther, tha t abstract labour has i ts  existence in tim e, not in 
space; ex ists as duration of socia l labour time and has th is
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existence incarnated in money. Money incarnates abstract 
labour because i t  is  a l l  o f the labours, every possible 
manifestation of labour, given 'a t  once1 and in d e fin ite  proportions 
depending upon i ts  quantity :
"When I state th a t coats or boots stand in a 
re la tio n  to  linen , because i t  is  the universal 
incarnation o f abstract human labour, the absurdity 
o f the statement is se lf-e v ide n t. Nevertheless, when 
the producers o f coats and boots compare those 
a r t ic le s  w ith linen , or what is  the same th in g , 
w ith gold or s ilv e r ,  as the universal equivalent, 
they express the re la tio n  between th e ir  own p riva te  
labour and the c o lle c tiv e  labour o f society in the 
same absurd form". (Marx, 1983; p. 80 my emphasis.)
Abstract labour, value, money, is the o b je c tif ic a t io n  o f a re la tio n ; 
when th is  re la tio n  extends un ive rsa lly  and is appropria te ly 
o b je c tif ie d , i t  is the va lue -re la tion  as investigated by Marx; 
i t  cannot be tha t abstract labour i t s e l f ,  which o b je c tif ie s  a 
re la tio n , is  i t s e l f  a palpable 'o b je c t '.  Therefore, as socia l 
labour which is expressed or represented as abstract general 
labour, we have Marx's notion o f abstract labour. As fo r  th a t 
ubiquitous 's im ple ' labour, which is  elsewhere id e n tif ie d  as 
abstract labour, Marx says in i t i a l l y :
" . . .  This abstraction, human labour in general ex is ts  
in the form of average labour which, in a given socie ty, 
the average person can perform ... I t  is  simple labour
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which any average ind iv idua l can be tra ined 
to  do and which in one way or another he has 
to  perform. The cha rac te ris tics  o f th is  
average labour are d if fe re n t in d iffe re n t 
countries and d iffe re n t h is to r ic a l epochs, 
but in any p a rtic u la r society i t  appears as 
something given". (1981a; p. 31)
When Marx says tha t th is  'a b s tra c tio n 1 "ex is ts  in the form o f . . . " ,  
he means th a t in the same way tha t' concrete useful labour is 
reduced to  abstract labour in the act o f exchange so i t  is 
manifest in society tha t the product o f s k ille d  labour is reduced 
to  being esse n tia lly  the same substance as the product of simple, 
unsk illed  labour since, when they are mutually affirmed as 
socia l labour, in the act o f exchange and by the successful 
completion of th is  act, they assume the same bodily form. That 
th is  is the case is confirmed by Marx when he says:
" . . .  a commodity may be the product o f the most 
s k ille d  labour, but i ts  value, by equating i t  to  the 
product o f simple unsk illed  labour, represents a 
d e fin ite  quantity  o f the la t te r  labour alone".
(1983; p. 51)
We can thus observe the process of the reduction o f complex, 
s k ille d  labour to  simple, unsk illed  labour amongst the m illio n s  
o f acts o f exchange which give every product the same bodily  
form and in th is  way equalise the various labours in d e fin ite  
proportions. We need only remember tha t the reduction of simple
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unskilled  labour to  abstract human labour in general is  also 
accomplished by the act o f exchange and th a t therefore th is  
's im ple ' labour requires mediation to q u a lify  as abstract 
labour and is not immediately abstract labour. But again, 
as indicated above, simple labour re ta ins i ts  autonomous existence 
outside o f the process of exchange as the minimum required of 
labour fo r  i t  to  function or be treated as so c ia lly  productive 
labour. I t  obtains outside o f exchange as the standard th a t 
is  re q u is ite  to  q u a lify  labour as productive labour. The r ise  
and the development o f machinery tends to  un iversa lize  th is  
so c ia lly  required minimum standard to a re a lly  ex is tin g  average 
level which is present in a socia l labour-force which can be put 
to  a va rie ty  of tasks. Thus the simple and average level o f 
labour in the automated c a p ita lis t  society is  more productive in 
comparison w ith e a r lie r  forms o f social development. Moreover:
" . . .  we can see at a glance tha t in our c a p ita l is t  society 
a given portion of labour is  supplied a lte rn a te ly  in the
form of ta ilo r in g  and in the form o f weaving, in
accordance w ith changes in the d ire c tion  fo r  the 
demand fo r  labour. This change in the form o f 
labour may well not take place w ithout f r ic t io n ,  but 
take place i t  must". (Marx, 1983; p .78)
I t  is  an inherent tendency of cap ita l as a value which breeds 
value, to  e lim inate th is  f r ic t io n  which acts as a 'b a r r ie r ' to  
the un inh ib ited flow  of i t s  movement across the socia l d iv is io n
of labour. In th is  manner, cap ita l i t s e l f  in pu rsu it o f
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re la tiv e  surplus value, raises average labour to  a higher 
productive power, so to  speak, and labour th a t is  described 
as simple, unsk illed  labour, becomes predominant in society 
over s k ille d  labour, or s k ille d  labour i t s e l f  loses i ts  
e x c lu s iv ity , which i t  had in the period o f manufacture, and 
assumes a form which any average ind iv idua l can be tra ined to  do. 
Whereas previously simple average labour could be conceived of 
as a kind of productive physio logica l fundament, upon which the 
various c ra fts  and s k i l ls  were ra ised, now, w ith the development 
of large-scale industry and machinery, simple average labour is 
i t s e l f  s u ff ic ie n t to  produce what had previously required crafted 
or s k ille d  labour. This is  an aspect o f the h is to r ic a l increase 
in the p rodu c tiv ity  of labour. The mass o f socia l labour is  
simple labour since what was before considered s k ille d  is now 
considered simple and average through the increase of soph is tica tion  
in the instruments o f labour which mediate the productive process 
between the worker and the object of h is labour.
The objection has been raised by Kay (1976), th a t when ed itin g  
the English ed ition  of Marx's C on tribu tion , Maurice Dobb added 
the footnote wherein Marx's usage of 's im ple ' labour is  equated 
with 'u n s k ille d ' labour when the context did not allow of th is  
in te rp re ta tio n . Kay says th a t:
"Marx ta lks  of simple labour, where in the context he 
c le a rly  means abstract la b o u r... th is  lessens the 
p o s s ib il ity  of assim ila ting  the notions of abstract 
and unskilled  labour", (p. 61)
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For Kay, then, 's im ple ' and 'a b s tra c t' labour are the same 
th in g , despite the fa c t th a t in the passage in question, which 
was quoted below (p. 55), Marx says th a t the former "e x is ts " . 
But because o f Kay's own concept o f abstract labour, ne ither 
th is  abstract labour n o t ‘ i t  would appear 's im ple ' labour, can 
be said to  e x is t in re a li ty  as the equivalent o f 'u n s k ille d ' 
labour, which has a real existence fo r  him. Dobb equates th is  
un sk ille d , ex is tin g  labour, w ith 's im ple ' labour, but Kay reads 
him as though he had treated unskilled  labour as the ex is ting  
form o f abstract labour. Kay shows elsewhere (1979) th a t he 
fu l ly  understands th a t the existence o f abstract labour in the 
process of production is  impossible, but th a t unsk illed  labour 
can e x is t there w ithout in any way a lte rin g  i ts  e sse n tia lly  
concrete character. He says:
" . . .  Concrete labour, no matter how d u ll,  boring 
and unskilled  is always concrete labour engaged in 
m aterial p roduction ... i t  is  not the nature of 
concrete labour tha t makes i t  abstract labour: 
th is  depends upon the socia l form assumed by 
the product outside the sphere o f production".
(p. 60)
This is p e rfe c tly  r ig h t;  but while i t  may be true  th a t i t  is  
not the nature o f concrete labour tha t renders i t  abstract 
labour, i t  _i_s the nature o f concrete labour th a t renders i t  
's im ple ' labour. Automation renders 's im p lic i ty ',  i .e .  the 
fa c t tha t any ind iv idua l can be tra ined to  do i t ,  one o f the
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determining cha rac te ris tics  o f concrete labour. Hence a 
problem arises. Namely, i f ,  fo llow ing  Kay, i t  is  accepted 
tha t by 's im p le1 labour Marx is re fe rr in g  to abstract labour 
then, i f  i t  can be shown th a t Marx considers th a t the former 
has a 're a l existence, then th is  can be taken to  mean th a t he 
must therefore also consider th a t abstract labour ex is ts  in 
r e a li ty .  I f  evidence fo r  the declared existence of 's im ple ' 
labour is treated as evidence fo r  the existence o f abstract 
labour then those who deem the la t te r  as a real ex is ten t have 
th e ir  case considerably strengthened.
Despite the fa c t th a t Dobb himself holds to  a physio log ica l 
conception of abstract labour (1937; p. 13), and conceives of 
i ts  expenditure in terms of 'human energy' (1981b; p. 14), 
in the present instance he is  correct to  tre a t 's im ple ' labour 
as the same as unskilled  labour, since th is  usage is  in conform ity 
w ith Marx's. We have previously quoted Marx (p. 56, 1983; p .51) 
as running together simple and unskilled  labour, and when 
discussing those conditions which are necessary to  enable the 
socia l m o b ility  of c a p ita l, Marx remarks:
"The second condition implies the a b o lit io n  o f a l l  
laws preventing the labourers from tra n s fe rr in g  
from one sphere o f production to  another; ind iffe rence 
o f the labourer to  the nature o f h is labour; the 
greatest possible reduction of labour in a l l  spheres 
o f production to  simple labour; the e lim ina tion  of 
a l l  vocational prejudices among the labourers; and 
la s t but not leas t, a subjugation o f the labourer to  
the c a p ita lis t  mode of production". (1984; p .191)
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And again, in the creation o f surplus-value:
" . . .  i t  does not in the least m atter, whether 
the labour appropriated by the c a p ita lis t  be 
simple unsk illed  labour o f average q u a lity  or 
more complicated s k ille d  labour". (1983; p. 191)
These examples could be eas ily  m u ltip lie d , however as i t  stands 
there is evidence enough to  conclude th a t, fo r  Marx, simple 
labour both ex is ts  and is equated with unsk illed  labour. For 
those who seek to  equate simple and abstract labour, th e ir  
position  appears as not only confirmed, but as unassailable. 
However, when Marx speaks of those conditions th a t are necessary 
fo r  the uninterupted process of value formation the m o b ility  of 
labour from one sphere to  another is c ru c ia l, so th a t th is  
process is the more eas ily  accomplished:
" . . .  the more qu ick ly labour-power can be transfe rred  
from one sphere to  another and from one production 
lo c a lity  to  another". (1984; p. 196)
Marx's conjunctional usage of the terms 's im ple ' and 'u n s k ille d ' 
then, is intended to  denote the growth o f a socia l labour-force 
which is  adequate to  the needs of c a p ita l. At th is  leve l o f 
the d ia le c tic a l synthesis value is enshrined in 'c a p ita l ' and 
use-value in 'wage-labour'; and th is  labour is  the be tte r suited 
as use-value fo r  cap ita l the more 's im ple ' and v e rs a tile  i t  is 
and hence the more cap ita l i t s e l f  is  emancipated from th a t s k i l l  
which resides only in the body o f the worker, in which lo c a lity  
i t  resides as a source o f tha t ' f r ic t io n '  which cap ita l must 
e lim inate . Considered as the use-value fo r  c a p ita l, or:
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" . . .  not only the use-value which confronts c a p ita l, 
but, ra the r, i t  is  the use-value o f cap ita l i t s e l f " .
(Marx, 1981a; p. 297)
labour is what cap ita l transforms i t s e l f  in to  in the movement 
M-C:
" . . .  As the use-value which confronts c a p ita l, labour 
is not th is  or another labour, but labour pure and simple, 
abstract labour, absolutely in d if fe re n t to  i ts  
p a rtic u la r s p e c if ic ity ,  but capable o f a l l  s p e c if ic it ie s  
. . .  That is to  say tha t labour is of course in each 
sing le case a spe c ific  labour, but cap ita l can come 
in to  re la tio n  w ith every sp e c ific  labour, i t  confronts 
the t o t a l i t y  o f a l l  labours and the p a rtic u la r labour 
i t  confronts at a given time is an accidental m a tte r . .."
( ib id .  my emphasis)
Here we are s t i l l  at the level o f 'c a p ita l in genera l'. This 
forms an essentia l stage of the d ia le c tic a l synthesis where 
the concern is  to  delineate those features which a l l  cap ita ls  
have in common and before the synthesis proceeds to  examine the 
many ind iv idua l cap ita ls  and th e ir  mutual re la tio n s , which 
represents a more concrete stage of development. The competition 
between 'many c a p ita ls ' and the re la tions  between cap ita l and 
wage-labour, the class struggle , are motive powers in technological 
innovation and the 's o c ia lis a tio n ' o f the process of production.
105
The d ia le c t ic a l tra n s it io n  from 'c a p ita l in general' to  'many 
c a p ita ls ' involves the p a ra lle l tra n s it io n  from the manner in 
which labour ex is ts  'conceptua lly ' as_ 'labour pure and simple, 
abstract labour' fo r  'c a p ita l in general' to  how i t  in fa c t 
ex is ts  in a form which comes ever closer to  re a lis in g  th is  
concept (which only appears 'a p r io r i '  but is  in  fa c t gleaned 
from observation of the e x is tin g  re a l i ty ) .  Labour, in re a l i ty ,  
comes ever closer to  function ing exclusive ly as the use-value 
of c a p ita l.
"This economic re la tio n  - the character which 
the c a p ita lis t  and the worker have as the extremes 
of a s ing le re la tio n  of production - there fore  
develops more fu l ly  and adequately in proportion 
as labour loses a l l  the ch a rac te ris tics  o f a r t ;  
as i ts  p a rt ic u la r s k i l l  becomes something more 
and more abstract and irre le va n t,- and as i t  becomes 
more and more purely abstract a c t iv ity ,  a purely 
mechanical a c t iv ity ,  hence in d if fe re n t to  i t s  
p a rtic u la r fo rm ... a c t iv ity  pure and simple, 
regardless o f i t s  form", ( ib id . )
What is  growing and developing here is  the productive capacity 
o f the simple average labour o f socie ty. -  I t  is  not the descrip tion  
o f a process which brings about the ‘ fa c tu a l' existence o f 
the substance o f value, abstract labour. I t  is  ra ther the '
process where ac tua lly  ex is tin g  labour-power - which is  essentia l 
to  every form o f production - comes to  epitomize i t s  ro le  as 
c a p ita l's  use-value. Hence, i f  simple unsk illed  labour is  the 
more adequate use-value fo r  cap ita l in s o fa r  as i t  can be transfe rred  
to  any branch of production and is  capable o f pursuing a m ultitude
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of productive a c t iv it ie s ,  then i t  cannot be abstract labour 
as the substance of value since the primary ch a ra c te ris tic  
of th is  abstract labour is  tha t i t  is  empty o f a l l  useful 
content and is an u tte r  abstraction from the commodity (here 
labour-power) considered as a use-value. The ‘ new1 p o la r ity  
of ca p ita l (value) and labour (use-value) continues to  embody 
con trad ic tion , and therefore cap ita l in the form o f simple 
labour (M-C.. . )  must embody i t s e l f  in use-values before i t  can 
embody i t s e l f  in values. The necessity fo r  mediation remains 
because the id e n tica l essence remains, i t  has only changed the 
form o f appearance o f the tw o-fo ld  character o f labour. So 
th a t, simple, soc ia lly-m ob ile  labour is  not immediately value- 
creating labour but has s t i l l  to  show tha t i t  is  value-creating 
labour by being in fa c t transformed in to  money. Hence, whereas 
the o b je c tif ic a tio n  of simple labour re su lts  in d e fin ite  use- 
values, the o b je c tif ic a tio n  of abstract labour ex is ts  as money - 
value incarnate. At f i r s t  then:
"The commodity is a tra n s fig u ra tio n  o f cap ita l tha t 
has valorised i t s e l f  and i ts  sale must be organised 
in the scale and in the quan tities  necessary to 
re a lise  the old cap ita l value and the surplus value 
i t  has created". (Marx, 1976; p. 54)
Whether the p o la r it ie s  involved comprise use-value/value, 
in d iv id u a l/so c ia l or sim ple/abstract, the fundamental con trad ic tion  
which is inherent in the system continues to  assert i t s e l f .  Each 
of these sets o f opposites express the d iffe rence between
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'v a lo r is a tio n ' and ’ re a lis a t io n 1 and are contained w ith in  i t ,  
so th a t the re a lis a tio n  of the old cap ita l value is  inseparable 
from the simultaneous transformation of use-value in to  value, 
ind iv idua l labour in to  socia l labour, and thus simple labour 
in to  abstract labour. These various determinations have a 
contemporaneity and are a r t i f i c ia l l y  separated in the the o re tica l 
method where they are conceived of as d iffe re n t ‘ layers ' or 
dimensions th a t are successively b u i lt  up in the process o f the 
comprehension o f the ex is tin g  t o t a l i t y .  Therefore i t  is  the 
same denial o f the same contrad ic tion  which takes place whenever 
any of these various levels o f con trad ic tion , from the most abstract 
to  the more concrete and 're c e n t',  are treated as passing in to  
one another 'im m ediate ly ', as is  the case here when simple labour 
is subsumed in abstract labour. This la t te r  tendency denotes 
a movement away from d iffe rence and towards id e n tity  which, as 
we have seen, en ta ils  the loss of Marx's spe c ific  con tribu tion  
and fa i ls  to  ra ise him above the level o f his c lass ica l predecessors. 
For example:
"The concept o f labour in general, abstract labour, 
as the source o f a l l  wealth and of value was 
introduced by Adam Smith and could not have 
been conceived in i ts  simple, general form u n t i l  
c a p ita l is t  production had reached a ce rta in  stage 
o f development. Real h is to ry  is  more than a 
dance o f abstract concepts". (Brewer, 1984; p. 195)
Confounding simple and abstract labour here re su lts  in c re d itin g  
Adam Smith the uncovering o f abstract labour, labour " in  i t s
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simple general form", which Brewer takes to  mean the form in 
which i t  is  va lue-creating. The denial o f con trad ic tion  expresses 
- i t s e l f  here in the fa ilu re  to  d is tingu ish  the con tribu tions o f 
the various dramatis personae in the h is to ry  o f the labour 
theory o f value.. S im ila rly  P il l in g  says:
"The Wealth o f Nations marks a new leap forward in th a t 
i t  sees 'labour in  general* as va lu e -c re a tin g ... The 
. category o f ‘ abstract labour* which Smith co rre c tly  
sees as forming the basis o f value was an expression 
o f the economic categories which were being c r e a t e d L  
by the  development o f the class struggle ; fo r  here 
was re flec ted .a  society where the organicbond 
between an ind iv idua l and his labour was in  the 
process o f v io le n t rup tu re ". (1986; p. 28)
-  Here the existence o f "abstract labour is  seen to  fo llo w  in the 
wake o f the rupture between the ind iv idua l and h is s k i l l ,  to  " 
which he was 'o rga n ica lly  bonded1. We sha ll re turn  to  th is  
v is ion  o f abstract labour appearing onthe h is to r ic a l stage w ith 
the demise o f s k i l l  and o f manufacture as the basis o f socia l 
production. For themoment we must note th a t, again, when . -  •“ 
-simple and abstract labour are confounded, a myriad o f erroneous
resu lts  ensue. One o f these is  the a ttr ib u t io n  to  cap ita lism
r o f.th e  po ten tia l ..to maintain the proper q u an tita tive  proportions 
between the d iffe re n t branches o f the socia l d iv is io n  of Tabouri 
This fa c u lty  is  more or less openly avowed by Gleicher when he 
says-that:- - ■'
. abstract labour is  a measurable phenomenon in i t s  
own r ig h t" .  (op. c i t .  p. 28)
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I t  is obvious th a t the sponteneity of the c a p ita lis t  economy 
disappears when abstract (so c ia l) labour is  made amenable to  
precise ca lcu la tion  in the process of production i t s e l f .  This 
emasculation o f the very nature of cap ita lism  is  the inev itab le  
consequence of what Gleicher et a lia  are arguing fo r ,  namely:
" . . .  the existence as a 'soc ia l substance' of 
abstract labour: labour th a t is homogeneous w ith
respect to  commodities, and is thereby capable of 
regulating prices. The emergence of th is  substance 
in the context o f c a p ita lis t  re la tion s  of production 
is what Mohun terms the 're a l abstraction o f labour' 
and what I have tre a te d ... under the ru b ric  'h is to r ic a l 
abstraction of la b o u r"1. (1986; p. 465)
In fa c t Mohun id e n tif ie s  the exchange process i t s e l f  as the locus 
fo r  the 're a l abstraction of labour', as a process of abstraction 
which takes place every day in the c a p ita lis t  soc ie ty . Whereas 
G leicher's 'h is to r ic a l abstraction of labour' traces the development 
or coming-to-be of abstract labour outside of the exchange process 
as an autonomously ex is ting  'e n t i t y ' .  And, as we have noted, 
th is  existence is so conceived th a t:
" . . .  the abstract labour required per u n it o f a 
commodity can in p r in c ip le  be measured in i t s  own 
un its  (labour time) p r io r  to  its  re a lis a tio n  in 
money", ( ib id ; p. 467)
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Thus whereas fo r  Marx abstract labour is a socia l magnitude 
conferred on the commodity by morney outside the process of 
production, here i t  is treated as a predetermined ind iv idua l 
magnitude reckoned in the production process i t s e l f .  But there 
would be no need, no essentia l in sp ira tio n  fo r  value to  e x is t 
in the f i r s t  place where the quan tita tive  in te rre la tio n s  between 
the various branches of production were predetermined. Therefore 
the case fo r  the 'h is to r ic a l abstraction of labour1 evokes the 
same response as th a t which Marx gave the 't im e -c h it te rs 1 when 
they attempted to  render ind iv idua l labour as immediately social 
labour, namely th a t:
"This demand can be s a tis fie d  only under conditions where 
i t  can no longer be ra ised". (1981a; p. 172)
These same 'harmonist' tendencies are present in Steedman when 
he says of the the o re tica l assumptions which underlie his treatment 
o f Marx's transform ation procedure:
"Any worker can perform every kind o f 'concrete ' labour.
A ll productive a c t iv it ie s  o f a given kind are assumed 
to  be carried out under ide n tica l conditions and w ith 
equal e ff ic ie n c y , so tha t each ind iv idua l expenditure 
time is an expenditure o f so c ia lly  necessary labour 
tim e". (1977; p. 19)
These and s im ila r assumptions are widely held in the l i te ra tu re ,  
so much so tha t Steedman's proposed so lu tion  to  the 'transform ation 
problem' is often treated in the absence o f reference to  h is
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the o re tica l assumptions, the focus being turned on his algebra. 
This being the case, Steedman can state unabashedly:
" I t  being understood tha t the object of discussion is a 
c a p ita lis t  commodity producing economy, 'coordinated* 
through money flows in markets, and th a t only s o c ia lly  
necessary abstract socia l labour, o f average s k i l l  
and in te s ity  is re ferred to , i t  may be said tha t the 
magnitude of value is a quantity  o f embodied labour­
tim e. That th is  statement accurately re fle c ts  Marx's 
pos ition  cannot be altered by po in ting to  the fa c t 
th a t Marx was much concerned w ith the 'form of va lue ', 
w ith the nature of 'abstract labour' and w ith the 
'un iversa l e q u iva le n t'" , ( ib id ; p. 211)
I f  th is  la s t is  the case, then i t  cannot be a lte red at a l l .
Only re jected . C erta in ly the subsequent l ite ra tu re  which 
becomes a lgeb ra ica lly  involved w ith Steedman's supposed so lu tion  
to  a supposed problem does l i t t l e  to  a lte r  i t .
Brewer's contention tha t the fa ilu re  to  consider abstract labour 
as a 're a l ' ex is ten t has the re su lt th a t h is to ry  becomes a 
mere 'dance of concepts', and the re legation o f the 'form of 
value' to  almost an afterthought by Steedman, suggests a purely 
em pirical approach to  the labour theory o f value. We know 
from the previous chapter tha t Marx's labour theory o f value 
does not exclude em pirical investiga tion  and knowledge. I t  only 
denies the supreme status of em pirical data. I t  reduces them
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to  the f i r s t  stage o f the process o f production o f knowledge, 
th a t o f the analysis. What is  required to  complete the method 
and allow comprehension is  what Marx termed, in the Preface to  
the f i r s t  German e d itio n  o f C a p ita l, "the force o f abs trac tion ". 
Hence, in terms of method, and therefore in  terms o f 's o lu tio n s ' 
to  ‘ problems1, there is  a fundamental ignorance in  these accounts 
o f the real nature o f value and i ts  substance. Ciphered 
solutions which.are b u i l t  upon th is  ignorance are only a su b s titu te  
fo r  Marx's method and must therefore be re jected as-fundamentally 
unsound. -
• U  ■ , ■ ■■■“. ... .
The ascrip tion  to  cap ita lism  o f those capacities which are part 
o f a consciously planned economy, by allow ing s o c ia lly  necessary" 
labour-time to  e x is t in the process o f production, has an a ir  o f 
fa ta 1ism about i t .  Under the ascribed circumstances, there is  
nothing to  hinder cap ita lism  from ex is ting  in pe rpe tu ity . This 
is  the more so since con trad ic tion , which is  fa ta l to  pe rpe tu ity , 
has been abolished, and o f what remains, Steedman can say:
"So fa r  as they go these solu tions are lo g ic a lly  
sound -  and th a t is" th a t" .  ( Ib id ; p. 33)_ -
From what has been said thus fa r ,  the brand o f ' lo g ic ' th a t insp ires 
~both-Steedman and Brewer may be considered in the B r it is h  'a n a ly t ic ' 
- t ra d it io n ,  whereas Gleicher, who reaches the same conclusions, 
is an American, w ith in  a somewhat d if fe re n t,  and more M atter day, - -
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' t r a d i t io n '.  The form ulation of G leicher's argument re lie s  
heavily upon the work of Braverman (1974) who investigates the 
American c a p ita lis t  system from the study of the labour-process 
and i ts  developments in the 20th century. Gleicher u t i l is e s  
Braverman's research to  substantiate his p rin c ipa l conclusion th a t:
"Through the reduction of the worker's a c t iv ity  to 
abstract labour, value ceases to  be merely the
negation of use-value manifested in the sphere of
c irc u la tio n , but now acquires a p o s itive  socia l 
existence". (1983; p. 111)
Of course, as we have shown, th is  conclusion is not uniquely 
American. Yet the p a rtic u la r manner o f i t s  d isp os ition , and
most of i t s  th e o re tica l presuppositions, show d is t in c t  traces of
the response to  a question asked by Werner Sombart years before.
Ten years a fte r the inception o f the debate from which arose 
Engels' 'h is to r ic a l ' dimension to  the transform ation procedure, 
Sombart inquired Why is there no Socialism in the United States 
(1906). His own reply was th a t socialism had "foundered upon 
shoals o f roast beef and apple-p ie", and the subsequent response 
to  th is  would be concerned w ith , among other th ings , the socia l 
and h is to r ic a l presuppositions which made th is  abundance possib le.
Behind Sonbart's answer lay his observance of the socia l m o b ility  
of ind iv idua ls  in American socie ty, and which, he believed, would 
reduce demands fo r  changing the system. This was well taken.
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For in the ensuing discussion th a t Sombartrs question and answer 
had generated, i t  seemed tha t American society required the 
application o f the concepts 's ta tu s ' and 'r a t io n a l i t y ' at the 
expense o f those of 'c la ss ' and, s ig n if ic a n t ly ,  'c o n tra d ic tio n ', 
which were ch a ra c te ris tic  of Marx's emphasis. The la t te r 's .  
notion th a t the working-class, the d ire c t producers, were d is t in c t  
because they stood in a unique re la tio n  to  the means of production 
which rendered them the agents o f any fundamental change, was 
la te r dismissed by C. Wright M ills  as:
" . . .  a labour m etaphysic... a legacy of V ictorian
Marxism th a t is  now qu ite  u n re a lis t ic " . (1967; p. 256)
M ills  elevated the ' in te l l ig e n ts ia ' to  the level o f those who 
would f u l f i l  the "progressive tendencies", occupying the ro le  
le f t  vacant by what was considered to  be working-class "d e fa u lt" . 
Thus the consideration o f Sombart's question came to  involve the 
investiga tion  and explanation of the manner in which the rad ica l 
po ten tia l o f the working-class had been annulled, and they 
themselves absorbed in to  the c a p ita lis t  system. The development 
o f these investiga tions became more exapnsive, and began to  
e n ta il more than Sombart's cu lina ry de ligh ts  as to  the reasons 
surrounding the e lim ina tion  o f the working-class as a po s itive  
source fo r  change. C lassical sociology provided much o f the 
nomenclature fo r  the subsequent descriptions o f th is  process. 
Although Weber is perhaps the most in f lu e n t ia l o v e ra ll, we may 
tre a t the c la s s if ic a to ry  system used by Ferdinand Tonnies as 
being more or less paradigmatic fo r th is  response.
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Tonnies sees h is to ry  in terms of the progression from the 
corporate and communal to  the in d iv id u a lis t ic  and ra tio n a l.
His own terms fo r  characteris ing these d if fe re n t states of 
a ffa irs  are to  be seen when the h is to r ic a l tra n s it io n  from the 
one to  the other is in terms o f a movement from 'Gemeinschaft' 
to  'G e se llscha ft'. Manifestations o f Gemeinschaft are said 
to  be found in guild-membership, fe llowships o f the arts and 
c ra fts , tra d it io n a l forms of a u th o rity , e tc . Whereas the 
essence of Gesellschaft is  ind iv idualism , ca lcu la tio n , and 
ra tion a l a u th o rity . Weber too has his models o f 'ra t io n a l' 
and 't r a d it io n a l ' types of a u th o rity . In d u s tr ia l socie ty, 
especia lly  in i ts  20th. century American form, comes to  be 
treated as the epitom ization of forms o f G esellschaft, and where 
the workers are pictured!'as estranged from th e ir  tasks, and as 
consequently su ffe ring  the e ffec ts  of a liena tion  and anomie, 
prisoners o f a technological 'iro n  cage1, forges by mechanisation 
and the destruction o f c ra ft  s k i l ls  and the socia l mileu these 
engendered.
Given th is  background, and, i f  we re ca ll th a t Marx himself 
singled out the United States as the locus fo r  simple, unsk illed  
labour, mobile over a va rie ty  o f tasks, then a l l  o f the ingredients 
were assembled whose combination would produce a purely negative 
characte risation o f abstract labour, at the expense o f i t s  p o s itive  
socia l s ign ificance .
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Braverman1s book fa l ls  w ith in  th is  tra d it io n  to  the extent 
tha t he has inherited  many of i t s  th e o re tica l presuppositions, 
and which reveal themselves in some of his emphases. His book 
is su b title d  "the degradation o f work in the tw entie th century", 
the implementation of the techniques of ‘ s c ie n t if ic  management1.
Mohun (1983) remarks th a t:
"C ritic ism  of Braverman1s w ork... tend in general to 
focus on his attempt to  analyse the modern working- 
class as a class 'in  i t s e l f '  ra ther than 'fo r  i t s e l f ' ,  
and his consequent eschewing of a l l  analysis of 
working-class consciousness, organisation, and 
a c t iv it ie s .  This approach renders the working-class 
a mere object o f c a p ita l, passively accommodating 
to  the changing dynamic o f va lo riza tio n , and th is  
loses s igh t o f the ways in which class struggle at 
the po int o f production is centra l to  an understanding 
of the development of the c a p ita lis t  labour process".
(p. 270)
However, here we are concerned w ith the collapsing o f simple 
labour in to  abstract labour, as the methodlogical p re requ is ite  
fo r  the kind o f neglect Mohun mentions, and makes th is  manner 
o f re su lt v ir tu a l ly  inev itab le  in the circumstances. I t  is  
no accident th a t most o f Braverman's re su lts  concur w ith the 
find ings o f an e a r lie r  study of monopoly cap ita lism  by Baran 
and Sweezy (1966), in p a rtic u la r w ith regard to  the complete
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domination over labour by monopoly c a p ita l. I t  is  only 'c a p ita l' 
a fte r a l l ,  working-out the inherent tendencies in i ts  nature.
But i t  is  a fa c t th a t whenever there is  something tha t is 
considered 'new', then its  contemporary appraisal ine v itab ly  
resu lts  in some conclusion tha t says Marx is no longer re levant, 
or tha t his work is in need of substantia l 'm o d ific a tio n '.
This i t s e l f  is one large symptom of the fa ilu re  to  comprehend 
the the o re tica l method.
However, fo r  Braverman, the spe c ific  product o f th is  domination, 
and th a t which is to  be bemoaned, is the presence o f simple, 
unskilled  labour, which presence, is the epitome o f 'the degredation 
of work in the twentieth cen tu ry '.
The breaking or 'ru p tu re ' o f what P il l in g  terms the 'organic l in k ' 
between the worker and his labour, which lin k  comprised the s k i l l  
required fo r  i ts  productive expenditure, is  treated as tantamount 
to  the loss o f community, lamented by almost a l l  o f the major 
European soc io log is ts . Braverman w rites :
"With the development o f the c a p ita lis t  mode of 
production, the very concept o f s k i l l  becomes 
degraded along with the degradation of labour and 
the yardstick by which s k i l l  is measured shrinks to 
such a po in t th a t today the worker is  considered to  
possess a ' s k i l l '  i f  his or her job requires a few 
days' or weeks' t r a in in g . . .  We may compare th is  w ith
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the tra d it io n a l c ra ft  apprenticeship, which ra re ly  - 
lasted less than fou r years and which was not 
uncommonly seven years long", (p. 444)
This_ stress on the negative aspect o f simple unsk illed  labour, 
a t the expense o f i t s  pos itive  s ign ificance , can be seen in 
the fa c t tha t,, from what he has said here, Braverman could not 
bring himself to  exa lt the fa c t o f the increasing p ro d u c tiv ity  
o f socia l labour, considered as the fundamental p re requ is ite  
fo r  a system o f s o c ia lis t production. Again, he reads the 
freedom from a circumscribed 's p e c i f ic i t y 1 on the part o f the 
worker as a loss o f freedom. However, to  approach our subject 
more d ire c t ly ,  Braverman says:
"We see tha t th is  abstraction from the concrete forms o f 
labour - the simple 'expenditure o f human labour in  general' 
in Marx's phrase, - which Marx employed as a means o f 
c la r ify in g  the value of commodities, (according to  
the share o f such general human labour they embodied) 
is  not something th a t ex is ts  only in  the pages of 
C ap ita l. . .  Labour in the form o f standardized motion 
patterns is  labour used as an interchangeable p a rt, and 
in  th is  form comes ever c loser to 'corresponding in l i f e “ ’ 
- to  the abstraction employed by Marx, in  analysis of the 
c a p ita lis t  mode o f production", ( ib id ;  p. 181) _
Here the movement from the abstract to  the concrete is  conceived 
in terms o f the con tinu ing .m a te ria lisa tion  o f an abstract concept 
Presumably Braverman considers th a t when Marx conducted th is
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abstraction in the la s t century i t  lacked a m aterial counterpart. 
Then, the existence o f s p e c if ic a lly  useful labour was manifest 
among the labouring population, and distinguished them as 
having exclusive occupations, in these circumstances, the 
abstraction 'human labour in general1 appears somehow 'more' of 
an abstraction , or i t  is  conceived of as a 're a l ' abstraction 
from the ex is ting  d iv e rs ity  of the concrete. Now, however, the 
ex is ting  concrete i t s e l f  comes ever closer to  re a lis in g  th is  
abstraction by bringing in to  being 'human labour in general' 
as a 'fa c t ' o f cap ita lism  and which represents fo r  Braverman, 
as we have seen, the 'substance' of value. Braverman has 
simply assumed in th is  tra n s itio n  tha t the q u a lity  of the 
substance of value is  i ts  general human q u a lity , which means 
tha t when he speaks o f 'v a lu e ', he can only mean 'magnitude of 
va lu e '. What he considers to  be Marx's 'd e f in it io n ' of the 
substance of value is  always couched in terms o f 'expenditure ' 
and 'embodiment', and seems to  consider, l ik e  Engels, tha t i t  
is a va lid a tio n  of Marx's theory o f value i f  i t  can be shown 
tha t the 'substance' o f value exists in fa c t, as a qu an tifia b le  
s tu f f ,  and th a t the magnitude o f value does indeed depend upon 
the amount o f 'labour' tha t is embodied in commodities. A ctua lly  
the abstraction Marx employs, 'human labour in general' is 
not his own, and i t  would be be tte r to  say tha t he a rticu la te s  
i t .  I t  is  an abstraction tha t is carried out by the exchange 
process i t s e l f  when i t  equates every kind of labour, in th is  
manner bestowing a socia l un ifo rm ity which abstracts from the 
various useful properties o f the labours. That every commodity
has a 'p r ic e 1, and before i t  is  metamorphosed in to  th is  p rice , 
is  testimony to  the abstraction th a t must be carried  out in  those 
conditions o f socia l production th a t are based on exchange and 
exchange-value as the a ll-s id e d  mediation. Again, the portraya l 
o f the socia l character o f-labour as i t s  natural-human character 
obscures ra ther than c la r if ie s  the nature o f value-creating ~
labour. I t  allows the re if ic a t io n  o f the e x is tin g  production 
re la tio n s  by g iv ing them a natura l foundation; man must labour, 
and labour is  the source o f value. Thus, ra ther than being 
u t il is e d  by Marx to  'c la r i f y !  the nature o f value-creating 
labour, as Braverman suggests, the 'expenditure o f human labour 
in general1 is  the appearance form th a t Marx found in existence, 
both as i t  was presented in re a li ty  and in the works o f his 
c lass ica l predecessors, and which had to  be transcended in order 
to  'c la r i f y '  the nature o f value-creating labour.
For both Braverman and Gleicher then, the ascent from the abstract 
to  the concrete is  in terms o f an h is to r ic a l,  as opposed to  a 
th e o re tic a l, process. Like Engels, th e ir  s ta rtin g -p o in t is  
w ith a re la tio n  which is  'a c tu a lly  a v a ila b le '. In th is  connection 
Gleicher says th a t Braverman:
" . . .  in  h is  pathbreaking work on the’ c a p ita lis t  .labour-process, 
id e n tif ie s  'Babbage's p r in c ip le 1 as the m otivating force 
behind the h is to r ic a l abstraction o f labour". (1986;.p. 465)
The app lica tion  of t h is - 'p r in c ip le ', according to  Braverman, 
means precise ly th a t:
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" . . .  in a society based upon the purchase and 
sale o f labour-power, d iv id ing  the c ra ft 
cheapens the ind iv idua l pa rts ", (op. c i t .  p. 80)
The loss o f c ra ft  s k i l ls  through th e ir  d iv is io n  and dissemination 
s ig n if ie s , h is to r ic a lly ,  the loss of any contro l the worker may 
have had over the labour-process and thus marks the beginning 
of the 're a l ' subordination o f labour to  c a p ita l. Braverman 
continues:
"The mass of the workers gain nothing from the fa c t th a t 
the decline in th e ir  command over the labour process 
is  more than compensated fo r  by the increasing command 
on the part o f managers and engineers. On the 
contrary, not only does th e ir  s k i l l  f a l l  in an 
absolute sense (in  th a t they lose c ra ft and 
tra d it io n a l a b i l i t ie s  w ithout gaining any new 
a b i l i t ie s  adequate to  compensate the loss) but i t  
f a l ls  even more in a re la tiv e  sense", (p. 425)
As remarked, i t  is th is  loss o f s k i l l  which is seen as the 
essential precondition fo r  the emergence o f what Gleicher c a lls :
" . . .  abstract la b o u r... sub jective a c t iv ity  of producing 
use-value tha t is not spe c ific  to  the production of any 
single use-value, but which, to  the contrary, represents 
the p o s s ib il ity  o f producing a wide va rie ty  o f use- 
values". (1983; p. 97)
I t  would be inco rrect to  id e n tify  completely what Gleicher has 
ju s t described with simple, unskilled labour. Gleicher gives
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the labour he re fers to  as abstract labour the added dimension 
of ' s k i l l ' .  He describes th is  concordance of abstraction 
and s k i l l  as the process of "the deepening o f abstract labour" 
as fo llow s:
"The statement tha t the abstraction of labour is 
'deepened' through mechanisation means th a t, not 
only is the subjective a c t iv ity  o f the fac to ry  worker 
d e ta il labour, but also the labour-power throughout 
the hierarchy o f s k i l ls  becomes, fo r  the f i r s t  time 
h is to r ic a lly ,  capable o f being employed across 
industries in the proportion d icta ted by the rate 
of p r o f i t " ,  ( ib id ; p. 117)
Presumably then, the 'deepening' o f abstract labour re fers to  
the fa c t tha t even labour tha t is  to  be considered s k ille d  or 
complex is penetrated by the a ttr ib u te  o f m o b ility , and th a t 
abstract labour, l ik e  the bourgeouis class h is to r ic a lly ,  "s e ttle s  
everywhere, nestles everywhere". On the other hand, i f  these 
s k i l ls  were acquired in a matter o f days or weeks, then G leicher's 
proposition would be compatible w ith what Braverman says in 
th is  regard, and also therefore with th a t simple labour 'th a t 
anyone can be tra ined to  do '.
However, th is  re tention  o f 'a hierarchy of s k i l ls '  is  in complete 
agreement w ith the find ings of Bowles and G in tis  (1977) who, 
adopting Weberian c r i te r ia ,  speak of abstract labour as e x is tin g
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'heterogeneneously' ,  by which they mean tha t i t  is  comprised 
of d if fe re n t levels o f s k i l ls .  Designating something th a t is 
so c ia lly  homogeneous by sheer necessity as ’ heterogeneous1 is 
a f i t t in g  complement to  the designation o f something tha t is 
necessarily abstract as 'con cre te '. Only, i t  was Hegel who was 
to be stood upon his head, not Marx. There is  a fu rth e r tw is t 
to  the descrip tion o f abstract labour as concrete labour, tha t 
is in order tha t i t  does not ac tua lly  become concrete labour, 
Gleicher adds:
"The ind iv idua l worker, no matter what rank he/she 
occupies in the hierarchy of s k i l ls ,  is  not a producer 
of a use-value. Each worker's labour is  abstract.
The engineer is no more the creator of automobiles 
than the assembly lin e  worker", ( ib id ;  p. 118)
Here as everywhere, the stress is never upon the pos itive  socia l 
e ffe c t o f cooperation and c o lle c tiv e  labour, but upon the loss 
of in d iv id u a lity  and tha t autonomy o f the worker tha t was the 
p rin c ip a l ch a ra c te ris tic  o f the craftsman.
Before we go on to  consider these po s itive  and negative aspects, 
we must consider on i ts  own th a t socia l m o b ility  o f labour tha t 
is the 'co n d itio  sine qua non' fo r  the id e n tif ic a t io n  of simple 
and abstract labour.
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In the le t te r  to  Kugelmann, quoted e a r lie r ,  Marx informs him 
th a t:
" . . .  science consists precise ly in demonstrating how
the law o f value opera tes... " (op. c i t . )
and the model o f the simple commodity economy is  constructed 
fo r  th is  precise purpose. I t  denotes tha t deviations from 
labour-value causes transfe rs of labour from the less to  the 
more p ro fita b le  branches o f the socia l d iv is io n  of labour.
I t  thus assumes the m o b ility  o f the producers across these 
branches. Equilibrium  is achieved when the products of each 
of these branches exchanges according to  th e ir  labour-value, 
so equ ilib rium  describes tha t state o f a ffa irs  where there is 
equal advantage fo r  a l l  and the tra n s fe r o f labour ceases.
Hence the assumption of m o b ility  can be suspended w ithout the 
socia l character o f labour ceasing to  express i t s e l f  abs trac tly , 
i .e .  as 'human labour in genera l'. Exchange i t s e l f  must be 
suspended to  achieve th is  la s t re s u lt. The real 'c o n d itio  sine 
qua non' is  so c ia lly  mediate p riva te  labour, and th is  is the 
ch a ra c te ris tic  feature o f both the c a p ita lis t  society and in the 
model of the simple commodity economy. Even th is  appears 
tau to log ica l since the la t te r  is  merely the former expressed 
th e o re tic a lly , i .e .  as the abstract consideration o f i ts  
determining cha rac te ris tic  - the va lu e -re la tion .
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The removal o f what is taken as the essentia l determining 
ch a ra c te ris tic  of abstract labour as a palpable ex is ten t - i ts  
m o b ility  or 'homogeneity across use-values' - does not therefore 
e n ta il tha t abstract labour i t s e l f  becomes more 'opaque', or 
tha t evidence fo r  i t s  existence has diminished. The primary 
ch a ra c te ris tic  of the ex is ting  subject, and therefore of i ts  
th e o re tica l re fle c tio n , is  th a t, in each case, production is 
based upon exchange values. The proportions of exchange regulate 
production in re a lity  and in the model o f r e a li ty ,  i .e .  exchange 
is the universal socia l connection. With th is  foundation, then, 
as Marx says:
" . . .  the exchange of commodities is  an act characterised
by a to ta l abstraction from use-value  But, i f  we
make abstraction from its  use-value, i t  can no longer 
be regarded as the product o f the labour o f the jo in e r, 
the mason, the spinner, or any of the other d e fin ite  
kinds o f productive la b o u r... we put out o f s igh t both 
the useful character of the various kinds o f labour 
embodied in them, and the concrete forms o f th a t labour; 
there is nothing le f t  but what is common to  them a l l ;  
a l l  are reduced to  one and the same sort o f labour, human 
labour in the abstract". (1983; p. 46, my emph.)
Here the emergence o f the 'category' abstract labour, considered 
as human labour in general, is  brought about, or o rig ina ted , 
by "an act" which "we" p re c ip ita te  by ac tu a lly  exchanging the 
products o f labour w ith one another. Therefore the social 
character o f labour expresses i t s e l f  as abstract human labour 
because th is  la t te r  is precise ly the product of socia l in te rcourse , 
and not o f Marx him self, as is claimed by Braverman and others.
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Marx's 'd iscovery ' o f the value-substance as 'abstract human 
labour' is in fa c t merely the product o f an act o f 'observation ' 
o f ex is ting  socia l p rac tice . But, as Marx notes, the ex is ting  
subject is not only the presupposed ground fo r  'observa tion ', 
but fo r  'conception' as w e ll:
" . . .  the concrete to ta l i t y  is a t o t a l i t y  of thoughts, 
concrete in thought, in fa c t a product o f th ink ing  
and comprehending... a product o f the working-up of 
observation and conception in to  concepts..." (1981a; p. 101)
The concept o f abstract labour - when th is  is considered as 
denoting human labour in general - is not "worked-up" in th is  
sense, but is 'g iven ' by simple contemplation of the ex is ting  
re a l i ty .  This product o f mere 'observation ' - i .e .  tha t in 
the exchange process the various kinds o f labour are represented 
as labour genera lly; or as simply 'labour' - was ava ilab le  to  
the c lass ica l economists, as we discussed e a r lie r .  They only 
ins is ted  th a t i t  was 'labour' p r io r  to  the act o f exchange as 
w e ll. But i t  would only collaborate the find ings o f the 
c lass ica l economists to  say th a t Marx defined the substance of 
value as human labour in the abstract. The 'category' of 
abstract labour, as human labour in general providing i ts  sole 
content, only ' f i 1ls - in ' what was im p lic it  in the c lass ica l analysis. 
I t  was the same substance, under the ru b ric  'la b o u r ', tha t f i l l e d  
the concept o f value fo r  Smith and Ricardo. Marx merely a rtic u la te s  
th is  'labou r' fu r th e r by providing a generic or physio log ica l 
d e f in it io n . But i t  is not th is  fu rth e r a r t ic u la tio n  by Marx 
which represents the transcendence of his c lass ica l predecessors,
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and constitu tes the s h if t  from 'observation ' to  'conception '.
I f  we re ca ll where th is  transcendence occurs, we sha ll be 
be tte r s ituated to  examine the pos itive  and the negative assessments 
of simple labour and to  bring out its  real methodological 
s ign ificance .
Marx says at th is  po in t:
" . . .  The innumerable equations o f which the general form 
o f value is composed, equate in tu rn  the labour embodied 
in the linen to  tha t embodied in every other commodity, 
and thus convert weaving in to  the general form of 
m anifestation of und iffe ren tia ted  human labour. In 
th is  manner the labour rea lised in the values of 
commodities is presented not only under i ts  negative 
aspect, under which abstraction is  made from every concrete 
form and useful property o f actual work, but i t s  own 
po s itive  nature is made to  reveal i t s e l f  expressly. . .
The general value-form, which represents a l l  products 
of labour as merely congelations o f und iffe ren tia ted  
human labour, shows by i ts  very s truc tu re  tha t i t  is 
the socia l resume o f the world o f commodities. That 
form consequently makes i t  ind isputably evident tha t in 
the world o f commodities the character possessed by 
a l l  labour of being human labour constitu tes i ts  
spe c ific  socia l character" , ( ib id ; p. 72, my emphasis.)
At th is  new depth, th is  deeper level o f meaning, abstract human 
labour is a character assumed by a l l  o f the d if fe re n t kinds o f 
labour only so soon as they come together to  construct or co n s titu te
128
a socia l re la t io n . Concrete useful labour is  given an id e n tity  
w ith in  th is  re la tio n  which i t  does not possess outside th is  
re la tio n . Obviously then, only th is  re la tio n  posits th is  
id e n tity , or brings th is  abstract id e n tity  in to  existence. That 
therefore abstract labour is esse n tia lly  the product or expression 
of a re la tio n  between people, is  the p o s itive  re s u lt th a t is  
disclosed by th is  abstraction, considered now as engendered by 
the va lu e -re la tio n . The negative re s u lt is  so designated 
because, whereas Marx affirm s the po s itive  determination th a t is 
revealed by the equalisation of the d iffe re n t labours, i t  
removes and denies q u a lit ie s  and determinations tha t perta in 
to  the ex is ting  d iffe re n t forms of labour. By moving from the 
concrete to  the abstract, and remaining the re , means never 
overcoming a na tura l/phys io log ica l concept o f abstract labour.
Marx takes us 'back' to  the ex is ting  forms of labour as redefined, 
as conceived d if fe re n t ly ,  so tha t our knowledge o f them is a lte red .
The d iffe re n t kinds of labour are d iffe re n t concrete expressions 
of socia l labour, and are not negated nor denied in order to  be 
subsumed under th is  descrip tion ; tha t is  why the re su lt is  p o s itive  - 
what ex is ts  has a dimension added to i t  while i t  re ta ins i t s  
concrete id e n tity . I t  fo llows from th is  th a t socia l m o b ility  
is a feature o f concrete, and not of abstract, labour.
Therefore the real s ign ificance of simple concrete labour l ie s  
in the fa c t th a t i ts  existence confirms th a t the 'law of motion' 
o f c a p ita l is t  society drives towards the ever-increasing expansion
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of the socia l character o f production, the development o f 
t r u ly  socia lised production. Marx depicts th is  pos itive  
s ign ificance o f simple labour when he comments on the:
" . . .  development o f the productive powers o f labour, 
which cap ita l incessantly whips onward... have flourished 
to  the stage where labour in which a human being does 
what a th ing could do has ceased... C ap ita l's  ceaseless 
s tr iv in g  towards the general form of wealth drives 
labour beyond i ts  natural p a ltrine ss , and thus creates 
the materia l elements fo r  the development o f the rich  
in d iv id u a lity  which is a ll-s id e d  in i t s  production as 
in i ts  consumption, and whose labour also therefore 
appears no longer as labour, but as the f u l l  development 
o f a c t iv ity  i t s e l f ,  in which natural necessity in its  
d ire c t form has disappeared, because a h is to r ic a lly  created 
need has taken the place of a natural one. This is why 
cap ita l is  productive i .e .  an essentia l re la tio n  fo r  the 
development o f the social productive fo rces . I t  
ceases to  e x is t as such only where the development of 
these productive forces themselves encounter i ts  
b a rr ie r in cap ita l i t s e l f " .  (1981a; p. 325)
This level o f development, where cap ita l i t s e l f  (as the 'p r iv a te ' 
or 'in d iv id u a l' pole o f the tw o-fo ld  character o f labour) becomes 
a b a rr ie r , is  the highest expression o f the con trad ic tion  between 
use-value and value or between the p riva te  and the social 
character o f labour. To meet i ts  ind iv idua l ends cap ita l must 
galvanize and develop the social process of production, and the 
expansion of cap ita l requires, o f necessity, the expansion o f i ts
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opposite. C ap ita l, being in opposition, is  founded on what 
negates i t ,  and is thus in opposition w ith i t s e l f  and must go 
under. To develop i t s e l f ,  to  maintain i ts  essentia l id e n tity  
as a value tha t breecb value, i t  is  compelled to  develop the 
very th ing th a t, standing in opposition to i ts  p riva te  character, 
w i l l  destroy i t .  But th is  v is ion  of development, which more or 
less culminates the d ia le c tic a l synthesis, is  made.possible by 
the app lica tion  o f the the o re tica l method, and the vis ion th is  
allows, o f the inherent tendencies of the ex is tin g  subject i t s e l f .  
And i t  is a leg itim ate  v is ion because no extraneous or 'Messianic' 
m ateria l has been introduced in to  the subject from outside. I f  
th is  is the case, then the same is also true o f the method, which 
is only what exists re flec ted  upon. Thus when Marx says th a t:
"The to ta l i t y  as i t  appears in the head, as a to ta l i t y  
o f thoughts, is  a product o f a th ink ing  head, which 
appropriates the world in the only way i t  can ... The 
real subject re ta ins i ts  autonomous existence outside 
the head ju s t as b e fo re ... Hence, in the the o re tica l 
method... the subject, socie ty, must always be kept 
in mind as the presupposition", (op. c i t . )
The 'thought concrete' is  governed in every d ire c tio n  by the 
ex is ting  subject i t s e l f .  Therefore the progressive tendencies 
o f th is  subject, which comprise i ts  'law of m otion ', or the 
working-out o f the unfolding o f i ts  inhering con trad ic tion , is  
not 'thought up' by Marx and imported in to  the subject, but 
arrived at by the comprehension of the subject i t s e l f .  And so
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i f  we wish to  demonstrate the pos itive  s ign ificance of the 
existence o f simple labour, we must say tha t i t  lie s  in the 
fa c t th a t i t  indicates th is  type of development, instead of 
i ts  purely negative characte risa tion , as when i t  is  treated as 
synonomous w ith 'degradation' and ‘ lo s s '.
I t  is  obvious th a t in the po int of view we are discussing here, 
the methodological s ign ificance of simple labour has been to ta l ly  
misread. In place of opposition and the real con trad ic tion  
between the p riva te  and the socia l character o f  labour, we are 
given a new 'p o la r i ty ',  between 's k i l le d ' and 'u n s k ille d ' labour; 
or between the conditions tha t pertained in the past and those 
which perta in  in the present. In e ffe c t, between rest and motion. 
For the objection th a t is raised against the 'motion' of the 
modern worker is a consequence of the fa c t th a t those who ra ise 
th is  objection are b lind  to  the larger d ia le c t ic a l motion which 
necessitates the f lu id i t y  of socia l functions. Braverman speaks 
of the workers losing th e ir  s k i l ls  "w ithout gaining any new 
a b i l i t ie s  to  compensate the loss". And elsewhere he ta lks  o f 
"emancipation" in terms o f:
" . . .  the return of re q u is ite  technical knowledge to  the 
mass of the workers and the reshaping o f the organisation 
o f labour", (p. 445)
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But the opposing perspective sees the ine v itab le  and the po s itive  
s ign ificance  o f the demise of s k i l l ,  and appreciates the period 
and conditions,where the s k i l l  of the worker was the foundation 
of socia l production, as a vanished moment, or as a set of 
conditions tha t are superseded by the inherent nature o f value 
in the form o f c a p ita l. And whereas Braverman sees the 
resto ra tion  o f s k i l l  and expertise to the workers, as the condition 
fo r emancipation, Marx considers the progressive e lim ina tion  of 
s k i l l  in Braverman's sense, as forming th is  cond ition :
" . . .  The p o s s ib il ity  of varying labour must become a 
general law of socia l p roduction ... the p a r t ia l ly  
developed in d iv id u a l, who is merely the bearer o f 
one specialised socia l function , must be replaced 
by the to ta l ly  developed in d iv id u a l, fo r  whom the 
d iffe re n t socia l functions are d if fe re n t modes of 
a c t iv ity  he takes up in tu rn " . (1983; p. 488)
Emancipation requires ease of function and the reduction o f 
necessary labour-time to  a minimum, both fo r  the ind iv idua l and 
fo r  society as a whole, so th a t:
"Just as the savage must w restle w ith Nature to  
sa tis fy  his w ants... so must c iv il is e d  man, and he 
must do so in a l l  social formations and under a l l  
possible modes of production. With h is development 
th is  realm of physical necessity expands as a re s u lt 
o f his wants; but at the same tim e, the forces of 
production which s a tis fy  these wants also increase.
Freedom in th is  f ie ld  can only consist in socia lised
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man, the associated producers, ra t io n a lly  
regu la ting  th e ir  interchange w ith Nature, bringing 
i t  under th e ir  common co n tro l, instead of being - _
ruled by i t . . .  and achieving th is  w ith the least 
expenditure o f energy and under conditions most 
favourable to , and worthy o f, th e ir  human 
n a tu re ..."  (1984; p. 820)
For Braverman, the condition which is  perceived o f as being 
' l o s t ' ,  is  also seen as requ iring  th a t we 1 re tu rn 1, i .e .  to  those 
conditions which pertained during the period o f manufacture and 
of the ‘ fo rm a l1 subsumption o f labour under c a p ita l, and p r io r  
to  i t s  'r e a l1 subsumption. A purely negative comparison is  
thereby drawn between the modern ind iv id ua l worker and the more ..... 
‘ f u l ly  developed’ and autonomous in d iv id u a l worker o f the past. 
What Marx says is apt here: ~ .
"In  e a r lie r  stages o f development the s ing le  ind iv idua l 
seems to  be developed more fu l ly  because he has not worked 
out his re la tionsh ips in th e ir  fu lln e s s , or erected them 
as independent social-powers and re la tio n s  opposite 
h im se lf. . I t  is  as rid icu lous  to  yearn fo r  a return 
to  th a t o r ig in a l_ fu lln e ss  as i t i s  to  believe th a t 
' w i t h  th is  complete emptiness h is to ry  has come to  a : 
s ta n d s t i l l . . . "  (1981a; p. 162)
The in i t i a l  p o la r ity , which we suggested provided the the o re tica l 
backdrop to  th a t viewpoint we are discussing here, between 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, remains the fundamental con tras t.
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Therefore the less l ik e ly  i t  appears, from th is  perspective, 
tha t elements of Gemeinschaft can remain in the contemporary 
world, then the more they must develop a sense o f 'fa ta lis m ',  
where the sense of 'h is to ry  coming to  a s ta n d s t i l l ' is  
expressed as capita lism  ex is ting  in pe rpe tu ity . As in the 
'embryonic' question o f the fundamental nature o f the substance 
of value, so at the level of h is to r ic a l re a li ty ,  th is  po int of 
view cannot d is tingu ish  the po s itive  in the negative because 
the esse n tia lly  socia l determination of the categories is completely 
absent here.. Concrete labour is made to vanish completely, since 
whereas fo r  Marx, value emanates from the tw o-fo ld  character of 
labour, in th is  perspective i t  is  considered to  be produced by 
the uniform 'human' character o f labour. Contradiction is  
therefore not a part o f th is  perspective, i t  can therefore proceed 
to  complete the notion o f the un ifo rm ity  o f labour by u tte r ly  
subsuming the concrete in the abstract. Yet despite i ts  modern 
appearance, and its  preoccupation w ith Fordism and 's c ie n t i f ic  
management' i t  is esse n tia lly  a pre-Marxist outlook because, as 
we have ju s t seen, i t  has a purely 'q u a n tita tiv e ' purpose, i t  
abolishes the 'q u a lita t iv e ' dimension because i t  considers tha t 
only exchange-value has a ro le  in p o l it ic a l economy. That is 
wty Gleicher says tha t as fa r  as p o l it ic a l economy is  concerned, 
value comprises "labour as such". This is true  of p o lit ic a l 
economy only i f  we exclude Marx.
The argument fo r  the real 'h is to r ic a l ' existence o f value, in 
both i ts  't r a d it io n a l ' and ' la t t e r  day' forms, fa i ls  to  ra ise
4 3 5 “
Marx's con tribu tion  above th a t o f his c lass ica l predecessors. 
Therefore i t  can ne ither adequately answer Marx's c r i t ic s  on 
the ■contradiction1 between Capital Vol. t and Capital Vol. 3, ^
nor provide a sa tis fa c to ry  methodological so lu tion  to  the 
so-called 'transform ation problem'., w ith or w ithout the 'h is to r ic a l ' 
dimension. In the fo llow ing chapter we sha ll attempt to  provide 
these requirements when considering those contemporary con tribu tions 
to  the discussion on these matters. The h is to r ic a l/ lo g ic a l d iv ide , 
which was present at the inception o f th is  debate remains, and 
the acceptance or re je c tion  o f Engels' account continues to  be 
expressed in these forms. .. -
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEBATE AFTER ENGELS:
THE METHODOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO THE 'TRANSFORMATION PROBLEM'
"Engels's a r t ic le  on the law of value and the 
ra te  o f p r o f i t  is an important addition to  the th ird  
volume o f C ap ita l, and is at the same time of 
considerable importance fo r  the correct understanding 
o f the Marxian economic theory as a whole. Countless 
c r i t ic s  o f Marx used up mountains o f paper try in g  
to  prove the alleged con trad ic tion  between the 
f i r s t  and the th ird  volumes of C a p ita l. . . .  Proceeding
from Marx's proposition th a t value, not only 
th e o re tic a lly  but also h is to r ic a lly ,  is  the ' p r iu s ' 
(antecendent) o f the price o f production, Engels 
shows the h is to r ic a l appearance o f value w ith the 
r is e  and development o f exchange, and the h is to r ic a l 
t ra n s it io n  from value to  prices of production when 
simple commodity production was superseded by 
c a p ita lis m ... Engel's essay is a splendid example of 
the genuine m a te ria lis t explanation of the Marxian 
theory of value and is s t i l l  unsurpassed as a weapon 
in the f ig h t  against a l l  kinds of id e a lis t ic  d is to rtio n s  
o f Marxism". ( In s t itu te  o f Marxiam Leninism,
C.P.S.U., in Engels, 1979; p. 11)
What th is  account fa i ls  to  take note o f is  tha t amongst these 
"countless c r i t ic s "  one of the most in f lu e n t ia l and enduring 
also proceeds from Marx's "proposition" th a t value is  not only 
th e o re tic a lly  but also h is to r ic a lly  prius to  the prices of 
production. And tha t therefore th is  po in t o f departure does
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not, by i t s e l f ,  ensure a "genuine m a te ria lis t explanation" - 
which in any event merely assumes what i t  should set out to  
es tab lish .
At the same time, and as fa r  as concerns the existence o f any 
tex tua l evidence fo r  Marx's advocacy o f an h is to r ic a l dimension 
to  the transform ation procedure, in his le t te r  to  Sombart, 
c ited  e a r lie r ,  Engels confesses tha t th is  is a po int "about which 
Marx him self does not say much". And the in f lu e n t ia l c r i t i c ,  
Bohm-Bawerk, who sees Marx through the f i l t e r  provided by Engels, 
also admits th a t - concerning the existence o f an h is to r ic a lly  
antecedent 1value-epoch' - th a t:
"This is an argument tha t has not been developed with 
precision and clearness by M arx..." (op. c i t .  p. 40)
However, the d iffe rence between Bohm-Bawerk's treatment o f Marx 
and tha t of the e a r lie r  'lo g ic a l ' exponents consists in the 
circumstances th a t:
"Sombart had defended the labour theory of value as 
a log ica l ra ther than an em pirical category. This, 
Bohm-Bawerk maintained, would not have s a tis fie d  
Marx, fo r  whom value did have 'an existence in the 
real world and not merely in though t'. The inescapable 
conclusion, however, was th a t the labour theory of
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value had never applied, even in p r im itiv e  soc ie ties .
This meant th a t the whole Marxian system was, lik e  
th a t o f Hegel before him, 'a house o f ca rd s '" .
(Howard and King, 1989; p. 52)
And i t  is  in re la tio n  to  Marx th a t Bohm-Bawerk asks:
What are we to  th ink  of th is  reasoning?, . . .  How 
exchange would present i t s e l f  in those p r im itiv e  
conditions o f society if_ everything took place 
according to  the Marxian law of value; but tha t 
th is  descrip tion contains no shadow o f proof, or 
even an attempt at proof, tha t under the given 
assumptions things must so take p la c e ... he consequently 
makes a bold jump when he proclaims as an ascertained 
re s u lt th a t i t  is therefore- qu ite  consistent w ith 
fac ts  to  regard values, h is to r ic a lly  also, as p r io r  
to  the prices of production. As a matter o f fa c t 
i t  is  beyond question th a t Marx has not proved by his 
'supposition* the h is to r ic a l existence o f such a 
condition . He has only hypo the tica lly  deduced i t  from 
his theory", (op. c i t .  p. 43)
Why is  i t  th a t both Engels and Bohm-Bawerk make such firm  
assertions regarding a connection tha t was e a r lie r  described 
as ne ither clear..nor precise? With regard to  Bohm-Bawerk, 
Marx's "bold jump" is  seen to  consist in his_.attempt to  connect 
his i l lu s tra t io n s  o f the workings of the th e o re tica l model o f 
the simple commodity w ith conditions, th a t take place in re a l i ty .
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In th is  manner the model of the simple commodity economy is  
married to  the 'h is to r ic a l ly  p riu s ' quote as though the former 
were being u t i l is e d  by Marx as an i l lu s t ra t io n  o f the tru th  of 
the la t t e r . Since examples u t i l is in g  th is  the o re tica l model 
occur throughout Capital then, when the connection o f these with 
the 'p r iu s ' passage is made - as i t  is  by both Bohm-Bawerk and 
Engels - together the h is to r ic a l dimension to  the transformation 
process and Marx's connection w ith i t  are so f irm ly  established 
th a t the genuine th e o re tica l method is completely lo s t.
For example, the "supposition" re ferred to  by Bohm-Bawerk is 
undertaken by Marx when he considers th a t:
"The sa lie n t po int w i l l  best be brought out i f  we 
approach the matter as fo llow s: Suppose the labourers
themselves are in possession of th e ir  respective means 
o f production and exchange th e ir  commodities w ith 
one another". (1984; p. 75)
A ll th a t Marx is doing here is  abstracting from the presence of 
c a p ita l, while re ta in ing  the simple untrammelled va lu e -re la tion  - 
the fundamental socia l re la tio n  o f the ex is tin g  subject. But 
what is ch a ra c te ris tic  of the approaches o f both Engels and 
Bohm-Bawerk is precise ly tha t th is  the o re tica l assumption, or 
'supposition ' is  seen not to  be derived from the re a lly  ex is tin g  
socia l subject but is  said to  exemplify ce rta in  'p r im it iv e  co n d itio n s '.
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What th is  whole approach loses s igh t o f is  the methodological 
p r io r i ty  which consists in the fa c t th a t what d istinguishes 
the presents from the past, or the spe c ific  subject o f Marx's 
inqu iry  from the preh isto ry o f th a t subject., is  th a t they are 
not governed by the same socia l necessity, and th a t therefore :
-they cannot share an id e n tica l essence - comprising 'va lue-creating  
la b o u r'. The value th a t is studied by Marx presupposes the 
interconnection o f every form o f labour, o f o f the la b o u rs .:
The law o f value pertains exclusive ly to  the socia l character ;  
assumed by p riva te  labour, not to  the ind iv idua l ' incorporation ' 
or '-embodiment' in the process o f production i t s e l f .  I t  is  then 
both methodologically and p ra c tic a lly  impossible fo r  the same 
kind o f labour to  regulate exchange transactions then, and. 
exchange transactions now. I t  is  also impossible therefore fo r  
the the o re tica l model o f the simple commodity economy to  coincide 
w ith any a c tu a lly  ex is tin g  'p r iu s ' s ta te  o f a f fa ir s .  -
The suggestion th a t the contrary is  the case, in  the case o f 
Marx him self, is  treated by Bohm-Bawerk as Marx's " re tre a t under 
f i r e " ,  i :e .  as his attempt to  s tave -o ff the ine v itab le  conclusion- 
th a t th is  theory o f value~wa”s a purely log ica l construction and 
his 'system' a "house o f cards". Marx is"characterised throughout 
Bohm-Bawerk* s -c r i t  iqueas 'a ttem pting  to  introduce 'extraneous'
:or f ic t i t io u s  'h is to r ic a l ' m a te ria l, in  the attempt to  give h is 
theory o f value some basis-in  '. r e a l i t y ' . .
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Rubin remarks:
"Bohm-Bawerk’ s arguments at f i r s t  glance seem so 
convincing tha t one may bo ld ly say th a t not a 
s ing le la te r  c r it iq u e  was formulated w ithout 
repeating them". (1982; p. 61)
The continuation o f the ‘ re a l' / ' lo g ic a l' d iv ide  concerning the 
nature of value which takes place w ith in  th is  debate, de fin ing 
its  boundaries, as well as the re ten tion  of elements of Bohm-Bawerk's 
c r it iq u e , are perpetuated and sustained by those on both sides 
who f a i l  to  d iscrim inate here between Marx and Engels, and 
thereby id e n tify  the claims of the la t te r  fo r  the 'h is to r ic a l ' 
re a l i ty  of value as the s ingu la r, authentic and exclusive claim 
fo r  th is  re a l i ty .  The inev itab le  consequence of the adoption 
of th is  pos ition  is  tha t Marx is  read as having said tha t the 
re a li ty  of value is  ‘ h is to r ic a lly  p riu s ' and th a t, in the absence 
of th is  re a li ty ,  i t  is  to  be considered as only th e o re tic a lly  or 
lo g ic a lly  p riu s . That in the absence of th is  'h is to r ic a l ' 
v e r if ic a t io n , i t  is  a mental f ic t io n .
What is therefore inherent in the debate around the 'h is to r ic a l 
transformation problem' - because shared by the extremes th a t 
make i t  up - is the conviction th a t, whatever else may vary, the 
demand fo r  the real existence o f value must e n ta il a f l ig h t  from 
the ac tua lly  ex is tin g  subject to  i ts  own h is to r ic a l presuppositions. 
T h irty  years before th is  Marx had w ritte n :
“ So long as each person works fo r  him self w ith  h is own 
too ls  and s e lls  his product him self (but in  re a l i ty ,  
the necessity to  s e ll products on a socia l scale never - -
coincides w ith production carried on.w ith the 
■ producer's own means o f production)". (1972; p. 74 
my emphasis) -
This means th a t i f  we wish to  estab lish  the manner in which the
law o f value is  expressed in  th e  prices o f production we must
apply the the o re tica l method to  the e x is tin g  s ta te  o f th ings via
the d isso lu tion  in to  and reconstruction o f i t s  ‘ abs trac t5determ inations'
The method is  u t i l is e d  in order to  discover how the subject
' l i v e s ' , how i t  is  enabled to  produce and reproduce i t s e l f
'p ro p o r t io n a lly ',  th a t is ,  maintain i t s e l f  as a system o f 2:
esse n tia lly  socia l production. That is  why the use o f th is
method secures-the " s c ie n t if ic  conviction" th a t: —
"— a ll o f the d if fe re n t kinds o f p riva te  labour, which 
are carried on independently o f each o th e r . . .  are con tinu a lly  
being reduced to  the qua n tita tive  proportions in which 
society requires them-..." (op. c i t . )
The ha b ita t o f the  law o f value is  broader than the simple 
proposition th a t the  value o f a commodity is  determined by the 
amount o f abstract human labour in general i t  embodies." The 
the o re tica l bancruptcy o f th is ' s ingular form ula tion is  shown by 
i t s  neglect o f the present, manifested in  i t s  a b i l i t y . to  be
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deemed applicable before the emergence o f the present. For 
Marx the value re la tio n  does not 'flo w  in to ' the present but 
emerges from i t ,  as the expression of a 'u n ive rsa l' re la tio n .
However there were always dissenters from the view tha t Marx 
treated the transform ation procedure 'h is to r ic a l ly ' .  With 
regard to  the man who was among the f i r s t  o f these, Howard and 
King report th a t:
"Value was a purely th e o re tica l concept, Sombart argued, 
and i t  was ne ither necessary nor possible fo r  i t  to 
correspond to  any observable h is to r ic a l s itu a t io n . . .
Unless Engels assured him of the contrary, Sombart 
concluded, he would in te rp re t Marx himself as having 
taken a s im ila r p o s itio n ", (op. c i t .  p. 46-7)
Eighty years la te r , Morishima and Catephores (1975, 1976), echo 
the precise sentiments o f Sombart, both in regard to  the purely 
log ica l status o f value and in th e ir  advocacy of the proposition 
tha t Marx had "taken a s im ila r p o s itio n ".
Dispensing w ith the real or the 'h is to r ic a l ' pos ition  obviously 
requires the separation o f Marx from Engels, a process which is 
begun when Morishima and Catephores (M and C) express what is  to  
be considered as the primary condition fo r  any attempt to  supply 
an h is to r ic a l dimension to  the 'transform ation problem' as:
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"In  order to  provide an h is to r ic a lly  oriented 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  of the labour theory o f value, by 
in te rp re ting  Marx's transform ation of value in to  
price  o f production as an h is to r ic a l process, one 
must be able to  show tha t the scheme of tra n s it io n  
from the simple commodity economy is an admissible 
abstraction of h is to r ic a l re a li ty  at some reasonable 
le v e l" . (1975; p. 314)
By c it in g  "merchants c a p ita l" , whose formation takes place p r io r 
to  cap ita lism , and whose 'modus operandi' o f buying cheap and 
se llin g  dear does not d isplay the requirement o f a p re -c a p ita lis t 
'exchange of equ iva len ts '; and by also h ig h lig h tin g  the absence 
of transfe rs o f labour in the p re -c a p ita lis t period, M and C 
fin d  an 'h is to r ic a l ly  oriented ju s t i f ic a t io n "  untenable, concluding 
th a t:
"Simple commodity production has never been realised 
in h is to ry  in i ts  f u l l  or pure form, or even in some 
to le ra b ly  approximate form, because of the lack of 
m o b ility  o f producers among jobs in the p re -c a p ita lis t 
age", ( ib id , p. 315)
This is an important the o re tica l po in t, whose f u l l  s ign ificance 
is however lo s t on M and C. Nevertheless, th is  lack o f m o b ility  
enables monopolisation by p a rtic u la r ind iv idua ls  and the subsequent 
sale of the products o f labour at prices which do not re f le c t 
labour content. They present th e ir  re s u lt as:
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"Therefore although i t  is reasonable to  invoke 
Engels in support o f the view th a t values are not 
only lo g ic a lly  but also h is to r ic a lly  p r io r  to  the 
prices of production (hence th a t an h is to r ic a l 
transform ation problem can be formulated) the 
au tho rity  of Marx, ca re fu lly  read and in te rpre ted , 
should not be so invoked", ( ib id ,  p. 318)
Before we present the resu lts  o f M and C's "ca re fu l" reading 
and in te rp re ta tio n , we must re ite ra te  the po in t tha t Marx's 
connection w ith the 'h is to r ic a l ' dimension to  the transform ation 
procedure was always a tenuous one so long as the only evidence 
fo r  th is  attachment comprised the 75 words th a t make up the 
'h is to r ic a l ly  p r iu s ' passage in Chapter 10 of Capital Vol. 3.
However, when th is  passage is  in terpreted in such a way th a t 
Marx is considered to  be a llud ing to  the existence o f an h is to r ic a l ly  
antecedent ' value-epoch' then his methodological use of the model 
of the simple commodity economy may be harnessed as i l lu s t ra t in g  
ju s t aspects o f the function ing o f th is  epoch. As soon as th is  
lin k  has been established, what should be a ra tion a l process o f 
comprehension becomes a con tribu tion  to  h istoriography. On the 
other hand, i f  Marx himself is  to  be recru ited  to  the 'lo g ic a l ' 
camp, i t  is  th is  correspondence o f theory and re a li ty  th a t must 
be broken. Marx's th e o re tica l ins igh ts  must be separated from 
whatever i t  is  th a t takes place in r e a li ty .  I t  is obvious then 
tha t what the h is to r ic a l/ lo g ic a l d iv ide addresses i t s e l f  to  is  the 
question of the re a lity  or no n -rea lity  of value i t s e l f .  Only,
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as we have noted, i t  is  always the 'h is to r ic a l1 re a lity  of 
value th a t is defended or refuted i .e .  the conception of value 
held renders impossible th a t i t  should e x is t contemporaneously 
with the prices of production. Algebraic 'so lu tio n s ' w i l l  
emerge which-attempt to  reconcile  the co-existence of value and 
prices o f production w hile , at the same time, holding an id e n tic a l, 
embodied labour theory o f value. We sha ll return to  th is  
question in a la te r section. For the moment we wish to  emphasize 
tha t i t  is  inherent in the 'lo g ic a l ' pos ition  tha t the breaking 
of the connection o f value and 'h is to ry ' is  synonymous with 
breaking the connection o f value with any re a li ty  at a l l .
However, having id e n tif ie d  and rejected Engels' pos ition , i t  
remains necessary fo r  M and C to  d is tingu ish  Marx's con tribu tion  
and his method fo r  the deriva tion  o f value, in circumstances 
where i t  can no longer be a question o f seeking to  establish the 
'r e a l i t y '  o f value since th is  endeavour has been shown to  be 
'untenable' and Marx distinguished from i t .
The f i r s t  step is  to  establish Marx's methodological te r ra in , 
i .e .  the place where his categories are said to  be operative.
To th is  end M and C quote him as estab lish ing th a t:
" . . .  commodity production develops fu l ly  only under 
cap ita lism , and indeed when the c a p ita lis t  mode of 
production has conquered a l l  sectors of the economy,
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ag ricu ltu re  included", ( ib id )
Marx is considered to be d is t in c t ly  ' la t t e r  day', in contrast 
to  Engels' pre-occupation with p re -c a p ita lis t economic formations. 
I t  is in th is  connection th a t they conclude:
" . . .  i t  is  c lear th a t Marx saw tha t only under f u l l  
cap ita lism  ( i .e .  fa r  beyond the stage o f Engels' 
independent peasants) could commodity production (the 
precondition o f the law o f value) develop fu l ly .
Therefore the c lass ica l h is to r ic a l locus of the 
concept o f value cannot be any p re -c a p ita lis t 
economic form ation, but cap ita lism  i t s e l f .  The 
attempt to  define a p re -c a p ita lis t value-epoch h is to r ic a lly  
thus seems to  us to  be involved in a log ica l 
con trad ic tion ", ( ib id ,  p. 316)
At f i r s t  s igh t th is  appears to  be in conform ity w ith aspects o f 
our own methodological p o s ition . But, as was alluded to  before, 
despite the fa c t th a t M and C consider th a t what is  problematic 
about 'h is to r ic a l transform ation ' is the attempt to  make p laus ib le  
the existence o f a p re -c a p ita lis t value-epoch, th is  insp ires 
them no fu rth e r than tre a tin g  the re je c tion  o f Engels' account 
as iden tica l w ith the re je c tion  o f any claim th a t value may have 
to  a real existence. Hence although - and in contrast to  
Bohm-Bawerk - M and C do not consider th a t Marx makes a "re tre a t 
under f i r e "  to  some more 'p r im it iv e ' conditions, at the same 
time, they do not disassociate Marx from Engels with the in te n tion  
o f establish ing th a t a real existence fo r  value can be established 
apart from these 'p r im it iv e ' conditions.
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That is ,  they hold from the very s ta r t th a t in the absence of 
any p re -c a p ita lis t re a li ty ,  value is a purely log ica l construction. 
They have taken seriously Bohm-Bawerk's declaration tha t Marx 
had ne ither 'c le a rly *  nor 'p re c is e ly ' argued fo r  the 'p r im it iv e ' 
or 'h is to r ic a l ' pos ition , but th is  is recognised only in order 
to  e n lis t  Marx himself as a p ra c tit io n e r o f the 'lo g ic a l approach. 
So when the 'h is to r ic a l ' claim is  torn away, the o r ig in a l claim 
o f Werner Sombart fo r  the log ica l nature o f value is revealed and 
retained, along w ith the a ttitu d e  th a t Marx him self had adopted 
a s im ila r p o s ition . This causes them to  say th a t:
" . . .  fo r  Marx, who saw h is to ry  more ca re fu lly  than 
Engels, value was reduced to  a log ica l category 
deprived op em pirical h is to r ic a l r e a l i ty " ,  ( ib id , p. 137)
And, more p recise ly:
" . . .  fo r  Marx value and abstract labour were indeed 
log ica l abstractions. He only ins is ted  th a t they were 
not a rb itra ry  abstractions in the fo llow ing  two senses: 
f i r s t  tha t the human mind produced them only, in an 
h is to r ic a lly  given context o f m ateria l conditions of 
socia l production (a t a ce rta in  stage of social 
evo lution) and, secondly, th a t they could be fu l ly  
applied in th is  given context only, not ju s t in any 
h is to r ic a l epoch . . .  Marx thought o f value (as well 
as abstract labour) as f u l l y  va lid  as an ana ly tica l 
device only i f  applied to cap ita lism ", ( ib id )
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For M and C then, abstract labour is confirmed as a " fu l ly  v a lid "  
concept only in "a h is to r ic a lly  given context o f m ateria l 
conditions o f socia l production".
What they are re fe rr in g  to , what makes the abstraction 'v a l id ' ,  
is  the exclusive existence in c a p ita lis t  society o f a unique set 
o f pa rticu la rs  which 'a llo w ' or 'pe rm it' o f the genera lisation 
'human labour in the abstract' or 'abstrac t labou r'. These 
pa rticu la rs  form the m ateria l foundation fo r  the o r ig in a tio n  
of the concept o f a s ing le value-substance. And the p a rticu la rs  
being re ferred to  comprise th a t s o c ia lly  mobile labour-force 
which is  homogeneous across use-values, and considered here as 
the ex is tin g  form of the concrete useful labours. I t  is  th is  
given h is to r ic a l existence of the ind iv idua l labours - o r ig in a lly  
in sp iring  Adam Smith's concept o f 'labou r' - which supply the 
social m ilieu  fo r  Marx to  perform his log ica l abstraction . Thus, 
whereas fo r  Braverman and Gleicher concrete labour was i t s e l f  
'abolished' by the imposition o f abstract labour upon i t ,  here 
the concrete labours remain, being only 'destroyed' by the mental 
act o f abstraction i t s e l f .  I t  is  in accordance w ith these 
s tr ic tu re s  tha t M and C define what they consider to  be Marx's 
concept o f abstract labour as:
" . . .  the expenditure o f a quan tifia b le  force resid ing
w ith in  human beings and measured in hours o f work".
( ib id ,  p. 318)
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And his express purpose in performing th is  abstraction:
"Marx defined abstract labour as the expenditure 
o f human labour power in production w ithout regard 
to  the special kind of object produced. As such, 
human labour o f any producer was equivalent to  th a t 
of any other producer so th a t a q u a n tifia b le  re la tion sh ip , 
making q u a lita t iv e ly  d if fe re n t commodities commensurate, 
could be established, since a l l  the various commodities 
incorporated a common substance, abstract labour 
subject to  a common measure", ( ib id )
We can note immediately th a t the designations "q u a n tifiab le  force" 
and "w ith in " represent respective ly  th a t a physio log ica l conception 
of abstract labour is being ascribed to  Marx, and tha t no ‘ extraneous1 
i.e .  outw ith the process o f production i t s e l f ,  mediation is 
required to  're a lis e 1 or make re a l, the values o f commodities.
I t  fo llow s tha t in th is  view o f th ings i t  is  considered th a t 
Marx made the mental reduction o f the ex is tin g  forms o f concrete 
labours to  th e ir  common 'a b s tra c tly  human' or physio log ica l q u a lity  
in the attempt to  secure some imminent or 'inheren t standard' 
by which the magnitude of value could be determined.
However, we know from what has gone before th a t Marx's theory 
o f value does not seek an 'inherent standard' fo r  the magnitude 
of value, but the 'cause' o f value i t s e l f .  I t  seeks to  answer 
the question why the product o f labour assumes the form or 
possesses the 'q u a lity ' o f having 'v a lu e '. That the products of
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labour have the 'p rope rty ' of 'va lue ' in the f i r s t  place is 
simply considered as part o f the 'g iv e n ', or 'presupposed', and 
must remain inso lubly so, since M and C's one-sided and inductive 
method renders them incapable o f transform ing the 'presupposed' 
in to  the 'p o s ite d '.
In any event, when Marx says o f Ricardo th a t he:
" . . .  con tinua lly  confuses the labour which is 
represented in use-value and th a t which is  represented 
in exchange-value. I t  is  true  th a t the la t te r  
species o f labour is only the former species expressed 
in an abstract form". (1972; p. .138)
But th is  is not Marx's own "expression". Concrete useful labour 
is not "expressed in an abstract form" only in the head, but is
a real socia l event:
"A c t iv ity ,  regardless of i t s  ind iv idua l m anifestations, 
and the product of a c t iv ity ,  regardless o f i ts  p a rt ic u la r 
make-up, are always exchange value, and exchange value 
is a genera lity , in which a l l  in d iv id u a lity  and 
p e c u lia r ity  are negated and extinguished". (1981a; p. 157)
As we have seen, reg is te ring  the physio log ica l homogeneity o f
every form of human labour does not disclose the esse n tia lly  socia l 
nature of value but requires to  be supplemented by tha t movement 
th a t discloses why the socia l character of labour is expressed 
as its  abstrac tly  human character.
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I t  is  w idely known and advocated th a t fo r  Marx behind ‘ va lue1 
lie s  ’ labou r'. But th is  labour must be conceived not as ‘ human1 
labour but as a p a rtic u la r cons te lla tio n  o f socia l labour.
I t  is  th is  labour, th is  h is to r ic a l formation o f socia l labour 
which ‘ causes' i ts  socia l character or aspect to  appear as i ts  
value-character. Hence the socia l connection is carried by the 
product and appears as i ts  'v a lu e '. And i t  is  the primary condition 
o f the product o f labour as the 'bearer' o f the socia l connection 
which posits the human character o f labour as i ts  primary socia l 
character.
Having no notion o f the genuine the o re tica l method, M and C's 
type o f log ica l abstraction is  the product o f simple 'observation ' 
or 'apprehension' o f the given subject. I t  is  considered by them 
to  be an attempt made by Marx to  bring some kind o f 'o rd e r' to  
the 'chaotic  conception o f the whole ', and is presented only in 
a one-sided movement from observed re a li ty  to  thought, or from 
concrete to  abstract.
The 'h a lf - t r u th ' o f the movement from concrete to  abstract is  
presented as comprising the whole o f the method, as a process 
o f deriv ing a common (abstract) universal from a series o f 
p a rtic u la rs . But, as Hegel remarks:
" . . .  the u n iv e rs a l... is  not a mere sum o f features 
common to  several th ings, confronted by p a rticu la rs  
which enjoy an existence o f th e ir  own. I t  is ,
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on the contrary, s e lf - p a r t ic u la r is in g . . . .  and w ith 
undimmed clearness finds  i t s e l f  at home in i ts  
a n tith e s is . I t  is  o f the utmost importance th a t 
the real universal should not be confused w ith 
what is  merely held in common. A ll the charges 
which the devotees o f fee lin g  make against thought, 
and especia lly  against philosophic thought, and the 
re ite ra ted  statement th a t i t  is  dangerous to  carry 
thought to  what are ca lled too great lengths, 
o rig in a te  in the confusion o f these two th in g s ".
(198T; p. 157)
; {W
Methodologically, M and C are among those fo r  whom " i t  is  
dangerous to  carry thought t o . . .  too great lengths". This 
censure is the product o f th e ir  epistemological assumption th a t 
a 'g u l f 1 ex is ts  between the given substantia l re a li ty  and the 
th e o re tica l descrip tion o f i t .  Here re a li ty  i t s e l f  remains 
s teadfastly  impenetrable to  what are considered mere 'thought 
e n t i t ie s '.  For example, o f the methodological procedure th a t 
they have ascribed to  Marx, M and C consider th a t i t s  adoption 
provides the advantage o f:
" . . .  the construction of a concrete the o re tica l 
o b je c t.. .  which allows the theo re tic ian  a ce rta in  number 
o f degrees of freedom from r e a l i ty .  I t  allows him to  
formulate concepts which have no s t r ic t  correspondence 
w ith any fac tua l datum, but can nevertheless be useful 
and f r u i t f u l  an a ly tica l devices";. (1976; p. 349)
\
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And what enhanced the id e n tif ic a tio n  of M and C’ s con tribu tion  
w ith th a t  of Werner Sombart was the fa c t th a t, methodologically,
M and C f a l l  under the influence of Sombart's 1lebensphilosophie' 
companion, and co-ed ito r Max Weber; they say:
"Marx’ s methodological remarks on the construction 
o f the theo re tica l object o f P o lit ic a l Economy may 
be compared w ith the position  of Max Weber", ( ib id , p. 350)
This w i l l  obviously be a favourable comparison, so much so tha t 
Marx's "idea l types" are subsequently said to  comprise " . . .  value 
simple commodity production and so on", ( ib id )
But an 'id e a l ty p e ', being an abstraction, is  'id e a l' and not 
'r e a l ' ,  and, Weber says o f the 'id e a l ty p e ':
"In  i ts  conceptual p u r ity , th is  mental construct 
cannot be found em p irica lly  anywhere in re a l i ty " .
(Giddens, 1979; p. 142)
This outlook describes the th e o re tica l high po in t o f c la ss ica l, 
non-Marxist sociology. I t  is  expressed in the conversion o f 
the one-sided ana ly tica l movement from concrete to  abstract in to  
an 'a r t  form' i .e .  i ts  d e ific a tio n  as a set o f theo re tica l and 
methodological disapprobations governing th is  movement which 
in s is t  upon an 'e th ica l n e u tra lity ' towards the given socia l 
re a li ty  and in s is ts  tha t i t  is  not the task o f science to  discover
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the true nature of th is  given, i t s  substance or essence. Here, 
tha t the simply 'presupposed* should and must remain so, is 
tenaciously th e o re tic a lly  defended. I t  is  the broaching o f 
these methodological s tr ic tu re s  th a t M and C fin d  is  the u ltim ate  
crime of those whom, lik e  Engels and Ronald L. Meek, attempt to  
id e n tify  the Maxian categories w ith 're a lly  e x is tin g ' e n t it ie s .  
Thus th e ir  f in a l judgement brings down the f u l l  wrath of Weber 
upon those who would seek to  give value and i ts  substance anything 
more than a purely 'lo g ic a l ' existence; M and C quote Weber th a t:
" ' . . .  a l l  s p e c if ic a lly  Marxian 'law s' and developmental 
tendencies are ideal types. The s ign ificance  o f these 
ideal types, when they are used fo r  the assessment 
o f re a li ty  is  known to  everyone. S im ila rly  th e ir  
perniciousness, as soon as they are thought o f as 
em p irica lly  va lid  or real is  likew ise known to  a l l  
who have used them '", ( ib id ,  p. 352)
These sentiments take fo r  granted th a t a fundamental d is t in c tio n  
exists between the knowing subject and the object th a t he knows. 
For Weber, the attempt to  bring some kind of ' lo g ic a l ' order to  
bear upon socia l re a li ty  is  a leg itim a te  one, but only so long 
as i t  is also remembered th a t th is  r e a li ty ,  considered ' i n - i t s e l f '  
is  and remains impervious to  our th e o re tica l comprehension.
This epistemological 'dualism ' is  the expression of Weber's 
'neo-Kantianism ', which emerged as a part o f th a t early 20th 
century debate with the 'ghost' o f Marx. I t  constitu tes a
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's o c io lo g ic a l1 palimpsest being placed upon the Kantian d is tin c tio n  
between 'phenomena' and 'noumena', or between dimensions of 
ob jec tive ly  ex is ting  re a li ty  as i t  ex is ts  ' fo r  u s ', and as i t  
ex is ts ' i n - i t s e l f  - in which la t te r  existence i t  remains impenetrable 
to  thought. In Weber's typology th is  contrast is  expressed in 
his fundamental methodological d is t in c tio n  between "the Ind iv idua l" 
and "Socie ty", and his basic objection to  Marx is tha t he considers 
him as attempting to  give 's u b je c t iv is t ' c r i te r ia  a real 'o b je c tiv e ' 
existence.
But Marx's categories are not 'sub je c tive ' in the narrow epistemological 
sense, but are ra ther o n to lo g ica l: they express the forms o f 
being o f a spe c ific  socie ty.
Therefore the o b jec tive ly  ex is tin g  re a li ty  th a t Marx seeks to  
comprehend is a social re a l i ty ,  inhabited by an 'o b je c t iv ity ' 
tha t man him self has constitu ted , and th a t is  therefore given 
an existence, as opposed to  possessing one ' i n - i t s e l f ' .
Marx remarks th a t:
"So fa r  no chemist has ever discovered exchange 
value in e ith e r a pearl or a diamond". (1983; p. 87)
And.the conclusion we seek to  draw from th is  here is tha t 'exchange
value' has an 'o b je c tive ly  re a l ' or 'e m p ir ica lly  v a lid ' existence
J
nevertheless, only i t  is  not in t r in s ic  nor 'beyond our ken '.
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What Marx says of the 'ph ilosophica l m a te r ia lis t ' dualism 
of Feuerbach can apply equally to  Weber, i .e .  th a t he:
" . . .  wants sensible objects re a lly  d istinguished from
the objects of thought, but he does not understand
human a c t iv ity  i t s e l f  as ob jective  a c t iv i ty " .
(1963; p. 82)
The 'o b je c tive ' nature o f value is  therefore a purely 's o c ia l' 
o b je c t iv ity ,  th a t is ,  i t  is  to  be conceived o f as ne ither 
'immutable' nor simply 'g iv e n ', but as created, 'brought about' 
or predicated upon a d e fin ite  form of socia l p ractice , and, 
what is  o f fundamental s ign ificance , something th a t is  'created ' 
can be changed, or 'brought about' d if fe re n t ly .
This raises an important dimension of the methodological question 
tha t is at issue here: The posthumous debate w ith Marx may be
seen as a dimension o f the class struggle th a t is  carried on 
in Germany in the f i r s t  quarter o f the 20th century. Max Weber's 
lo y a ltie s  are here, as in other places, expressed in the fa c t 
tha t he advocates and defends an in te rp re ta tio n  o f the world and 
methodologically and p ra c tic a lly  opposes any changing o f i t ,  in 
the precise sense in which th is  changing was advocated by 
Leibknecht and Luxemburg. Marx's method discloses who the 
o rig ina to rs  of socia l 'o b je c t iv ity ' re a lly  are, thereby d is p e llin g  
tha t 'r e if ic a t io n ' tha t enmeshes the purely 'lo g ic a l ' approach.
And inherent in th is  method is the c r it iq u e ^o f a society which 
bestows o b je c tiv ity  upon the products of labour because i t  is  
here th a t:
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" . . .  the socia l character o f men's labour appears to  
them as an ob jective character stamped upon the 
products o f tha t la b o u r... a d e fin ite  socia l 
re la tio n  between men, th a t assumes, in th e ir  
eyes, the fa n ta s tic  form o f a re la tio n  between 
th in g s ...  To them, th e ir  own socia l action takes 
the form o f the action o f ob jects, which ru le  the 
producers instead o f being ruled by them".
(1983; p. 77, 79, my emphasis)
The whole dimension of 'fe t is h is m ' is  therefore closed to  Weber 
because o f his fundamental methodological d is t in c tio n  between 
the find ings o f em pirical science and the world o f "the S e lf" .
This means th a t va lid  'so c ia l a c tio n 1 is  assessed purely in 
terms o f 'su b jec tive ly  intended meaning', i .e .  the extent to  which 
the 'a c tio n ' o f the ind iv idua l takes account o f the behaviour o f 
other socia l 's e l f s '.  Therefore fo r  Weber i t  is  impossible fo r  
us to  know the real or 'e m p ir ica lly  v a lid ' "actions o f objects" 
outside o f the realm o f the 'exact' sciences, and thus the 
perpetuation o f 'fe tis h is m ' is  accomplished in the fa c t th a t his 
'soc ia l action ' theory concerns only ' in te r -s u b je c t iv ity ' in the 
narrow d u a lis t ic  sense. Following Kant, his insistence upon 
the fa c t tha t i t  is  both methodologically erroneous and destructive  
to  tra ns fe r judgements appropriate to  one sphere to  another thereby 
allows the continuation of men's so c ia lly  established objects 
as "th in gs-in  themselves".
r
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Nevertheless, i t  is  th is  fundamental methodological censure 
w ith regard to  keeping apart what are considered to be the 
d iscre te  and autonomous, subjective and ob jec tive , 'le v e ls ' 
o f re a li ty  th a t is adopted by M and C when they d is tingu ish :
"The deeper errors o f those authors who, s ta rtin g  
w ith Engels, have stressed the h is to r ic a l aspect o f 
the transform ation problem seems to  l ie  in tha t they 
have read a theory o f h is to r ic a l evolution of 
economic systems, and in p a rtic u la r o f tra n s itio n  
from a p re -c a p ita lis t to  a c a p ita lis t  economy, in 
what was esse n tia lly  a s ta t ic ,  atemporal, ana ly tic  
device". (1975; p. 325)
Here is  a descrip tion o f the tw in poles of th is  debate where the 
claim fo r  the dynamic and h is to r ic a lly  're a l ' existence o f value 
and i t s '  epoch is  contrasted w ith i t s '  characterisation as a 
s ta t ic  and atemporal ana ly tic  device, an1ideal ty p e '. On the 
one hand value is  considered as sub s tan tia lly  re a l, formed and 
created by i t s 1 matter or content 'labour and labour a lone ', 
the inherent regu la tor of exchange transactions.
On the other i t  is  immaterial, a conceptual or log ica l device 
of the same purely theo re tica l nature as i ts  'modus operandi' - 
the simple commodity economy or 'value epoch'. The reso lu tion  
of th is  p o la r ity , or the provision of the so lu tion  to  the 'h is to r ic a l 
transform ation problem', must therefore begin w ith the establishment 
o f what the true  nature of value re a lly  is ,  i .e .  not on ly .the  




When Marx is explaining the e sse n tia lly  socia l determ ination of 
value, in opposition to  the claim fo r  i t s 1 ind iv idua l determ ination 
by such as the 't im e -c h it te rs ', he says th a t:
"The value of commodities as determined by labour­
time is  only th e ir  average value. This average 
appears as an external abstraction i f  i t  is  
calculated out as the average fig u re  o f an epoch... 
but i t  is  very real i f  i t  is  at the same time 
recognised as the d riv in g  force and the moving 
p r in c ip le  o f the o s c illa t io n s  which commodity prices 
' run through during a given epoch...
Market value equates i t s e l f  w ith real value by means 
o f i t s  constant o s c illa t io n s , never by means o f an 
equation w ith real value as i f  the la tte r.w ere  a 
th ird  pa rty , but ra ther by means o f constant non­
equation o f i t s e l f  (as Hegel would say, not by way 
of abstract id e n tity , but by constant negation o f the 
negation, i .e .  o f i t s e l f  as negation o f real v a lu e )...
Price therefore is  d istinguished from value not only 
as the nominal from the re a l; not only by way o f the 
denomination in gold and s ilv e r ,  but because the la t te r  
appears as the law o f the motions which the former 
runs through. But the two are constantly d if fe re n t 
and never balance out, or balance only co in c id en ta lly  
or exceptiona lly . The price  o f a commodity constantly 
stands above or below the value o f the commodity, and 
the value o f the commodity i t s e l f  ex is ts  only in th is  up 
and down movement o f commodity p rice s ". (1981a; p. 137-8)
I n i t i a l ly  what Marx asks us to  do is  to  consider ‘ average va lue1 
as not only extraneously re la ted to  the flu c tu a tio ns  of p rice
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but as ‘ in te rn a lly ' or ‘ in h e re n tly1 re la ted to  them. . We are 
asked to  tre a t 'average value' as not simply 'appearance' but 
as 'essence', as "the d riv in g  force and the moving p r in c ip le " , 
as the ind ica tion  of the indwelling regu la to r o f the o s c illa tio n s  
of p rice . In a society o f producers who are in d if fe re n t to  
one another and who express th e ir  socia l connection through the 
p riva te  exchange o f the products o f labour, then the dynamo here, 
or the "moving p r in c ip le " , is socia l labour and the manner in 
which i t  is  to  be s o c ia lly  a llocated amongst i t s  various useful 
functions. Marx says in answer to  Bailey:
"There is ,  in actual fa c t , a very s ig n if ic a n t d iffe rence 
(which Bailey does not no tice) between 'measure' ( in  
the sense o f money) and 'cause o f va lu e '.
The !cause' o f value transforms use-values in to  
value. The external measure of value already 
presupposes the existence o f v a lu e ... The 'cause' 
o f value is  the substance o f value and hence also 
i t s  imminent measure". (1972; p. 163)
When Marx speaks o f the 'cause' o f value i t  is  already an a n tic ip a tio n  
of the answer he w i l l  provide to  the 'why' o f value, i .e .  to  
tha t question th a t was never posed by the c lass ica l economists. 
Therefore by 'cause' o f value he means 's p e c if ic  conste lla tion  
of socia l labour' where i ts  socia l character can only be expressed 
in the 'va lue ' o f the products o f labour. This is  the labour 
which 'causes' value, and i t  is  the amount o f th is  labour which 
determines i ts  magnitude. Price flu c tu a tio n  around a 'cen tre '
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is ,  as i t  were, the mode of communication from essence to  
appearance; the essence must appear. But th is  'hidden re g u la to r ', 
although i t  has a 're a l ' existence, i t  is  ne ither a quantity  o f 
'embodied1 labour nor a purely 'ideal' construction. Marx says 
two important th ings in re la tio n  to  the real nature o f value.
The f i r s t  is  th a t value i t s e l f  has no corporeal existence, and 
therefore cannot be considered as a " th ird  party" which forms a 
material coexistent fo r  price  (money). The second, fo llow ing  
from th is ,  is  th a t value i t s e l f  "ex is ts  only in th is  up and down 
movement o f commodity p rices". But, again, th is  m ateria l 
' i n v is ib i l i t y '  should not be taken to  s ig n ify  th a t value is 
the re fo re .on ly  a 'lo g ic a l con s tru c tio n '. This amounts to  a 
'p o s i t iv is t ic '  ob jection , insp ired by type o f methodological 
nominalism which considers imperceptible 'essences' or 'u n ive rsa ls ' 
to  be mereby general 'no tions ' formed by the human in te l le c t  and 
with no claim to  any v e r if ia b ly  're a l ' existence. This e m p iric is t 
o rie n ta tio n , and i ts  narrow c r i te r ia  fo r  what is  to  con s titu te  
s c ie n t if ic  tru th , is thereby excluded from considering 'va lue ' 
as a re a li ty  -  as a real e n tity  in the way th a t such as 'magnetism' 
and 'g ra v ity ' are real e n t it ie s .  Marx him self speaks o f the 
law o f value asserting i t s e l f  in the same way tha t the law of 
g rav ity  asserts i t s e l f  when a house " fa l ls  about our ears". A ll 
three, magnetism, g ra v ity  and value, are themselves imperceptible 
by the senses, and yet each o f them contro ls  the movement o f 
ob jects. I t  is indeed the law-governed behaviour o f these objects 
which enables us to  te s t i f y  to  the real existence of magnetism, 
g ra v ity  and value. The, em p irica lly  re a l, existence of a l l  three
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is  evidenced and only ex is ts  in th e ir  e ffe c ts , and i t . i s  the 
s c ie n t if ic  observation o f these e ffec ts  which allows us to  say 
th a t the movement of objects is law-governed, and therefore in 
the case o f value th a t i t  has a socia l existence 1sui generis1.
The model o f the 'simple commodity economy', or the 'e a rly  
c a p ita l is t ' period o f 'market va lu e ', are constructed in order 
to  i l lu s t ra te  how equ ilib rium  is  maintained by exchange at labour- 
value, thus i l lu s t ra t in g  how the., q u a lita tiv e  and q u a n tita tive , 
determination of value proceeds from the socia l character o f 
autonomous p riva te  labour.
Here the exchange o f commodities at th e ir  labour-values equalises 
the advantages fo r  the commodity producers in each branch o f 
production, and removes the motives fo r  tra n s fe r from one branch 
to  another,. As Rubin remarks very much to  the po in t:
" . . .T h is  state o f equ ilib rium  corresponds to  the 
average level of prices. This average level is  a 
the o re tica l conception. The average prices do not 
correspond to  the actual movements of concrete market 
p rices, but explain them. This the o re tica l abstract 
formula o f the movement of prices is , in fa c t, the 
'law o f value1. . .  Economic l i f e  is a sea of 
f lu c tu a tin g  motion. I t  is  not possible to  observe 
the state of equilib rium  in the d is tr ib u tio n  of 
labour among the various branches of production at 
any one moment. But w ithout such a th e o re tic a lly  
conceived state o f equ ilib rium , the character and
164
d ire c tio n  o f the flu c tu a tin g  movement cannot 
be explained", (op. c i t .  p. 78)
And Marx him self remarks:
"The exchange or sale of commodities at th e ir  
values is  the ra tio n a l s tate of a f fa ir s , i .e .  the 
natura l law o f th e ir  eq u ilib rium . I t  is th is  
law th a t explains the deviations, and not vice 
versa, the deviations th a t explain the law".
(1984; p. 188, my emph.)
The ’ ra tio n a l state of a f fa ir s ' corresponds to  'the  necessity 
o f the d is tr ib u tio n  o f socia l labour in d e fin ite  p ropo rtions ', 
th a t is ,  th a t society would require from each of the separate 
branches o f production only th a t amount of labour which is 
necessary to  s a tis fy  socia l needs at a given level of development 
of productive forces. Or, th a t 'the  masses o f products corresponding 
to  the d if fe re n t needs require d iffe re n t and q u a n tita tive ly  
determined masses o f the to ta l labour o f s o c ie ty '. The 'ra t io n a l ' 
or the 'sane' condition is then the condition of 'e q u ilib riu m ' - 
where socia l labour is not squandered, is  not 'unnecessary' 
labour. The fo rc ib le  assertion o f th is  ra tio na l state o f a ffa irs  
is the 'law o f v a lu e ':
" I t  requires a fu l ly  developed production o f commodities 
before, from accumulated experience alone, the s c ie n t if ic  
conviction springs up, th a t a l l  the d if fe re n t kinds o f
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priva te  labour, which are carried  on independently 
o f each other, and yet as spontaneously developed 
branches o f the socia l d iv is io n  o f  labour, are 
con tinua lly  being reduced to  the quan tita tive  
proportions in which socie ty requires them. And why? 
Because, in the midst o f a l l  the accidental and 
eve r-flu c tua ting  exchange re la tio n s  between the 
products, the labour-time s o c ia lly  necessary fo r  
th e ir  production fo rc ib ly  asserts i t s e l f  l ik e  
and ove r-rid ing  law o f nature". (1983; p. 80, my emph.)
And again:
"The d iffe re n t spheres o f production, i t  is  tru e ,
, constantly tend to  an equ ilib rium : fo r ,  on the
one hand, while each producer o f a commodity is  
bound to  produce a use-value, to  s a tis fy  a p a rt ic u la r 
socia l want, and while the extent o f these wants 
d if fe rs  q u a n tita tiv e ly , s t i l l  there ex is ts  an inner 
re la tio n  which se ttle s  th e ir  proportions in to  a 
.regu la r system... the law o f value of commodities 
u ltim a te ly  determines how much o f i t s  disposable 
working time society can expend on each p a rtic u la r 
class of commodities. But th is  constant tendency 
to  equ ilib rium , o f the various spheres o f production, 
is  exercised only in the shape o f a reaction against 
the constant upsetting of th is  equ ilib rium . The 
'a p r io r i1 system on which the d iv is io n  o f labour 
w ith in  the workshop is  re gu la rly  carried  out, becomes 
in the d iv is ion  o f labour w ith in  the socie ty, an 
‘ a p o s te r io r i1 nature-imposed necessity, co n tro llin g  
the lawless caprice of the producers, and perceptib le 
in the barometrical flu c tu a tio n s  of the market p rice s", 
( ib id , p. 336, my emph.)
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The 'in n e r re la t io n ’ is  the assertion o f 'the ra tio na l state 
o f a f fa ir s ' is  the 'law o f value' is  the Essence, is the re fore :
" . . .  a secret, hidden under the apparent fluc tu a tio ns  
in the re la tiv e  values o f commodities. I ts  discovery 
while removing a l l  appearance of mere acc iden ta lity  
from the determination of the magnitude o f the values 
o f commodities yet in no way a lte rs  the mode in which 
th a t determination takes place", (op. c i t .  ib id )
Of course th is  'ra tio n a l state of a f fa irs ' is  'th e o re tic a lly  
conceived', yet the only way in which Marx's ra tiona le  can be 
questioned or refuted is  to  deny his onto log ica l premise, i .e .  
is to  say th a t we are not dealing with a system of esse n tia lly  
socia l production which presupposes the a ll-round dependence 
o f the producers on one another together w ith the to ta l iso la tio n  
of th e ir  p riva te  in te rests  and th a t:
"This necessity in the d is tr ib u tio n  o f socia l labour 
in d e fin ite  proportions cannot possibly be done away 
w ith by a p a rtic u la r form o f socia l production but 
can only change the form in which i t  appea rs ...."
(op. c i t . )
We could approach the matter in a s lig h t ly  d iffe re n t way by 
s ta ting  th a t the 'soc ia l*  and the 'in d iv id u a l',  or the general 
and the p a rtic u la r, appear as opposites in the c a p ita lis t  socie ty 
whereas, in th e ir  essence, they are id e n tic a l, th a t is ,  th a t the
socia l is  the universal which develops p a rt ic u la r ly  out o f i t s e l f *
( ■
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and th a t the terms developed out o f i t  remain fu l ly  id e n tica l 
w ith i t :
"Hence, in Hegelian terms, the underlying id e n tity  
is the d iffe rence, the s e lf -d if fe re n t ia t io n ,  tha t which 
deploys the d iffe re n t properties in th e ir  necessary 
. re la tio n  to  each other. The nature o f Essence is  to  
manifest i t s e l f  in these properties as necessarily 
re la ted . I t  is  the 're p u ls io n 1 o f i t s e l f  from 
i t s e l f ,  which at the same time is the re fle c tio n  back 
in to  i t s e l f . . .  This id e n tity  has d iffe rence as an 
essentia l moment, and d iffe rence as re flec ted  back 
in to  i t s e l f  is  also one w ith id e n t ity " .  (Taylor, op. c i t .  
p. 261)
In the p r im itive  commune, or in the s o c ia lis t socie ty, the socia l 
and the ind iv idua l e x is t in un ity  w ith one another - the in d iv id u a l 
d ire c t ly  or immediately performs socia l labour, i ts  quantity  being 
prescribed. The p a rtic u la r and the general are thus id e n tica l
in essence. However, since in c a p ita lis t  society - the soc ie ty
of universal and a ll-s id ed  mediation - the p a rtic u la r and the 
general have come apart and are opposed as in d iv id u a l/s o c ia l, 
concrete/abstract, use-value/value, then the 'law of value1 is 
the expression of essentia l id e n tity  in and through opposition 
or, as Marx has i t :
" . . .  the incessant equ lib ra tion  o f constant divergencies". 
(1984; p. 162)
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When we said a moment ago tha t Marx's ra tiona le  could only have 
its  v a l id ity  denied i f  one were to  ignore i ts  on to log ica l 'g round ', 
i ts  sp e c ific  methodological presuppositions, then th is  negation 
is the precise e ffe c t o f the attempts by - o r ig in a lly  Engels and 
H ilfe rd in g , la te r Mandel and Fine - t o  s h if t  th is  onto log ica l 
ground to  include a 'p re h is to r ic a l1 period o f 'simple commodity 
production ', or indeed a period of 'e a r ly ' cap ita lism  where 
exchange transactions are regulated by 'market va lu e '. This very 
displacement is  encapsulated by H ilfe rd in g  when he w rites th a t:
"Marx conceives the transform ation o f value in to  price  
o f production as an h is to r ic a l p rocess ..." (op. c i t .  p. 162)
And by Mandel when he states:
"Von Bortkiewicz shows a lack of h is to r ic a l sense when 
he declares tha t the transform ation o f value in to  price  
o f production does not re f le c t  any real h is to r ic a l 
process. Today i t  has become almost commonplace to  
stress th a t th is  transform ation re fle c ts  the tra n s it io n  
from petty commodity p roduction ... to  c a p ita lis t  
soc ie ty". (1968; p. 301)
And fo r  Fine:
" I t  is  qu ite  c lear th a t Marx's view is  th a t there is 
a h is to r ic a l transform ation". (1986; p. 147)
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I t  is  a comment upon the almost to ta l neglect o f the genuine 
th e o re tica l method tha t Mandel can characterise as 'commonplace1 
the methodolgocial tra n s fe r from the real subject of Marx's 
inqu iry  to  the h is to ry  of the formation of th a t subject. At 
the same tim e, however, th is  transposition  demands the adherence 
to , and communication o f, a d e fin ite  version o f Marx's method 
where the the o re tica l categories must be seen to  have genuine 
'a rcha ic ' counterparts. Thus fo r  H ilfe rd in g :
"Marx demonstrates economic phenomena and th e ir  
m odifications as they manifest themselves in 
conform ity to  la w ... In th is  demonstration, in 
accordance w ith the d ia le c tic a l method, conceptual 
evo lution runs p a ra lle l throughout w ith h is to r ic a l 
e v o lu tio n ... Moreover th is  pa ra lle lism  furnishes 
the s tr ic te s t  em pirical proof of the accuracy o f the 
theory". (op. c i t .  p. 195)
A s im ila r , more standard depiction - and therefore more vacuous - 
is  given by Fine and H arris, to  the e ffe c t th a t:
"The concepts produced and th e ir  log ica l order are 
in accordance w ith material re a l i ty " .  (1979; p. 7)
And fo r  Mandel:
"Marx was able to  grasp h is to r ic a l re a li ty  only because 
he produced a s c ie n t if ic  re fle c tio n  of i t . ,  the m a te r ia lis t
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d ia le c tic  can only t r y  to  reproduce re a li ty  w ith , 
ever increasing p rec is ion ". (1975; p. 18; 19)
Accordingly, i f  we re c a ll Engels' conviction th a t Marx would 
have 'considerably extended' the 'h is to r ic a l ly  p r iu s ' quotation, 
no doubt to  fu rth e r extend and cement th is  'p a ra lle lis m ', then 
Mandel's Marxist Economic Theory (1968) adequately f u l f i l s  th is  
function o f extension. Mandel u t i l is e s  the find ings of 
contemporary anthropologists and p r im itiv e  h is to rians  to  evidence 
the 'p re h is to r ic a l' existence o f exchange transactions th a t are 
regulated and governed by ' la b ou r-va lue ', and where there emerges 
an invariab le  determination o f 'va lue ' between the Toda, Karumba, 
Badaga and Kota tr ib e s  and c a p ita l is t  socie ty i t s e l f .  This 
co n tin u ity  is maintained by the same und iffe ren tia ted  'lab ou r' 
being considered as operative between the two. Later (1979), 
in his in troduction  to  Capital Vol. 1, Mandel w rites :
"The simplest forms o f appearance o f the economic 
categories (which are ju s t forms o f m ateria l 
existence, of m ateria l re a l i ty ,  as perceived and 
s im p lifie d  by the human mind), are often also th e ir  
p r im itiv e , th a t is  to  say th e ir  o r ig in a l form.
However controversia l th is  in te rp re ta tio n  may be, 
i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  deny th a t th is  un ity  o f h is to r ic a l 
and log ica l analysis is  the way Marx and Engels 
understood th e ir  own method", (p. 22)
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But th is  in te rp re ta tio n  is not at a l l  'c o n tro v e rs ia l', but is , 
as Mandel remarked e a r lie r ,  'commonplace'. I t  forms the 
tra d it io n a l Engelsian response to  the charge th a t value was a 
purely mental construct and which had no e x is te n tia l complement, 
a claim which followed the appearance o f Capital Vol. 3 in the 
18901s and which reposes now as the standard (M arxist) response 
on th is  issue. I t  is  represented by Mandel himself when he 
w rites th a t:
"Objections have been raised - by early  Russian Marxist 
authors lik e  Bogdanov, by la te r  commentators l ik e  Rubin 
and by contemporary Marxists lik e  Lucio C o lle tt i and 
Louis Althusser - to  the view, o r ig in a tin g  w ith Engels 
to  which I subscribe, th a t Marx's Capital provides not 
only a basic analysis o f the c a p ita lis t  mode of production, 
but also s ig n if ic a n t comments upon the whole h is to r ic a l 
period which includes essentia l phenomena o f petty 
commodity production. These objections however are 
based upon a double confusion. I t  is  true  tha t the 
c a p ita lis t  mode of production is the only social 
organisation o f the economy which implies generalised 
commodity p roduction ... But th is  in no way implies 
tha t in socie ties in which petty commodity production 
has already become the predominant mode o f production., 
the laws governing the exchange o f commodites and the 
c irc u la tio n  o f money do not strongly influence the 
economic dynamic. Indeed i t  is  prec ise ly  the 
unfolding of the law o f value which leads in such 
socie ties to  the separation o f the d ire c t producers 
from th e ir  means of production", ( ib id ,  p. 14-15)
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I t  should be established immediately th a t the group o f w rite rs  
c ited  by Mandel as ra is in g  objections to  the view which he 
subscribes to  are by no means homogeneous, e ith e r in these 
objections or in th e ir  methodological o r ie n ta tio n . Bogdanov, 
C o lle t t i and Althusser express various forms o f Kantian and 
Feurbachian dualism, whereas Rubin sides f irm ly  w ith Hegel on 
the question o f method. However, i t  is  methodologically misleading 
fo r  Mandel to  speak of ' essentia l -phenomena o f pe tty  commodity 
production' and the ' unfolding o f the law o f value' as though 
both 'essence' and the 'law o f value' had some kind o f extant 
q u a lita tiv e  existence p r io r  to  the emergence o f the sp e c ific  
subject o f Marx's inq u iry . This impression is  re inforced when 
th is  subject i t s e l f  is  characterised as d if fe r in g  only q u a n tita tiv e ly  
from what has gone before, i .e .  as a 'g e ne ra lisa tion ' or 'spread' 
of previously established determ inations. S im ila rly , ' the laws 
governing the exchange o f commodities' and mention o f ' the economy' 
are u t i l is e d  to  in s t i l  th a t 'evo lu tion a ry ' perspective wherein 
everything is present 'a t  b ir th ' and simply 'matures' and is  
therefore pe rfe c tly  consistent w ith the claim th a t value has an 
existence p r io r to  cap ita lism  and th a t there is  thereby an 
'h is to r ic a l ' dimension to  the transform ation process.
I t  is o r ig in a lly  Engels' attempt to  stand Hegel 'on his fe e t ' and 
his conclusion th a t 'the  general laws o f motion of the external 
world and of human thought' are 'id e n tic a l in substance' which 
forces a tten tion  onto the 'p re h is to r ic a l te rra  firm a as the only
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adequate 'ground1 fo r  Marx's 'm a te r ia lis t ' method. Here i t  
would be profane to  consider th a t the model o f the 'simple 
commodity economy' had an existence which was 'pu re ly  in the 
head', th a t is ,  could be anything other than an actual h is to r ic a l 
ex is te n t. And i t  is  the search and elaboration of these h is to r ic a l 
p re-existents or 'correspondents which is  the declared purpose 
of Mandel's en tire  (1968) p ro je c t. His ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  th is  
is phrased as:
"The s c ie n t if ic a l ly  correct pos ition  is  obviously tha t 
which endeavours to  s ta r t from the em pirical data o f the
science of today in order to  examine whether or not
the essence o f Marx's economic propositions remains 
v a l id . . .  What we seek to  show is  tha t i t  is  possible, 
on the basis of the s c ie n t if ic  data of contemporary 
science, to  reconstitu te  the whole economic system of 
Karl Marx". (1968; p. 17)
The p o s s ib il ity  of th is  're c o n s titu tio n ' o f Marx's 'whole economic 
system' is  only tenable i f  i t  is  considered th a t 'em pirica l fa c ts ' 
form i t s  essentia l 'c o re ', and th a t the e n tire  content o f the
d ia le c tic a l synthesis is a restatement or 're f le c t io n ' o f these
em pirical fa c ts . Contrary to  th is ,  in the form ulation of the 
method presented here., em pirical fac ts  were received i n i t i a l l y  
from the ex is ting  subject i t s e l f  and were subsequently reduced 
as perta in ing to  the f i r s t  stage in  the process of production o f 
knowledge: the conceptual analysis. Mandel both considerably 
extends the methodological s ign ificance of em pirical fac ts  and 
ju s t i f ie s  th e ir  harvest when he claims th a t:
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" . . .  the 'secret* o f no 'category' can be discovered 
w ithout study of both i t s  o r ig in  and i ts  evo lu tion ".
( ib id ,  p. 18)
But again, and as we have shown, the secret o f the 'an ted ilu v ian ' 
category 'exchange-value', i .e .  the va lue -re la tion  which causes 
i ts  appearance, is given only and can be given only, in the 
conditions of developed 'u n iv e rs a li ty ',  indeed has no 'se c re t' 
p r io r  to  the emergence o f the 'tw o -fo ld  character o f labou r', 
which i t s e l f  presupposes the development and the opposition of 
the universal over and against the p a rtic u la r . On the other hand, 
the bulk o f Mandel's em pirical fac ts  are recru ited  from diverse 
sources and are u t i l is e d  in order to  i l lu s t ra te  how 'labour 
q u a n tit ie s ' govern exchange transactions fo r  the whole h is to r ic a l 
period, so th a t i f  there is  any 'se c re t' w ith regard to  the 
determination o f these exchange transactions is  a remarkably 
'open' one.
I t  is  obvious from his comments th a t Mandel tre a ts  the 'method 
of in q u iry ' as re la tin g  exc lus ive ly  to  the gathering o f em pirical 
fac ts  from the whole o f h is to ry , and which are then 'reversed' 
to  form the 'method of p resen ta tion '. In th is  way the backbone 
o f the method is  considered to  l ie  in the number of these fa c ts , 
the gathering o f which is  undertaken in order to  render more 
compelling the thesis th a t there ex is ts  a 'p a ra lle lis m ' between 
h is to r ic a l and conceptual evo lu tion . The inclusion o f contemporary 
s c ie n t if ic  data which re la te  to  the h is to ry  of exchange would, 
no doubt, enrich the 'manner o f presentation ' - render i t  more
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exhaustive, but to  advocate a methodological ’ re co n s titu tio n ' 
of Marx's e n tire  economic 'system' on the basis o f such data 
shows a complete lack o f understanding o f the nature o f Marx's 
'method o f in q u iry ' and i t s  source.
For example, when i t  comes to  the question o f the nature o f the 
'substance' o f value i t s e l f ,  or what Mandel c ite s  as "the fa c t 
th a t commodities are commensurable", he continues:
" . . .  i t  is  th is  general human labour - ca lled abstract 
labour because abstraction is  made from i ts  spe c ific  
nature, ju s t  as when one adds together 3 apples, 4 pears 
and 5 bananas, one has to  abstract from th e ir  sp e c ific  
q u a lit ie s  so as to  be le f t  w ith merely 12 f r u i ts  - th a t 
is  the basis o f exchange value", ( ib id ,  p. 65)
But th a t is  not the basis o f exchange value o r, ra the r, i t  is  
the basis th a t must su ffice  when one's version of the method 
has departed from the sp e c ific  socia l determination o f value by 
labour, as th is  labour ex is ts  in the conditions of c a p ita lis t  
socie ty, and proceeds to  other, more diverse, socia l form ations, 
w h ile , a t the same time, attempting to  hold constant throughout 
th is  's h i f t '  the determination o f value by labour. No matter 
how much 'general human labour' a commodity may contain, i f  the 
socia l need fo r  i t  has been sa tia ted , i .e .  i f  i t  does not contain 
labour th a t is  so c ia lly  necessary, then i t  is  useless; and i f  
i t  is  useless i t  is  'va lue less ' -  is  not at a l l  'commensurable'. 
At f i r s t  s igh t Mandel proceeds to  improve upon th is  descrip tion  
when he says:
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" . . .  i f  commodities are each the products o f a 
spe c ific  kind o f labour, they are also products 
o f socia l human labour, th a t is ,  a part o f the 
to ta l labour-time ava ilab le  to  a p a rtic u la r socie ty, 
and on the economy o f which society is  based", ( ib id )
We may a lign  th is  w ith what Paul Sweezy says when he addresses 
the same question:
"The fa c t tha t a commodity is  a value means th a t i t  
has m ateria lised abstract labour, o r, in other words, 
th a t i t  has absorbed a part o f the to ta l wealth- 
producing a c t iv ity  o f soc ie ty ". (1942; p. 38)
These formulations are more or less ide n tica l and, in each case, 
what is  being answered is  the question as to  how commodities a tta in  
a magnitude of value, th a t is ,  the reason why commodities, or 
the products of labour, have the socia l 'form o f value' in the 
f i r s t  place, and which question both Mandel and Sweezy sought to  
answer, is not a fte r a l l  addressed. Every product, in every 
form o f d ire c t ly  socia l production - from the p r im itive  communal 
society to  the s o c ia lis t society o f the fu tu re  - absorbs a part 
o f the to ta l labour-time or wealth-producing a c t iv ity  of soc ie ty , 
w ithout every form of s p e c if ic a lly  socia l production becoming 
commodity production.
What has happened here w ith Mandel and Sweezy is  the symptom of 
a more far-reaching misunderstanding o f Marx's concept o f the
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'substance* o f valua Let us take the fo llow ing  statement by 
Marx to  i l lu s t ra te  one possible source o f th is  confusion. Marx 
says:
"On the one hand a l l  labour is , speaking physio log ica lly , 
and expenditure o f human labour power and in i ts  
character o f id e n tica l abstract human labour i t  
creates and forms the value o f commodities. On the 
other hand, a l l  labour is  the expenditure o f human 
labour power in a special form and w ith a d e fin ite  
aim, and in th is ,  i t s  character o f concrete useful 
labour, i t  produces use-values". (1983; p. 53)
The above is  Marx's characte risa tion  o f the e a r lie r  'c la s s ic a l' 
conclusion, the re s u lt at which i t  arrived in i ts  investiga tion  
in to  the value o f commodities. Value has a na tu ra l, physio log ica l 
foundation, which explains why the c lass ica l analysis places the 
iso lated or ind ividuated value-producing hunter and f is h e r at 
h is to ry 's  po in t o f departure. And i t  is  the acceptance o f th is  
'premature' an a ly tica l conclusion as Marx's own conclusion which 
forms the foundation fo r  the v ir tu a l absence o f the correct 
th e o re tica l method in a whole s tra in  o f Marxist w rite rs . Marx 
e x p l ic i t ly  states here tha t he is  'speaking p h y s io lo g ic a lly ', i .e .  
he is s ta ting  a physio log ica l fa c t and not yet a 's o c ia l' one, 
so th a t value appears to  have a natural or 'in e v ita b le ' foundation.
Here labour is  endowed w ith a 'tw o -fo ld  character' in v ir tu e  of 
i ts  very 'generic ' existence. I t  is  th is  absence of the soc ia l - 
determination of value and the presence o f i t s  'ready-made'
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generic existence which allows the collapse o f 'va lu e1 in to  
'exchangeable va lu e ', or the subsumption o f q u a lity  in to  quan tity , 
and permits a whole generation o f Marxist economists to  emerge 
as "neo-Ricardians", "Bortkiew icz supporters" and "S ra ffia n s ".
The absence o f the q u a lita t iv e , socia l determination o f value 
means th a t the c lass ica l analysis is  not 'c lo s e d -o ff ',  but 
continues uninteruptedly down the whole h is to r ic a l period to  
where value is deemed to  be as old as labour i t s e l f  -  a fa c t which 
the researches o f the 'h is to r ic a l transform ation ' advocates seem 
only too eager to  es tab lish . And i t  is  the concommitant absence 
of a methodological 'p iv o t ' -  provided fo r  Marx by the fundamentally 
socia l nature o f the va lu e -re la tion  - and a l l  th a t th is  e n ta ils , 
which permits Engels to  journey to  Egypt and Babylon in search 
of evidence fo r  the ‘ law o f value' and fo r  Mandel to  u t i l is e  
contemporary s c ie n t if ic  research to  the same end of attempting 
to  'prove' Marx's conclusions. But once something has been 
'grasped1 or comprehended in i t s  essence, then i t  stays th a t way 
once and fo r  a l l ,  there is  a f in a l i t y  attaching to  i t .  Therefore 
'comprehension' is  also o f necessity 'comprehensive', complete.
Yet Mandel wants to  argue th a t:
"M arxist economic thought ought not to  be regarded as 
a completed outcome o f past inves tiga tion  but ra ther 
as the summation of a method, o f the resu lts  obtained 
by using th is  method, and o f resu lts  which are 
con tinua lly  subject to  re-exam ination". (1968; p. 18)
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I f  the essence of something has been disclosed then i t s  forms 
of appearance are unproblematical. And i f  these forms of 
appearance form the very po in t o f departure fo r  s c ie n t if ic  
inqu iry  then there is  nothing here th a t is  'co n tin u a lly  subject 
to  re-exam ination '. I f  Marx's inves tiga tion  discloses the 's e c re t' 
of value then th a t is th a t: the subject is  comprehended in i t s  
e n tire ty , and once the secret o f value is  disclosed, comprehended, 
then, as Marx says in another context, i t  provides:
" . . .  a general illu m in a tion  which bathes a l l  the 
other colours and modifies th e ir  p a r t ic u la r ity .  I t  
is  a general ether which determines the spec ific  
g ra v ity  o f every being which has m ateria lised 
w ith in  i t " .  (1981a; p. 107)
Thus i t  is  the method o f comprehending the nature o f value which 
discloses the s ign ificance of the h is to ry  o f the subject and 
not the h is to ry  o f the subject which discloses the nature o f 
value.
I l l
In the previous section we saw th a t Engels' 'in ve rs io n ' o f Hegel 
produced what he variously ca lled 'the  m a te r ia lis t standpoint' 
or the 'm a te r ia lis t world o u tlo o k '. Put simply, th is  inversion 
substitu ted the process o f the development o f matter and i t s  'law s ' 
fo r  the process o f the development o f 'S p i r i t '  or 'the  idea1.
Engels sums up his treatment of Hegel and o f c lass ica l German 
philosophy when he describes his own treatment o f these as:
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" . . .  a general sketch of the Marxist conception 
of h is to ry . . .  The proof must be derived from 
h is to ry  i t s e l f . . .  This conception, however, puts 
and end to  philosophy in the realm o f h is to ry .
I t  is  no longer a question anywhere o f inventing 
interconnections from out o f our brains, but of 
discovering them in the fa c ts . For philosophy 
there remains only the realm o f pure thought".
(1968; p. 631)
Im p lic it  here is  the methodological tenet th a t the log ica l or 
conceptual method w i l l  have e x is tin g  m ateria l 'correspondencies1, 
of which i t  is  the 'r e f le x '.  Moreover since the conceptual method 
describes a process, an ascent from the lower to  the higher, or 
from the simple to  the combined, then the h is to r ic a l process 
should provide the continuing accompanying 'c o rre c tiv e ' to  the 
development o f the categories. As we said above, i t  was 
therefore inconceivable th a t the 'pure ' va lue -re la tion  should 
have a conceptual or log ica l existence in the absence o f a 
p r io r , h is to r ic a l m a te r ia lis t, existence. As Engels said to  
Sombart:
" . . .  the concept o f value has or had more re a li ty  than 
you ascribe to  i t .  When commodity exchange began, 
when products gradually turned in to  commodities, they 
were exchanged approximately according to  th e ir  
v a lu e ... Thus value had a d ire c t and real existence 
at th a t tim e. . .  And I believe th a t i t  won't be 
p a r t ic u la r ly  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  you to  trace the intermediate 
lin ks  th a t lead from d ire c t ly  real value to  the value 
of the c a p ita lis t  mode o f production. A genuinely
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h is to r ic a l exposition o f these processes... would 
be a very valuable supplement to  C ap ita l" ,  (op. c i t .  
my emph.)
And a few months la te r  Engels provided th is  supplement, along 
the lines suggested in his le t te r  to  Sombart. Yet here already 
in th is  b r ie f  sketch is the embryo of the 'h is to r ic a l ' 
explanation of the transform ation procedure. In contrast to  
th is  is Charles Taylor's  characte risa tion  o f the task of Hegel's 
Logic:
" I f  the real ex is ts  and has the s tructu re  i t  has by 
conceptual necessity, then the task o f the Logic is 
to  show th is  conceptual s truc tu re  by pure conceptual 
argument", (op. c i t .  p. 225)
Now while Marx would in s is t  th a t 'the  re a l' -  the given e x is tin g  
subject -  has the structu re  i t  has through socia l necessity and 
not conceptual necessity, and th a t the task o f his method was 
to  reveal the inner connections between th is  socia l necessity 
and the ex is tin g  socia l s truc tu re , to  th is  end he would recognise 
the s c ie n t if ic  and h e u ris tic  m erits o f d isc losing the e x is tin g  
s tructure  as manifest necessity 'by pure conceptual argument'.
I t  would be 'pure ' in the sense th a t the method would provide 
a 'thought concrete' whose coming-to-be did not re f le c t  the process 
of coming-to-be o f re a lity  i t s e l f ,  in the sense th a t every stage 
in the th e o re tica l method had a corresponding stage in h is to r ic a l
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r e a li ty .  Unlike Engels, Marx re ta ins Hegel's 'manner of 
working' as i t  ex is ts  in the Logic. And, in a sense th a t is 
s t i l l  at variance w ith Engels' p o s ition , Marx would indeed 
'invent interconnections out o f h is b ra in '.  I t  is  these 
conceptual interconnections th a t provide the methodological 
so lu tion to  what has become known as the 'transform ation problem1. 
However, concerning the e luc ida tion  o f th is ,  there is  a technique 
in mathematics which is  known as 'p roo f by invers ion ' and, fo llow ing  
th is  procedure, we sha ll examine f i r s t  what Marx's methodological 
so lu tion is  not by discussing the ground and the consequent o f 
the 'h is to r ic a l ' so lu tion  in the post-Engels period.
Nevertheless, i t  is  w ith Engels and his concept o f 'labou r' as 
the substance o f value th a t the foundation must be la id , since 
th is  provides, in the name o f Marx, the the o re tica l leg itim acy 
fo r  the subsequent use o f th is  category and i t s  treatment, from 
H ilfe rd ing  to  the present day.
Engels w rites :
"Hundreds and thousands o f years elapsed before human 
socie ty arose out o f a troupe o f tree-c lim b ing monkeys.
Yet i t  did f in a l ly  appear. And what do we fin d  once 
more as the ch a ra c te ris tic  d iffe rence between the troupe 
o f monkeys and human society? Labour" . (1977; p. 273)
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In the Middle Ages too, long a fte r  i t s  f i r s t  appearance, i t  is 
th is  same 'an th ropo log ica l1 "Labour and labour alone" which is  
decis ive, th is  time as the measure or the 'inheren t standard' 
o f exchange-value. In each case the same timeless physio log ica l 
substance: human labour. Thus Engels uses the category 'labou r'
as an 'abstrac t un ive rsa l' ,  th a t is ,  i t  is  abstract because i t  
e x p l ic i t ly  excludes from i t s e l f ,  or abstracts from the p a rt ic u la r  
and s ingu lar 'soc ia l forms' o f labour. Whereas Marx has as his 
po in t o f departure 's o c ia lly  determined ind iv idua l p roduction ',
Engels has simply 'la b o u r ', labour as such. He never introduces 
s o c ia lly  determined forms o f labour,, or only to  the extent th a t 
th is  same 'labour' stands enshrined in a class of labourers, over 
and against a class of c a p ita lis ts .  But 'labou r' i t s e l f  is  
not affected , i .e .  is  not determined other than p h ys io lo g ica lly .
Hence the socia l form o f 'va lue ' cannot be deduced out o f 'la b o u r' 
because i t  is  not contained w ith in  i t .  The spe c ific  q u a lity  
o f value-creating labour is excluded from the concept o f 'lab o u r' 
which contains only what the mode o f production resting  on value 
has in common w ith every other mode or system o f production.
Therefore 'va lue ' does not proceed o f necessity out o f Engels' 
concept o f 'labour' because value is  a spe c ific  socia l form o f 
labour while 'labour' is  at home everywhere, from the p r im itiv e  
Peruvian communal society and the Middle Ages to  the c a p ita lis t  
society i t s e l f .  Yet th is  concept o f 'lab ou r' is  to  be the f i r s t  
essentia l constituent and explanatory p r in c ip le  of the m a te r ia lis t 
conception of h is to ry ' and therefore fo r  the 'h is to r ic a l tra n s fo rm a tio n '.
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Contrast Marx in re la tio n  to  both the general and the p a rtic u la r 
usages o f th is  concept of 'la b o u r ':
"Labour as such, in i t s  simple capacity as purposive 
productive a c t iv ity ,  re la tes  to  the means of 
production, not in th e ir  socia l determinate form, 
but ra ther in th e ir  concrete substance, as m ateria l 
and means fo r  la b o u r..."  (1984; p. 825, my emph.)
Paradoxically then, and from the very outset, Engels' 'h is to r ic a l
an
m ateria lism ' is  burdened with^ tth is to r ic a l conception o f 'la b o u r ',  
as is  the attempt at 'h is to r ic a l ' transform ation:
"To develop the concept o f ca p ita l i t  is  necessary 
to  begin not w ith labour but w ith value, and precise ly 
w ith exchange value in an already developed moment of 
c irc u la tio n . I t  is  ju s t as impossible to  make the 
tra n s it io n  d ire c t ly  from labour to  cap ita l as i t  is  to  
go from the d iffe re n t human races d ire c t ly  to  the banker, 
or from nature to  the steam engine", ( ib id , p. 827, my emph.)
When Marx says th a t the po in t o f departure fo r  the de riva tion  o f 
cap ita l must be 'v a lu e ', then he has immediately replaced a 
non-specific 'n a tu ra l' conception o f labour w ith a s p e c ific , 
so c ia lly  determined one. In the former case the transform ation, 
o r, here 't ra n s it io n ' cannot be made. But Marx does not mean 
tha t th is  tra n s it io n  is  impossible because an immemorial w orld 's  
h is to ry , an expanse o f h is to r ic a l time, separates labour and 
c a p ita l. I t  is  methodologically impossible to  deduce a d e f in ite  
socia l form of labour from 'lab o u r' as such. But th is  methodological
185
im p o s s ib ility  does not re s u lt in Marx abandoning his method and 
adopting another 'h is to r ic a l ' one, ra ther he re jec ts  'lab ou r' 
out o f hand as a possible po in t o f departure. I t  never occurs 
to  him to  make good the methodological or conceptual defic iency 
th a t is  offered here by tra c ing  the 'h is to r ic a l ' connections.
This manner o f approach simply does not e x is t fo r  him. Instead 
he defines the po in t o f departure as an 'already developed moment', 
i .e .  as presupposing a w orld 's  h is to ry , the s ig n if ic a n t moments 
of which w i l l  only be included when Marx comes to  present the 
re su lts  th a t are obtained through the construction of a 'concrete 
in thoug h t'. Hence Engels' 'h is to r ic a l transform ation1 and 
Marx's 'methodological t ra n s it io n 1 have d iffe re n t points o f 
departure. 'Value' in Engels' version is ,  along w ith the 'la b o u r' 
tha t produces i t ,  antecedent to  c a p ita lis t  production, whereas 
fo r  Marx, 'va lue ' presupposes 'u n iv e rs a lity ' as an already developed 
moment o f i t s  own determination and i t  is  therefore given w ith 
the c a p ita lis t  process o f production. The conceptual synthesis 
proceeds as: value (or the a ll-s id e d  va lue -re la tion ) - value
as cap ita l (nature o f c a p ita l)  -  prices o f production. But 
the 'p rices  o f production' have been the po in t of departure, and 
the analysis o f these, or o f the general ra te o f p r o f i t  o f which 
they are the expression, y ie lds  th e ir  presuppositions - or th e ir  
'abs trac t determ inations' - i .e .  the existence of labour on one 
side and o f cap ita l on the other:
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"The transform ation o f surplus value in to  p r o f i t  must 
be deduced from the transform ation o f the rate of 
surplus value in to  the ra te  o f p r o f i t ,  not vice 
versa. And in fa c t i t  was the ra te o f p r o f i t  which 
was the h is to r ic a l po in t o f departure. Surplus value 
and ra te  o f surplus value are, re la t iv e ly ,  the in v is ib le  
and unknown essence th a t wants inve s tiga tin g , while the 
ra te  o f p r o f i t  and the appearance of surplus value in 
the form o f p r o f i t  are revealed on the surface of 
the phenomena..."  (1984; p. 43)
There emerges from th is  another and h igh ly important consequence 
fo r  the contrasting methodologies we are discussing here: For
Marx labour and value, or concrete and abstract labour, are not 
ide n tica l -  requ iring  mediation between them before one passes 
in to  the other -  the use-value must be 're a lis e d 1. For Engels, 
on the other hand, labour and value are treated as ide n tica l - 
labour is  'embodied' as value, and a 'causal' connection is  
established between the two so th a t, under the conditions of 
value production, one is  'immediately' i t s  other, value is  
l i t e r a l ly  'produced' a t the po in t o f production.
Engels gives an example o f h is underlying notion of the substance 
o f value as an 'embodied' substance when he says, in the process 
o f trac ing  the 'h is to r ic a l ' transform ation, th a t:
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" . . .  S ta rting  w ith th is  determination of value by 
labour time, the whole o f commodity production 
developed... The most important and most in c is ive  
advance was the tra n s it io n  to  m e ta llic  money, 
the consequence o f which, however, was th a t the 
determination o f value by labour-time was no 
longer v is ib le  upon the surface of commodity 
exchange". (1984; p. 899)
This statement is never modified, th a t is ,  labour-time is , 
always and everywhere, the same labour-tim e. So th a t, whereas 
fo r  Engels money conceals the determ ination o f value by labour­
time - conceived here as e x is tin g  p r io r  to  price  as a presupposed 
embodied 'e n t i t y 1 - fo r  Marx i t  is  the expression.of a l l  commodities 
in money which reveals the essentia l nature o f labour-tim e, i .e .  
which kind o f labour-time creates 'v a lu e '.
"The representation o f the commodity as money im p lie s ... 
they they are a l l  expressed in a form in which they 
e x is t as the embodiment o f socia l labour. . .
This transform ation o f the labour o f p riva te  
ind iv idua ls  as uniform socia l labour. . .  the necessity 
o f presenting the labour contained in commodities as 
money - is  overlooked by Ricardo". (1972; p. 131)
And by Engels too . Money is  not considered by Engels as a 
necessary means fo r  transform ing the labour o f the ind iv idua l 
in to  'uniform  socia l labour' because 'labou r' as he conceives i t
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is  already uniform - is  'g ive n1 as uniform because given as 
phys io log ica lly  homogeneous. Indeed access to  the form ulation 
o f a process o f h is to r ic a l transformation is  only granted on 
the possession o f a physio log ica l conception of abstract labour.
I f  labour is  not considered as a sp e c ific  socia l form o f labour, 
then value cannot be considered as the exclusive product o f 
th is  labour. And th is  is  how i t  must be i f  one is  to  propose 
the p r io r  h is to r ic a l existence o f a fu lly -b low n  value, since th is  
demands the determination o f value by the same kind o f labour in 
d if fe re n t socia l formations.
The advocacy o f 'h is to r ic a l transfo rm ation1 is  next taken up by 
H ilfe rd in g , and the extent to  which he shares - and needs must 
share - Engels' methodological presupposition is  evident when 
he says th a t Bohm-Bawerk:
" . . .  confounds the exchange-value w ith the value.
Value manifests i t s e l f  as exchange-value, as
a q u a n tita tiv e ly  determined re la tio n s h ip . . .  But
whether, fo r  example, a coat can be exchanged fo r
twenty yards of linen c lo th  or fo r  fo r ty  yards is
not a matter o f chance, but depends upon ob jective
cond itions, upon the amount o f s o c ia lly  necessary
labour-time contained in the coat and the linen
respective ly . These conditions must make themselves
f e l t  in the process o f exchange, they must su b s ta n tia lly
contro l th a t process, and they must have an independent
existence qu ite  apart from exchange", (op. c i t .  p. 159, my emph.)
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The f i r s t  th ing  to  note here is th a t H ilfe rd in g , in attempting 
to  move from exchange-value to  the value th a t lie s  hidden 
behind i t ,  finds  tha t he cannot get there, and simply explains 
one 'q u a n tita tiv e ly  determined re la tio n sh ip ' in terms o f another 
q u a n tita tiv e ly  determined re la tio n sh ip . I f  i t  is  suggested th a t 
there is  in fa c t a 'q u a lita t iv e ' d iffe rence , inasmuch as H ilfe rd in g  
appeals to  's o c ia lly  necessary lab ou r', we sha ll see th a t th is  
is not the case, tha t the concept o f the substance o f value th a t 
he works w ith p roh ib its  q u a lita tiv e  determ ination. He explains 
i t  as fo llow s:
" I f  I disregard the concrete manner in which I have, 
expended my labour, i t  nevertheless remains a fa c t 
th a t labour in general has been expended in i t s  
universal human form, and th is  is  an ob jective  
magnitude the measure o f which is  furnished by the 
duration o f the e f fo r t .  I t  is  prec ise ly  th is  
ob jective  magnitude w ith which Marx is  concerned".
( ib id ,  p. 131)
But, as we have shown, I can 'd isregard ' the concrete manner in 
which I have expended my labour as often as I please, but i t s  
product w i l l  never a tta in  to  'u n iv e rs a lity ' nor become an 
'ob je c tive  magnitude' u n t i l  I a lienate i t  in the socia l process 
o f exchange fo r  a sum o f value (money). (Unless o f course my 
labour is  conceived of as 'embodied' - cogealed as value - and 
the process of production is  conceived o f as the process o f 
tra n s fe rrin g  human labour in general onto an 'o b je c t' - a commodity 
value of a dtermined magnitude). Yet H ilfe rd in g  spoke of 'o b je c tiv e
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cond itions ' as comprising 'the  amount o f so c ia lly  necessary 
labour-time contained in the coat and the lin e n '.  But he 
conceives of so c ia lly  necessary labour-time as a predetermined 
magnitude w ith the re s u lt th a t what is  fo r  Marx an 'a p o s te r io r i1 
category becomes fo r  H ilfe rd in g  an 'a p r io r i '  technological 
condition which perta ins exc lus ive ly  to  the process of production 
i t s e l f .  Yet he says:
" I t  is  prec ise ly  because Marx takes s o c ia lly  necessary 
labour-time as his s ta rtin g  po in t th a t he is  so well 
able to  discover the inner working o f a society based 
upon p riva te  property and the d iv is io n  o f labour".
( ib id ,  p. 134)
This is  a h igh ly  important category; i t  is  the qua n tita tive  
determination o f abstract labour and i t s  proper usage there fore  
presupposes the q u a lita tiv e  id e n tity  o f th is  labour. H ilfe rd in g  
explains i t  as:
"The re la tion sh ip  o f the quantity  o f labour to  the 
process of exchange does not come in to  consideration 
u n t i l  they are re gu la rly  produced as commodities... 
thus th is  re la tionsh ip  makes its  appearance only in a 
d e fin ite  phase of h is to r ic a l evo lu tion . The q u an tita tive  
ra t io  wherein they are now exchanged becomes thereby 
dependent upon the time of production, which is  in i t s  
turn determined by the degree of socia l p ro d u c tiv ity .
The exchange re la tion sh ip  thus loses i ts  chance character, 
thus ceases to  be dependent upon the caprice o f the owner.
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The socia l conditions imposed upon labour become ' 
ob jective lim ita tio n s  fo r  the ind iv idua l and the 
socia l complex contro ls the in d iv id u a l's  
a c t iv i t ie s " ,  ( ib id , p. 188)
The most te l l in g  aspect o f th is  is  th a t 'the  time o f p roduction ', 
or so c ia lly  necessary labour-tim e, is  determined exclusive ly by 
'the degree o f socia l p ro d u c tiv ity ',  th a t is ,  by technological 
c r i te r ia  alone. Competition w ith in  the d iffe re n t branches o f 
production ensures tha t only th a t labour which is  performed at 
the given or average level o f development o f productive forces 
w ith in  these branchs is to  be considered value-creating labour.
I t  is  thus an 'ob jec tive  lim ita t io n ' upon the expenditure o f 
labour fo r  the ind iv idua l c a p ita lis t  f irm , and H ilfe rd in g 's  
attempt to  'ge t behind' the purely q u an tita tive  expression o f 
value to  i t s  q u a lita tiv e  id e n tity , i .e .  what i t  is  th a t permits 
th e ir  purely qu an tita tive  comparison in the f i r s t  place, has fa i le d .  
He cannot get beyond 'q u a n tity ' because the 'lab ou r' upon which 
his understanding o f the categories is  based is  already a mass 
of 'formlessness' - does not possess any q u a lita tiv e  determ ination 
above being simply 'human' - is  a content which, as was noted, 
does not develop spec ific  forms out o f i t s e l f ,  and th is  by 
necessity. Rubin remarks:
"One cannot fo rge t th a t, on the question o f the re la tio n  
between content and form, Marx took the standpoint o f 
Hegel, and not o f Kant. Kant treated form as something 
external in re la tio n  to  the content, and as something
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which adheres to  the content from the outside. From 
the standpoint o f Hegel's philosophy, the content is 
not in i t s e l f  something to  which form adheres from 
the outside. Rather through i ts  development, the content 
i t s e l f  gives b ir th  to  the form. . .  Form necessarily 
grows out o f the content i t s e l f . . .  From th is  po in t of 
view, the form of value necessarily grows out of the 
substance o f value", (op. c i t .  p. 117, my emph.)
That is why, fo r  Marx, the substance of value is  labour as i t  
ex is ts  as re la ted in the c a p ita lis t  form o f socia l production, 
and where th is  spe c ific  socia l combination o f labour causes 
'va lue1 to  emerge as the necessary expression o f th is  labour.
On the other hand, when the substance of value is  treated as 
simply 'la b o u r ', w ith no fu r th e r q u a lif ic a t io n , then there is  
no imperative or, as we saw in the case of the c lass ica l economists, 
no reason is  provided as to  why value is  the m anifestation of 
i t s  substance - labour. H ilfe rd in g  tre a ts  's o c ia lly  necessary 
labour' as comprising the cornerstone of Marx's theory o f value, 
yet Marx himself says o f th is  category:
"That the quantity  o f labour embodied in a commodity 
is  the quantity s o c ia lly  necessary fo r  i t s  production - 
the labour-time being thus necessary labour time - 
is  a d e fin it io n  which concerns only the magnitude o f value.
But the labour which constitu tes the substance of 
value is not only uniform, simple, average labour; i t  
is  the labour o f a p riva te  ind iv idua l represented in 
a d e fin ite  product. However, the product as value must 
be the embodiment o f socia l la b o u r..."  (1972; p. 135)
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This la s t s tip u la tio n , th a t the product as value must be the 
embodiment of 1 s o c ia l; labour1, H ilfe rd ing  imagines he has 
successfully adhered to  by c it in g  the 'ob je c tive  l im ita t io n 1 
which is  provided by 's o c ia lly  necessary lab o u r'. But th is  is  
a purely 'one-sided' lim ita t io n  which owes nothing to  the socia l 
q u a lity  o f tha t labour which produces value. In the passage 
from Marx th a t was ju s t quoted, Marx says th a t among the 
determining cha rac te ris tics  of va lue-creating labour is  th a t i t  
i t  is  the labour o f a p riva te  ind iv idua l and th a t i t  is 
represented in a d e fin ite  product. These q u a lif ic a tio n s  mean 
tha t value-creating labour is  more spec ific  than having simply 
'la b o u r ', or human labour in  general, as the substance of value, 
w i l l  allow . The labour o f the ind iv idua l is  as one-sided as h is 
wants are many-sided. Hence, in contrast to  H ilfe rd in g , the 
‘ ob jective lim ita t io n ' th a t is  imposed upon the labour o f the 
ind iv id u a l, i t s  q u an tita tive  re s tr ic t io n  or 'b a r r ie r ' to  re a lis a tio n , 
lie s  also in i ts  q u a lita tiv e  determinatness, in the 'd e fin ite n e ss ' 
of the product o f his labour as a spe c ific  use-value. Marx 
explains th a t:
"In  order to  be transposed in to  the general form, the 
use-value has to  be present in a lim ite d  and spe c ific  
quan tity ; a quantity  whose measure does not l ie  in 
the amount of labour o b je c tif ie d  in i t , but arises 
from its  nature as a use-value, in p a rt ic u la r , 
use-value fo r  others. . . "  (1981a; p. 406)
194
And more s ig n if ic a n t ly :
"Although the labour o f the d ire c t producers... 
breaks up in to  necessary and surplus labour as 
fa r  as they themselves are concerned, i t  
represents from the socia l standpoint only the 
necessary labour required. . .  i t  is  the labour 
necessary fo r  the production o f p a rtic u la r a r t ic le s , 
fo r  the sa tis fa c tio n  o f some p a rtic u la r need of 
society fo r  these p a rtic u la r  a r t ic le s .  I f  th is  
d iv is io n  is  p ropo rtiona l, then the products are 
sold at th e ir  values (a t a la te r  stage o f development 
they are sold at th e ir  prices of p ro d u c tio n )... I t  
is  indeed the e ffe c t o f the law o f value, not w ith 
reference to  ind iv idua l commodities or a r t ic le s , but 
to  each to ta l product o f the p a rt ic u la r socia l spheres 
of production; so th a t not only is  no more than the 
necessary labour-time used up fo r  each spe c ific  
commodity, but only the necessary proportional 
quantity  o f the to ta l socia l labour-time is  used 
up in the various groups. For the condition remains 
tha t the product represents use-va lue ... The socia l 
need, th a t is ,  the use-value on a socia l scale, appears 
here as a determining fa c to r fo r  the amount of to ta l 
socia l labour-time which is  expended in the various 
spheres...
But i t  is  merely the same law which is  already applied 
in the case o f s ing le commodities, namely, th a t the 
use-value of a commodity is  the basis, o f i t s  exchange 
value and thus o f i t s  v a lu e ... This qu a n tita tive  l im it  
to  the quota o f socia l labour-time ava ilab le  fo r  the 
p a rtic u la r spheres o f production is  but a more developed 
expression o f the law o f Value in general, although 
necessary labour-time assumes a d if fe re n t meaning here. 
Only so much' o f i t  is  required fo r  the sa tis fa c tio n  o f
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socia l needs. The lim ita tio n  occurring here is due to  
the use-value " (1984; p .635-6, my emph.)
This 'more developed expression o f the law o f value' is  not 
ava ilab le fo r  H ilfe rd ing  because he conceives the law o f value 
to  perta in exclusive ly to  the fa c t th a t the value of a commodity 
depends upon the amount o f 'human labour in general' i t  contains.
There can be no fu rth e r development here. The law o f value is  
not conceived o f as the law o f p ro p o rtio n a lity , o f equ ilib rium , 
by H ilfe rd in g , indeed cannot be conceived by him as such since 
he deduces 's o c ia lly  necessary labour' in a purely q u an tita tive  
sense from 'labour' as such, and the lim ita t io n  occurring here 
is  'due to  the use-value'. And, as we sa^, H ilfe rd ing  has 
'discarded' use-value as a th ing o f no importance when he proceeded 
to  'd isregard ' the concrete manner in which labour was expended 
in order to  reach the purely q u an tita tive  substance o f value.
Here the non-contradictory character o f 'lab ou r' as the substance 
o f value, and the consequent absence o f the necessity fo r  m ediation, 
shows i t s e l f  in i ts  p u r ity .
The theme o f 'c o n tin u ity ' tha t is  established in the argument 
fo r  'h is to r ic a l transform ation' between p re -c a p ita lis t and c a p ita l is t  
socie ty, and therefore o f the determination o f value by 'labour.1, 
then and the determination of value by 'labour' now, gives th is  
'labour' an 'an ted iluv ian ' existence, and where q u a lita tiv e  d iffe rences 
in the mode of determination cannot be taken acocunt o f. Marx 
describes exactly H ilfe rd in g 's  mode of reasoning when he says th a t:
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"Use-value presupposed even in simple exchange or 
ba rte r. But here, where exchange takes place 
only fo r  the recip roca l use of the commodity, 
the use-value, i .e .  the content, the natural 
p a r t ic u la r ity  o f the commodity has as such no 
standing as an economic form. I ts  form, ra ther 
is  exchange value.
The content apart from th is  form is  irre le v a n t;
Nis  not the content o f the re la tio n  as a social 
re la t io n " . (1981a; p. 267)
I t  is  the inev itab le  consequence o f an embodied labour theory 
of value th a t th is  conclusion w i l l  be retained in the presence 
of more developed, more concrete re la tio n s . From th is  po in t 
of view, what Marx describes here therefore is  the a tt itu d e  
not only of H ilfe rd in g , but o f Ricardo as w e ll, since he too 
is saddled w ith 'labour' as the substance o f value. And Marx 
goes on immediately to  ask:
" . . .  But does th is  content as such not develop in to  
a system o f needs and production? Does not use-value 
as such enter in to  the form i t s e l f ,  as a determinant 
o f the form i t s e l f . . . ?  I f  only exchange value as 
such plays a ro le  in economics, then how could elements 
la te r  enter which re la te  purely to  use-value?
This is  not in the s lig h te s t contradicted by the fa c t 
th a t exchange value is  the predominant aspect. But 
of course use does not come to  a h a lt because i t  is  
determined only by exchange; although o f course i t  
gains i ts  d ire c tion  thereby.
In any case, th is  is  to  be examined w ith exactitude 
in the examination o f v a lu e ... Above a l l  i t  w i l l  and
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must become clear in the development o f the ind iv idua l 
sections to  what extent use-value ex is ts  not only as 
presupposed matter, outside economics and i ts  forms, 
but to  what extent i t  enters in to  i t " ,  ( ib id )
Like Engels before him, H ilfe rd in g 's  notion o f the substance of 
value remains fixed  and stab le . That is  why there is  no 
development o f the law of value, no higher development; the 
method th a t is inspired by an embodied labour theory o f value 
is not reve la to ry , because i t  is  not syn th e tic . As we noted, 
i t  was impossible to  ex trac t sp e c ific  socia l forms o f labour 
from 'la b o u r1 i t s e l f ,  considered as a mere 'dumb substratum1.
'Labour' remains exclusive ly 'on ly  as presupposed m a tte r ', and 
determinations cannot be gotten out o f i t  because i t  does not 
contain determinations w ith in  i t ;  i t s  very conceptual id e n tity  
is founded upon the negation o f determinateness. I t  has there fore  
no 'process' nature, tha t is , i f  there is  no necessary procession 
o f determinateness out of 'labour' then there can be no methodological 
synthesis o f the categories, so th a t i t  is  impossible from th is  
perspective to  show 'in  the development o f the ind iv idua l sections' 
how use-value 'enters in to ' economics and i t s  forms. Hence, i f  
there is  no synthesis then there is  only analysis, which means 
tha t the theo re tica l underpinnings of the 'h is to r ic a l transfo rm ation1 
have th e ir  roots in a purely lim ited  and one-sided analysis which 
proceeds from value to  'labour' and stays the re . I t  does not 
therefore get beyond the level o f mere Understanding, since no 
Reason is  provided as to  why the products o f th is  'lab our' needs
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must assume the form of value or why use-value must enter as 
a 'b a r r ie r ' to  re a lis a tio n . A 'more developed expression of 
the law of value' is  therefore inconceivable since th is  law i t s e l f  
is perceived as re la tin g  exc lus ive ly  to  'q u a n tit ie s ' o f 'la b o u r '.
The 'law of va lu e ', as the a lte r  ego o f the 'ra tio n a l s tate of 
a f fa irs ' is therefore unknown in the 'h is to r ic a l ' version o f 
transform ation.
This 'ra tio n a l state of a f fa ir s ' or 'the  natural law o f e q u ilib riu m ' 
is not, because 'r a t io n a l ',  to  be taken as merely ' id e a l '.  On
the contrary, i t  has d e fin ite  on to log ica l presuppositions. For
example, and p r in c ip a lly :
"Exchange o f products as commodities is a method of 
exchanging labour, i t  demonstrates the dependence of 
the labour of each upon the labour o f others and 
corresponds to  a ce rta in  mode of socia l labour or 
socia l production". (1972; p. 129)
In th is  se tting  o f universal interdependence quantity  becomes 
q u a lity  and q u a lity  becomes quan tity , so th a t:
"As a sp e c ific , one-sided, q u a lita tiv e  use -va lu e .... i t  
is required only in a sp e c ific  quan tity , i .e .  in a ce rta in  
measure. . .  Hence as use-value the product contains a 
b a rr ie r -  p recise ly the b a rr ie r consisting of the 
need fo r  i t . . . .  (1981a; p. 405)
That society requires 'on ly  the necessary proportional q u a n tity ' 
of each of the spec ific  a r t ic le s  o f use is  an on to log ica l fa c t .
199
As a society i ts  various wants are circumscribed in each 
p a rtic u la r d ire c tio n , at a given level o f development o f 
productive forces. I t  has or possesses these d e fin ite  l im its ,  
and thus, in the type of society we are dealing w ith here, i t  
has or possesses the 'law o f va lu e ', which is  the assertion 
of these l im its ,  th e ir  fo rc ib le  assertion . The use o f th is  
'law ' to  apply exclus ive ly to  quan tities  o f embodied labour-tim es, 
and w ith exclusive reference to  the ind iv idua l commodity, by 
the exponents o f 'h is to r ic a l trans fo rm a tion ', only has the e ffe c t 
o f confin ing th is  law to  the conceptual and methodological 
kindergarten:
"Labour, ' is  the source o f a l l  wealth and a l l  c u l tu r e '. . .
The above phrase is  to  be found in a l l  ch ild ren 's  p rim e rs ...
A s o c ia lis t  programme cannot allow such phrases to  pass 
over in silence the conditions th a t alone given them 
meaning". (Marx, 1968; p. 319)
TV
We saw in the previous section how any conceptual or methodological 
development out of 'labou r' was impossible. Thereby 'h is to r ic a l ' 
procession usurped the place o f conceptual procession, find ing  
sustenance in Marx's i n i t i a l  th e o re tica l assumptions but incapable 
o f any development beyond these. I t  is  therefore necessary to  
s itua te  where Marx leaves these primary assumptions behind as 
he progresses to  a higher level in the comprehension o f the 
subject:
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"So long as we dealt w ith ind iv idua l commodities 
only we could assume tha t there was a need fo r  
a p a rtic u la r commodity - i t s  quantity  already 
implied by i t s  price - w ithout inqu iring  fu rth e r 
in to  the quantity  required to  s a tis fy  th is  want.
This quantity is ,  however, o f essential importance , 
as soon as the product o f an e n tire  branch of 
production is  placed on one side, and the socia l 
need fo r  i t  on the other. I t  then becomes 
necessary to  consider the extent, i .e .  the amount 
o f th is  social want". (1972; p. 185)
H ilfe rd in g 's  analysis remains at the level o f 'in d iv id u a l commodities 
o n ly ',  tha t is , where price  approximates value, ind iv idua l 
expenditures of labour coincide w ith socia l expenditures, and 
therefore where concrete useful labour is ,  at one and the same 
time, abstract universal labour. The transformation o f values 
in to  prices o f production is  a process which is  made to  f i t ,  or 
is made subject to , th is  leve l o f analysis, and where Marx's 
in i t ia l  assumptions are treated as 'd e s c rip tiv e ' o f an extant 
period in the p re -h is to ry  o f cap ita lism . In th is  way are these 
the o re tica l i l lu s tra t io n s  removed from the leve l o f a 'thought 
concrete' and placed w ith in  h is to r ic a l re a li ty  as the 'd ire c t  
and re a l' locus of 'v a lu e ', thereby providing the precedent 
fo r  the h is to r ic a l transform ation o f th is  value in to  p rice  o f 
production.
However the p rin c ipa l methodological reason fo r  the construction 
of an abstract or 'ra t io n a l' model is  to  e lucidate the concrete
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or the ' i r r a t io n a l1 state o f a f fa irs ,  which presents i t s e l f  
on the surface o f socie ty. In th is  sense we can only know 
what is ' i r r a t io n a l1 from a ra tio n a l base, and Marx.describes" 
the 'p r ic e  of production' as:
" . . .  a completely externalized and primae fac ie  ir ra t io n a l 
form of commodity value". (1981d ; p. 300)
The methodological move from the elemental conditions which comprise 
the the o re tica l 'simple commodity economy' is made when the 
ind iv idua l values of commodities no longer coincide w ith th e ir  
socia l values. This procedure demands a fu rth e r determination 
o f 's o c ia lly  necessary la b ou r-tim e ', one th a t removes i t  from 
the exclusive se tting  o f the process o f production ( 'te c h n o lo g ic a l' 
d e fin it io n )  where commodities are considered to  emerge as_ values, 
and places i t  in the la rger socia l whole, where alone i t  has f u l l  
v a l id ity  since i t  is  here th a t the labour expended in production 
must show th a t i t  has been a necessary expenditure, i .e .  th a t i t  
has produced so c ia lly  va lid  use-values, at a given leve l o f 
development of productive forces:
"Every ind iv idua l a r t ic le  or every d e fin ite  quantity  o f 
a commodity, may indeed contain no more than the socia l 
labour required fo r  i ts  production, and from th is  point', 
o f view the market value o f th is  e n tire  commodity 
represents only necessary labour, but i f  th is  commodity 
has been produced in excess of the ex is ting  social 
needs, then so much of the socia l labour-time is
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squandered and the mass of the commodity comes to  
represent a much smaller quantity  o f socia l labour 
in the market.than is  ac tua lly  incorporated in i t . . .
For th is  reason these commodities must be sold below 
th e ir  market value, and a portion o f them may be 
altogether unsaleable. The reverse is  the case i f  
the quantity  o f socia l labour employed is too small 
to  meet the socia l demand". (1984; p. 187)
Here Marx has broken the connection between the ind iv idua l value 
o f the commodity and i ts  socia l value, or between its  value and 
its  p rice , which is  the fundamental condition fo r  the form ulation 
o f the ’ prices of p roduction ', th a t is ,  fo r  the systematic deviation 
of price from value. The ind iv idua l value o f the commodity is 
not a ltered in th is ,  only i t  no longer corresponds to  i t s  socia l 
value. Having been produced in excess, then a l l  o f the labour 
tha t the mass of the commodity contains, while i t  might be 
necessary in the 'techno log ica l' sense, from the socia l po in t 
o f view a part o f th is  labour is  'unnecessary', and the ind iv idua l 
commodity is only an a liqu o t pa rt o f the to ta l labour expended:
" . . .  suppose every piece o f linen on the market contains 
no more labour-time than is  so c ia lly  necessary. In sp ite  
o f th is ,  a l l  these pieces taken together may have had 
superfluous labour-time spent upon them. I f  the 
market cannot stomach the whole quantity  at the normal 
price o f 2 s h illin g s  a yard, th is  proves tha t too great 
a portion of the to ta l labour-time o f the community has 
been expended in the form of weaving. The e ffe c t is 
the same as i f  each ind iv idua l weaver had expended more
203
labour-time on his p a rtic u la r  product than is s o c ia lly  
necessary. Here we may say w ith the German proverb: 
caught together, hung together. A ll the linen in 
the market counts but as one a r t ic le  o f commerce, 
o f which each piece is  only an a liquo t p a rt. And 
as a matter o f fa c t ,  the value also of each sing le  
yard is  but the m ateria lised form of the same d e fin ite  
and s o c ia lly  fixed  quantity  o f homogeneous human 
labour". (1983; p. 109, my emph.)
Since a part o f th is  labour was expended superfluously, the mass 
o f the commodity in which i t  is  contained has a smaller value 
in exchange than i ts  real value, o r, i t  is  only the value o f 
the amount of labour th a t was s o c ia lly  necessary to  meet the 
ex is tin g  socia l need which counts, and is to  be spread over the 
en tire  mass o f commodities, and which resu lts  in them being sold 
below th e ir  value. And, as Marx says, the opposite is  the case 
when less labour than is  s o c ia lly  necessary to  meet the e x is tin g  
needs has been performed by a p a rtic u la r branch o f production - 
they are sold above th e ir  value.
In th is  way 'p r ic e 1 is  in a sense 'lib e ra te d ' from the d ire c t 
attachment i t  had to  labour value in the e a r lie r  model. The 
conditions of equ ilib rium  at labour value has been suspended since 
price  no longer necessarily corresponds to  value, does not flu c tu a te  
around value, and therefore ind iv idua l expenditures o f labour no 
longer automatically correspond to  socia l expenditures o f labour.
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Necessary mediation has entered in the form o f 'soc ia l use-value' 
which has a ' f i n i t e '  character, as opposed to  the ' in f in i t e '  
character o f value i t s e l f ,  an in f in i te  character which the product 
of labour was simply guaranteed in the e a r lie r  model. As Marx 
says: 'use-value does not have the boundlessness of value i t s e l f ' :
" . . .  i f  the use-value of ind iv idua l commodities depends 
upon whether they s a tis fy  a socia l need, which is  a 
p a rt ic u la r need, then the use-value o f the mass of 
the socia l product depends upon whether i t  s a tis fie s  
the q u a n tita tiv e ly  d e fin ite  socia l need fo r  each 
p a rtic u la r kind of product in  an adequate manner, and 
whether the labour is  p ropo rtion a lly  d is tr ib u te d  among 
the d if fe re n t spheres in keeping w ith th is  socia l needs 
which are q u a n tita tiv e ly  circumscribed. (This po int 
to  be noted in the d is tr ib u tio n  o f ca p ita l among the 
various spheres o f p ro d u c tio n )... This has a bearing 
on the re la tion sh ip  between necessary and surplus 
labour only inso far as a v io la tio n  o f proportion makes 
i t  impossible to  re a lise  the value o f the commodity and 
the surplus value contained in i t " .  (1984; p. 635, my emph)
We have seen th a t th is  'im p o s s ib ility  o f re a lis a tio n ' is  due 
to  the use-value, i t  is  therefore methodologically inaccessible 
to  H ilfe rd in g  who, a fte r  having 'discarded' use-value, seeks 
to  establish value i t s e l f  as having 'an independent existence 
qu ite  apart from exchange', i .e .  as not requ iring  necessary 
mediation before i t  is  'v a lu e '.
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In th is  way value is  treated as 'p r iu s ' in two d is t in c t ways 
by H ilfe rd in g : I t  is  'h is to r ic a l ly  p r iu s ' - as ex is ting  in the
p re -c a p ita lis t simple commodity economy; and i t  is  prius in the 
sense o f being 'e x ta n t' p r io r  to  i ts  own subsequent transform ation 
in to  p rice  o f production, tha t is ,  as i t  emerges as a quantity  
o f embodied value-substance from the production process i t s e l f .
This is why he says:
"For Marx, value is  the prius the th ing  g iv e n ..."
(op. c i t .  p. 175)
And i t  is  in th is  la t te r  sense o f being 'g iven ' extant before 
i ts  own transform ation in the process o f exchange th a t value is  
u lit is e d  in  H ilfe rd in g 's  rep ly to  Bohm-Bawerk.
Before he furnishes th is  rep ly , H ilfe rd in g  presents Bohm-Bawerk's 
objection to  Marx's transform ation procedure in the fo llow ing  terms:
"In  Bohm-Bawerk's opinion the th ird  volume o f Capital 
m anifestly contains the statement o f an actual and 
ir re c o n c ilib le  con trad ic tion  to  the law of va lue ., 
th a t is  th a t commodities which embody the same 
amount o f labour must, on p r in c ip le , in the long run, 
exchange fo r  each other. And now, in the th ird  
volume, we are to ld  th a t what according to  the teaching 
o f the f i r s t  volume must be, is not, and never can be; 
th a t ind iv idua l commodities do and must exchange with 
each other in a proportion d iffe re n t from tha t o f the 
labour contained in them, and th is  not accidenta lly  and 
tem porarily , but o f necessity and permanently...
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The theory of the average ra te  of p ro f i t  and the 
prices of production cannot be reconciled w ith the 
theory o f value", ( ib id ,  p. 154)
H ilfe rd ing  provides a thumbnail sketch o f 'h is to r ic a l transform ation ' 
at the same time as he begins to  frame his rep ly to  Bohm-Bawerk as:
" . . .  exchange fo r  th e ir  values is  not a condition of 
exchange in general, even though, under certa in  spe c ific  
h is to r ic  conditions, exchange fo r  corresponding values 
is  indispensable i f  these h is to r ic a l conditions are to  
be perpetua lly reproduced by the mechanism of socia l 
l i f e .  Under changes h is to r ic a l conditions, m odifications , 
o f exchange ensue, and the only question is  whether 
these m odifications are to  be regarded as taking place 
according to  law, and whether they can be represented 
as m odifications o f the law o f value.
I f  th is  be so, the law o f value, though on modified 
form, continues to  contro l exchange and the course of 
p rices. A ll th a t is  necessary is  tha t we should 
understand the course of prices to  be a m odification 
o f the p re-ex is ting  course o f p rices, which was under 
the d ire c t contro l o f the law of value", ( ib id , p. 156)
The 'p re -e x is tin g  course o f p rice s ' re ferred to  by H ilfe rd in g  
can only allude to  the equ ilib rium  prices of the simple commodity 
economy, where they approximated labour-value. Therefore what 
remains constant in the tra n s it io n  from the simple to  the c a p ita l is t  
production of commodities can only be the way the magnitude of 
value is determined by 'la b o u r-tim e '. The d ire c t and immediate 
determination o f the ind iv idua l values o f commodities by the 
'labour' th a t is  embodied in them is  a feature of both the 's im p le '
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and the c a p ita lis t  production of commodities. I t  is  in th is  
guise th a t 'the  law of value which continues to  contro l exchange 
and the course o f p r ic e s '.  H ilfe rd ing  says much the same 
elsewhere:
"The exchange which gives expression to  the equa lity  
o f the owners o f cap ita l is  o f course d if fe re n t ly  
determined from the exchange tha t is  based upon an 
equa lity  in the expenditure o f labour. But, ju s t 
as both socie ties have the same foundations, the 
d iv is io n  o f property and the d iv is ion  o f labour; 
ju s t  as c a p ita lis t  society can be conceived as 
merely a higher m odification of the e a r lie r  type of 
socie ty; so also is  the law of value unchanged in 
i t s  foundation". ( ib id , p. 189)
That H ilfe rd in g  can say tha t 'both socie ties have the same foundations' 
when one is  'a b s tra c t' and the other 'concrete ' shows a complete 
absence o f understanding o f Marx's the o re tica l method. However, 
even from the h is to r ic a l po int o f view, tha t an envisaged pre­
c a p ita lis t  society should have in common i t s  'foundations' w ith  
c a p ita lis t  society i t s e l f  shows again a lack o f understanding o f 
the w o rld -h is to rica l d iffe rence tha t is wrought by 'c a p ita l ' and 
distinguishes i t  from every other system of production. This 
absence o f an adequate awareness of the very nature o f cap ita l 
w i l l  be h igh ly s ig n if ic a n t fo r  H ilfe rd in g 's  account, as we sha ll see.
Because H ilfe rd in g 's  is an 'h is to r ic a l transform ation ' then 'va lu e ' 
needs must be 'p r iu s ';  and because he has an embodied labour
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theory o f value ’ value1 must be 'p r iu s ' to  exchange or, 'have 
an independent existence qu ite apart from exchange1. Each 
mode o f 'p r iu s ' is made c lear when he says in response to  
Bohm-Bawerk's contention of an 'irre c o n c ila b le  con trad ic tion ' 
between volumes one and three o f C ap ita l, th a t Bohm-Bawerk's:
" . . .  e n tire  turn o f reasoning is u tte r ly  beside the 
p o in t. Marx is inqu iring  about the to ta l value, 
and his c r i t i c  complains because he is  not inqu iring  
about the value of the ind iv id ua l commodity. Bohm- 
Bawerk fa i ls  to  see what Marx is  aiming at in th is  
demonstration.. I t  is important to  show tha t the sum 
to ta l o f the prices of production is  ide n tica l w ith 
the sum to ta l o f the values", ( ib id , p. 158)
Although he is  not aware o f i t ,  the d is t in c tio n  H ilfe rd ing  draws 
between 'the  value of the ind iv idua l commodity' and the 'sum 
to ta l o f the values' or to ta l value, ex is ts  fo r  Marx as the 
d is tin c tio n  between 'the simple commodity' and the 'c a p ita l is t ic a l ly  
produced commodity'. That is , th a t th is  d is t in c tio n  m irrors two 
e n tire ly  d iffe re n t levels in the conceptual synthesis, in the 
progress o f which the former is  subsumed in the la t te r :
"The whole d i f f ic u l t y  arises from the fa c t tha t commodities 
are not exchanged simply as commodities, but as products 
o f c a p ita ls , which claim p a rtic ip a tio n  in the to ta l 
amount o f surplus value proportional to  th e ir  
m agnitude...." (Marx, 1984; p. 175)
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This is the key to  the transform ation procedure, or the subsumption 
o f one state o f a ffa irs  by another more combined state o f a f fa ir s ,  
and where there is  also a re su ltin g  change in the conditions o f 
socia l equ ilib rium  between i ts  regu la tion through labour-value 
( ‘ as commodities') and i t s  regu la tion through the p rice  of 
production ( ‘ as products o f c a p ita ls ') .  This tra n s fe r from the 
simple to  the combined marks prec ise ly  the same methodological 
move as th a t s ig n if ie d  by the tra n s fe r from the 'tech n o lo g ica l' 
d e f in it io n  o f 's o c ia lly  necessary labour-tim e' where i t  re la ted 
exc lus ive ly  to  i t s  qua n tita tive  determ ination, to  th a t descrip tion  
o f i t  where i ts  q u a lita tiv e  s o c ia lly  useful determination was 
c ru c ia l. The methodological re s u lt o f th is  tra n s fe r from the 
lower to  the higher is  th a t commodities as the products of 
cap ita ls  which demand a share in  the to ta l surplus value proportiona l 
to  th e ir  magnitude system atica lly deviate from th e ir  values because 
these cap ita ls  do not seek recompense in terms o f labour-value, 
but in terms o f 'equal p r o f i t  fo r  equal c a p ita l '.  However, 
H ilfe rd ing  himself mentions a type of 'ascent' to  the more concrete 
re la tio n s  when he juxtaposes 'to ta l value' and 'in d iv id u a l v a lu e '.
He proceeds w ith th is  d is tin c tio n  when he pursues Bohm-Bawerk's 
c r it ic is m , saying:
" I t  is  important to  show th a t the sum to ta l o f the 
prices o f production is  id e n tica l w ith the sum to ta l 
o f the va lu es ... i f  the value, in the Marxist sense, 
is  known to  me, the value o f the aggregate of these 
un its  is likew ise known... I t  is obvious tha t i f  we 
are to  determine the amount of divergence ( i .e .  between
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values and prices of production) we must know, 
not only the magnitude of the surplus value, but also 
the magnitude and indeed the value magnitude of 
the advanced c a p ita l. The law o f value enables me 
to  determine th is  magnitude.
I can thus read ily  ascertain the deviations as soon 
as the value magnitudes are known to  me... For the 
to ta l price  o f production can be compared w ith to ta l 
value only i f ,  though q u a n tita tiv e ly  d if fe re n t,  they 
are q u a lita t iv e ly  homogeneous, both being expressions 
of m ateria lised labour", (op. c i t .  p. 159)
This is how H ilfe rd in g  attempts to  reconcile  the ‘ irreconcilab le  
con trad ic tio n1 between volumes 1 and 3 o f C ap ita l, and the re fo re , 
fo r  him, between value and price  o f production.
In the f i r s t  place, H ilfe rd in g  tre a ts  value and price as two 
d is t in c t and autonomously e x is tin g  e n t it ie s .  This is  simply 
the consequence of the fa c t th a t H ilfe rd in g  does not see value 
as a socia l re la tio n , a socia l re la tio n  between people th a t is  
expressed in price at any given tim e, i .e .  p rice  regulates the 
quan tita tive  'e x te n t' o f th is  re la tio n , i t s  q u a lita t iv e  socia l 
character having been presupposed. Or, we could say, he sees 
i t  as exclusive ly a qu an tita tive  socia l re la tio n  and where here, 
the q u a lita tiv e  nature of the substance o f value is again assumed, 
as 'la b o u r ', pure and simple.
Therefore he sees value as a 'th in g ',  as an embodied e n t ity  w ith 
an existence of i t s  own. I t  is  because o f th is  th a t his analysts
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can proceed no fu rth e r than the set o f the o re tica l assumptions 
which surrounded 'the  value of the ind iv idua l commodity'. And 
tha t is why his so lu tion  to  the 'transform ation problem ', i .e .  
to  render concilable value and price  o f production, consists in 
his summing-up the values o f a l l  o f the ind iv idua l commodities 
so tha t the to ta l value produced can be 'compared w ith 1 the to ta l 
prices o f production. This is  also why he speaks o f divergence 
and deviation o f the one from the other when, he has previously 
noted, th a t th e ir  sum to ta ls  are 'id e n t ic a l1. Thus he proceeds 
in the manner where ' i f  the value is known to  me, the value o f 
the aggregate o f these un its  is  likew ise known', which procedure 
.presumably renders the to ta l value produced in the branch o f 
production, and where these are summed in tu rn , in order to  be 
compared w ith the re s u lt o f the summation o f the prices of 
production. But Marx only moves to  consider 'to ta l value' fo r  
the precise reason th a t 'in d iv id u a l value' no longer ex is ts  under 
the conditions where i t  was produced in the precise proportion 
in which society required i t ,  th a t is , where labour appeared to  
be affirmed as s o c ia lly  necessary labour as soon as i t  emerged 
from the process o f production. This appearnace is  a re s u lt o f 
the fa c t th a t because equ ilib rium  is  assumed in the 's im ple ' model 
there does not appear a need fo r  mediation. This is why 'embodied 
labour' th e o ris ts  are able to  gain a degree o f theo re tica l 
sustenance from Marx's in i t ia l  methodological assumptions. I t  
also means however th a t an embodied labour theory o f value is 
severely lim ited  because bounded by the assumptions surrounding 
'the value o f the ind iv idua l commodity'. Now however:
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"We are no longer faced w ith the ind iv idua l commodity, 
the ind iv idua l p roduct... I t  is  not the ind iv idua l 
commodity which appears as the re su lt o f the process 
but the mass of the commodities in which the value of 
the to ta l ca p ita l has been reproduced plus a surplus 
value. The to ta l value produced divided by the 
number o f products determines the value of the 
ind iv idua l product and i t  becomes a commodity only 
as such an a liqu o t pa rt. I t  is no longer the labour 
spent on the ind iv idua l p a rtic u la r commodity, but 
a proportional part o f the to ta l labour - i .e .  the 
average of the to ta l value divided by the number of 
products - which determines the value o f the ind iv idua l 
product and establishes i t  as a commodity. Consequently 
the to ta l mass o f commodities must be sold, each 
commodity at i t s  value, determined in th is  way, in 
order to  replace the to ta l cap ita l together w ith a 
surplus value. I f  only 800 out o f the 1200 yards 
were sold, then cap ita l would not be replaced, s t i l l  
less would there be a p r o f i t .  But each yard is also 
sold below i ts  value, fo r  i t s  value is  determined 
not in is o la t io n , but as an a liquo t part o f the to ta l 
amount". (Marx, 1972; p. 113, my emph.)
That is to  say, 1200 yards must be sold at the value of 800 yards, 
and each commodity must be sold as an a liqu o t part o f th is  800 
yards. Therefore i f  only 800 yards corresponded to  the socia l 
demand fo r  th is  a r t ic le  then only these contain s o c ia lly  necessary 
labour-tim e. The 800 yards are confirmed as abstract value- 
creating labour and the labour contained in the other 400 yards 
is not, even though, p r io r to  c irc u la tio n , each of the 1200 yards 
emerged from the same ‘ techno log ica lly  necessary’ process o f 
production. The labour expended upon the superfluous 400 yards
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never became abstract labour because i t  was not rea lised in the 
process o f exchange even when a l l  o f the commodities are sold.
In other words, the ind iv idua l concrete labour o b je c tif ie d  in 
these 400 yards was not rendered abstract by having i ts  product 
( line n ) transformed in to  value (money).
Therefore we can only 'sum1 value when i t  has been rea lised , 
when i t  manifests i t s e l f  in the form o f p rice . This means th a t 
'to ta l value' can only be perceived when i t  is  already in the 
form o f p rice . Price o f production is  therefore the form value 
has, or is  the way tha t i t  appears and expresses i t s e l f  in the 
c a p ita lis t  system of production.
And we have to  be made aware th a t the sum o f prices o f production 
themselves are the sum to ta l value, and must, o f necessity, equal 
to ta l value. In contrast to  H ilfe rd in g 's  'two magnitudes' o f 
value on the one hand and prices on the other, and where these 
can be compared in order to  reveal any 'd e v ia tio n ' between the 
two, Marx says:
"The progress o f our investiga tion  w i l l  show th a t 
exchange value is the only form in which the value 
o f commodities can manifest i t s e l f  and be expressed".
(1983; p. 46)
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In the c a p ita lis t  system o f production the price o f production 
' is  the only form in which the value o f commodities can manifest 
i t s e l f ' .  I f  the ' r e a l i t y '  o f value ex is ts  only in i t s  e ffe c ts , 
only in the up and down movement o f commodity prices, then so 
too does the 'r e a l i t y '  o f the price  o f production. The establishment 
of the 'law of value' as the regu la tor o f p ro p o rtio n a lity  in the 
'ra tio n a l state of a f fa ir s ' is  the essential theo re tica l prelude 
to  the understanding o f the p rice  o f production as the regu la to r 
o f the equ ilib rium  o f the c a p ita lis t  system of production. This 
means th a t the conditions o f p ro p o rtio n a lity  which existed in the 
labour-value model are no longer adequate to  explain those which 
perta in  when exchange transactions are regulated by the p rice  o f 
production. 'E qua lity  o f la b ou r', which maxim stood above the 
entrance to  the e a r lie r  model, must give way to  'e q u a lity  o f 
c a p ita l1, and the transformation i t s e l f ,  as outlined by Marx, 
describes the th e o re tica l s h if t  from one ru lin g  maxim to  the 
other.
Marx says o f the conditions tha t ex is t under th is  la t te r :
" I t  is  in general in the form of the market p rice , 
and furthermore, in the form of the regula ting market 
p rice , or market price  o f production, tha t the nature o f 
the value o f commodities asserts i t s e l f ,  i t s  determ ination 
not by the labour-time necessary in the case of any 
ind iv idua l producer fo r  the production of a ce rta in  
quantity  o f commodities, or o f some ind iv idua l 
commodity, but by the s o c ia lly  necessary labour-tim e;
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th a t is ,  by the labour-time required fo r  the 
production o f the so c ia lly  necessary to ta l quantity 
o f commodity va rie tie s  on the market, under the 
ex is ting  conditions of socia l production".
(1984; p. 640)
Since H ilfe rd in g  does not consider tha t determination of s o c ia lly  
necessary labour which re la tes exclusive ly to  use-value or 
therefore the quantity  o f commodity v a r ie tie s , we are compelled 
to  ask where the dimension of socia l need is  to  come from, or 
’ e n te r1 the h is to r ic a l perspective in the tra n s itio n  from simple 
to  c a p ita lis t  commodity production. Are we being asked to  
consider a period o f p re -c a p ita lis t production which attained 
to  socia l equ ilib rium  by the exchange o f i t s  products and th a t 
a state o f equ ilib rium  existed where production equalled 
consumption, supply equalled demand when these products exchanged 
at th e ir  market values, as they inva riab ly  did? Here is  H ilfe rd in g 's  
descrip tion o f the s itu a tio n :
"Whereas the con tinua lly  increasing d iv e rs ity  in the 
organic composition o f c a p ita l, and the consequent ■ 
greater and greater varia tions in the masses of 
surplus value d ire c t ly  created in the ind iv idua l 
spheres o f production, are in the f i r s t  instance the 
outcome o f c a p ita l is t  evolution - th is  evolution in 
tu rn  creates the p o s s ib il ity  and the need fo r  
extinguish ing these differences so fa r  as cap ita l 
is  concerned, and fo r  thus re a lis ing  the equa lity  o f 
human beings qua owners o f c a p ita l" , (op. c i t .  p. 192)
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The creation o f d iffe re n t masses o f surplus value among the 
indvidual spheres o f production, and where these d if fe re n t 
masses remain, is  only possible on the basis th a t commodities 
exchange at th e ir  market value. This sale o f commodities at 
th e ir  market value is  the sole condition which allows of the 
existence o f d iffe re n t masses o f surplus value in the d if fe re n t 
branches of production. Here then we have the co-existence 
of exchange e t  labour value - which permits the existence o f d if fe re n t 
masses o f surplus value - and c a p ita lis t  ownership o f the means 
of production. But how can the s itu a tio n  arise where surplus 
value ex is ts  alongside cap ita l but is  not perceived in  the form 
of 'p r o f i t 1? That is  to  say, how can a ra te  o f surplus value, 
which is  expressed as s /v , and corresponds to  exchange at labour- 
value, be reconciled w ith the demand o f cap ita l fo r  s /(c+ v), th a t 
is , fo r  a ra te  o f p r o f i t  adequate to  i ts  magnitude? Why should 
these two coincide, so th a t p r o f i t  according to  labour value 
is adequate to  f u l f i l  p r o f i t  required according to  ca p ita l expended? 
Conversely, Marx described p r o f i t  as 'a necessary form of 
appearance o f surplus va lu e ', what is i t  then th a t renders th is  
appearance 'necessary' and are we to  accept th a t there existed 
a period in the evo lution o f cap ita lism  when th is  necessity was 
in abeyance? In the fo llow ing  section we sha ll attempt to  
answer these questions in  re la tio n  to  the necessary th e o re tica l 
pre-suppositions to  Marx's transform ation procedure.
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V
The simultaneous existence of cap ita l and the exchange of 
commodities at th e ir  values is  described in more d e ta il by 
H ilfe rd in g :
"With the fu r th e r progress o f c a p ita lis m ... when the 
c a p ita lis t  began to  e ffe c t a conquest o f the whole 
market, his p r o f i t  was c h ie fly  dependent upon the 
fo llow ing  fac to rs : His technica l methods of production
were superior, so th a t he could produce more cheaply 
than the handicraftsmen. Since fo r  the time being 
the market value o f the handicraftman's products 
determined prices, the c a p ita lis t  was able to  rea lise  
an extra surplus value or extra p r o f i t .
By the supplanting o f handicraftsmanship and the increase 
o f competition w ith in  the sphere o f c a p ita lis t  production, 
the extra p r o f i t  realised by cap ita l was reduced; and 
subsequently freedom of transference from one sphere 
o f production to  another effectuated the equalisation 
of p r o f i t  to  become average p r o f i t " ,  ( ib id , p. 171)
Here surplus value, or p r o f i t ,  is  treated in terms of i t s  being. 
•extracted1 in conditions of exchange at labour value (s /v ) and 
in the manner o f i t s  function ing i t  is treated as being the 
samething, or having the same regula tory s ign ifica nce , as 
s /(c+ v). The former is  treated as being q u a n tita tiv e ly  adequate 
to  the demands o f the la t te r ,  indeed is  considered as fa c i l i ta t in g  
an 'ex tra  p r o f i t '  on cap ita l advanced fo r  production. I t  is  
obvious from th is  th a t H ilfe rd ing  does not understand the nature 
of 'c a p ita l ' and why therefore 'p r o f i t  is  the necessary form o f -
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appearance o f surplus value1 and which p roh ib its  them being 
id e n tif ie d  as the same th in g . Methodologiclaly, and in 
reverse order from H ilfe rd in g , i t  is the existence o f p r o f i t  
and the ra te  o f p r o f i t  which explains surplus value, and not 
a 'p r iu s 1 and previously comprehended surplus value which 
enters in to  the c a p ita lis t  system of production h is to r ic a lly  
and 'e xp la in s1 p r o f i t  and the ra te  o f p r o f i t .
"The transformation of surplus value in to  p r o f i t  must 
be deduced from the transformation of the rate o f surplus 
value in to  the ra te  o f p r o f i t ,  and not vice-versa. And 
in fa c t i t  was the rate of p r o f i t  which was the 
h is to r ic a l po in t o f departure. Surplus value and the 
ra te  o f surplus value are, re la t iv e ly ,  the in v is ib le  
and unknown essence tha t wants inves tiga ting , while 
the ra te o f p r o f i t  and therefore the appearance of 
surplus value in the form o f p r o f i t  are revealed on 
the surface o f the phenomenon", (op. c i t . )
In H ilfe rd in g  we come to  the ra te  of p r o f i t  armed w ith a 
'p recogn itive ' surplus value because Marx's 'e s s e n tia lis t ' 
understanding is  seen to  have i t s  o rig ins  in the 'a n te -d ilu v ia n ' 
category o f 'lab our' which 'evolves in to ' surplus value and p r o f i t .  
But surplus vlaue does not 'become' p r o f i t  in r e a li ty ,  in the 
sense th a t i t  is presupposed to  i t ;  surplus value, as Marx's 
statement suggests, is  given immediately in the form o f 'p r o f i t ' ,  
appears and ex is ts  a_s p r o f i t .  Surplus value presupposes c a p ita l,  
and where there is cap ita l surplus vlaue is  simultaneously p r o f i t .
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I f ,  however, we concede th a t H ilfe rd ing  does not re a lly  mean 
'surplus value' but a simple 'excess' which is  adequate to  the 
needs o f the handicraftsman then, again, th is  simple excess cannot 
be adequate fo r  c a p ita l. Just as with 'lab ou r' and the 'va lue ' 
i t  produces, simple 'excess' is  not transformed by H ilfe rd in g , 
but merely progresses in ta c t from the lower to  the higher.
He therefore does not recognise the necessity fo r  p r o f i t  as the 
form o f appearance o f surplus value, and is incapable of 
comprehending the 'average ra te o f p r o f i t ' .
H ilfe rd ing  does not re a lly  carry out any 'transfo rm ation ' at a l l ,  
but merely depicts the 'm ig ra tion ' of extant categories from one 
epoch to  another.
At the root o f th is ,  or we could say as the f r u i t  o f H ilfe rd in g 's  
a ttitu d e  to  the fundamental categories, is  h is fa i lu re  to  comprehend 
the nature o f c a p ita l, since such a comprehension would involve 
a d iffe re n t determ ination of 'to ta l value' than th a t which 
H ilfe rd ing  describes, and where the proportions o f exchange are 
d if fe re n t ly  determined:
"In  accordance w ith the changing conditions of 
demand and supply, the market price o f commodities 
fa l ls  below or rises above th e ir  exchange value.
The exchange value of commodities is , consequently, 
determined not by the labour-time contained in them, 
but by the re la tio n  of demand and supply. In fa c t, 
th is  strange conclusion only raises the question how 
on the basis o f exchange value a market-price d if fe r in g
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from th is  exchange value comes in to  being, or ra ther, 
how the law o f exchange value asserts i t s e l f  only 
in i t s  a n tith e s is " . (Marx, 1981b; p. 62)
Or, how the law o f equivalence only expresses i t s e l f  through 
non-equivalence. In the model o f the simple commodity economy 
p ro p o rtio n a lity  is  maintained in terms o f the equa lity  o f labour, 
whereas in  the more combined or c a p ita lis t  production of 
commodities p ro p o rtio n a lity  is  maintained in  terms o f the equa lity  
o f c a p ita l. We could say th a t the assertion o f equa lity  only 
in terms o f i t s  an tithe s is  ( i . e .  where an inequa lity  is  expressed 
between labour-value and price) is  the distance between the 
'ra t io n a l' model o f equ ilib rium  and the ' i r r a t io n a l ' or c a p ita l is t  
model, i .e .  p recise ly the poles o f the transform ation procedure.
But how does inequa lity  appear as eq ua lity , and how is  th is  
inequa lity  'to le ra te d ' as i t  were, treated as_ equality? The 
answer, and which also i l lu s tra te s  the im p o s s ib ility , both lo g ic a lly  
and h is to r ic a l ly ,  o f the co-existence o f s/v and s/(c+v) or o f 
market value and c a p ita l, is  to  be found in  the nature o f ca p ita l 
i t s e l f :
"Capital is  now realised not only as value which 
reproduces i t s e l f  and is hence perennia l, but also 
as value which posits value- . .  i t  re la tes to  i t s e l f  
as pos iting  new value, as producer o f value. I t  
re la tes as the foundation to  surplus value as to  
th a t which f t  founded... Proceeding from i t s e l f  as 
the active subject the subject of the process - cap ita l 
re la tes  to  i t s e l f  as se lf-increas ing  value. I t
221
therefore no longer measures the newly produced 
value by i ts  real measure, the re la tio n  o f surplus 
labour to  necessary labour, but ra ther by i t s e l f  
as presupposition. Surplus vlaue thus measured 
by the value of the presupposed c a p ita l . . .  is  p r o f i t . . .
The magnitude, surplus value, is there fore  measured 
by the value-magnitude of the c a p ita l" . . .
(1981a; p. 745, my emph.)
And again:
" I t  has not only preserved i t s e l f  but also rea lised 
i t s e l f  as cap ita l by being d istinguished as such 
from (c o s t-p r ic e ), to  which i t  stands in the 
same re la tio n  as to  an increase o f i t s  own, to  a 
f r u i t  o f i t s  own, to  an increment to  which i t  has 
given b ir th  i t s e l f .  I t  has been rea lised as 
cap ita l because i t  has been rea lised as a value 
which has created value, hence possessing the 
property o f self-expansion, o f hatching a higher 
value than i t  i t s e l f  has". (1977; p. 45)
And when Marx says th a t the d is t in c tio n  between constant and 
variab le cap ita l 'escapes the c a p ita lis t  in the co s t-p rice ' then 
the 'p r o f i t 1 realised by the c a p ita lis t  from the value o f 'the  
handicraftsman's product' would not even e x is t fo r  him as 'p r o f i t ' .
And in order th a t there be no confusion between H ilfe rd in g 's  
scheme and Marx's when the la t te r  says th a t the value newly produced 
is no longer calculated 'by i t s  real measure' then th is  re fe rs
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to  i t s  'e s s e n tia l' measure, not to  re a lity  in the sense o f a 
measure which had a transparent existence in some other e a r lie r  
form o f socie ty.
In any event, 'c a p ita l fe tish ism ' ensures th a t 'in e q u a lity ' in 
terms o f labour-value proceeds as 'e q u a lity ' in terms of cap ita l 
advanced, or the ' i r r a t io n a l ' successfully subsumes the 'r a t io n a l '.  
But i t  should be stressed th a t th is  'in e q u a lity ' and ' i r r a t io n a l i t y '  
perform the decidedly ra tiona l function  of regula ting the c a p ita lis t  
economy via the general average ra te of p r o f i t  and of thus 
governing the equ ilib rium  of th is  economy in terms of 'equal 
p r o f i t  fo r  equal c a p ita l ',  hence 'p r ice  o f p roduction '.
Equality o f cap ita l thus displaces equa lity  o f labour, and 
equilib irum  in the former case is  not to  be conceived o f as 
social equilib rium  th a t is achieved when labour is p rop o rtion a lly  
d is tr ib u te d , ra ther th a t the to ta l socia l ca p ita l is  p rop o rtio n a lly  
d is tr ib u te d , each a liquo t part receiving cost-p rice  + average 
p r o f i t  and therefore se llin g  th e ir  respective commodities at 
prices o f production. ‘ Price o f production' expresses th is  
equilib rium  and is  to  be considered as a methodologically transformed 
form o f value, or o f tha t equilib rium  which labour-value expresses. 
'M ethodologically ' because th is  e a r lie r  and more 'a b s tra c t' model 
o f equilib rium  does not depict an e a r lie r  form of socie ty, but 
is  an abstract determination o f c a p ita lis t  society i t s e l f  only 
stripped o f i t s  more concrete determ inations, the subsequent 
inclusion of which requires the comprehension o f the inner nature
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of c a p ita l. Marx tre a ts  the nature o f cap ita l when he examines 
'c a p ita l in general1 th a t is , th is  inner nature expresses what 
a l l  cap ita ls  have in common - the capacity fo r  expanding th e ir  
own value, and 'c a p ita lin  general' is investigated p r io r  to  
'many c a p ita ls ' in competition w ith each other. Thus he says:
"The various forms o f c a p ita l, as evolved in th is  
book ( i.e . .  Capital Vol.. 3 ), thus approach step by 
step the form which they assume on the surface of 
socie ty, in the action of the d iffe re n t cap ita ls  
on one another, in competition, and in the ordinary 
consciousness o f the agents o f production themselves".
(1984; p. 25)
And i t  is  the action o f d if fe re n t cap ita ls  upon one another in 
competition which is  the real precondition fo r  the emergence o f 
a general ra te  of p r o f i t  and consequently the prices o f production 
which correspond to  i t .  The stage in the conceptual synthesis 
which corresponds to  'c a p ita l in general' and is  not yet 'many 
c a p ita ls ',  is  th a t o f 'market va lu e ', and is presented by Marx as:
"What com petition, f i r s t  in a single sphere, achieves 
is  a s ing le market value and market p rice  derived 
from the various ind iv idua l values o f commodities.
And i t  is competition o f cap ita ls  in d iffe re n t 
spheies which f i r s t  brings about the price  o f production 
equalising the rates o f p r o f i t  in the d if fe re n t spheres.
The la t te r  process requires a higher development of 
c a p ita lis t  production than the previous one", ( ib id ,  p. 180)
224
Since we have argued th a t i t  is impossible fo r  both ca p ita l and 
market value to  co -ex is t, and th a t th is  im p o ss ib ility  te s t i f ie s  
to  the purely the o re tica l ' r e a l i t y 1 o f the category 'market va lu e ', 
and since i t  is  essentia l fo r  the 'h is to r ic a l ' perspective th a t 
th is  stage o f market value should e x is t in fa c t , then, and fo r  
obvious reasons, the previous passage by Marx has become almost 
as s ig n if ic a n t as the 'h is to r ic a l ly  p r iu s ' passage in forming 
and butressing th is  la t te r  perspective. For example Fine wishes to :
r "Recall Marx's theory o f the transform ation. At the 
f i r s t  stage, market value is  formed from ind iv idua l 
values. At the second stage, prices of production are 
formed from market values". (1986; p. 146)
This sequence is  accurate fo r  both the proposed 'h is to r ic a l ' and 
the methodological versions of the transform ation, and Fine goes 
on to  fu r th e r describe the h is to r ic a l account:
" . . .  the h is to r ic a l transform ation problem concerns 
i t s e l f  w ith the question o f whether these stages 
correspond to  p a rtic u la r h is to r ic a l epochs. Was 
there a stage, c a p ita l is t  or otherwise, fo r  which 
commodities exchanged at th e ir  values? Was th is  
transformed in to  a stage where commodities 
exchanged at prices of production diverging from 
va lues?... I t  is  qu ite  c lea r th a t Marx's view is 
th a t there is a h is to r ic a l transfo rm ation", ( ib id )
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Fine then goes on to  quote the passage we re ferred to  as 
s ig n if ic a n t in th is  context in order to  establish th a t indeed 
fo r  Marx there is an h is to r ic a l transform ation. A ll the same, 
whereas i t  might be unfortunate but nevertheless correct fo r  
Mandel to  say th a t the above view is  'commonplace1, i t  is  wrong 
fo r  Fine to  state th a t i t  is  'q u ite  c le a r ',  although equally 
unfortunate. Nevertheless, as we have seen, H ilfe rd ing  places 
the period o f market value seemingly in the p re -c a p ita lis t past, 
in the 's im ple ' production o f commodities dominated by the 
handicraftsman's labour, saying:
"In  the loca l market which i t  dominates, p re -c a p ita lis t 
competition effectuates the equalisation o f the d if fe re n t 
ind iv idua l values to  produce a s ing le  market value; 
c a p ita l is t  competition e ffectuates the transformation 
o f value in to  p rice  o f production", (op. c i t .  p. 166)
Rather confusingly, H ilfe rd in g  also re fers to  th is  f i r s t  period 
as a stage in 'c a p ita l is t  e v o lu tio n ', but th is  is perhaps to  be 
explained by the fa c t th a t he v isua lises the co-existence of 
market value and c a p ita l, and where the c a p ita lis t  at f i r s t  
usurps th is  ex is ting  market value, p r io r  to  transforming i t  to  
the price  o f production. However, in the tra n s it io n  from market 
value to  price  o f production the formerstage is characterised 
by Marx as where unequal organic compositions o f cap ita l in  d if fe re n t 
branches o f production y ie ld  unequal rates o f p r o f i t  in equal 
periods o f time. I t  there fore  forms the the o re tica l presupposition
226
fo r  the competition between cap ita ls  in these d if fe re n t branches 
of production whereby an average ra te  o f p r o f i t  is  formed.
But can we establish unequivocally th a t 'market value' represents 
a 'th e o re tic a l' as opposed to  an 'h is to r ic a l ' stage in the 
transformation o f these market values in to  prices of production?
H ilfe rd ing  says tha t the equalisa tion o f the ra te  o f p r o f i t :
" . . .  is  only possible because cap ita l and labour can 
remove at w i l l  from one sphere of production to  another., 
u n t i l  there ex is ts  absolute l ib e r ty  o f movement fo r  
both cap ita l and labour. But in p re -c a p ita lis t 
conditions th is  competition fo r  spheres o f investment 
is  impossible, and consequently the equalisa tion of the 
d iffe re n t rates o f p r o f i t  is  impossible. Since th is  
is  so, since the labourer who produces on his own 
account cannot change his sphere o f production at w i l l , 
the d iffe rence in p r o f i t  rates is  in d if fe re n t to  h im ...
Not u n t i l  the days of monopoly were over, not u n t i l  
the re s tr ic t io n s  upon the tra n s fe ra b il ity  o f ca p ita l had 
been abolished, not u n t i l  the shackles o f the labourer 
had been removed, was the equalisation o f the varying 
rates o f p r o f i t ,  o r ig in a lly  so very d if fe re n t,  rendered 
possib le", (op. c i t .  p. 66; 71, my emph.)
And Fine elaborates his own pos ition  when he comes to  discuss:
" . . .  the element o f the transform ation problem th a t has 
suffered neglect in the recent debates. I t  concerns 
the question o f where the values th a t form the basis fo r
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the transform ation come from in the f i r s t  place. - 
Marx argues th a t values are f i r s t  formed by the 
process o f competition between cap ita ls  w ith in  a 
sector, and he c a lls  the process involved the 
formation o f market va lu e s ...
I t  fo llow s th a t there is  a two-stage process in 
Marx's transform ation. F irs t  competition w ith in  
sectors establishes market values and thereby 
unequal rates o f p r o f i t .  Secondly competition 
between sectors establishes prices o f production 
from those market values on the basis o f equalised 
rates o f p r o f i t " ,  (op. c i t .  p. 66; 71)
For both H ilfe rd in g  and Fine i t  is  the absence of m o b ility  
between sectors o f the economy which ensures the sale o f commodities 
at th e ir  market values and the consequent inequa lity  o f p r o f i t  
rates among the spheres o f production. This absence o f m o b ility  
e ffe c tiv e ly  prevents the transform ation o f market values in to  
prices o f production.
I f  the  immediate presupposition to  the formation o f the prices 
of production, through the equalisation o f the divergent rates 
o f p r o f i t ,  is  the competition between cap ita ls  w ith in  the various 
branches o f production and the absence of competition between 
them, then, fo r  the exponents o f 'h is to r ic a l transform ation ' th is  
marks a re a lly  ex is tin g  stage in the evolution o f cap ita lism . We 
said before th a t m o b ility  ls_ socia l regula tion of production, is  
the manner in which th is  socia l regula tion expresses i t s e l f .
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Therefore i f  the lack o f m o b ility  between sectors o f the economy 
acts as a b a rr ie r to  the formation of the prices of production 
in r e a l i ty ,  then th is  condition also p roh ib its  the exchange of 
products at th e ir  market values. In Marx's the o re tica l model 
o f the simple commodity economy i t  is  the essentia l condition 
fo r the sale o f commodities at th e ir  values th a t the producers 
can tra n s fe r from one branch o f production to  another. I f  th is  
is not the case then a state o f monopoly ex is ts  w ith in  the branch 
of production so th a t the sale o f commodities above th e ir  market 
values does not provoke an in f lu x  o f e ith e r cap ita l nor labour 
to  th a t p a rtic u la r branch. In fa c t there is  no socia l regu la tion  
of production since there is no compulsion to  s e ll commodities 
at th e ir  values. As we said, m o b ility  is  the response to  law, 
i t  is  the 'p e rs o n ific a tio n ' or the 'ac ting  ou t' o f the 'law of 
value' and is  therefore an essentia l feature o f the socia l regu la tion  
of the economy, simple or c a p ita l is t .  Thus whether in  response 
to  labour-value or to  the ra te  of p r o f i t  on ca p ita l advanced, 
m o b ility  is  the 'performance' o f the law o f value. Equlibrium 
of the socia l economy - or the law o f valud - asserts i t s e l f  
and can only assert i t s e l f  in m o b ility  between the various 
branches o f production, whether th is  be equ ilib rium  o f labour 
or equilib rium  o f cap ita l.. And the transformation procedure is  
precise ly the displacement o f equ ilib rium  at labour-value by 
equilib rium  in terms o f 'equal p r o f i t  fo r  equal c a p ita l '.  What 
is of fu r th e r s ign ificance  here is  tha t the condition o f universal 
m o b ility  which is  a necessary feature of the simple commodity 
economy, shows by the very presence of th is  m o b ility  th a t i t  
can only re fe r to  a theoretica l'm odel since th is  degree of socia l
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m o b ility  in the p re -c a p ita lis t past is an u tte r  im p o ss ib ility  
in r e a l i ty .  S im ila r ly , the co-existence of c a p ita l, as a 
value which has the ’ property* o f s e lf -expansion, and market 
value, in Table 1 o f Marx's transformation procedure, must only 
depict a the o re tica l and not a 're a l ' state o f a f fa irs .  When 
Marx ascends from the the o re tica l model o f the simple commodity 
economy to  th a t o f the hypothetical c a p ita lis t  economy he re ta ins  
the assumption th a t commodities exchange at th e ir  values.
He does th is  in order to  i l lu s t ra te  how these same values are 
re d is tr ibu te d  and thus transformed in to  prices of production 
by the very nature o f ca p ita l i t s e l f .  He shows th a t th is  stage 
o f the co-existence o f cap ita l and market value is  impossible 
in r e a li ty ,  and is  only th e o re tic a lly  leg itim ate  so long as we 
assume th a t commodities exchange at th e ir  values. Marx f i r s t  
describes what th is  the o re tica l stage e n ta ils  and then proceeds 
to  c ite  the th e o re tica l assumption upon which i t  is  based in 
the fo llow ing  manner:
"We have demonstrated th a t d iffe re n t lines of 
industry have d iffe re n t rates of p r o f i t ,  which 
correspond to  d ifferences in the organic compositions 
o f th e ir  c a p ita ls . . .  Here the law (as a general 
tendency) th a t p ro f its  are re lated to  one another 
as the magnitudes o f the ca p ita ls , applies only to  
cap ita ls  o f the same organic composition. . .  These 
statements hold good on the assumption which has 
been the basis of a l l  our analysis so f a r , namely 
th a t commodities are sold at th e ir  values. There 
is  no doubt, on the other hand... tha t d ifferences in
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the average ra te o f p r o f i t  in the various branches 
o f industry do not e x is t in  re a li ty  and could not 
e x is t in r e a l i t y . . .  I t  would seem the re fo re , th a t 
here the theory o f value is  incompatible w ith the 
actual process, incompatible w ith the real phenomena 
o f production, and th a t fo r  th is  reason any attempt 
to  understand these phenomena should be given up".
(1984; p. 153, my emph.)
The model o f exchange o f commodities a t th e ir  market values and 
the consequent existence of d iffe re n t rates of p r o f i t  among the 
various branches o f production ex is ts  in con trad ic tion  with 
re a li ty .  But Marx has constructed i t  to  be in con trad ic tion  
with re a l i ty .  I t  is th e o re tic a lly  's e t up1 by Marx in order 
tha t he can produce 'the  c lin c h e r ',  the methodological ' f a i t  
accompli' which renders re a li ty  comprehensible. Since market 
value and cap ita l as co-existents are in con trad ic tion  w ith 
themselves and in con trad iction  w ith re a l i ty ,  they must be 
th e o re tic a lly  suspended. Marx immediately goes on to  i l lu s t r a te  
what th is  suspension comprises and then goes on to  show the 
manner in which the theory o f value is  indeed compatible 'w ith  
the actual process':
" I t  fo llow s from the f i r s t  part o f th is  volume 
th a t the cost prices of products in d if fe re n t spheres 
o f production are equal i f  equal portions o f cap ita l 
have been advanced fo r  th e ir  production, however 
d if fe re n t the organic composition of such ca p ita ls .
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The d is tin c tio n  between variab le  and constant cap ita l 
escapes the c a p ita lis t  in the co s t-p rice . A commodity 
fo r  whose production he must advance 100 costs him 
ju s t  as much, whether he invests 90c + 10v, or 10c +
90v. I t  costs him 100 in e ith e r case - no more no less.
The cost-prices are the same fo r  equal cap ita ls  in 
d if fe re n t spheres, no matter how much the produced 
values and surplus values d i f fe r .  The equa lity  of 
cost-prices is  the basis fo r  competition among invested 
cap ita ls  whereby an average p r o f i t  is brought about".
( ib id )
The key to  the transform ation of values in to  prices o f production 
is thus to  be found in the nature o f c a p ita l, th a t is ,  th a t ca p ita l 
i t s e l f  is  advanced fo r  production, and where th is  d e fin ite  amount 
is treated as a 'value-breeding va lu e ', and which is  there fore  
considered to  be e n tit le d  to  ju s t as much p r o f i t  as th a t obtained 
by another other cap ita l o f the same size. This is  i t s  ' r i g h t ' ,  
since here i t  is  cap ita l i t s e l f  which creates p r o f i t  as a 'p ro pe rty ' 
o f i t s e l f ,  and s ig n if ic a n tly , equa lity  o f cos t-p rice , or 'e q u a lity  
o f c a p ita l' necessarily implies 'in e q u a lity  o f lab ou r'. Thus 
Marx says:
"In  Books I and I I  we dealt only w ith the value of 
commodities. On the one hand, the cost-p rice  has 
now been singled out as a part of th is  value, and, 
on the other, the price o f production o f commodities 
has been developed as its  converted form" , ( ib id ,  my emph.)
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As converted forms o f value ’ c o s t-p r ic e 1 and 'p r ice  of production' 
are the 'two ends', inputs and outputs, o f the process o f 
production which emerges from Marx's transform ation procedure.
What is s ig n if ic a n t fo r  us here is  th a t the f i r s t  'c o s t-p r ic e ' 
(equa lity  o f c a p ita l)  necessarily e n ta ils  the o the r, 'p r ic e  o f 
production' (in e q u a lity  o f labour).
The t i ire c t  lin k ' th a t existed between value and price in the 
th e o re tica l 'ra t io n a l' model, is  now mediated by the existence 
o f c a p ita l. The Tables in Chapter 9 o f Capital Vol. 3 -  the 
transformation procedure - represent the process o f the methodological 
ascent o f the conceptual synthesis from the more abstract .(theory 
o f labour-value) to  the more concrete (theory o f c a p ita l) .  At 
the outset o f the transform ation procedure the fundamental value- 
re la tio n  is  reta ined, only th is  time the economy is  not run by 
's im ple ' commodity producers but by c a p ita lis ts ,  i t  is  the 
tabu la tion  of the th e o re tica l condition o f the co-existence o f 
market value and c a p ita l. I t  is  therefore purely th e o re tic a l, 
as Rubin points out:
" I t  is  to  be understood th a t we do not deny th a t in 
a real c a p ita lis t  economy, d if fe re n t rates o f p r o f i t  
in d if fe re n t spheres can be observed constan tly .
They bring about a tendency toward the tra n s fe r of 
cap ita l and th is ,  in tu rn , removes the inequa lity  
in the rates of p r o f i t .  We also do not deny tha t
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in the period of undeveloped cap ita lism , ine qua litie s  
of p r o f i t  rates were very s ig n if ic a n t.
But we re je c t the theory which holds th a t ...these 
in e q u a lit ie s  of p r o f i t  rates were caused by the 
fa c t th a t commodities were sold according to  
labour value on one hand, and th a t competition 
among d if fe re n t spheres was-absent on the other 
hand. I f  we assume th a t competition among 
d if fe re n t spheres was absent, then i t  becomes 
unexplainable why commodities were sold according 
to  labour-values". (op. c i t .  p. 245)
Hence the transform ation procedure /describ ing as i t  does the 
methodological ascent from the abstract to  the more concrete, 
does not depict events which take place in the day-to-day re a l i ty  
of c a p ita lis t  production, or i t  does not yet depict these events 
as i t s  stands, nor is i t  the descrip tion o f a process o f h is to r ic a l 
evo lu tion , but is the process o f d ia le c tic a l synthesis which 
proceeds from the abstract determinations o f the subject to  i t s  
concrete existence as comprehended. I f  we describe th is  process 
as feeding the sub ject’ s own abstract determinations back-into 
i t ,  or ‘ re-assembling1 the subject, then we may envisage the 
'ra t io n a l' model o f equ ilib rium  awaiting the a rr iv a l or the 
addition o f 'c a p ita l ' .  Capital in  the f i r s t  Table of Marx's 
transformation is 'inse rted  in to ' the ra tion a l model o f equ ilib rium  
where socia l labour is d is tr ib u te d  evenly among the various branches 
of production due to  the exchange of products at th e ir  market values.
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But i t  is  impossible fo r  cap ita l to .d is tr ib u te  labour evenly, 
and Marx points to  the con trad ic to ry  character of Table 1 when 
he says th a t i t  c o n flic ts  w ith re a l i ty ,  and must c o n f l ic t  w ith 
re a l i ty .  Since at any given magnitude one cap ita l is  ju s t  as 
good as any other, the va ria tions  in the ra te  o f p r o f i t  among 
the various branches o f production (conceived not as a given 
'h is to r ic a l stage' but 'dynam ica lly ', i .e .  at any given time) 
spreads cap ita l everywhere in pu rsu it o f the highest ra te . 
D is trib u tio n  o f cap ita l takes precedence over d is tr ib u tio n  of 
labour since the motive fo r  tra n s fe r o f cap ita l is  to  be found 
in the ra te  o f p r o f i t  not in the labour-value o f the products 
o f labour. Thereby d is tr ib u tio n  o f socia l labour fo llow s in the 
wake of the d is tr ib u tio n  o f c a p ita l and c a p ita l, as we have seen, 
does not d is tr ib u te  labour in accordance w ith , or in response to , 
labour-value 's terms o f p ro p o rtio n a lity , but in accordance w ith  
i ts  own need to  secure the most favourable ra te  of p r o f i t  according 
to  i t s  s ize . Values are transformed in to  prices of production 
(Table 3 ), and prices of production represent a d if fe re n t centre 
of equ ilib rium  than labour-value. In a very real sense th is  
is what the transform ation procedure is  -  a transform ation from 
one the o re tica l mode of equ ilib rium , which explains and con tro ls  
the flu c tu a tio n s  of p rices, to  another th e o re tica l model o f 
equ ilib rium  where prices o f production now represent th a t leve l 
around which market prices flu c tu a te  and w ith which they would 
coincide i f  every cap ita l receive an average ra te  of p r o f i t  on 
cap ita l advanced. Rosdolsky remarks:
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" . . .  von Bortkiew icz's supporters overlook the fa c t 
th a t Marx's 1 prices of production1 are not re a lly  
'p r ic e s ' at a l l ,  but simply values modified by the 
in te rven tion  o f the average ra te o f p r o f i t " ,  (op. c i t .  p. 411)
I t  fo llows then th a t the onto log ica l nature o f value, as the
expression of a fa c t of socia l being, is  the nature o f the price
of production. And th a t the mode of existence of value, i . e .
where is  ex is ts  in i t s  e ffec ts  as the 'hidden regu la to r' which 
explains the devia tions, is  the id e n tica l mode o f existence o f 
the p rice  o f production* Again, and as is  the case w ith value 
i t s e l f ,  prices of production do not correspond to  the flu c tu a tin g  
market prices but explain them. I f  the quan tita tive  proportion 
in which things exchange are expressions o f the law o f p ro p o rtio n a lity  
o f socia l labour then, whereas in the o r ig in a l and 'ra t io n a l' 
model o f equ ilib rium  th is  condition represented d is tr ib u tio n  of 
labour, in the 'transformed' or 'more concrete' model the condition 
of equ ilib rium  is  in terms of the d is tr ib u tio n  o f c a p ita l. The 
d is tr ib u tio n  and a lloca tion  o f socia l labour is  dependent-upon - 
the tra n s fe r o f cap ita l to  those spheres where the ra te  of p r o f i t  
is  higher than the* average, and its  withdrawal from those where 
i t  is lower. In terms o f the transformation from one equ ilib rium  
condition to  another 'e q u a lity  o f c a p ita l' means 'in e q u a lity  o f 
labour'.
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"The e n tire  process o f c a p ita l is t  production is  ' 
regulated by the prices o f the products. But 
the regula ting prices of production are themselves 
in turn regulated by the equalisation o f the rate 
o f p r o f i t  and i ts  corresponding d is tr ib u tio n  of 
cap ita l among the various spheres o f socia l production. 
P ro f it ,  then, appears here as the main fa c to r, 
not o f the d is tr ib u tio n  o f products, but o f th e ir  
production i t s e l f , as a fa c to r in the d is tr ib u tio n  
o f cap ita ls  and labour i t s e l f  among the various 
spheres o f production". (Marx, 1984; p. 882)
And Marx says elsewhere th a t:
" . . .  in conditions o f c a p ita l is t  production, the 
commodity - in the long run, on the average - 
is  not brought to  the market i f  i t  does not 
y ie ld  the (p rice  o f production), which is  equal 
to  the value of the advances plus the average p r o f i t . . .  
because the p r o f i t  (and there fore  the p rice  o f 
production which includes i t ) ,  is  a condition o f 
the supply o f the commodity... I t  is  a matter of 
ind iffe rence to  the c a p ita lis t  whether h is commodity 
contains more or less unpaid labour than other 
commodities i f  in to  i t s  p rice  enters as much o f the 
general stock o f unpaid labour as every other equal 
quantity  o f cap ita l w i l l  draw from th a t common stock. 
P ro f it ,  a phenomenon o f d is tr ib u t io n , is  here 
simultaneously a phenomenon o f production, a 
condition of production, a necessary constituent 
part o f the process o f production". (1972; p. 83)
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Thus i f  we say th a t a general ra te  of p r o f i t  is  only possible 
i f  the ra te  o f p r o f i t  in one branch o f production is  too high 
and in another too low, then th is  re fers to  the dynamic to t a l i t y  
o f cap ita lism  at any given time and not to  any 'p r iu s ' condition 
where the rates o f p r o f i t  are d iffe re n t because commodities 
exchange at th e ir  market values. Capitalism cannot achieve 
equ ilib rium , and the d is p a rity  in rates o f p r o f i t  between branches 
o f production is  a permanent and ongoing feature of th is  socie ty.
But, most s ig n if ic a n t ly ,  p r o f i t  can only be discerned as 'too  
h igh1 or 'too  low' on the basis o f equa lity  of cap ita l or in 
re la tio n  to  another ca p ita l o f an equal s ize. As early  as the 
Contribution (1859) Marx>raises the question o f how:
" . . .  on the basis o f exchange value a market price 
d if fe r in g  from th is  exchange value comes in to  being, 
or ra th e r . . .  the law o f exchange value asserts i t s e l f  
only in i t s  a n tith e s is " .,  (op. c i t .  p. 62)
The 'law  o f exchange value' expresses equa lity  - the 'na tu ra l 
law o f equ ilib rium ' -  but in the c a p ita lis t  society the eq ua lity  
o f cap ita l takes precedence and causes the inequa lity  between 
value and p rice . Therefore the equa lity  o f cap ita l is  expressed 
in the inequa lity  of labour, or in the inequa lity  o f the exchange 
value o f the product o f labour. This inequa lity  o f value and 
price  is  a consequence of the fa c t th a t surplus value is re d is tr ib u te d , 
or transfe rred from one sphere of production to  another, and the 
only way th is  re d is tr ib u tio n  can take place is  by way of the 
prices th a t are paid fo r  the products o f labour, the commodities
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which emanate from the d if fe re n t branches o f production.
" I t  is  every b i t  as important, fo r  a correct understanding 
of surplus value, to  conceive i t  as a mere congelation 
o f surplus labour-tim e, as nothing but m ateria lised 
surplus labour, as i t  is ,  fo r  a proper comprehension o f
value, to  conceive i t  as a mere congelation o f so
many hours of labour, as nothing but m ateria lised 
labour". (Marx, 1983; p. 209)
I f  the to ta l surplus-value is  to  be re d is tr ib u te d , and not a lte red 
in the aggregate, then some o f these ‘m ateria lised labours ', 
some o f the products of labour, must be sold above th e ir  value 
and some sold below th e ir  value.. The inequa lity  o f value and 
price  is the essentia l and therefore necessary consequence o f
the equa lity  of cap ita ls  which claim a share in to ta l p r o f i t
according to  th e ir  magnitude. Marx describes the process as:
"The la rger p r o f i t  - a ris ing  from the real surplus labour 
w ith in  a branch of production, the re a lly  created surplus 
value - is  pushed down to  the average leve l by com petition, 
and the d e f ic i t  of surplus value in the other branch o f 
business is  raised up to  the average leve l by withdrawal 
of ca p ita l from i t ,  i .e .  a favourable re la tio n  o f supply 
and demand... This is  rea lised by means o f the re la tio n  
o f prices in the d iffe re n t branches o f business, which 
f a l l  below the value in some, r is e  above i t  in others.
This makes i t  seem as i f  an equal sum of cap ita l in 
unequal branches of business created equal surplus labour 
or surplus value". (1981a; p. 436)
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Capital is  transfe rred from branches of production w ith low 
rates o f p r o f i t  to  branches w ith higher ra tes. The in f lu x  o f • 
cap ita l to  a p a rtic u la r branch causes over-supply and a f a l l  in 
the prices o f commodities u n t i l  th is  p rice  fa l ls  below the leve l 
of the average ra te  o f p r o f i t .  As fo r  the other branches which 
cap ita l has tem porarily abandoned, commodities are sold at prices 
in excess o f th e ir  values because supply has fa lle n  below the 
social demand fo r  th a t sp e c ific  product. I t  is  obvious th a t 
the branch o f production in to  which ca p ita l i n i t i a l l y  flowed is  
now ripe  fo r  a withdrawal o f ca p ita l from i t ,  and the branch th a t 
was in i t i a l l y  neglected by cap ita l is  now ripe  fo r  an in f lu x  o f 
cap ita l to  i t ,  or they are subject to  the process o f what Marx 
ca lls  'the  incessant e q u ilib ra tio n  of constant d ive rgenc ies '. 
S im ila rly :
"Capital is  ju s t as much the constant pos iting  as 
the suspension o f proportionate production. The 
ex is ting  proportion always has to  be suspended by 
the creation o f surplus values and the increase o f 
productive fo rces", ( ib id ,  p. 414)
This means th a t equ ilib rium  can never be observed in r e a l i ty .
A ll the same, and as we saw in re la tio n  to  the 'ra t io n a l' model, 
without th is  th e o re tic a lly  conceived model o f equ ilib rium  the 
character and d ire c tio n  of the flu c tu a tio n s  o f p rice  cannot be 
explained. We repeat, the transform ation procedure is  e sse n tia lly  
the replacement of one model of equ ilib rium  (value) w ith another, 
more concrete, model (p rice  o f production).
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The laws o f the d is tr ib u tio n  of socia l labour have been a lte red 
in th is  transform ation in tha t the a lloca tion  of labour is not 
d ire c t ly  responsive to  changes in price in re la tio n  to  the 
value of the commodity, but to  changes in the rate o f p r o f i t  on 
cap ita l advanced. The tra n s fe r and d is tr ib u tio n  of cap ita l 
has the d is tr ib u tio n  o f socia l labour only as i ts  consequence, 
and there fore  the centre o f equilib rium  has altered. The 
g ra v ita tio n a l p u ll now comes from the price o f production, which 
is  the centre around which market prices flu c tu a te . I f  each 
c a p ita lis t  receives the p rice  o f production (cost-p rice  + average 
p r o f i t )  fo r  his to ta l product then we have the state of equ ilib rium  
of the c a p ita l is t  economy since the incentive fo r  cap ita ls  to  
tra n s fe r th e ir  cap ita ls  has been removed - each c a p ita lis t  
receives an average ra te  of p r o f i t  on cap ita l advanced in every 
sphere o f the socia l economy.
In the same way th a t the 'ra t io n a l' model o f equilib rium  underlay 
and enabled our comprehension o f the simple commodity economy, 
so the c a p ita lis t  model o f equ ilib rium , where each c a p ita lis t  
receives the prices o f production fo r  his product, underlies and 
enables our comprehension of the modus operandi o f the c a p ita lis t  
economy. The tra n s it io n  of 'transform ation ' is  then the 
methodological ascent from the simple to  the combined, and does 
not provide the descrip tion o f a process which takes place in 
re a li ty .
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Marx describes the construction of the model of equ ilib rium  and 
i t  methodological s ign ificance when he says:
" . . .  in so fa r  as we speak o f a necessary ra te o f 
p r o f i t ,  we precise ly want to  know the p r o f i t  ra te  
independently o f the movement of com petition, we 
want to  know the ra te which ac tua lly  governs 
com petition. The average ra te  o f p r o f i t  appears 
when the forces o f the competing cap ita ls  balance 
one another.
Competition can produce th is  balance, but not 
the ra te  o f p r o f i t  which appears when the balance 
is  given". (1981d; p. 1005)
The transform ation procedure allows us to  comprehend th is  ra te  
o f p r o f i t  'which appears when the balance is  given' (e q u ilib r iu m ), 
and which 'a c tu a lly  governs com petition' i .e .  explains the centre 
or the d ire c tio n  o f th is  'incessant e q u ilib ra tio n  o f constant 
divergences'. The average ra te o f p r o f i t  is  determined by the 
re la tion sh ip  o f to ta l surplus value to  to ta l socia l c a p ita l, or 
in the wake o f the transform ation, between to ta l p r o f i t  and to ta l 
cos t-p rice . I t  is  the re s u lt o f th is  re la tion sh ip  which w i l l  
regulate the average ra te o f p r o f i t  and there fore  the p rice  o f 
production. The to ta l value o f commodities and the unpaid labour 
they contain therefore regulates the p rice  o f production - the 
centre around which market prices flu c tu a te :
" I t  is  in general in the form of market p rice , and, 
furthermore, in the form o f the regula ting market p rice ,
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or market price o f production, th a t the nature , 
of the value o f commodities asserts i t s e l f ,  i ts  
determination not by the labour-time necessary 
in the case o f any ind iv idua l producer fo r  the 
production of a certa in  quantity  o f commodities,
or of some ind iv idua l commodity, but by the
s o c ia lly  necessary labour-tim e; th a t is ,  by the 
labour-time required fo r  the production o f the 
so c ia lly  necessary to ta l quantity  o f commodity 
va rie tie s  on the market under the e x is tin g  average 
conditions o f socia l production1',  (op. c i t . )
Here s o c ia lly  necessary labour-time has i ts  determination at 
the level o f socia l need, and when a given leve l o f development 
o f the productive forces is  presupposed; i t  is  what Rosdolsky 
terms 'the  moment o f supply and demand'. And when Marx says
th a t in the determination of equ ilib rium , or in the determ ination 
of the regula ting price  o f production, 'the  nature o f the value 
of commodities asserts i t s e l f ' , ,  then he means th a t i t s  socia l 
nature is  asserted, th a t is , the need fo r  value to  re a lise  i t s e l f ,
to  be confirmed as socia l labour only in the process o f exchange.
I t  also means th a t i f  too much o f soc ie ty 's  labour is  expended 
in one d ire c tion  then the value created may not be rea lised as 
a value, i .e .  i t s  socia l nature demands th a t i t  must create 
use-value, use-values fo r  others, socia l use-values. Like 
language, value is 'burdened w ith m atter' or is  'bounded' by 
consumption, and therefore i t  is  only the 's o c ia l' nature o f 
value which can permit the deviation o f p rice  from i t  in the 
f i r s t  place. -
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Price of production expresses the ra te of p r o f i t  'which a c tu a lly  
governs com petition' because each price  o f production is  only 
an a liq u o t segment o f the reproduced to ta l cost-p rice  and the 
newly produced to ta l p r o f i t ,  th a t is , a segment of the to ta l 
value of commodities, so th a t the aggregate of the prices o f 
production equals the to ta l value.
This is  the equ ilib rium  cond ition :
"Since the to ta l value o f the commodities regulates 
the to ta l surplus value, and th is  in turn regulates 
the leve l o f average p r o f i t  and thereby the general 
ra te  of p r o f i t  -  as a general law or a law governing 
flu c tu a tio n s  - i t  fo llow s th a t the law o f value 
regulates the prices o f production". (Marx, 1984; p. 180)
I f  no natura l laws can be done away w ith , but can only change the 
form in which they appear, then the price o f production is  the form 
of socia l regula tion o f the economy as i t  appears in c a p ita l is t  
socie ty. I ts  comprehension, is  the aim o f the 'transfo rm ation ' 
which, as i t  ex is ts  in the Tables o f Chapter 9 of Capital V o l.3, 
describes a methodological ascent from the abstract to  the more 
concrete and not a process which takes place in r e a li ty .  I t  
is  'the  product of a th ink ing  head which appropriates the world 
in the only way i t  can '. The suggestion to  the contrary, th a t 
Marx's transform ation procedure is  indeed the attempt to  describe 
the transform ation o f values in to  prices o f production in r e a l i t y ,  
and to  the extent th a t i t  does attempt to  describe a real process 
i t  is  'erroneous* or 'in te rn a lly  in co n s is te n t', is  a charge we 
shall take up in the f in a l section.
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One of the benefits o f the formation o f the 'h is to r ic a l transfo rm ation1 
argument is  th a t i t  allows us to  d ire c t our a tten tion  to  the embryonic 
period o f cap ita lism  where rates of p r o f i t  d iffe re d  between the 
branches o f production due to  the d iffe re n t organic compositions 
of the cap ita ls  w ith in  them. I t  is  th is  s itu a tio n  which is 
described in Tables 1 and 2 o f Marx's transform ation procedure, 
and which therefore inaugurates th is  procedure. We know th a t 
th is  is  not the descrip tion o f any real socie ty, but is th e o re tic a lly  
constructed.. Nevertheless here, th is  makes l i t t l e  d iffe rence .
Whether conceived o f as- 'r e a l ' o r as 'id e a l' i t  is  s t i l l  value 
magnitudes which form the po in t o f departure,. Hence Fine describes 
the 'problem' in Marx's transform ation as:
"In  general i t  has been taken fo r  granted tha t 
there ex is ts  a set o f commodities each w ith a 
corresponding value, and the 'problem1 concerns 
how these values become expressed as prices of 
production". (1986; p. 116)
Now i t  is  obvious, as we have shown, th a t values are indeterminate 
in the absence of p rice , so th a t what is re a lly  meant is  th a t 
there ex is ts  a set o f commodities each with a price which corresponds 
to  i ts  value at the inception o f the transform ation procedure.
But th is  makes l i t t l e  d iffe rence to  the perceived 'problem '. Inputs 
may be in terms of prices, but they are not in terms o f 'p rices
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of production1. Thus:
"In  Table 1, fo r  example, the cost price  o f each 
o f the f iv e  commodities is  calculated as the sum 
o f the values o f the commodities (constant and 
variab le  c a p ita l)  used to  produce the commodity.
But these products themselves w i l l  s e ll at th e ir  
prices o f production, which w i l l  ( in  a l l  except 
te ry  special cases) d i f fe r  from th e ir  labour 
values. Marx's '-cost-prices' are thus not prices 
at a l l ,  and i t  fo llow s th a t the prices of 
production th a t he calculates are in c o r re c t . . . .  Marx 
saw the d i f f ic u l t y  but offered no means of 
overcoming i t " .  (Howard & King, op. c i t .p .  45)
And fo r  Steedman:
"A 'th e o re tic a l system' in which a given commodity 
has d if fe re n t prices according to  whether i t  is  
being sold or being purchased ju s t does not 
correspond to  any real c a p ita l is t  economy. I f  
we do not transform input prices then we commit 
the absurd ity o f assuming th a t the price  paid fo r  
a commodity by the immediate purchaser can d if fe r  
from the price  received by the immediate s e lle r .
That input prices must be transformed in any sensible 
so lu tion  is c lea r. No less c lear is the fa c t th a t 
Marx was p e rfe c tly  well aware of th is ,  even though 
he fa ile d  to  take account o f i t  in the solutions 
he le f t " ,  (op. c i t .  p. 31)
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That Marx le f t  'so lu tio n s ' merely begs the question,-and Steedman 
has a development of th is  'problem' when he says th a t:
"Marx's argument then is  in te rn a lly  inconsis ten t.
He assumes th a t s/(c+v) is  the ra te of p r o f i t  but 
then derives the re su lt th a t prices diverge from 
values which means prec ise ly , in general, tha t 
s/(c+v) is  not the ra te o f p r o f i t " ,  ( ib id )
I f  s/(c+v) is  the ra te o f p r o f i t  then i t  is  the general average 
ra te o f p r o f i t  which permits the divergence o f p rice  from value 
in the ind iv idua l case, but which remains id e n tica l w ith prices 
in the aggregate - the to ta l prices do not diverge from to ta l 
values. I f ,  on the other hand Steedman means th a t in the 
c a p ita lis t  society i t s e l f  the to ta l prices o f production would 
not equal the to ta l amount o f c+v+s* then th is  is  simply a 
restatement o f the fa c t th a t Marx did not transform inputs, th a t 
s/(c+v) cannot be the ra te o f p r o f i t .  Fine and Harris express 
the 'problem' in the fo llow ing terms:
"Examining the sphere of production C P ....C ' in
abstraction , values and surplus value are, fo r  Marx, 
the appropriate concepts. But as cap ita l moves out 
o f th a t sphere in to  the sphere of exchange (C'-M '-C) 
w ith which i t  is  integrated together w ith the d is tr ib u tio n  
sphere, values (c+v+s) are transformed in to  prices of 
production. In a l l  th is ,  however, ca p ita l advanced 
is treated as untransformed values; C and V are in 
terms of values ra ther than prices o f production. I t  
is  th is  which is inadequate. For i t  implies th a t
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ca p ita l assumes the price re la tio n  as i t  comes out of 
the sphere o f production, th a t i t  enters the sphere 
o f production as unmodified values, and th a t i t  does 
so by magic. For no consideration is  given to  the 
question o f how the prices o f production are transformed 
back in to  values as cap ita l re-enters the sphere of 
production from exchange. As Marx recognised but did 
not work o u t . . .  we should not attempt to  consider the 
transform ation of prices of production back in to  
values at the end o f C '-M '-C ". (1979; p. 24)
But i f  the values which inaugurate, or are the inputs to , the 
transformation procedure are the outcome of unequal rates o f 
p r o f i t ,  i .e .  i f  they emerge from the period o f 'c a p ita l is t  market- 
value' -  and to  which Table 1 corresponds - then how can they 
be inputed in terms of 'p rices o f production1? That is  to  say, 
i f  Marx assumes the absence of competition between the d if fe re n t 
spheres o f production a t the outset o f the transform ation, then 
inputs cannot be in terms o f prices of production. And what has 
become o f F ine's 'h is to r ic a l tra n s fo rm a tio n '; when does th a t 
h is to r ic a l moment a rrive  when cap ita l advanced begins to  reckon 
i ts  p r o f i t  in terms o f prices of production, or in accordance 
w ith i t s  magnitude, ra ther than in terms of labour-value?
Fine and Harris must be re fe rr in g  to  Table 3, where inputs are 
in.terms o f labour-value and outputs are in terms o f prices o f 
production. Therefore to  ground th is  ob jection , cap ita lism  must 
be presupposed, in which case there is no 'tra ns fo rm a tio n ', ne ithe r 
h is to r ic a l nor methodological. Only i f  the transform ation of
248
embodied labour-values in to  prices o f production w ith in  the 
c a p ita lis t  society i t s e l f  can the above objections and the 
ensuing 'problem' have any meaning. Marx is  then perceived 
as attempting to  i l lu s t ra te  how value regulates the socia l process 
of production upon an i l l ig i t im a te  and i l lo g ic a l foundation.
Upon th is  basis these objections go back a long way, as Seton 
(1957) points out:
"The arithm etic  i l lu s t ra t io n  o f the transform ation 
process which Marx gave in  Volume 3 of Capital has 
been the subject o f a long drawn-out controversy.
Bohm-Bawerk, one o f the f i r s t  to  c a ll a tten tion  to  
the obvious inadequacies o f the exercise, was 
generally taken to  imply th a t the transformation 
of 'values' in to  prices as conceived by Marx was 
a log ica l im p o s s ib ility . Since then a number o f 
authors have come to  the defence o f Marx with 
attempts to  demonstrate the in te rna l consistency 
and determinacy o f his conception by means of 
an algebraic treatment o f the problem". (H & K,
1976; p. 162)
I t  is  not only a 'lo g ic a l im p o s s ib ility ' but also an h is to r ic a l 
im p o ss ib ility  i f  we re je c t th a t inputs must be in terms of 
values. In any event, Seton proceeds to  provide his own a lgebraic 
treatment, a practice which Brewer deems necessary:
"There is  now general agreement on the correct formal 
so lu tion  to the 'transform ation problem', and on the 
determinants of the prices o f production. The f i r s t  
correct so lu tion  was by L. Bortkiewicz in 1907, and
249
the theory has been re fined by subsequent w r ite rs . . .  
many of whom make substantia l use of mathematics, and
so they should, since the qu an tita tive  aspects o f
values and prices are esse n tia lly  mathematical.
Marx's approach might be defended on the grounds
th a t i t ,  a t leas t, is  comprehensible to  non-mathematicians".
(op. c i t .  p. 206)
Brewer too describes Marx's a tt itu d e  to  the 'transform ation 
problem' when he says:
"A major d i f f ic u l t y  w ith Marx's analysis, which Marx 
touches on tw ice but dismisses c a s u a lly ... he seems 
to  have regarded the problem as a d e ta il tha t could 
be cleared up la te r " ,  ( ib id ,  p. 138)
This a tt itu d e , th a t Marx 'saw the d i f f ic u l t y  but offered no 
means of overcoming i t 1, or th a t 'he fa ile d  to  take account of 
i t  in the solutions he l e f t ' ,  or indeed th a t he was myopic 
enough to  dismiss i t  as an in s ig n ific a n t d e ta il,  is  obviously 
one which is predicated upon the assumption tha t Marx bequeathed 
a 'problem' in the f i r s t  place.
This descrip tion o f Marx's a tt itu d e  is  usually an essentia l 
supplement to  the treatment o f the 'transform ation problem' i t s e l f ,  
and tha t Marx was capable o f recognising the 'problem' is  simply 
to  damn w ith fa in t  praise. However i f  th is  a ttitu d e  to  Marx 
is a consequence of the in i t ia l  perception o f a 'problem' then,
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as we have suggested, th is  perception i t s e l f  is  founded on the 
fa c t th a t the transformation procedure i t s e l f  is  considered 
as an attempt by Marx to  describe an ongoing process o f the 
transformation o f embodied labour-values in to  prices of production 
w ith in  the c a p ita lis t  process o f production i t s e l f .  I t  is  only 
in th is  context th a t i t  makes any sense to  demand th a t inputs
themselves be 'transformed1. But then prices o f production
would not be comprehended, th e ir  process o f coming-to-be, which 
is  described in the transform ation procedure, would simply not 
e x is t. Marx says:
"The re a lly  d i f f i c u l t  question is  th is :  how is  th is
equalisation o f p ro f its  in to  a general ra te  of
p r o f i t  brought about, since i t  is  obviously a re s u lt
ra ther than a po in t o f departure"? (1984; p. 174, my emph.)
In Marx's transformation procedure 'va lue ' needs must be the 
po int o f departure since, i f  prices o f production are used as
the s ta r tin g -p o in t, they would have 'come about' before they had
come about, and the transformation procedure would comprise one 
immense tauto logy. Nothing would have been transformed nor 
comprehended.
"Science consists precise ly in demonstrating how the 
law o f value operates. So tha t i f  one wanted at the
very beginning to  'e xp la in ' a ll  the phenomena which
apparently con trad ic t tha t law, we would have to  present 
the science before the science". (Marx, op. c i t . )
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When Marx says th a t the general ra te  o f p r o f i t ,  and therefore 
i ts  expression in the prices o f production, is  a re su lt and 
not a po in t o f departure, then th is  echoes other s im ila r 
methodological jux tapos itions . For Marx th is  diference is 
'the re a lly  d i f f i c u l t  question ', i .e .  the one tha t is  to  be 
addressed. So, s im ila r ly :
"The whole d i f f ic u l t y  arises from the fa c t tha t 
commodities are not exchanged simply as commodities 
but as products of c a p ita ls " ,  (op. c i t . )
Again the question th a t is  to  be addressed is  posed in the form 
of a po in t o f departure and a re s u lt,  and the solu tion to  the 
'd i f f i c u l t y '  w i l l  comprise o f showing how the point o f departure 
'becomes' or is  'transformed' in to  the re s u lt. Table 1 o f the 
transformation procedure 'represents' simply 'commodities' and 
Table 3 the 'c a p ita l is t ic a l ly  produced commodity'. I t  is  a move 
from market value, or the 'ra t io n a l' model o f equ ilib rium , to  
prices o f production as a spe c ific  m odification of th is  model.
As we have see, Table 1 is  inherently  con trad ic tory , and the 
con trad ic tion  ex is ts  in the fa c t tha t these market values are 
not in fa c t products o f labour ('com m odities '), but products o f 
cap ita l ( 'c a p ita l is t ic a l ly  produced'). We thus have the co­
existence o f tha t which posits equa lity  in exchange transactions 
w ith th a t which, by i ts  very nature, posits inequa lity  in 
exchange transactions.
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"But i t  is impossible to  res t in th is  con trad ic tion , 
fo r  i t  means th a t opposite categories are applicable 
to  the same th ing at the same time. I t  means tha t 
i f  we a ffirm  th a t anything ' i s '  we must at the same 
time admit th a t i t  ' is  n o t '.  How can a th ing  both
be and not be? The answer is tha t i t  both is  and 
is  not when i t  becomes. The category o f becoming 
therefore resolves the c o n tra d ic tio n ... Reason 
cannot res t in what is  s e lf  con trad ic to ry , and is  
the re fo re  forced onwards to  the synthesis". (Stace, 
op. c i t .  p. 93)
And, as we indicated e a r lie r ,  i t  is  Marx him self and the method 
he employs th a t ensures th a t we cannot re s t. Table 1 represents 
an a r t i f ic a l ly  created con trad ic tion  - a con trad ic tion  th a t is 
constructed by reason - which means th a t i t  is  constructed on 
the basis th a t i ts  'denouement' already ex is ts  in r e a l i ty ,  which 
is only to  re ite ra te  th a t the existence o f the general ra te o f 
p r o f i t  and the ensuing prices o f production form the re a lly  
ex is tin g  po int o f departure, ' i t  is  the po in t o f departure in 
re a lity  and hence also the po int o f departure fo r  observation 
and conception '. Table 1 is only constructed because i t  is  
f e r t i le  w ith 'becoming' something else, i t  points beyond i t s e l f ,  
and thereby the method impels us forward by ra tio n a l necessity.
What resolves the con trad iction  is  the perpetuation o f equa lity  
in the form o f inequa lity  - or o f id e n tity  _i_n d iffe rence - the 
id e n tity  o f cap ita l as a 'value-breeding-value' is  maintained 
in the d iffe rence between value and p rice . And the d iffe rence 
between 'va lue ' inputs in Table 3 and 'p r ice  o f production' outputs 
can be stated as the d iffe rence between 'va lue ' and 'value as
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c a p ita l ',  and where in place of simple s e lf - id e n t ity  (inputs) 
we have d iffe rence  and mediation (outpu ts). In the passage 
from the one to  the other Marx shows th a t the average ra te  of 
p r o f i t  is  determined by the re la tio n  o f to ta l surplus value to  
to ta l socia l c a p ita l, and he sta tes:
"An average p r o f i t  cannot be anything but the p r o f i t  
on the average socia l c a p ita l, whose sum is  equal to  
the sum o f surplus value. Moreover, the prices 
obtained by adding th is  average p r o f i t  to  the cost- 
prices cannot be anything but the values transmuted 
in to  prices o f production". (1984; p. 174)
I f  the prices of production are transmuted forms o f value they 
therefore represent also a transmuted form o f socia l eq u ilib rium . 
This is  what Marx seeks to  show in the transform ation procedure, 
namely th a t the values o f commodities and the surplus value they 
contain - and which finds expression as the average p r o f i t  - 
continue to  regulate the prices o f the products. But the 
presentation o f the prices of production, as not being 'p r ic e s ' 
at a l l ,  but simply modified values is ,  as we have seen above, 
subject to  the objection tha t they should not be so presented, 
but ra ther as 'm odified ' cost-prices or previous prices o f 
production. I t  is  c lea r tha t Marx's transform ation procedure 
is  not to  be considered by those who voice th is  objection as 
a methodological process o f comprehension, and th a t value as the 
regu la tor o f production is  in danger o f being completely displaced. 
And because Marx's procedure is  not seen as a process of the
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comprehension o f the equ ilib rium  o f the c a p ita lis t  economy, 
i.e .  how i t  functions as e sse n tia lly  a system o f socia l production, 
th is  displacement is  exactly what takes place. Consequently 
prices o f production are no longer considered as transmuted 
forms o f value but as ‘ p rice s1. Having ‘ the science before 
the science' means no longer having any science at a l l ,  and the 
argument emerges th a t the value-concept is  'redundant' since 'p rices  
of production' can be derived 'd ir e c t ly ' from physical production 
data and knowledge of the real wage. But we must be c lea r th a t 
'values' treated as inputs to  the process o f socia l production 
are a th e o re tica l abstraction . This function of value is  a 
requirement o f the the o re tica l method and therefore takes place 
only once, th a t is ,  only in the th e o re tica l process o f comprehending 
re a lity  is  i t  leg itim ate  to  'in p u t ' value magnitudes. 'P rice-, 
o f production' inputs to  other 'p r ic e  o f production' outputs is  
not a 'transfo rm ation ' at a l l ,  but merely the application o f the 
transform ation procedure to  the everyday function ing o f c a p ita l is t  
society i t s e l f .  But the transformation procedure i t s e l f ,  as^ a 
process o f comprehension, is  to  be kept d is t in c t  from i t s  app lica tion  
to  the more concrete re la tio n s , where the elements th a t make up 
cost-p rice  are themselves 'p rices o f p roduction '. The charge 
tha t Marx intended the former procedure to  f u l f i l  the la t te r  is  
completely groundless. I t  would indeed be strange i f  Marx 
attempted the app lica tion  of his methodological conclusion before 
he had formulated i t .  A ll of those versions of the transform ation 
which append the reminder tha t Marx foresaw the d i f f ic u l t y  but 
offered no means o f overcoming i t ,  or words to  tha t e ffe c t, are
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to ta l ly  wrong in th e ir  conv ic tion . Marx did not intend the 
transformation procedure to  apply to  the day-to-day working of 
cap ita lism , but intended its  conclusion to  be applied to  those 
day-to-day workings, i .e .  as the f r u i t  o f th is  comprehension. 
And in fa c t Marx does make the 'adjustment1, notwithstanding 
the widespread fa lla c y  th a t he does not.
This la s t conviction is  in va ria b ly  grounded in the fo llow ing  
statement by Marx:
"We had o r ig in a lly  assumed th a t the cost-p rice  o f a 
commodity equalled the value o f the commodities 
consumed in i ts  production. But fo r  the buyer the 
prices o f production o f a spe c ific  commodity is  
i t s  cos t-p rice , and may thus pass as co s t-p rice . 
in to  the prices o f other commodities. Since the 
price  o f production may d i f fe r  from the value o f 
a commodity, i t  fo llow s th a t the cost-p rice  o f a 
commodity containing th is  p rice  o f production of 
another commodity may also stand above or below 
th a t portion of i t s  to ta l value derived from the 
value o f the means o f production consumed by i t .
I t  is  necessary to  remember th is  modified s ign ificance  
of the cost-p rice  and to  bear in mind th a t there is 
always the p o s s ib il ity  o f an e rro r i f  the cost-p rice  
o f a commodity is  id e n tif ie d  w ith the value o f the 
means o f production consumed by i t .  Our present 
analysis does not necessitate a closer examination 
o f th is  p o in t", ( ib id , p. 165)
256
I t  is  Marx's reference to  the 'p o s s ib i l i ty  o f an e rro r ' in 
th is  connection which is  treated as his admission th a t the 
transform ation problem is  somehow 'incomplete' and serves to  
le g itim ise  the claim tha t there is  a 'problem '. Indeed th a t 
there is  a 'transform ation problem' is treated as undeniable, 
because 'se lf-con fessed '.
But what kind o f an 'e r ro r ' could Marx possibly be re fe rr in g  to?
I f  we assume th a t Marx should have provided an explanation in 
terms o f prices o f production as 'in p u ts ' then these prices of 
production themselves, th e ir  substance, could only have been 
given in the f i r s t  place on the basis o f Marx's investiga tion  
as to  why prices deviate from values. That is  to  say, i f  prices 
of production are a 'de v ia tio n ' then they are a re s u lt and cannot 
be a po in t of departure. Or, the price  o f production can only 
be the po in t o f departure fo r  the very reason th a t i t  has 
previously been a comprehended re s u lt.
There is  simply no po int in i ts  app lica tion  before th is .  I t  must 
f i r s t  emerge from value as a form of value i t s e l f  before i t  
can then presuppose i t s e l f  w ith in  the continuous process o f 
c a p ita l is t  production. To assume th a t Marx is  re fe rr in g  to  some 
kind o f a 'q u a n tita tiv e ' e rro r is  to  have previously assumed th a t 
the transform ation procedure is  the attempt to  describe a func tion  
of the day-to-day a c t iv ity  o f c a p ita l is t  society i t s e l f ,  i . e .  to  
be e n tire ly  b lind  to  Marx's methodological procedure.
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I f  we say th a t ’ values as inpu ts ’ is  a th e o re tica l abstraction , 
is only leg itim ate  as a methodological device, then the 'e r ro r ' 
Marx warns against would consist in attempting to  hold th is  
methodological practice 'constant' in re la tio n  to  day-to-day 
r e a li ty .
I t  would consist in the app lica tion  o f 'va lue ' to  re a li ty  a fte r 
i t s  methodological app lication to  re a li ty .  We have seen the 
absurdity o f H ilfe rd in g 's  attempt to  hold fa s t to  value magnitudes 
as a constant 'th ir d  pa rty ' ex is ten t in the c a p ita lis t  society 
i t s e l f ,  in his endeavour to  sum these magnitudes and reckon th e ir  
'd e v ia tio n ' from the prices of production. By re ta in ing  value 
magnitudes H ilfe rd ing  both commits the 'e r ro r ' Marx warn against 
and shows th a t the 'h is to r ic a l ' version of transform ation has 
not understood the methodological de riva tion  o f the prices o f 
production. For example fo r  Mandel:
" . . .  the whole transformation problem concerns the 
transformation of values and of values only (measurable 
in g o ld )". (1984; p. 159)
And a new lig h t  is  shed on Fine's proposition th a t p r io r  to  
transform ation there exists a set of extant commodity values, 
and the 'problem' consists in how these become expressed as 
prices o f production. S im ila rly  his complaint th a t Marx gave
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no consideration to  the question as to  how prices o f production 
are transformed back in to  values as cap ita l re-enters the sphere 
of production, shows th a t he conceives o f value in completely 
the wrong way. The transform ation procedure is e sse n tia lly  
tha t o f the 'v a lu e - re la t io n ', in to  th a t o f the 'prices o f 
p rodu c tio n -re la tio n 1, and does not re fe r to  a given 's e t ' or
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'bundle' o f values. The quan tita tive  proportions th a t Marx 
works w ith are only s ig n if ic a n t inasmuch as they i l lu s t ra te  
tha t the average ra te  o f p r o f i t  is  formed out o f the to ta l surplus 
value and th a t th is  la t te r  magnitude determines-the rate o f p r o f i t  
and there fore  the equ ilib rium  price  o f production, i .e .  those 
prices at which the c a p ita lis t  must s e ll i f  he is  to  re a lise  an 
average ra te  o f p r o f i t  on his advanced c a p ita l.: Those who commit
the 'e r ro r ' o f seeking in some way to  re ta in  value as an input 
want to  transform the newly emerged model o f equilib rium  back 
in to  the 'ra t io n a l' one. While those who seek to  have prices 
of production 'be fo re ' prices o f production, want to  discard the 
'ra t io n a l' model e n t ire ly ,  and w ith i t  Marx's theory of value.
But i f  the ra tio na l model is  discarded, or is  simply ignored, 
then, apart from the complete misrepresentation o f Marx's 
transform ation, the immediate 'adjustment' o f the ex is ting  Tables 
to f i t  cap ita lism  i t s e l f  is  compulsory. I t  then simply becomes 
a question of v a r ia tio n , from forms of m atrix algebra to  the use 
of lin e a r programming which has been developed from cybernetics 
(Morishima 1973) in the attempt to  'rescue' Marx's procedure. Of
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course th is  'compulsory adjustment1 is sanctioned by Marx's 
seeming neglect to  do ju s t th is  and by deeming tha t in his 
analysis i t  was treated as requ iring  no fu r th e r examination.
But as we have said, the 'e r ro r ' tha t Marx 'postponed' re la ted 
to  the question of attempting to  use the methodological procedure 
w ithout attempting to  adjust the inputs to  the everyday re a li ty  
of prices o f production, o f deviations from value. But i f  the 
whole po int o f the transform ation is to  show how the average 
ra te o f p r o f i t  is  formed and regulated by the to ta l value o f 
commodities and the surplus values they re a lis e , then Marx makes 
the 'adjustment' h im self. He says:
the sum o f the prices o f production o f a l l  
commodities produced in society -  the to ta l i t y  o f a l l  
branches o f production - is  equal to  the sum o f th e ir  
values. This statement seems to  c o n f lic t  w ith the 
fa c t th a t under c a p ita lis t  production the elements 
o f productive cap ita l are, as a ru le , bought on the 
market, and tha t fo r  th is  reason th e ir  prices include 
p r o f i t  which has already been re a lise d , hence include 
the price  of production of the respective branch of 
industry together w ith the p ro f i t  contained in i t ,  
so th a t the p r o f i t  o f one branch o f industry goes 
in to  the cost-p rice  o f another. But i f  we place 
the sum o f the cost-prices o f the commodities o f 
an e n tire  country on one side, and the sum of the 
surplus values, or p ro f its  on the other, the ca lcu la tion  
must ev idently  be r ig h t . . .  since the p ro f its  o f one 
sphere o f production pass in to  the cost-p rice  of 
another, they are therefore included in the ca lcu la tion  
as constituents o f the to ta l price o f the end product, 
and so cannot appear a second time on the p r o f i t  s ide ".
(1984; p. 160, my emph.)
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When Marx says th a t i f  we place the sum of the cost-prices on 
one side and the sum of the surplus value or p ro f its  on the 
other, 'the  ca lcu la tion  must be r ig h t1, he means th a t at any 
given tim e, or in any given productive cycle, the determination 
o f the average ra te  o f p r o f i t  continues to  e x is t in the d iffe rence 
between to ta l cos t-p rice  and to ta l p r o f i t .  The deviations of 
the prices o f production from the values of the elements o f the 
cost-p rice  fo r  th is  productive cycle have already been taken account 
o f by the fa c t th a t they have been realised precise ly in order 
to  inaugurate th is  cycle o f production., and cannot be rea lised again. 
This is what Marx means to  ind ica te  when he says tha t the p ro f its  
from one sphere 'pass in to 1 the cost-p rice  o f another, i .e .  are 
rea lised already in th a t c o s t-p rice , and cannot enter the  p r o f i t  
side tw ice . And th is  is  also why he goes on to  say:
" . . .  no matter how much the cost-p rice  o f a commodity
may d i f fe r  from the value o f the means o f production
consumed by i t ,  th is  past mistake is  immaterial to
the c a p ita l is t . The cost-p rice  o f a p a rtic u la r
commodity is  a d e fin ite  condition which is given,
and independent o f the production of our c a p ita lis t ,
while the re s u lt o f his production is  a commodity
containing surplus value, and therefore an excess of
value over and above i ts  c o s t-p ric e v .. the statement
th a t the cost-p rice  is  smaller than the value has
now changed p ra c tic a lly  in to  the statement tha t
the cost-p rice  is smaller than the p rice  o f production. . .
the fundamental fa c t always remains th a t in the case
of the to ta l socia l cap ita l the cost-p rice  o f the commodities
produced by i t  is  smaller than th e ir  value, or in the
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case of the to ta l mass of socia l commodities, 
smaller than th e ir  price  of production, which 
is  ide n tica l w ith th e ir  value. The cost-p rice  
o f a commodity re fers only to  the quantity  o f
paid labour contained in i t , while i t s  value re fers
to  a l l  the paid and unpaid labour contained in i t " .
( ib id ,  p. 165, my emph.)
I t  is  the d is t in c tio n  between paid and unpaid labour which is  
c ru c ia l, since i t  is  th is  d iffe rence which continues to  regulate 
the average ra te  o f p r o f i t  and the prices o f production both before
and a fte r  the 'adjustment1 of the methodological conclusion to
the day-to-day re a li ty  o f c a p ita lis t  production,. I f  both 'ends' 
of the problem, inputs and outputs, are in terms o f 'o ld ' and 
'new' prices of production, then these 'o ld 1 prices are already 
a rea lised magnitude. They are a given magnitude upon which 
a new magnitude is  created. And i t  is  th is  d iffe rence between 
to ta l cost-p rice  and to ta l p r o f i t  which therefore regulates the 
average ra te of p r o f i t  and the equ ilib rium  of the c a p ita lis t  
economy. But i t  was only the presence of the va lue -re la tion  
in i ts  'ra t io n a l' expression, and which formed the po in t o f departure, 
which allowed us to  comprehend the essentia l nature o f the p rice  
of production as_ the expression o f socia l equ ilib rium . Marx 
says o f the re la tio n  between what happens in fa c t ,  in the more, 
concrete re la tio n , and in the the o re tica l model o f equ ilib rium :
262
"In  actual fact'demand and supply never coincide,, 
o r, i f  they do so i t  is  only by chance and not 
to  be taken account o f fo r  s c ie n t if ic  purposes; 
i t  should be considered as not having happened.
Why then does p o lit ic a l economy assume th a t they x — 
do coincide? In order to  tre a t the phenomena 
i t  deals w ith in th e ir  la w -like  form, the form 
^ th a t corresponds to  th e ir  concept, i .e .  to  
consider them independently o f the appearance 
produced by the movement o f demand and supply.
And, in add ition , in order to  discover the real 
tendency o f th e ir  movement and to  define i t . .
For the disproportions are contrary in character 
and, since they constantly fo llo w  one another, 
they balance each other out in th e ir  movement in 
contrary d ire c tio n s , th e ir  co n tra d ic tio n ... and 
the re s u lt o f a divergence in one d ire c tio n  is to  
c a ll fo r th  a divergence in the opposite d ire c tion  - 
supply and demand always coincide i f  a greater or 
lesser period o f time is  taken as a whole; but 
they coincide only as the average of the movement 
th a t has taken place and through the constant 
movement o f th e ir  co n trad ic tio n ". (1981d; p. 291)
I t  is  in order to  discover ‘ the real tendency of th e ir  movement1 
th a t the prices o f production are derived out o f value, and are 
only then ‘ adjusted1 to  the ongoing s itu a tio n  where they presuppose 
themselves. And i t  is  the demand th a t th is  purely secondary 
operation shoudl displace the methodological deriva tion  o f the 
prices o f production which shows the complete absence of what 
Marx means by a 's c ie n t i f ic a l ly  co rrec t' method and the manner 
of i t s  application to  re a li ty .  Paradoxically then, the
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'methodological so lu tion  to  the transform ation problem' discloses 
th a t there is no 'problem' at a l l ,  unless i t  re fers  to  th a t 
methodological a tt itu d e  which in s is ts  th a t there is  and th a t Marx 
him self was fu l ly  aware o f i t .  That a problem should have 
existed in the f i r s t  place w ith respect to  Marx's transform ation 
procedure is  not e n tire ly  su rp ris ing , since 'problems' e x is t 
everywhere else in Marx's 'system' according to  his c r i t ic s .
But th a t th is  'problem' should have been accepted as such and 
perpetuated from w ith in  'Marxism' i t s e l f  over a number o f years 
means th a t methodological s tr ic tu re s  other than Marx's have been 
employed in the name of Marx. Engels' ro le  is  c ru c ia l here, 
as we have seen. In terms o f P o lit ic a l Economy, t ra d it io n a lly  
conceived, Engels immediately defers to  the question o f the 
'q u a n tita tiv e ' determination o f value in response to  Marx's c r i t ic s ,  
seeing his task as estab lish ing the 'constancy' o f th is  determ ination 
over h is to r ic a l tim e. He therefore remains w ith the magnitude 
o f value, which was the h igh-po in t o f the c lass ica l analysis 
previous to  Marx, notably in Ricardo. P h ilosoph ica lly , the 
subsequent form ulation o f an 'h is to r ic a l transform ation ' only 
serves to  evaporate the q u a lita t iv e ly  socia l determ ination o f 
value, lending the 'substance' o f value a purely n a tu ra lis t ic  
meaning. Thereby Marx's c lass ica l predecessors are never re a lly  
le f t  behind, th e ir  presence being f e l t  in a whole generation of 
Marxist economists who begin to  emerge between the wars, and whose 
influence is  f e l t  to  the present day. This 'neo-R icardian'
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Marxism is butressed from the philosophical side by Engels’ 
w ritin g s , most notably his a tt itu d e  to  Hegel and his subsequent 
e laboration of ’ the m a te r ia lis t conception o f h is to ry 1 which, 
fo r  him, marked the culm ination and the 'end' o f c lass ica l 
German philosophy. His re je c tio n  o f a l l  forms of ’ idea lism ’ 
means th a t re a li ty  can never be considered as being in any way 
‘ posited ’ by thought, but must, m ethodologically, be simply 
’ presupposed’ . I t  is  not Engels' methodological in s t in c t to  
seek to  look behind re a li ty  as i t  manifests i t s e l f ,  but to  seek 
to  look before i t ,  i .e .  to  i ts  h is to r ic a l antecedents. In th is  
way the very subject o f Marx's investiga tion  is  seen as the outcome 
of a methodological process which has already taken place ahd 
the function  o f science is  to  re f le c t th is  process. Thus when 
Engels considers the 'determ inations' o f re a lity  they are simply 
another r e a l i ty ,  or the ’ determ inations' o f c a p ita lis t  re a l i ty  
are the immemorial exchange transactions and the period o f 
’ simple commodity p roduction '.
The coming-to-be of re a li ty  is  thus depicted in re a l i ty 's  own terms 
and not. in terms of a conceptual synthesis since, as we have 
noted, th is  'syn thes is ' is  assumed to  have already occurred.
The upshot is a method which can scarcely be distinguished from 
Feuerbach's, and therefore where 'contemplation' usurps the place 
o f active 'comprehension' and which provides f e r t i le  ground fo r  
the growth o f neo-Kantianism and positiv ism  w ith in  Marxism, 
su itab le  handmaidens fo r  the perpetuation o f a 'transform ation 
Problem'.
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"However th a t may be, philosophic thought, or 
’ s c ie n t i f ic ' thought in the Hegelian sense of 
the word - i .e .  rigo rous ly  true  thought -  has
the goal o f revealing, through the meaning o f
a coherent discourse, being, as i t  _i_s and ex is ts  
in  the t o t a l i t y  o f i t s  o b je c tiv e - re a lity " .
(Kojeve, 1969; p. 171)
Our conviction throughout has been th a t Marx's 's c ie n t i f ic '  
thought is  to  be understood in 'the  Hegelian sense of the word'
and th a t th is  is  the fundamental condition fo r  the comprehension
of both the transform ation procedure i t s e l f  and the 'problem' 
which is  sa id .to  attach to  it., and whether th is  'problem' has 
been conceived 'h is to r ic a l ly ' or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The purpose here is  t o  p ro v id e  in a b r i e f  space a ske tch  o f  the- o n t o ­
lo g i c a l  and m ethodo log ica l  assumpt ions upon which t h i s  t h e s i s  is  based. 
In the  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  a compar ison 'w i  I I be made between th e  method as 
i t  i s  presented here and as i t  is  represented  e lsewhere in t h e  l i t e r ­
a tu r e .
There is  one fundamental q ue s t ion  th e  answer t o  which w i l l  have d e f i n i t e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  both the  methodo log ica l  and comparat ive  issues t h a t  
are ra ised  here.
Th is  has t o  do w i th  the  p re c is e  na tu re  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
Marx and Hegel and, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  w i t h  the  que s t ion  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  d e l i m i t i n g  p r e c i s e l y  what i t  was t h a t  Marx to o k  f rom Hegel and the  
s p e c i f i c  area in which he a pp l ie d  i t .
( I ) .  The d e l i m i t a t i o n  o f  Hegel
I t  is  necessary t o  e s t a b l i s h  immed ia te ly  t h a t  f rom the  ve ry  f i r s t  
Marx r e j e c t e d  Hege l ’ s ’’ s p e c u la t i v e  p h i lo s o p h y ’’ in favou r  o f  what he 
termed Feuerbach’ s ’’ t r u e  m a t e r i a l i s m ”  and " r e a l  s c ie n c e ” . However, 
w h i l e  never abandoning a m a t e r i a l i s t  o n to lo g y ,  Marx subsequen t ly  
considered Feuerbach’ s brand o f  m a te r ia l i s m  as e n t a i l i n g  an e s s e n t ­
i a l l y  ’ c o n te m p la t i v e ’ and pass ive  human s u b j e c t ,  which stood o ve r  and 
a g a in s t  th e  o b j e c t ,  as opposed t o  one which is  a c t u a l l y  and p r a c t i c ­
a l l y  engaged in i t s  c r e a t i o n .
The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  a c t i v e  engagement w i t h  a g iven  o b j e c t i v i t y  i s  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a new one -  t h a t  is  why t h i s  a c t i v i t y  is  desc r ibed  by 
Marx as ’’ c r i t i c a l " .  The f u r t h e r  r e s u l t  is  t h e  p o s i t i n g  o f  the  s o c ia l  
and h i s t o r i c a l  w i t h  ?t s  laws, above th e  mere ly n a t u r a l .  Of course  i t  
is no t  t o  be f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  the  s o c ia l  and h i s t o r i c a l  aspects o f  being  
a r i s e  o u t  o f  th e  o rg a n ic  wor ld o f  n a tu re ,  and t h a t  i t  is  o n to  I o g i c a I  Iy 
im poss ib le  f o r  i t  t o  leave t h i s  basis  beh ind.  N ever the less  :
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"So much Is t h i s  a c t i v i t y ,  t h i s  unceasing sensuous labour 
and c r e a t i o n ,  t h i s  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  bas is  o f  t h e  whole 
sensuous wor ld  as i t  now e x i s t s ,  t h a t ,  were i t  i n t e r r u p t e d  
f o r  o n l y  a year ,  Feuerbach would not  o n l y  f i n d  an enorm­
ous change in the  n a tu ra l  w o r ld ,  but  would very  soon f i n d  
t h a t  the  whole wor ld  o f  men and h is  own p e r c e p t i v e  f a c u l t y ,  
nay h is  own e x is te n c e ,  were m iss in g .  Of course ,  in  a l l  t h i s  
the  p r i o r i t y  o f  e x te rn a l  n a tu re  remains u na s s a i le d ,  and a l l  
t h i s  has no a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  men produced by 
’ spontaneous g e n e r a t i o n ’ ; bu t  t h i s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  has 
meaning o n l y  i n s o fa r  as man is  cons ide red  t o  be d i s t i n c t  
f rom n a tu re .  For t h a t  m a t te r ,  n a tu re ,  t h e  na tu re  t h a t  p re ­
ceded human h i s t o r y ,  i s  not  by any means th e  n a tu re  in 
which Feuerbach l i v e s ,  i t  is  na tu re  which no longer e x i s t s  
anywhere . . .  and which,  t h e r e f o r e ,  does not  e x i s t  f o r
Feuerbach. ”  (Marx and Engels,  1978, p . 171)
I t  is  one o f  the  p r i n c i p a l  assumpt ions o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  t h a t  Marx reached 
the  p o s i t i o n  which has come t o  be desc r ibed  as h is  ' h i s t o r i c a l  mat­
e r i a l i s m ’ th rough the  c r i t i q u e  o f  Feuerbach and not  v i a  the  c r i t i q u e  
o f  HegeI .
I f  we remind o u rse lves  o f  Marx ’ s c r i t i c i s m  o f  ’ a l l  h i t h e r t o  e x i s t i n g
m a t e r i a l i s m ’ and i t s  image o f  a disengaged human s u b j e c t ,  then  -
"Hence in c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  m a t e r i a l i s m ,  th e  a c t i v e  s i d e  
was developed by id e a l i s m  -  which o f  course ,  does no t  know 
r e a l ,  sensuous a c t i v i t y  as s u c h . "  (1981c,  p . 421)
Then i t  is  tem pt ing  here t o  suggest  t h a t  Marx ’ r e c l a i m s ’ f o r  m a t e r i a l ­
ism t h i s  " a c t i v e  s i d e " ,  removes i t  f rom i t s  ' i d e a l i s t ’ in tegument '  and
uses i t  as an ’ i n p u t '  t o  h is  " t h e o r y  o f  h i s t o r y " .  But  t h i s  would be
fundam en ta l l y  m is taken ,  as would th e  sugges t ion  be t h a t  Marx ' i n v e r t s ’ 
Hege l ’ s e n t i r e  ’ ph i losophy  o f  h i s t o r y ’ , o n l y  f i l l i n g  He ge l ’ s c a te g ­
o r i e s  w i t h  a new ' m a t e r i a l i s t '  co n te n t .
What has become known as Marx ’ s ' h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m ’ is  o n l y  t h e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a process which takes p lace  in r e a l i t y  i t s e I f . Marx i s
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say ing  t h a t  Hegel m i s i d e n t i f i e d  a reaI  p rocess ,  m is took  f o r  a 
process which takes p lace  o n ly  in th e  head. But  he does no t  o f f e r  
an a I t e r n a t i v e  process t o  H e g e l ' s ,  in  t h e  sense t h a t  he does not  o f f e r  
a f u r t h e r  ’’ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ”  o f  t h e  development o f  t h e  wor ld  but  
d i r e c t s  our  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h i s  development i t s e l f .  The ' d i s c o v e r y '  
o f  the  d i a l e c t i c  o f  h i s t o r y  by Marx does not  r e q u i r e  th e  p r i o r  sub­
sumption o f  t h e  Hegel ian  p h i loso p h y .  On the  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  is  t h e  
d is cove ry  o f  th e  rea l  process which renders t h e  Hegel ian  ph i loso phy  
inadequate t o  i t s  o b j e c t .
We could  say t h a t  Marx d isco ve rs  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  theses which compr ise  
' h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia  I ism‘ th rough e m p i r i c a l  o b s e rv a t io n  o f  t h e  c l a s s -  
s t r u g g l e  and o f  h i s t o r y  i t s e l f ,  and does no t  d e r i v e  i t  o u t  o f  h i s  
own head.
We t h e r e f o r e  contend t h a t  i f  Marx has a p lace  in th e  h i s t o r y  o f  
' i d e a s ’ then i t  is  due t o  the  manner o f  t h e  f o r m u la t i o n  and e x p o s i t ­
ion o f  h i s  ' t h e o r y  o f  v a lu e '  -  what we have elsewhere  termed h is  
t h e o r e t i c a l  'method o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy’ -  and not  t o  h i s  c o n s t r u c t ­
ion o f  a ' t h e o r y  o f  h i s t o r y ’ .
C o n t r i b u t i o n s  in the  l i t e r a t u r e  f rom both th e  r i g h t  and t h e  l e f t  have 
the  ' i n v e r t e d '  Hegel ian d i a l e c t i c  p re sen t  a t  t h e  b i r t h  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  
m a t e r i a l i s m .  However the  e m p i r i c a l  f o u n da t io n  f o r  t h e  t e n e t s  o f  h i s t ­
o r i c a l  m a te r ia l i s m  and th e  redundancy o f  t h e  Hege l ian  d i a l e c t i c  f o r  
t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  by c o n s id e r in g  what Marx has t o  
say in r e l a t i o n  t o  Proudhon :
"M. Proudhon, incapab le  o f  f o l l o w i n g  the  rea l  movement o f  
h i s t o r y ,  produces a 'phan tasm agor ia '  which p re s u m p t i v e ly  
c la im s  t o  be d i a l e c t i c a l .  He does not  fee l  i t  necessary t o  
speak o f  the  seven teen th ,  th e  e ig h te e n th  o r  t h e  n i n te e n th  
c e n tu ry ,  f o r  h is  h i s t o r y  proceeds in the  m is ty  realm o f  imag­
in a t i o n  and r i s e s  f a r  above space and t im e .  In s h o r t ,  i t  i s  
no t  h i s t o r y  bu t  o ld  HegeI ian ' j u n k ,  i t  is  no t  p ro fane  h i s t o r y
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-  a h i s t o r y  o f  man -  bu t  sacred h i s t o r y ,  a h i s t o r y  o f  
i d e a s . . .  What i t  comes t o  is  t h a t  M. Proudhon is  o f f e r i n g  
you th e  o rd e r  in which economic c a te g o r ie s  a rrange them­
se lves  i n s id e  h is  own m in d . ”  (Marx and Engels,  1978,p . 138)
That  i s ,  Proudhon is  a t te m p t in g  t o  pass these  o f f  as r e a I . La te r  Marx
h im s e l f  w i l l  p re sen t  an e x p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  process o f  comprehending
the  s p e c i f i c  s u b j e c t  o f  h i s  i n q u i r y  and where th e  c a te g o r ie s  wi I I be
arranged v ia  " t h e  fo r c e  o f  a b s t r a c t i o n " ,  i . e .  f rom Marx’ s "own mind".
But Marx w i l l  make i t  abundant ly  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  arrangement is  not
t o  be p a sse d -o f f  as r e a l .
For th e  moment however we are concerned t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  as f a r  as
concerns the  t e n e ts  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r i a l i s m  -
"These premises can thus  be v e r i f i e d  in a p u re ly  e m p i r i c a l
way. "  ( i b i d ,  p . 149)
The appeal t o  h i s t o r i c a l  r e a l i t y  i t s e l f  as the  genuine fo u n d a t io n  f o r
He ge l ' s  e n t i r e  system and f o r  the  emergence o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m
i t s e l f  is  no t  born f rom the  f u r t h e r  development o f  H e ge l ’ s system 
but  by t h e  p e rce p t io n  o f  t h e  reasons f o r  i t s  c l o s u r e .  As a s p e c u l a t ­
ive  account  o f  the  process o f  development i t  is  superseded by t h i s  
development i t s e l f .
Our fundamental conc lus ion  here is  then  t h a t  Hegel p layed no p a r t  in 
the  d iscove ry  and f o r m u la t i o n  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia  I ism.and,  most 
im po r ta n t  o f  a l l ,  Marx ’ s own " d i a l e c t i c  method",  which he a l l u d e s  t o  
in the  A f te rw a rd  t o  the  second German e d i t i o n  o f  Cap i ta  I , does no t  
e x i s t  in  the  area o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r i a l i s m  g e n e r a l l y , as i s  suggested 
by Engels.
By ’ area o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia l i s m  g e n e r a l l y ’ we mean t h a t  s e t  o f  
general  p r o p o s i t i o n s  which are put  fo rward  in  The German Ideo logy  
(1845 -6 ) ,  Marx 's  l e t t e r  t o  Annenkov o f  Dec. 28,  1846, and, most 
c o n c i s e l y ,  in th e  Pre face  t o  t h e  C o n t r i b u t i o n , (18591.
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The core  p r o p o s i t i o n  is  t h a t  labour i s  t h e  b as ic  e lement o f  human soc -  
i e ty  -
" . . .  an e lement whose development u l t i m a t e l y  determines the  
e n t i r e  development o f  s o c i e t y . ”  (Rubin ,  1982, p . I )
Th is  development is  expressed as th e  c o n f l i c t  which a r i s e s  between th e  
s o c ia l  p ro d u c t i v e  f o r ces  unleashed by labour and th e  s o c ia l  r e l a t i o n s  
o f  p ro d u c t io n  w i t h i n  which these  are  meant t o  o pe ra te .
I t  is  upon th e  c e n t r a l  theses  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia l i s m  t h a t  t h e  ’ i n f l ­
uence’ o f  th e  Hegel ian d i a l e c t i c  is  sa id  t o  be i n o p e r a t i v e .  A t  the  
same t im e ,  Marx d id  indeed have h is  own " d i a l e c t i c  method” , which he 
open ly  compared t o  Hege l ’ s .  Th e re fo re  i f  we are  t o  d e l i m i t  Hegel s t i l l  
f u r t h e r ,  in th e  sense o f  l o c a t i n g  th e  p re c i s e  area where h is  ’ i n f l u e n c e ’ 
may be sa id  t o  be f e l t ,  and i f  we are t o  d e f i n e  th e  p lace  where Marx 
a p p l i e s  h is  own " d i a l e c t i c  method” , we must f i r s t  co n s id e r  t h e  f o l l o w ­
ing d i s t i n c t i o n  :
( 2 ) .  On the  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  is  t o  be observed between Marx ’ s ’ h i s t o r ­
i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m ’ and h is  t h e o r e t i c a l  method o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy.
I t  i s  among the  p r i n c i p a l  aims o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  Marx
does not  app ly  H eg e l ’ s d i a l e c t i c a l  "manner o f  wo rk in g "  t o  t h e  whole o f
h i s t o r y  bu t  o n l y  in o rd e r  t o  enable  th e  comprehension o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c
s u b je c t  o f  h i s  i n q u i r y  -  "modern bourgeois  p r o d u c t i o n " .
Th is  means t h a t  we d i f f e r e n t i a t e  Marx ’ s h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m  as a
general  overv iew  o f  h i s t o r y ,  f rom h is  ’ method o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy’
( th eo ry  o f  v a lu e ) ,  which l a t t e r  i s  cons idered  th e  s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n
o f  H ege l ’ s "manner o f  wo rk ing "  t o  the  c a p i t a l i s t  system o f  p r o d u c t i o n .
Marx speaks o f  "my d i a l e c t i c  method" in c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  H e g e l ’ s 
use o f  i t ,  in  t h e  A f te rw a rd  r e f e r r e d  t o  above and immed ia te ly  a f t e r  he 
has cons idered th e  rev iew o f  Cap i ta  I I by J . J .  Kaufman, o f  which he r e ­
marks :
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"Here th e  rev iewer  p i c t u r e s  what he takes  t o  be my own ac tua l  
method, In a s t r i k i n g  and, as f a r  as concerns my own a p p l i c a t ­
ion o f  i t ,  generous way. But  what e ls e  is  he d e p i c t i n g  but  
the  d i a l e c t i c  meth6d ?" ('1983, p . 28)
Since t h i s  rev iew had Marx’ s undoubted a pp ro va l ,  we s h a l l  a t t e m p t  t o  
show th rough  i t s  u t i l i s a t i o n  how Marx’ s "own ac tua l  method" f i n d s  i t s  
e x c lu s i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n  in r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  comprehension o f  t h e  c a p i t a l ­
i s t  system o f  p ro d u c t io n .
Kaufman w r i t e s  :
"The one t h i n g  which is  o f  moment t o  Marx, is  t o  f i n d  th e  law 
o f  t h e  phenomena w i th  which he is  concerned;  and o n ly  t h a t  
law is  o f  moment t o  him which governs these  phenomena, in  so 
f a r  as they  have a d e f i n i t e  form and mutual c o n n e c t i on ,  w i t h ­
in a g iven h i s t o r i c a l  p e r i o d . Th is  law, once d isco ve red ,  he 
i n v e s t i g a t e s  in d e t a i l  t h e  e f f e c t s  in which i t  m a n i fes ts  i t s e l f  
in  s o c ia l  l i f e . . .  But  i t  w i l l  be sa id  t h a t  t h e  general  laws o f  
economic l i f e  are one and th e  same, no m a t te r  whether they  are 
ap p l ie d  t o  the  p resen t  o r  t o  t h e  p as t .  Th is  Marx s t r i c t l y  den-, 
ie s .  According t o  him such a b s t r a c t  laws do not  e x i s t .  On 
the  c o n t r a r y ,  in  h is  o p i n i o n ,  every h i s t o r i c a l  p e r io d  has laws 
o f  i t s  own . . .  The s c i e n t i f i c  va lu e  o f  such an e n q u i r y  l i e s  
in t h e  d i s c l o s i n g  o f  th e  sp ec ia l  laws t h a t  r e g u la te  the  o r i  q i  n, 
e x is te n c e ,  development and death o f  a g iven  s o c ia l  organism 
and i t s  replacement by ano the r  h ig h e r  o n e . "  (Marx,  1983,p . 28; my emp.)
Marx ’ s:Own " d i a l e c t i c  method" is  then t o  be cons idered  as being u t i l i s ­
ed t o  i d e n t i f y  " t h e  law o f  t h e  phenomena" ( i . e .  ’ t h e  law o f  v a l u e ’ ) 
which e x i s t s  " w i t h i n  a g iven  h i s t o r i c a l  p e r io d "  and is  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  
express ion  o f  "a g iven  s o c ia l  o rgan ism" .  As Rubin p o in t s  o u t  :
" P o l i t i c a l  economy, which dea ls  w i th  t h e  p ro du c t io n  r e l a t i o n s  
among people in the  commodity c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t y ,  presupposes 
a co nc re te  s o c ia l  form o f  economy, a conc re te  economic f o r m a t ­
ion o f  s o c i e t y .  We cannot  c o r r e c t l y  understand a s i n g l e  s t a t e ­
ment in Marx ’ s Cap?t a I  i f  we o v e r lo o k  th e  f a c t  t h a t  we are  d e a l ­
ing w i th  events which take  p lace  in a p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t y . "
(1982,  p . 3)
’ H i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia l i s m  does no t ,  indeed cannot ,  presuppose "a c o n c r e te
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s o c ia l  form o f  economy", but  o n l y  what is  common to  forms o f  economy
g e n e r a l l y ,  i . e .  ’ l a b o u r ’ , ’ f o r c e s ’ and ’ r e l a t i o n s '  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  a
legal  and p o l i t i c a l  s u p e r s t r u c t u r e ,  e t c .  Nor is  t h e r e  a d i s t i n c t i v e
'method'  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r i a l i s m  which,  e .g .  moves f rom the  co nc re te
to  t h e  a b s t r a c t  and back aga in .
Marx says o f  Cap i ta  I t h a t  :
" I t  is  t h e  u l t i m a t e  aim o f  t h i s  work t o  lay bare th e  economic 
law o f  mot ion o f  modern s o c i e t y . "  (1983,  p . 20)
That  i s ,  no t  " t h e  law o f  m o t io n "  o f  h i s t o r y  g e n e r a l l y .  H i s t o r i c a l  mater­
ia l i s m  is  not  and should no t  be s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  method 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy. That  i s  t o  say th e  ' c a t e g o r i e s ’ which a re  
sa id  t o  app ly  in the  area o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia l i s m  should no t  be 
taken  as the  same t h i n g  as t h e  ' c a t e g o r i e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy’ .
For example, Marx ’ s ' h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s t ’ use o f  ' l a b o u r '  i s  used t o  
denote human p ro d u c t i v e  a c t i v i t y  in general  as t h e  c r e a t o r  o f  o b j e c t s  
which s a t i s f y  i t s  needs. I t  is  :
"  . . .  t h e  labour process p o s i te d  p r i o r  t o  v a lu e ,  as p o i n t  o f  
d ep a r tu re  -  which,  owing t o  i t s  a b s t ra c tn e s s ,  i t s  pure m a te r ­
i a l i t y ,  is  common t o  a I I forms o f  p r o d u c t i o n . "  (1981a,  p . 304)
S i m i l a r l y ,  ’ l a b o u r ’ in  the  h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s t  c o n t e x t ,  i s :
" . . .  a necessary c o n d i t i o n ,  independent  o f  a l l  forms o f  
s o c i e t y ,  f o r  the  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  human race ;  i t  is  an 
e t e r n a l ,  na tu re  imposed n e c e s s i t y ,  w i t h o u t  which t h e r e ,  
can be no m a te r ia l  exchanges between man and Nature,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  no l i f e . "  (Marx, 1983, p . 50)
And f  i naI Iy :
"Labour as such,  in i t s  s im p le  c a p a c i t y  as pu rpos iv e  p ro d ­
u c t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  means o f  p ro d u c t io n  not  in 
t h e i r  s o c ia l  de te rm ina te  form, but  r a t h e r  in t h e i r  co n c re te  
subs tance,  as m a te r ia l  and means f o r  l a b o u r . "  ( i b i d ,  1984; p . 825)
I t  is  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  m is take o f  Engels and those  who a s c r ib e  t o  h i s
methodo log ica l  d i r e c t i v e s  t h a t  " l a b o u r  as such" is  never a d e q ua te ly
d is t i n g u i s h e d  f rom labour as t h e  ’ subs tance ’ o r  ’ essence ’ o f  v a lue .
Th is  i s  p r e c i s e l y  the  R ica rd ia n  shor tcom ing ,  o n l y  here i t  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  
o f  f a i l i n g  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  th e  s p e c i f i c  c a te g o r ie s  o f  p o l i t i c a l '  economy 
f rom the  general  t e n e ts  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m .  ’ Labour ’ and ’ v a l u e ’ 
are g iven  p r e c i s e l y  th e  same meaning f o r  Marx ’ s t h e o ry  o f  v a lu e  as 
they  have f o r  h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m .  Th is  is  why Engels t r e a t s  va lu e  
as "common t o  a l l  forms o f  p r o d u c t i o n " ,  and t r e a t s  i t s  subs tance as 
being p resen t  in  the  immemorial exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s  in t h e  p r e -  cap­
i t a l i s t  pas t .  I t  is  t h e  t o t a l  subsumption o f  t h e  t h e o ry  o f  va lu e  
( t h e o r e t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy) i n t o  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r i a l i s m ,  so t h a t  
the  ’ c a t e g o r i e s ’ are in te r cha n ge a b le ,  which produces E nge ls ’ "m a te r ­
i a l i s t  concep t ion  o f  h i s t o r y "  o r  " m a t e r i a l i s t  wor ld  o u t l o o k " .  Th is  
l a t t e r  i s  t o  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  f rom Marx ’ s h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m ,  which 
is  cons idered  here as a prolegomenon t o  h is  th e o ry  o f  v a lu e ,  and not  
a s ta tement  o f  t h i s  th e o ry  i t s e l f .
Engels does not  c o n s ide r  t h a t  a t  the  beg inn ing  o f  C ap i ta l  Marx is
in a u g u ra t in g  a d i a l e c t i c a l  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  labour t h e o ry  o f  v a lu e .
Rather he views i t  e x c l u s i v e l y  in  h is  own ’ m a t e r i a l i s t ’ t e rm s ,  deeming
t h a t  Marx does not  begin h is  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t i c a l l y
produced commodity, bu t  w i t h  ’ t h e  commodi ty’ in  g en e ra l .
Thus Engels is  t h e  f i r s t  t o  su bsc r ib e  t o  t h e  v iew t h a t  :
" . . .  even though th e  law o f  labour va lu e ,  in  th e  form in which 
' ' c • Marx developed i t  in  the  f i r s t  volume o f  Cap i ta  I , i s  no t
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  economy, i t  i s  n e v e r th e les s  f u l l y  
v a l i d  f o r  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  pe r iod  which precedes the  emergence 
o f  c a p i t a l i s m  and in which p e t t y  c r a f t s  and peasant  economy a re  
dom tnan t . "  ( R u b i n , 1982, p . 254)
Th is  is  more o r  less e x a c t l y  th e  f o r m u la t i o n  which Engels p re s en ts  in
h is  l e t t e r  t o  Sombart , and f rom which we have quoted e x t e n s i v e l y  in
the  t e x t .
In complete c o n t r a s t  t o  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  we wish t o  argue t h a t  Marx ’ s^
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t he o ry  o f  v a lu e ,  as fo rm u la ted  in C a p i t a I , has e x c lu s i v e  re fe r e n c e  t o  
t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  economy and o n ly  secondary s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  t h e  p r e - h i s t ­
o ry  o f  c a p i t a l i s m .  In o th e r  words,  where Engels e t  a l i a  c o n s id e r  t h a t  
h i s t o r i c a l  development i l l u m i n a t e s  the  t h e o ry  o f  v a lu e ,  we c o n s id e r  t h a t  
the  th e o ry  o f  va lue  i l l u m i n a t e s  h i s t o r i c a l  development,  i . e .  t h a t  :
"The i n t im a t i o n s  o f  h ig h e r  deveIopment. . .  however, can be
understood o n l y  a f t e r  the  h ig he r  development i s  a l re a d y  known.”
(Marx,  1981a, p . 103)
Marx’ s t h e o r e t i c a l  method o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy, and t h e r e f o r e  h is  use 
o f  t h e  " d i a l e c t i c  method",  are u t i l i s e d  p r e c i s e l y  t o  render t h i s  
" h i g h e r  development"  known o r  comprehended.
Hegel is  no t  ’ u t i l i s e d ’ by Marx in the  I840 ’ s o r  e a r l y  I85 0 's  as an i n ­
put  t o  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia l i s m ,  but  appears p o s i t i v e l y  in  1857-8 when 
Marx is  w r i t i n g  the  1857 I n t r o d u c t i o n  and t e l l i n g  Engels t h a t  in  t h e  
"manner o f  wo rk ing "  he had u t i l i s e d  H eg e l ’ s Log?c .
( 3 ) .  Marx ’ s " d i a l e c t i c  method" and the  i n f l u e n c e  o f  Hegel
"My d i a l e c t i c  method i s  not  o n l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom th e  H e g e l ian ,  
bu t  i t s  d i r e c t  o p p o s i t e .  To Hegel ,  t h e  l i f e - p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  
human b r a in ,  i . e .  t h e  process o f  t h i n k i n g ,  wh ich ,  under t h e  
name o f  ’ t he  I d e a ' ,  he even t ra n s fo rm s  i n t o  an independent  
s u b j e c t ,  is  the  demiurgos o f  th e  rea l  w o r ld ,  and t h e  rea l  
wor ld  is  o n l y  th e  e x t e r n a l ,  phenomenal form o f  ’ t h e  I d e a ' .
With me, on the  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  ideal  is  n o th ing  e ls e  t h a t  t h e  
m a te r ia l  wo r ld  r e f l e c t e d  by th e  human mind,  and t r a n s l a t e d  
i n t o  forms o f  t h o u g h t . . .  The m y s t i f i c a t i o n  which th e  d i a l e c t i c  
s u f f e r s  in Hege l ' s  hands, by no means p reven ts  him f rom being 
the  f i r s t  t o  p resen t  i t s  genera l  form o f  work ing  in a compre­
hensive  and conscious manner. With him i t  i s  s tand in g  on i t s  
head. I t  must be tu rne d  r i g h t - s i d e  up a g a i n . "  (Marx,  1983, p . 29)
What t h i s  t u r n i n g  " r i g h t - s i d e  up aga in "  e n t a i l s  above a l l  is  t h a t  t h e
d i a l e c t i c  is  t o  be presented as no longer s im p ly  an 'e p i s t e m o lo g i c a I  ’
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p r i n c i p l e ,  i . e .  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  knowing about  knowing,  but  as an o n to ­
lo g i c a l  one,  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  knowing about  be ing .
For Marx d i a l e c t i c  is  both a method o f  knowing and a movement in the  
o b j e c t  known. A t  th e  same t im e  t h i s  movement in  the  o b j e c t  can on ly  
be rendered ’ known’ by means o f  t h e  method o f  knowing.
Marx adopts t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  H e g e l ’ s d i a l e c t i c a l  ’ method o f  kn ow ing ' ,  
o r  i t s  "genera l  form o f  w o rk ing "  e la bo ra ted  by him, w h i l e ,  a t  t h e  same 
t im e ,  t u r n i n g  i t  " r i g h t - s i d e  up a g a in " .
Hence the  " d i a l e c t i c  method" is  t o  be conceived o f  as a manner o f  p re ­
s e n t in g  th e  s u b j e c t  by means o f  a r a t i o n a l  d is c o u rs e ,  a t  t h e  end o f  
which th e  s u b je c t  s tands as comprehended in i t s  t o t a l i t y .  However 
t h i s  ’ e n d -p ro d u c t ’ , t h i s  t o t a l i t y  i s ,  in  H e ge l ' s  case,  conce ived o f  as 
th e  p roduc t  and r e s u l t  o f  :
" . . . t h o u g h t  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  i t s e l f ,  p rob ing  i t s  own dep ths ,  and 
u n fo ld in g  i t s e l f  o u t  o f  i t s e l f ,  by i t s e l f  . . . "  (Marx,  1 9 8 1 a ,p .101)
What i s  g iven  and e x i s t s  in  r e a l i t y  i s ,  f o r  Hegel ,  t h e  r e s u I t  o f  t h e
process o f  th e  d i a l e c t i c  o f  consciousness " c o n c e n t r a t i n g  i t s e l f " .
Whereas fo fM arx ,  what is  g iven  and e x i s t s  in  r e a l i t y  i s  t h e  poi n t  o f
depa r tu re  f o r  any succeeding d i a l e c t i c .  Here th e  manner in which t h e
d i a l e c t i c a l  development is  t o  proceed is  determined beforehand by th e
r e a l l y  e x i s t i n g  s u b j e c t ,  and which both p r e - e x i s t s  and a I Iows th e
manner o f  the  u n fo ld in g  o f  t h e  c a te g o r ie s .  I t  does t h i s  f o r  t h e  ve ry
reason t h a t  i t  ’ s u p p l i e s ’ o r  f u r n i s h e s  these  c a te g o r ie s  in t h e  f i r s t
p lace.
I t  i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  f o r  Marx, the  s u b je c t  -  "modern bourgeo is  p ro d ­
u c t i o n "  -  i s  th e  p o i n t  o f  d e p a r tu re  f o r  the  d i a l e c t i c a l  s y n t h e s i s ,  and 
not  i t s  r e s u l t ,  which compr ises t h e  t u r n i n g  o f  t h e  Hege l ian  d i a l e c t i c  
" r i g h t - s i d e  up a g a in " .  For Hegel :
" . . .  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  is  p o s i te d  as th e  c o n d i t i o n e d ,  t h e  d e te r m in -  
a t o r  as t h e  dete rm ined,  t h e  producer as th e  p r o d u c t . "  (Marx,  1981 c ,p .63)
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I t  must be borne in mind however t h a t  Marx ’ s own " d i a l e c t i c  method" 
i s  t o  be conceived o f  as a t h e o r e t i c a l  "manner o f  w o rk in g "  i . e .  as a 
" r e p r o d u c t i o n  o f  th e  co nc re te  by way o f  t h o u g h t . "
"The conc re te  t o t a l i t y  is  a t o t a l i t y  o f  t h o u g h ts ,  conc re te  in
tho u g h t ,  in f a c t  a p roduc t  o f  co m p re h e n d in g . . . "  (M a rx ,1 9 8 1 a ,p .101)
The ’ co nc re te  t o t a l i t y ’ is  no t  g ive n ,  does not  e x i s t  in  r e a l i t y ,  bu t  is  
’ made’ co ns t ru c te d  as the  p roduc t  " o f  a t h i n k i n g  head".  The r e a l l y  
e x i s t i n g  r e a l i t y  is  no t  co ns t ru c te d  by t h o u g h t ,  bu t  n e i t h e r  does i t  
immed ia te ly  e x i s t  as ’ r e v e a le d ’ . As Marx says :
" A l l  sc ience  would be s u p e r f lo u s  i f  t h e  outward appearance
and th e  essence o f  t h i n g s  d i r e c t l y  c o i n c i d e d . "  ( 1 9 8 4 ,p . 817)
Thus what Marx is  say ing in the  1857 I n t r o d u c t i o n  is  t h a t  " t h e  method 
o f  r i s i n g  f rom the  a b s t r a c t  t o  the  c o n c r e te "  which takes  p la ce  " i n  
the  head" is  " s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  c o r r e c t " .  However what i s  i n c o r r e c t  i s  
the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  process as one which takes  p lace  in r e a l i t y  
and not  s im p ly  " i n  th e  head" i . e .  by both Hegel and Proudhon.
For Marx the  lo g i c a l  sequence o f  the  c a te g o r ie s  i s  de te rm ined ,  bu t  
i t  is  determined by the  r e l a t i o n  which these  c a te g o r ie s  occupy in  the  
c a p i t a l i s t  s o c ie t y  i t s e l f .  The sequence o f  t h e i r  u n fo ld in g  is  n e i t h e r  
determined by ’ t h e  Idea ’ (Hegel)  nor by ’ t h e  a c tua l  h i s t o r i c a l  c o u r s e ’ 
( E n g e l s ) . ,  For both Hegel and Engels the  g iven  s u b j e c t  is  t r e a t e d  as 
a r e s u l t  and not  as a p o i n t  o f  d e p a r tu re .  Th e re fo re  the  u n f o ld i n g  in 
Marx ’ s d i a l e c t i c  does no t  d e p i c t  an h i s t o r i c a l  u n fo ld in g  bu t  a l o g i c a l  
one. I t  c o n s t ru c t s  a no the r ,  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o t a l i t y ,  which stands  over  
and a g a in s t  the  r e a l l y  e x i s t i n g  s u b je c t  as i t s  comprehension.  As i t  
p resents  i t s e l f ,  t h e  r e a l l y  e x i s t i n g  s u b j e c t  is  " c h a o t i c "  and i s  s t i l l  
t o  be rendered a "c o n c re te  t o t a l i t y "  by the  t h e o r e t i c a l  method o f  
r i s i n g  f rom the  a b s t r a c t  t o  the  co nc re te ,  and where the  ’ a b s t r a c t ’ is  
t h e  a b s t r a c t  d e te rm in a t io n s  o f  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  s o c i e t y ,  t h i s  s u b j e c t .  
Marx ’ s " d i a l e c t i c  method" is  t o  be understood then as a t h e o r e t i c a l
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method o f  comprehension, which proceeds f rom the  lower t o  t h e  h ig he r  
by way o f  conceptual  n e c e s s i t y .  I t  i s  Marx ’ s own c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  a form 
o f  the  u n fo ld in g  o f  the  e x i s t i n g  s u b j e c t  t h a t  he_ has a pp l ie d  t o  th e  
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  in  o rd e r  t o  b r i n g  i t  t o  l i g h t .  Moreover,  and as we have 
no t ice d  in r e l a t i o n  t o  Kaufman's rev iew ,  i t  is  a p p l ie d  on ly  t o  a 
"g iv e n  s o c ia l  o rgan ism" ,  which possesses i t s  "own laws" ,  and w i t h i n  
which the  ' l a w  o f  v a l u e ’ is  p r im a ry .
We s a id  above t h a t  f o r  both Hegel and Engels t h e  s u b je c t  o f  t h e  i n q u i r y  
was t r e a t e d  as a ’ r e s u l t ’ . What t h i s  means in  t h e  case o f  Hegel is  t h a t ,  
when c o n s id e r in g  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between Marx and Hegel in  o n t o l o g i c a l  
te rms ,  o r  in  terms o f  t h e i r  o n t o l o g i c a l  p r i o r i t i e s ,  H eg e l ’ s s p e c u l a t i v e  
ph i losophy  i s  t o  be cons idered  what we may c a l l  ’ gen u in e ly  m e t a p h y s i c a l ’ . 
That  i s ,  t h e  course o f  d i a l e c t i c a l  development and i t s  in h e r e n t  necess­
i t y  is  determined f o r  Hegel a p r io r?  by the  need f o r  s e l f - c o n s c io u s n e s s  
t o  become s e l f - i d e n t i c a l  Reason. Th is  i s  why Feuerbach c h a r a e te r i s e d  
Heg e l ’ s ph i losophy  as b a s i c a l l y  ’ t h e o l o g i c a l ’ . For Marx, on th e  o th e r  
hand, t h e  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  t h e  course o f  d i a l e c t i c a l  development a I ready * 
e x i s t s  and 1s t h e  o r i g i n  and e x p la n a t io n  o f  t h e  d i a l e c t i c a l  development.
In the  case o f  Engels the  r e a l l y  e x i s t i n g  s u b je c t  appears as th e  r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  process,  and where i t s  comprehension is  t o  be achieved 
o n ly  by th e  study o f  t h i s  p rocess.  That  is  why he o r i g i n a t e s  an ’ h i s t ­
o r i c a l ’ d imension t o  th e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  procedure  in t h e  a t te m p t  t o  a id  
t h i s  comprehension.
In r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  i t  must a ls o  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  Engels conce ives  t h a t  
the  s tan d in g  o f  Hegel "on h is  f e e t "  takes  p lace  a t  th e  i n c e p t io n  o f  h i s t ­
o r i c a l  m a te r i a l i s m ,  in the  m id - l 8 4 0 ’ s.  On t h i s  view H e g e l ’ s ’ m y s t i c a l ’ 
d i a l e c t i c  is  rep laced by th e  d i a l e c t i c  o f  r e a l i t y ,  i . e .  t h a t  t h e  d i a l ­
e c t i c  o f  h i s t o r y  i t s e l f  is  Marx ’ s own d i a l e c t i c ,  is  what he r e f e r s  t o  
as "my d i a l e c t i c  method".
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However, by subsuming Heg e l ’ s d i a l e c t i c  f rom th e  very  f i r s t  -  i . e .  by 
t r e a t i n g  i t s  ’ i n v e r s i o n ’ as a necessary p r e l i m i n a r y  t a s k  t o  t h e  form­
a t i o n  o f  ’ t h e  m a t e r i a l i s t  wor ld  o u t l o o k ’ and th e  's c ie n c e  o f  d i a l e c t i c s '  
-  Engels p rec ludes  th e  unders tand ing  t h a t  Marx w i l l  o n l y  l a t e r  ' i n v e r t '  
Hege l ’ s d i a l e c t i c a l  method and in r e l a t i o n  t o  h is  t h e o r e t i c a l  method o f  
p o l i t i c a l  economy, t o  which ' h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l i s m ’ had b ro ugh t  him 
t o  the  t h r e s h o ld .
U n fo r tu n a te l y  however, when Marx says t h a t  h i s  d i a l e c t i c  method i s  
" t h e  complete o p p o s i t e "  o f  H eg e l ’ s then  t h i s  i s  o f t e n  taken as c o n f i r m ­
a t i o n  o f  E nge ls ’ reading t h a t  Marx s u b s t i t u t e d  a ’ r e a l ’ d i a l e c t i c  f o r  
Heg e l ' s  ' m y s t i c a l '  one. Again However, t h i s  o n l y  serves t o  l e g i t i m a t e  
the  mis taken n o t io n  t h a t  h ' i s t o r i  ca I . m a te r ia  I i sm c o n ta in s  t h e  th e o ry  o f  
va Iue  w i t h i  n i t .
However, as Rubin remarks :
"Con fus ing  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  and th e  h i s t o r i c a l  s e t t i n g  o f  t h e  
th e o ry  o f  va lu e  is  not  o n l y  p o i n t l e s s . . .  bu t  a l s o  h a r m fu l .
Such a t r e a tm e n t  puts t h e  p r o p o r t i o n s  o f  exchange i n t o  t h e  
fo reg ro und ,  and ignores  th e  s o c ia l  form and the  s o c ia l  f u n c ­
t i o n  o f  va lue  as the  r e g u l a t o r  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  la b ou r ,
. a f u n c t i o n  which va lue  per forms t o  a g r e a t  e x te n t  o n l y  in  a 
developed commodity economy, i . e .  a c a p i t a l i s t  economy. I f  
t h e  a n a l y s t  f i n d s  t h a t  p r i m i t i v e  t r i b e s ,  who l i v e  in c o n d i t ­
ions o f  a n a tu ra l  economy and r a r e l y  r e s o r t  t o  exchange,  a re  
guided by labour expen d i tu res  when they  e s t a b l i s h  exchange 
p r o p o r t i o n s ,  he is  prone t o  f i n d  here t h e  ca tegory  o f  v a lu e .
Value is  t rans fo rmed  i n t o  a s u p r a - h i s t o r i c a I  c a te g o ry ,  i n t o  
labour e xpe nd i tu re s  independent  o f  t h e  s o c ia l  form o f  o rg an ­
i s a t i o n  o f  labour.  The ’ h i s t o r i c a l ’ s e t t i n g  o f  the  problem 
thus  leads t o  ig n o r in g  the  h i s t o r i c a l  c h a r a c te r  o f  th e  c a te g ­
o ry  o f  v a l u e . "  (1982,  p .p .  256-7)
That  i s ,  t o  i g n o r i n g  th e  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c te r  o f  both t h e  labour t h e o r y
o f  va lue  and th e  " d i a l e c t i c  method" in which i t  i s  s e t .
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( 4 ) .  ' Va lue '  as " c o n c re te  in th o u g h t "
In t h e  course o f  t h e  t h e s i s  we have r e f e r r e d  t o  t h a t  ’ inn e r  n e c e s s i t y '  
which 'd e p lo y s '  t h e  v a r io u s  p a r t i c u l a r s  in t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t o  one a no th ­
e r .  We have a ls o  cons idered  Marx 's  ' r a t i o n a l '  model o f  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
i . e .  the  " n a t u r a l  law" o f  commodit ies ten d in g  t o  exchange accord ing  t o  
the  s o c i a l l y  necessary labour t im e  con ta in ed  in  them.
Again,  we drew ana log ies  between va lu e  and magnetism and v a lue  and 
g r a v i t y  i,n o rd e r  t o  convey t h a t  va lue ,  a l though  a nonphys ical  ' i n v i s ­
i b l e '  e n t i t y ,  n eve r th e less  has th e  s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f e c t  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  
th e  p r i c e s  o f  commodi t ies .  Here the  ' v i s i b l e '  phys ica l  aspec t  o f  
commodit ies was seen as r e l a t i n g  e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  t h e i r  use -va lu e .
In t h i s  s e c t i o n  we s h a l l  a t te m p t  t o  b r in g  these  v a r io u s  aspec ts  
t o g e th e r  by r e l a t i n g  Marx 's  concept  o f  va lue  t o  t h e  d i a l e c t i c a l  p ro ­
cess o f  c o n s t r u c t i n g  a " th o u g h t  c o n c re te "  wh ich ,  as we remarked,  
s tands over  and a g a in s t  the  r e a l l y  e x i s t i n g  co nc re te  as th e  compre­
hension o f  t h i s  co nc re te .
We have seen, again f rom Kaufman's rev iew ,  t h a t  Marx 's  s u b j e c t  i s  a 
" s o c ia l  o rganism" and in Marx 's  l e t t e r  t o  Kugelmann, c i t e d  ear  I i e r ,
Marx aga in t r e a t s  o f  a s o c ia l  organism which "would d i e " ' i f  i t  f a i l e d  
t o  per form c e r t a i n  v i t a l  and e s s e n t i a l  f u n c t i o n s .
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s o c ia l  labour in d e f i n i t e  p r o p o r t i o n s  was seen as
a " n a t u r a l  law" which could no t  p o s s ib l y  be done away w i th  b u t  cou ld
o n ly  change the  form in which t h i s  law appeared o r  m an i fes ted  i t s e l f .
These c o n s id e ra t i o n s  are t o  be t r e a t e d  as r e l a t i n g  t o  the  o n t o l o g i c a l
fou nda t ion  f o r  t h e  t heo ry  o f  v a lu e :
"F o r  l i v i n g  t h i n g s  have a form which is  in h e re n t  in  t h e m . . . t h i s  
form is  in sepa rab le  f rom t h e i r  m a t te r ,  i t  is  t h e  form in h e re n t  
in  a phys ica l  organism. T h e i r  form is  a ls o  a n e c e s s i t y ,  as i t  
were,  in  t h a t  they  cannot  help t r y i n g  t o  conform t o  i t . But
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a t  th e  same t im e  i t  is  t h e i r  own n e c e s s i t y . . .  The requ irem ents  
o f  t h e  whole I i f e - f o r m  e x p la in  processes in the  organism as 
what is  needed f o r  t h e  whole. Th is  e x p la n a t i o n  r e l a t e s  these  
processes ' to  a purpose; i t  g ives  th e  reason f o r  them. I t  
g ive s  th e  sense behind t h i n g s .
T e le o lo g i c a l  e x p la n a t i o n  is  e x p la n a t i o n  o u t  o f  t o t a l i t y .  The
p a r t i a l  processes are exp la ine d  by t h e i r  r o l e  in the  whole.
( T a y lo r ,  1975, p . 321; my emphasis)
T a y l o r ’ s o b s e rv a t io n  t h a t  form is  a n e c e s s i t y  t o  which the  organism 
cannot  help t r y i n g  t o  conform is  p r e c i s e l y  th e  sense o f  th e  passage
i
in Marx ’ s l e t t e r  t o  Kugelmann mentioned above.
Again,  th e  s ta tement  t h a t  t e l e o l o g i c a l  e x p la n a t i o n  proceeds o u t  o f  
t o t a l i t y  and t h a t  t h i s  t o t a l i t y  p r o v id e s . t h e  e x p la n a t i o n  o f  th e  
p a r t i a l  processes which make i t  up, may be cons idered  as r e l a t i n g  t o  
the  ’ q u a l i t a t i v e ’ d e te rm in a t io n  o f  va lu e  being the  f o u n d a t io n  f o r  
i t s  ’ q u a n t i t a t i v e ’ d e te r m in a t i o n .
We s h a l l  a t tem p t  t o  make t h i s  c l e a r e r  by proceed ing  on the  assumpt ion  
t h a t  the  o n t o l o g i c a l  foun d a t io n  f o r  Marx 's  t h e o ry  o f  va lue  is  t h e  
" l i f e - p r o c e s s ”  o f  a " s o c ia l  o rgan ism" .
Stace says :
"The l i v i n g  organism p rov ides  t h e  bes t  example o f  in n e r  
des ign ,  o r  t r u e  t e l e o l o g y  . . .  A l l  t he  organs o r  separa te  
pa r ts  work in  s u b o rd in a t i o n  t o  the  purpose o f  th e  whole.
Th is  purpose o f  th e  whole i s  s im p ly  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  whole 
i t s e l f .  The p a r ts  t h e r e f o r e  are  th e  means, t h e  whole is  
the  end. But  the  p a r ts  and th e  whole are  one and the  same 
t h i n g ,  now viewed as a p l u r a l i t y ,  now as a u n i t y .  So t h a t  
means and end are the  same t h i n g .  The organism regarded 
as a p l u r a l i t y  is  a means; regarded as a u n i t y  i t -  is  an 
end. Means and end are not  two o b j e c t s ,  bu t  two aspects  
o f  one o b j e c t . "  (1955, p . 274)
I f  we conce ive  o f  the  " n a t u r a l  laws" Marx r e f e r s  t o  in a b s t r a c t i o n
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from " t h e  forms In which they  may appear ” , i . e .  i f  we conce ive  o f  an 
e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c ia l  organism in a b s t r a c t i o n  f rom the  forms in which i t  
appears, then ,  in accordance w i th  t h i s  essence, th e  image shou ld  be 
one where th e  l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g  p r o d u c t i v e  fo r c es  o f  t h e  organism have 
been - p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  a l l o c a t e d  in  accordance w i t h  th e  v a ry in g  needs 
o f  the  organism i t s e l f .
Here equi I i  b r i  urn among the  va ry in g  f u n c t i o n s  o f  the  organism would be 
cons idered as express ing  the  ’ i n ne r  purpose ’ o f  the  o rgan ism, expre ­
ss ing  the  ’ in n e r  n e c e s s i t y ’ o f  th e  I i f e - f o r m  i t s e l f .  E q u i l i b r i u m ,  as 
the  express ion  o f  t h e  l i f e  o f  an e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c ia l  o rgan ism, can be 
sa id  t o  ’ g o v e rn ’ th e  movement o f  t h e  p a r ts  and t h e i r  mutual r e l a t i o n s  
t o  one ano the r .  The ’ purpose ’ o f  the  whole i s  the  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t ­
ion,  where the  p a r ts  work in s u b o r d in a t i o n  t o  t h i s  purpose o f  t h e  
whole.  E q u i l i b r i u m  the n ,  is  the  express io n  o f  t h e  ’ in n e r  n e c e s s i t y ! 
o f  t h e  s o c ia l  organ ism.
I t  i s  t h i s  o n t o lo g i c a l  fou n da t io n  in the  " n a t u r a l  laws" which r e g u l ­
a te  th e  l i f e - p r o c e s s  o f  a s o c ia l  organism which forms the  t h e o r e t ­
i ca l  background f o r  the  model o f  the  ’ s i m p l e ’ commodity economy :
" I n  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a s im p le  commodity economy the  average 
p r i c e s  o f  p roducts  are p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e i r  labour v a lu e .
In o th e r  words va lue  rep resen ts  t h a t  average leve l  around 
which market  p r i c e s  f l u c t u a t e  and w i t h  which p r i c e s  would 
c o in c id e  i f  s o c ia l  labour were p ro p o r t i o n a I  Iy d i s t r i b u t e d  
among the  va r io us  branches o f  p r o d u c t i o n . Thus a s t a t e  o f  
e q u i l i b r i u m  would be e s ta b l i s h e d  among the  branches o f  
p r o d u c t i o n . "  (Rub in,  1982, p . 64;  my emphasis)
In o th e r  words,  va lue  rep resen ts  the  c o n d i t i o n  o f  th e  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  
the  s o c ia l  economy. In the  p r i m i t i v e  communal s o c ie t y  o r  in  t h e  
s o c i a l i s t  s o c i e t y ,  - labour is  immed ia te ly  p r o p o r t i o n ­
a l l y  a l l o c a t e d  in accordance w i th  needs o f  the  s o c ia l  o rgan ism.
Here th e  r e a l i t y  corresponds more o r  less t o  ou r  a b s t r a c t i o n  o f
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t he  model o f  th e  s o c ia l  organism in t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
Commodit ies exchanging a t  t h e i r  va lues  i s  th e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  
o f  t h e  commodity economy. I t  i s  t h e  l i f e - p r o c e s s  o f  the  organ ism 
’ showing t h r o u g h ’ , as i t  were,  o r  th e  form o f  appearance o f  t h e  
o n t o l o g i c a l  essence.  We cou ld  a lso  say va lu e  is  the  form o f  appear ­
ance o f  ’’n a tu ra l  law",  where th e  ’ in n e r  purpose ’ o f  th e  s o c ia l  o rgan ­
ism t o  a t t a i n  t o  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  is  the  essence,  which 
appears in the  model o f  th e  ’ s i m p l e ’ commodity economy as when ’ v a l u e ’ 
is the  leve l  around which commodit ies exchange.
The o n t o l o g i c a l  n ec e s s i t y  f o r  s o c i e t y  t o  p r o p o r t i o n a I  Iy d i s t r i b u t e  i t s  
labour  among th e  v a r io u s  branches o f  p ro du c t io n  is  th e  o n t o l o g i c a l  
fou nda t ion  t o  the  th e o ry  o f  v a lue .
The 'magni tude o f  th e  va lue  o f  th e  commodity corresponds t o  t h e  amount 
o f  labour t h a t  th e  s o c ia l  organism f i n d s  necessary t o  expend f o r  i t s  
p ro d u c t io n ,  a t  a g iven leve l  o f  development o f  t h e  s o c ia l  p r o d u c t i v e  
fo r c e s .  In the  model o f  the  ’ s i m p l e ’ commodity economy t h i s  p r o d u c t ­
ive  e x pe nd i tu re  is  assumed t o  correspond e x a c t l y  w i t h  s o c ia l  need.
The tendency o f  the  s o c ia l  o rganism, as a " s o c i a l  o rgan ism " ,  t o  d i s t ­
r i b u t e  i t s  labour in  accordance w i t h  i t s  va r io us  needs i s ,  in  each o f  
the  i n d i v i d u a l  branches o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  c e n t r e  around which comm­
o d i t y  p r i c e s  f l u c t u a t e .
Thus in a s o c ie t y  composed o f  m u tu a l l y  independent  commodity producers  
va lue  and i t s  magni tude are  th e  i n e v i t a b l e  express ion  o f  t h e  o n to ­
lo g i c a l  n ec e s s i t y  f o r  s o c ie t y  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  i t s  labour in d e f i n i t e  
p r o p o r t i o n s .  And the  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conce ived e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  
o f  th e  s o c ia l  organism is  expressed o r  appears in t h e  model o f  t h e  
’ s im p le ’ commodity economy as th e  average p r i c e s  o f  commodi t ies app­
ro x im a t in g  t h e i r  va lues .
As Rubin s t re sses  :
"The law o f - v a l u e  is  t h e  law o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  t h e  commodity
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economy." ( o p . c i t .  p . 67)
And he goes on t o  remark o f  th e  ’ s i m p l e ’ model :
” ln o th e r  words,  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  corresponds t o  the  
average leve l  o f  p r i c e s .  Th is average leve l  is  a t h e o r e t i c a l  
c o nce p t ion .  The average p r i c e s  do no t  correspond t o  t h e  a c t ­
ual movements o f  co nc re te  market  p r i c e s ,  bu t  e x p la in  them.
Th is  t h e o r e t i c a l  a b s t r a c t  fo rmu la  o f  t h e  movement o f  p r i c e s  
i s ,  in f a c t ,  ’ t he  law o f  v a l u e ' . ’’ ( i b i d ,  p . 78)
When Rubin says t h a t  these  average p r i c e s  do n o t  "co r resp o n d "  b u t  "e x ­
p l a i n " ,  then they are t o  be seen as t h e  ’ r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ’ o f  t h e  
u n d e r l y in g  o n t o l o g i c a l  essence,  i . e .  as the  u l t i m a t e  e x p l a n a t i o n .
This average leve l  o f  p r i c e s  is  a " t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n c e p t i o n " ,  which 
means t h a t  i t  t h e o r i z e s  the  o n t o l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  the  s o c i a l  o rgan­
ism t o  express i t s  l i f e  in a c e r t a i n  way. Average p r i c e s  correspond 
t o  the  u n d e r l y in g  tendency in the  organism t o  a t t a i n  t o  p r o p o r t i o n ­
a l i t y  in  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i t s  labour.
In t h i s  way the  ' l aw  o f  v a l u e ’ is  o n t o l o g i c a I l y  grounded in t h e  being  
o f  th e  organism; is  the  express ion  o f  i t  as essence.  Hence :
"Only as an inn e r  law, v i s - a - v i s  the  i n d i v i d u a l  agen ts ,  as a
b l i n d  law o f  na tu re ,  does the  law o f  va lu e  e x e r t  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  
here and m a in ta in  the  s o c ia l  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  p ro du c t io n  am ids t  
i t s  a c c id e n ta l  f l u c t u a t i o n s . "  (Marx,  1984, p . 380)
And again :
"The d i f f e r e n t  spheres o f  p r o d u c t i o n , , i t  is  t r u e ,  c o n s t a n t l y  
tend t o  an e q u i l i b r i u m  . . .  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an in n e r  r e l a t i o n  
which s e t t l e s  t h e i r  p r o p o r t i o n s . "  ( i b i d ,  1983, p . 336; my emph.)
Thus th e  c o ns ta n t  tendency t o  e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s  in t h e  commodity econ­
omy as th e  ’ law o f  v a l u e ’ ; hence :
"The d e v i a t i o n  o f  market  p r i c e s  f rom va lues is  the  mechanism 
by means o f  which the  o ve rp ro d u c t i o n  and underp roduc t  ion is
removed and th e  tendency towards th e  re e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  e q u i -
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l i b r i u m  among the  g iven branches o f  the  n a t i o n a l  economy is  
s e t  u p . "  (Rub in,  o p . c i t .  p . 65)
Since the  p a r ts  and the  whole are  t h e  same t h i n g ,  then they  can o n l y  
be separa ted t h e o r e t i c a l l y .  The law o f  va lu e ,  as the  exp ress io n  o f  
the  whole,  is  t h e r e f o r e  ’ t h e o r e t i c a l l y  co n c e iv e d ’ .
I t  i s ,  as we s a id  b e fo re ,  an i n v i s i b l e ,  n on p hys i ca l ,  y e t  s u b s t a n t i a l  
e n t i t y  -  which substance is  de r ived  f rom i t s  o n t o lo g i c a l  ground -  
which re g u la te s  o r  governs th e  p a r ts  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  who le ,  
’’s e t t l e s  t h e i r  p r o p o r t i o n s ” .
We shou ld  o f  course remember t h a t  th e  model o f  t h e  ’ s i m p l e ’ commodity 
economy is  a t h e o r e t i c a l  a b s t r a c t i o n  f rom an e x i s t i n g  s o c ia l  o rgan­
ism. I t  is  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  o n ly  one aspec t  o f  t h i s  
e x i s t i n g  s o c ia l  organism, i . e .  the  e q u a l i t y  o f  the  producers as a u t ­
onomous owners o f  commodi t ies.
Neve r the less ,  as t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conce ived ,  a long  w i t h  i t s  o n t o l o g i c a l  
essence,  i t  inaugura tes  th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a " t h o u g h t  c o n c r e t e ” .
Yet  i t  is  a ’ s i m p l e ’ model, which must be d e te r m in a te l y  negated as 
the  d i a l e c t i c  method proceeds t o  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  th e  " c o n c r e te  
in t h o u g h t " ,  which is  t h e  adequate t h e o r e t i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  and presupposed s o c ia l  organ ism.  The ’ s i m p l e ’ model w i l l  
be o v e r b u i l t  by th e  more co nc re te  r e l a t i o n s .
As we have noted,  t h e  ’ s i m p l e ’ model is  r e t a i n e d  in Cap i ta  I vo l 's .
I and 2 and o n l y  g ives  way t o  th e  more co nc re te  r e l a t i o n s  in v o l .  3. 
The t r a n s fo r m a t io n  procedure i s  t o  be cons idered  as th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
’ b r i d g e ’ between the  ’ s i m p l e ’ and th e  ’ combined’ -  f rom th e  t h e o r e t ­
i c a l  model o f  the  ’ s i m p l e ’ commodity economy t o  the  t h e o r e t c a l  model 
o f  th e  c o m m o d i t y - c a p i t a l i s t  economy.
What we may term th e  ’ i n t e r m e d i a r y ’ t h e o r e t i c a l  model between th e  
two is  t h a t  where we r e t a i n  th e  fou nda t ion  o f  t h e  ’ s imple1 commodity
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economy, whi le a t  the  same t im e ,  having each o f  th e  branches o f  the  
s o c ia l  d i v i s i o n  o f  labour owned and c o n t r o l l e d  by c a p i t a l .
We c i t e d  t h i s  ?i n t e r m e d i a r y ’ model e a r l i e r  as th e  s tage  desc r ibed  as 
th e  coex is ten ce  o f  c a p i t a l  and exchange a t  market  va lu e .
As was s a id ,  t h i s  model o r  s tage  in the  conceptua l  ascent  rep resen ts  
a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  in terms,  o r  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  in concepts .
The fo u n d a t io n  o f  t h e  ’ s i m p l e ’ model, where commodit ies exchange a t  
around t h e i r  va lu es ,  must e x i s t  in  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  w i t h  c a p i t a l  which 
is  a va lue  which breeds va lu e  o u t  o f  i t s e l f .
In both th e  Grundr isse  and C a p i ta l  v o l . 5 Marx d i sc I oses. t h e  in n e r  n a t ­
ure o f  c a p i t a l - a s  a ’’va lu e -b re e d in g  va lu e "  b e fo re  he proceeds t o  i l l ­
u s t r a t e  th e  in h e re n t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  o f  the  concept  ’ c a p i t a l i s t  m a rke t -  
v a l u e ’ and, synonymously,  th e  t r a n s fo r m a t io n  o f  va lues  i n t o  p r i c e s  o f  
p ro d u c t io n .
Of course,  as was noted e a r l i e r ,  t h i s  concept  has been c o n s t ru c te d  by 
Marx t o  be i n h e r e n t l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y , t h a t  i s ,  as a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  whose 
t ranscendence w i l l  take  us t o  a h ig h e r  leve l  in  t h e  d i a l e c t i c a l  expos­
i t i o n .
The t r a n s fo r m a t io n  procedure represen ts  p r e c i s e l y  t h i s  synonymous 
t ranscendence o f  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  and the  move t o  a more combined s e t  o f  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
For example, in the  model o f  the  ' s i m p l e ’ commodity economy th e  i n d i v ­
idua l  producers are p e r f e c t l y  happy t o  s tay  where they  are in t h e  s o c i a l  
d i v i s i o n  o f  labour.  The exchange o f  commodit ies a t  o r  around t h e i r  
va lu es ,  i . e .  in  terms o f  t h e  necessary l a b o u r - t im e  expended, ensures 
t h a t  each i n d i v i d u a l  producer f i n d s  no advantage in  t r a n s f e r r i n g  f rom 
one branch o f  p ro du c t io n  t o  ano the r .
Here th e  e xp e n d i tu re  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  l a b o u r - t im e  c o in c id e s  w i t h  t h e  expen­
d i t u r e  o f  s o c i a l l y  necessary la b o u r - t im e .  That  i s ,  t h e  labour t im e  
s o c i a l l y  necessary f o r  th e  p rodu c t io n  o f  the  commodity a t  a g ive n  leve l
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o f  development o f  p r o d u c t i v e  f o r c e s ,  and t o  s a t i s f y  the  amount o f  ex­
i s t i n g  s o c ia l  need f o r  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  use -va lue .  Here t h e r e f o r e  
supp ly  and demand are  assumed t o  be equa l ,  and the  c o n d i t i o n  o f  equ- 
I i  b r i  urn i s a t t a i  ned.
We may say then t h a t  the  ’ s i m p l e ’ model shares one o f  the  p r im ary  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a co n s c io u s ly  planned s o c ia l  economy in tha t -  each 
o f  them are ’ f a i t h f u l ’ t o  th e  f u n t i o n i n g  o f  the  ’’s o c ia l  o rgan ism”  in 
the  p r o p o r t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s o c ia l  labour.
But  c a p i t a l  w i l l  n e i t h e r  expand nor c o n t r a c t  p ro d u c t io n  in accord ­
ance w i th  o r  in  terms o f  s o c i a l l y  necessary l a b o u r - t im e ,  i . e .  in 
terms o f  th e  va lue  o f  th e  commodity,  b u t  o n l y  in  terms o f  t h e  r a t e  
o f  p r o f i t  i t  cons ide rs  t o  be a t  le a s t  adequate t o  i t s  magni tude.  
C a p i ta l  does not  seek recompense in  terms o f  Iab ou r -va Iue ,  b u t  in 
terms o f  i t s e l f  as p o i n t  o f  dep a r tu re .
I t  is  t h e r e f o r e  ’ u n f a i t h f u l ’ t o  the  " s o c i a l  o rgan ism" in  t h a t  i t  
achieves e q u i l i b r i u m  in terms o f  i t s e l f .  The equi I ib r iu rn  o f  t h e  cap­
i t a l i s t  economy does no t  c o in c id e  w i th  t h e  s a t i f a c t i o n  o f  t h e  needs 
o f  th e  " s o c ia l  organism" -  expressed as ’ v a l u e ’ -  bu t  concides  w i t h  
the  needs o f  c a p i t a l .  These needs o f  c a p i t a l  n e c e s s a r i l y  express 
themselves in  the  fo rm a t ion  and e q u a l i s a t i o n  o f  a general  average 
r a t e  o f  p r o f i t .
Thus when each c a p i t a l  par takes e q u a l l y  in  the  t o t a l  new va lu e  p ro ­
duced -  which is  i t s  tendency -  accord ing  t o  i t s  s i z e ,  we have th e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  the  c a p i t a l i s t  economy.
Th is  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conceived c o n d i t i o n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  means t h a t  each 
c a p i t a l i s t  s e l l s  h i s  commodit ies a t  ’ p r i c e s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ’ , which is  
t h e r e f o r e  the  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  o f  the  c a p i t a l i s t  economy.
Equal p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in t h e  t o t a l  new va lu e  s o c i a l l y  produced -  t o t a l  
s u rp lu s  va lue  -  accord ing  t o  t h e  s i z e  o f  the  c a p i t a l  i n ve s te d ,  is  t h e
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e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  o f  th e  c a p i t a l i s t  economy, i . e .  where no cap­
i t a l i s t  is  advantaged by moving h is  c a p i t a l  f rom one branch o f  p rod­
u c t i o n  t o  ano the r .
This is  a t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conceived c o n d i t i o n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  p a r t  o f  
the  " t h o u g h t  c o n c r e te " .  When we comprehend the  in n e r  na tu re  o f  
c a p i t a l ,  which i s  t r e a t e d  as e v o lv in g  s u rp lu s  va lue  o u t  o f  i t s e l f ,  
then t h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conceived e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  is  t h e  comp­
rehension o f  i t s  necessary in n e r  tendency.
" I t  is  no t  p o s s ib le  t o  observe th e  s t a t e  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  
in th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  among the  va r io us  branches 
o f  p ro d u c t io n  a t  any one moment. But  w i t h o u t  such a 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conceived s t a t e  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h e  c h a r ­
a c te r  and d i r e c t i o n  o f  the  f l u c t u a t i n g  movement cannot  
be e x p l a i n e d . "  (Rub in ,  1982, p . 78; m o d i f i e d . )
The t r a n s i t i o n  f rom the  ’ s im p le ’ model o f  equi I ib r iu rn  o f  t h e  s o c ia l  
economy t o  th e  more ’ combined’ o r  c a p i t a l i s t  model is  t h e  t r a n s ­
fo r m a t io n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  in terms o f  ’ e q u a l i t y  o f  l a b o u r ’ ( v a lu e )  t o  
e q u i l i b r i u m  in terms o f  ’ e q u a l i t y  o f  c a p i t a l ’ ( p r i c e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ) .
"S ince  th e  t o t a l  va lue  o f  the  commodit ies re g u la te s  th e  
t o t a l  s u rp lu s  va lu e ,  and t h i s  in  t u r n  re g u la te s  the  leve l  
o f  average p r o f i t  and the reby  th e  general  ra te  o f  p r o f i t  
-  as a general  law o r  a law govern ing  th e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  -  
i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  law o f  va lu e  r e g u la te s  the  p r i c e s  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n . "  (Marx,  1984,p . 180)
Hence in the  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conceived e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  th e  c a p i t a l i s t  
economy, t o t a l  p r i c e s  o f  p ro du c t io n  equal t o t a l  va lu e ,  i . e .  t h e
p r o p o r t i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t o t a l  va lue  t o  each and every c a p i t a l
accord in g  t o  i t s  s i z e .  Th is  means t h a t  ’ p r i c e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ’ i s  t h e
e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  o f  the  c a p i t a l i s t  economy.
Th is  being the  case,  then ’ p r i c e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ’ is  o n l y  a more conc­
r e t e  express ion  o f  the  ’ average p r i c e ’ w h ic h • reg u Ia ted  th e  equi l i b -
288
r ium of  t h e  ’ s i m p l e ’ commodity economy, and is  t o  be ' t h e o r e t i c a I l y  
c o nc e iv e d ’ in  p r e c i s e l y  the  same manner.
’ P r i ces  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ’ are  on ly  t h e  form o f  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  ’ v a l u e ’ 
i t s e l f  when the  ’ s i m p l e ’ r e l a t i o n s  have been mediated by th e  presence 
o f  ’ many c a p i t a l s ’ and th e  fo rm a t io n  o f  a genera I average r a t e  o f  
p r o f i t .
This means t h a t  p r i c e s  o f  p ro du c t io n  do not  "co r resp o n d ”  t o  t h e  e x i s t ­
ing c o n c re te  market  p r i c e s ,  bu t  ’’e x p l a i n ”  them. As express ions  o f  
the  t o t a l  amount o f  s u rp lu s  v a lue ,  In which each c a p i t a l  c la im s  p a r t ­
i c i p a t i o n  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  i t s  s i z e ,  they  a re  th e  ’’h idden r e g u l a t o r ”  
o f  the  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  economy.
S ince ,  as Rubin remarks,  t h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  conceived s t a t e  o f  e q u i l ­
ib r ium  is  e s s e n t ia l  i f  t he  f l u c t u a t i n g  movement is  t o  be e x p la in e d ,  
then th e  p r i c e s  of  p ro du c t io n  are  an e lement o f  t h a t  ’’c o nc re te  in  
th o u g h t ”  which comprehends th e  ’ movement in  t h e  o b j e c t ’ , renders i t  
’ known’ .
Marx ’ s ’’d i a l e c t i c  method” does not  re p lace  o r  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  d i a ­
l e c t i c  o f  the  r e a l l y  e x i s t i n g  and presupposed s u b j e c t ,  bu t  a l l o w s  us 
t o  comprehend i t  by the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a " t h o u g h t  c o n c r e te ”  which 
i d e n t i f i e s  the  d i a l e c t i c  o f  r e a l i t y  as an emergence f rom i t s  bas is  as 
the  form o f  appearance o f  an e s s e n t i a l l y  " s o c ia l  o rgan ism" .
F i n a l l y ,  i f  p r i c e  of  p ro du c t io n  is  t o  be comprehended as emerging 
f rom va lu e  as a form o f  va lue  i t s e l f ,  then  t h i s  o n l y  means t h a t  we 
must comprehend those  c o n d i t i o n s  where commodi t ies exchange a t  t h e i r  
va lues  in o rd e r  t o  then comprehend how they  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  d e v i a t e  
f rom t h e i r  v a lu e s .  Th is  means we must f o l l o w  the  course o f  d i a l e c t i c ­
a l  reasoning f rom the  more a b s t r a c t  t o  the  more co nc re te  r e l a t i o n s .  
There fo re  those  who suggest  t h a t  Marx 's  the o ry  o f  va lue  is  no longer  
r e l e v a n t  t o  c a p i t a l i s t  p ro d u c t io n ,  f a i l  com p le te ly  t o  comprehend th e
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p re c is e  na tu re  of  the  the o ry  o f  va lue  and i t s  p lace in t h a t  " t h o u g h t  
c o n c r e te "  which is  t h e  comprehension o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  r e a l i t y ,  i . e .  as 
the  form o f  express io n  o f  a system o f  s o c ia l  p ro du c t io n  in g e n e r a l ,  as 
a type  o f  " s o c ia l  o rgan ism" .
(5 ) .
In th e  I n t r o d u c t i o n  we made re fe re n ce  t o  th e  p io n e e r in g  work o f  I . I .
Rub i n .
From the  d is c u s s ion s  o f  recen t  years in the  area o f  v a lu e - t h e o r y  t h e r e  
have emerged two fundam en ta l l y  opposed approaches,  c h a r a c te r i s e d  by 
de Vroey (1982) as the  " t e c h n o l o g i c a l "  and the  "s o c ia  I "  parad igms.
The fo rmer is  a l s o  dep ic ted  as th e  "S ra f fa -b a s e d  c r i t i q u e "  by F ine  
(1986) and has been d e a l t  w i t h  here in th e  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  o f  c h a p te r  
3.
The " t e c h n o l o g i c a l "  paradigm t r e a t s  ’ v a l u e 1 as " l i n k e d  t o  t h e  d i f f ­
i c u l t y  o f  p r o d u c t i o n " ,  w h i l e  the  " s o c i a l "  -  which de Vroey a l s o  r e f e r s  
t o  as " t h e  a b s t r a c t  labour t h e o r y "  -  " v a lu e  r e f e r s  t o  the  v a l i d a t i o n  
o f  p r i v a t e  labour through th e  exchange o f  commodi t ies a g a in s t  money", 
(de Vroey,  i b i d , p . 40) .
The " s o c i a l "  paradigm has a ls o  been r e f e r r e d  t o  as " t h e  v a lu e - f o r m  
s t r a n d "  (F ine ,  1986,p . 13), and as being synonymous w i th  the  "Rubin 
sch oo l "  ( G le i c h e r ,  1983,p . 9 8 ) ,  in  which both de Vroey and F ine  a re  i n ­
c luded ,  a long w i th  P i l l i n g  (1986) and Elson (1979) amongst o t h e r s .  
G l e i c h e r ’ s c r i t e r i a  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  in the  " s c h o o l "  a re  t h a t  each o f  i t s  
members " f o l l o w  Rubi n 1 s c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  labour becomes a b s t r a c t  o n l y  
in  the  a c t  of  exchange between the  commodity and money." ( o p . c i t . p . I  19) 
As our c r i t i c i s m s  o f  both Fine and P i l l i n g  may i n d i c a t e ,  i t  is  no t  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  deem admission t o  the  "Rubin s c h o o l "  on the  bas is  o f  one 
o r  two c r i t e r i a  re sp ec t in g  the  l o c a t i o n  o f  the  subs tance o f  v a lu e .
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For example,  de Vroey says t h a t  :
" .  . . p r i v a t e  labour becomes v a l i d a t e d  ( i . e .  reckoned as a 
f r a c t i o n  o f  s o c ia l  labour)  o n l y  i n s o fa r  as i t s  p roduc t  is 
s o l d . ”  (1 9 8 2 ,p . 40)
This c e r t a i n l y  f o l l o w s  as one o f  the  i n e v i t a b l e  r e s u l t s  o f  R ub in ’ s
approach,  and is  w id e ly  expressed in the  " s o c i a l ”  paradigm. But  i t
re q u i re s  t o  be p laced in the  a p p r o p r i a t e  m e thodo log ica l  c o n t e x t ,  i . e .
t re a te d  as deduced o u t  o f  a t o t a l i t y ,  o th e rw is e  i t  s im p ly  ra is e s
as many ques t ions  as i t  pu rpo r ts  t o  answer.
The absence o f  t h i s  me thodo log ica l  c o n te x t  becomes apparent  when de
Vroey goes on t o  say t h a t  :
"The the o ry  o f  va lu e  must be ab le  t o  dete rm ine  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
the  e q u i l i b r i u m  exchange-magni tudes, b u t  p r i m a r i l y  in  o rd e r  
t o  answer the  cha l lenges  o f  i t s  c a p a c i t y  t o  do so,  r a t h e r  
than  t o  e x p la in  th e  r e a l i t y .  In f a c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  exchanges 
do not  form an e s s e n t ia l  p a r t  o f  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  
Cap i t a I . ”  ( i b i d ,  p .4 I )
To suggest  t h a t  e q u i l i b r i u m  exchanges are  not  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  t h e o r -  
e t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  C a p i ta l  shows t h a t  th e  m e th o d o Io g ica 1 s i g n i f ­
icance o f  th e  model o f  the  ’ s i m p l e ’ commodity economy, and i t s  o n to ­
lo g ic a l  f oun da t io n  in a system o f  s o c ia l  p r o d u c t i o n ,  have gone compl­
e t e l y  unno t iced .  As an a c c re d i t e d  member o f  the  "Rubin s c h o o l "  de 
Vroey seems not  t o  have grasped the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  Rub in ’ s i n s i g h t  
t h a t  " t h e  law o f  va lu e  is  the  law o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  th e  commodity 
economy. "
Whi le  f o r  El son (1979) the  t h e o r e t i c a l  model does not  even seem t o  
e x i s t ,  and she equates the  ’ s im p le ’ commodity economy w i th  the  h i s t ­
o r i c a l  a c t i v i t y  o f  "a s im p le  commodity producer who uses h is  own o r  
h is  f a m i l i e s  labour"  ( p . 126). She f u r t h e r  equates th e  work o f  what 
she c a l l s  " t h e  Hegel ian  I . I .  Rubin"  ( p . 124) t o  t h a t  o f  Sweezy, Meek 
and Dobb (p.  127) .
We cannot here enter into a detailed discussion 
respecting the precise nature of the various contrib­
utions which together may be said to comprise the 
"social” paradigm, and the reasons for their inad­
equacies. However one feature does emerge which 
possesses a general significance with regard to 
these matters.
Even if we allow that Gliecher’s designation "Rubin 
school" is largely inadequate as a generalisation, 
there would remain the fact that despite the inclus­
ion of Rubin in a growing number of bibliographies, 
the genuine nature of his contribution has gone 
largely unappreciated.
For- example, as with de Vroey so in the "Rubin school"
general ly, ’equilibrium’ tends to be treated only
as a neo-Classical or Sraffa-based ’device* which
i s imposed upon the subject matter from the outside,
and not as the theoretically conceived expression
of an essential property of this subject-matter
as a system of specifically ’social’ production.
On this perspective "average prices" must only be
conceived as an external abstraction, and not as 
a "hidden regulator".
Then again, from the position adopted here, on quest­
ions of theoretical political economy Rubin is treat­
ed as only articulating the position of Marx.
This forces the conclusion that in many cases it 
is aspects of the work of Marx himself which have 
gone largely unappreciated.
We hope to have established that this is undoubted­
ly the case with respect to what we may call the 
'Engelsian' position where, as was discussed earlier, 
'historical materialism’ is treated as containing 
the ’theory of value’ within it.
The core assumption of this position - that feature 
which identifies it in the literature - is the con­
viction that knowledge of the past, or the process 
of coming-to-be, is the source of our comprehension 
of the present. This is typified in the ’historical’ 
writings of Mandel as well as in the work of those 
Marxist scholars in the field of ’historical mater­
ialism' who have been influenced by Soviet Marxism 
- which is surfeited by Engels's methodological 
postulates.
Yet, for Marx, precisely the opposite is the case. 
It is the knowledge of the present, the comprehension 
of what it. essentially ijs, which provides us with 
the means to understand the past, i.e. to determine 
what it is a past or a process of coming to be of.
We cannot legitimately claim to travel from the 
past to the present feeling theoretically enriched 
with respect to the nature of value. We must be 
previously ’theoretically enriched’ - or in possess­
ion of a "thought concrete” - before we can see 
the significance of past development.
Much scholarly labour is expended in the social- 
historical excavation of the past which offers very
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little with regard to aiding our comprehension of the 
'theory of value’.
The methodological difficulty arises when this schol­
arly labour is represented as the exclusive means of 
gaining any knowledge of the theory of value. In fact 
however, and as we hope to have shown, we could only 
reasonably considere that knowledge of the past incr­
eased our knowledge of the present in value terms on 
the basis that we hold to a physiological conception 
of the substance of value.
The comprehension of the present carries with it the 
notion as to precisely what manner of general histor­
ical presuppositions were necessary for the emergence 
of capitalism in the first place.
On the basis of the comprehension of the present those 
past ’moments' which have been of significance for the 
emergence of the present can be sought out and develop­
ed as historical examples:
” ... The extent to which the production process 
in general comes to be modified historically 
as soon as it becomes merely an element of cap­
ital has to be found out in the course of devel­
oping it; just as the simple conception of the 
specific characteristics of capital must yield 
its general historic presuppositions.
Everything else is empty chatter. Only at the 
end, as a result of the whole development, can 
it become clear which aspects belong in the first 
section, 'Production in General’, and which into
the first section of the second section, Exchange 
Value in General’.’’ (Marx, 1981a,p.320)
The point we are attempting to make here is that the 
point of departure in the ’method of presentation’ is 
not simply ’given’ as e.g. ’’the first and simple relat­
ion which is historically actually available” .
Rather the point of departure is indicated as such 
only via the comprehension of the present. It is there­
fore to be considered as the result of the process of 
the production of knowledge.
Therefore Marx’s "end" or the "result of the whole dev­
elopment" is considered here as the thorough comprehen­
sion of the present which then enables the presentation 
of the material in a manner which is rich in historical 
detail.
But the historical ’fleshing out’ of the subject matter 
is to be considered as a secondary operation which is 
only made possible by the prior construction of the 
"concrete in thought".
Hence this latter "thought concrete" may exist in the 
absence of an authentic and adequate demonstration of 
the former, i.e. the "method of inquiry" precedes the 
"method of presentation".
Of course the adequate "method of presentation" is ess­
ential, since it is this which provides us with both a 
"thought concrete" and the historical verification of 
its legitimacy. Marx acknowledges the necessity for 
this ’adequacy’ in the Grundrisse when he says that :
"It will be necessary later...to correct the 
idealist manner of the presentation, which 
makes it seem as if it were merely a matter
zyh
of conceptual determinations and of the dia­
lectic of these concepts. Above all in the 
case of the phrase: product (or activity) be­
comes commodity; commodity exchange value; 
exchange value, money.” (1981a p.151)
This ’conceptual shorthand’ which Marx uses may be con­
sidered as testifying to the fact that reality as it ex­
ists has been comprehended, but that the "method of pre­
sentation" has not been fully worked out.
In the Contribution (1859) Marx recalls the 1857 Intro­
duction , saying :
"A general introduction which I had drafted is 
omitted, since on further consideration it seems 
to me confusing to anticipate results which 
have still to be established." (1981b,p.19)
That is, "established" with respect to their actual hist­
orical development.
Similarly, when comparing this same Contribution with
the first volume of Capital, published eight years later,
Marx notes especially that :
"The presentation of the subject-matter has been 
improved." (1983, p.19)
Thus we may view the intervening years as ones where 
Marx laboured to formulate the precise "manner of pres­
entation" which would be an exhaustive treatment of 
the given subject-matter.
We know that in this endeavor he was aided by Hegel's 
dialectical ’mehtod of working’. In this connection, 
the ’etymology' of method reveals it as denoting ’foll­
owing a way'. If this refers to the specification of 
the steps that must be taken, in a given order, to ach­
ieve a given end, then Marx follows Hegel’s ’way’ in 
order to achieve the end of the full construction
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of that ’'concrete in thought” which is the rational 
comprehension of the existing state of things.
What we have termed our ’delimitation’of Hegel, 
which connotes the 'confinement* of Marx's "dialec­
tic method*’, is important in one final respect.
This has to do with the Hegelian historicism of 
Lukacs and Korsch, which we must briefly consider.
(On the grounds of immediate methodological relev­
ance, as well as space, we shall exclude any treat­
ment of ’phenomenological* Marxism, and with it 
Gramsci’s notion of a ’universal intersubjectivity 
of persons', as well as the utilisation of the categ­
ories of Freudian metapsychology by the 'Frankfurt 
school *.)
Both Lukacs and Korsch treat Marx’s "dialectic meth­
od" as being fundamentally the expression of a sub­
ject, rather than the knowledge of an object.
’The proletariat* become the specific subject of 
history, and Marxism itself is its expression. 
For both, Marxism preserved the ’truths’ of philoso­
phy, which only means that for each of them the 
"active side’’ which was such a feature of ’idealist 
philosophy’ is seen as being taken over or 'rescued’ 
by Marx’s historical dialectic, i.e. Hegel is ’’turned 
right-side up again” in the production of ’historic­
al materialism’
It is essentially a return to the 'early* Marx,
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a return which is inspired by the conviction that 
Hegel was exhaustively inverted then. It is signif­
icant that the favourite text of both Lukacs and 
Korsch is the Introduction to A Critique of Hegel*s 
Philosophy of Right. (1843-4).
It is ironic that Lukacs are Korsch were each castig­
ated by Deborin for the anti-Engeisian nature of 
their emphases, when they each follow precisely 
his example of proceeding on the methodological 
basis that Marx replaced Hegel's ’mystical’ dialectic 
with his own ’real’ one, which was said to be incarn­
ated in the historical process.
It is surely fundamentally significant that the 
manner of the derivation of the categories within 
Marx’s theoretical method of political economy does 
not appear as informing the work of any of these 
’Western Marxists' we have mentioned up until now.
The necessary consequence of what is largely the 
eschewing of political economy, and the replacement 
of its centrality by questions of alienation and 
ideology, is that Hegel is not 'delimited' here. 
On the contrary, Hegel is made to appear ubiquitous 
with regard to Marx’s entire contribution.
Thus Rosdolsky, who champions what he calls Lukacs’s 
"pioneering study’1 in the realm of methodology, 
deems that :
"If Hegel’s influence on Marx’s Capital can 
be seen explicitly only in a few footnotes, 
the Rough Draft must be designated as a
zyo
massive reference to Hegel, in particular to
his Logic - irrespective of how radically
a n a  materialistically Hegel was inverted!"
(1977,p.xiii)
However, and as we have been at pains to show, the 
comprehension of the existing reality and the determ­
ination of the categories in the dialectical synth­
esis is not at all "irrespective of how materialist­
i c a l l y  Hegel was inverted", but depends exclusively 
upon just this.
Rosdolsky has Hegel everywhere, as an all-embracing 
presence in the work of Marx.
This ubiquity of Hegel only spreads confusion with 
regard to the Marx-Hegel relationship, and obscures 
the precise manner and to what specific end the 
latter was 'inverted'.
It is one of our conlusions that reference to Hegel 
and his ’influence’ on the work of Marx should be 
largely confined to the theoretical method of polit­
ical economy, and that elsewhere, the ’ cocquetting’ 
with the ’modes of expression peculiar to Hegel’ 
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